Yamato-class battleships. The legendary Japanese battleship Yamato: photo, history. Construction and armor

For 70 years now, in the waters of the Pacific Ocean at a depth of more than 1,410 feet, the wreckage of the most advanced ship of that time has rested - the Japanese battleship Yamato, the lead ship of the Imperial Navy. This ship was considered unsinkable. It was the deadliest warship ever built.

Formidable weapon

A few years after the First World War ended, most naval departments of various states started talking about the use of battleships. In those days, there was an opinion that warships of this type still remained the main power of any fleet, since they were intended for naval battles in close formation.

The fact is that battleships are equipped simultaneously with both offensive and defensive combat weapons, arranged in the most rational order. When developing such ships, they were primarily concerned with their armor, unsinkability and artillery, and secondarily with their range and speed.

Simultaneous maximum enhancement of the offensive and defensive qualities of a vessel is possible only on board a large warship, since the installation of additional equipment takes up a significant part of its total mass. This explains the increase in the displacement of battleships.

Program "Marusai"

In 1930, an international agreement was adopted in London regarding the limitation of naval weapons. Japan was among the states that signed this document. But after 4 years, this country set a course to strengthen its armed forces and refused to adhere to the London agreements. Instead, the Japanese government developed a program called Marusai, which involved the construction of a range of advanced warships for the Imperial Navy, including several battleships. From the very beginning, the emphasis was not on the quantity of military equipment produced, but on its quality.

The main goal of developing the newest battleships was the idea of superiority over American ships of the same class. Japanese experts came to the conclusion that, according to the mandatory condition for the passage of international ships through the Panama Canal, all ships had to have restrictions regarding tactical and technical data. This meant that their displacement was no more than 63 thousand tons, their speed did not exceed 23 knots, and their guns had a caliber of up to 406 mm. But the Japanese ships were not going to pass through the canal, so their size could be anything. It was decided that the lead ship of the Imperial Navy would be the battleship Yamato, and its commander would be Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto.

Construction

The laying of the first battleship took place on November 4, 1937 in Kure, in the naval arsenal. It was the battleship Yamato (photo provided above). For its construction, dry dock No. 4, which had a length of 339 m and a width of 44 m, was specially deepened by 1 m. The second ship of the same class was laid down in the spring next year in Nagasaki and was called "Musashi". Its construction was carried out on an inclined reinforced slipway No. 2 with parameters 312 by 40.9 m, which belonged to the Mitsubishi Heavy Industries company.

In 1939, Japan adopted the Fourth Fleet Renewal Program, according to which construction of the third battleship, Shinano, began in the spring of 1940. It was produced in dry dock at Yokosuka Naval Arsenal. And the fourth, last, ship No. 111 was laid down in the same year in the dock where the battleship Yamato had previously been built.

The creation of the Shinano was suspended at the very end of 1941 at the stage when the hull had already been assembled to the height of the main deck. Over the next three years, it was converted into an aircraft carrier, while retaining its original name.

It must be said that the construction of all ships of this type was carried out in an atmosphere of extreme secrecy. All slip platforms were fenced with high fences and covered on top with either camouflage nets or special canopies. In addition, all the windows of nearby buildings overlooking the shipyard were tightly blocked. Also, all shipbuilders were forced to sign a non-disclosure agreement on the non-disclosure of any information about the facility at which they work.

The Japanese battleship Yamato and the other three ships of the same type were assembled in such a way that none of the workers knew what specific object he was building. It got to the point that engineers were given design documentation strictly in parts. Only a very narrow circle of people had a complete understanding of the ship construction plan.

The lead battleship was removed from the dock in early August 1940. And already at the end of 1941 it was put into operation. This event occurred almost 7 years after the first drawings of the battleship Yamato appeared. The ship "Musashi" was launched three months later, and put into operation at the end of the summer of 1942.

Combat history

Contrary to expectations, the military career of battleships of this class was not eventful. The battleship Yamato was the flagship of Admiral Yamamoto. While the Battle of Midway was underway, he received word that his carrier force had been defeated, but rather than use the battleship's huge guns against the enemy, he withdrew from the battle.

Yamato's twin, Musashi, was the headquarters of Admiral Koga, who became commander of the Imperial Navy after Yamamoto's death. Both battleships practically did not engage in battle and remained off the coast of Truk the entire time.

At the end of December 1943, Yamato, while north of the same island, was torpedoed by the American submarine Skate. Having received damage, the battleship did not immediately turn to its native shores. The ship arrived in the Land of the Rising Sun on November 22, 1944 and was immediately sent not only for repairs, but also for modernization. After the incident with the torpedoing of the lead ship of the Imperial Navy, the Japanese had to somewhat improve the mine protection of ships of this type. But during the fighting in the Pacific Ocean, it became clear that the leading role at sea now belonged to aviation, and the huge guns of battleships turned out to be completely useless.

Battle of Leyte Gulf

It is no secret that 1944 was a bad year for Japan. After the defeat near the Mariinsky Islands, its carrier-based aircraft were never able to recover, but it was necessary to conduct further military operations. The Imperial Navy intended to take revenge on the Americans, while pulling all remaining forces to the Philippine Islands. This formation included 9 battleships and 4 aircraft carriers. The Japanese command was well aware that if they lost, they would lose the fleet completely and irrevocably, but retaining the Philippines, like the oil fields, was a vital necessity.

The Americans managed to gather all the largest forces in this area - 12 battleships and 16 aircraft carriers. In addition, they had undoubted superiority in airspace, which ultimately decided the outcome of the battle.

The first minor clashes between the two warring fleets began on October 23, and the real battle in the air did not begin until the morning of the next day. Japanese Admiral Onishi organized 3 raids on American ships. Each of them involved from 50 to 60 aircraft, but this number was not enough to achieve success.

One of the Japanese dive bombers even managed to attack an American aircraft carrier, dropping a 600-pound (272 kg) bomb on it. The bomber was shot down, but a strong fire broke out on the ship, and it had to be sunk with torpedoes. This episode was the only significant achievement of Japanese aviation that day. After this there were other attacks using dive bombers and torpedo bombers, but they were ineffective.

The sinking of the battleship Musashi

That day, US aircraft methodically continued to strike the Japanese formation. These attacks involved more than 250 aircraft taking off from three aircraft carriers. At the end of the battle, American pilots reported 76 enemy aircraft shot down. Worst of all was the battleship Musashi, which became the main target. It was hit by 17 bombs and 20 torpedoes, and this is not counting close explosions. Finally, at 18:35, having received multiple serious damage, the Musashi ship sank. It took with it 991 of its 2,279 crew members.

In the next two days, success was on the side of American carrier-based aircraft. As a result, the battle ended in the complete defeat of the Japanese Imperial Navy, which lost all its aircraft carriers, three battleships and most other ships.

Specifications

The battleship Yamato, with a displacement of 72,800 tons, had a length of 263 m and a height of 38.9 m with a draft of 10.6 m. On board was a ship-borne four-shaft steam turbine power plant with a capacity of 150,000 hp. With. Maximum speed This ship's speed was 27 knots and its cruising range was 7,200 miles.

The ship was armed with 9 guns with a caliber of 460 mm, 12 anti-mine 155 and 127 mm barrels, as well as 24 25 mm anti-aircraft guns. In addition, there were also 7 seaplanes.

Final trip

The battleship Yamato (photo below) was based in Japan since the fall of 1944. It was from there that he set off on his last voyage in April 1945. It was military operation called "Tenichigo". Its goal was to destroy units of American troops that landed on Okinawa on April 1.

6 days after the enemy landed on the Japanese island, the battleship approached its shores as part of a small formation. On board there was as much fuel as was needed to travel only in one direction. The death of the Yamato and the rest of the ships was only a matter of time, since not only it, but also other ships received an order to fight until their last breath, and this could only mean one thing - the Japanese command was sending them to certain death. This is confirmed by the fact that this formation did not have air cover.

Yamato: The Last Battle

Soon the Japanese ships were discovered by US aircraft. The battleship was immediately attacked by enemy planes. There were three attacks in total, in which up to 200 bombers took part, taking off from the American aircraft carriers Hornet, Yorktown and Bennington.

As a result of the first raid, three torpedoes hit the Yamato ship. They damaged the auxiliary steering gear, in turn, the battleship was shot down by only one torpedo bomber. After the second attack, two shells damaged the on-board electrical equipment, as a result of which part of the artillery was disabled. But even after this, the battleship’s position could not yet be called critical, although all reserves of stability and survivability were rapidly being exhausted. Finally, the final raid on the ship began. This time it was hit by at least four torpedoes. By this time, the only remaining propeller shaft on the Yamato was in working order, but soon the personnel had to leave the boiler rooms, which were gradually filling with water. After that he completely lost momentum. The ship began to tilt to port.

Soon the roll reached 80 degrees, after which a monstrous explosion occurred. It meant the death of Yamato. last fight the battleship, which lasted about two hours, was over. The explosion was so strong that it was heard for many miles around, and its reflection was seen from American ships located off the island of Kagoshima. The column of smoke that rose above the site of the tragedy resembled a so-called nuclear mushroom. It reached a height of about 6 km, and the flames from the explosion rose at least 2 km.

A similar effect could have been produced by detonated explosives in an amount of about 500 tons. But what exactly caused this explosion is still unknown. The Americans are inclined to believe that it was provoked by an armor-piercing bomb that hit the tower, and then the main cellars where ammunition was stored.

Consequences

The sinking of the battleship Yamato resulted in terrible loss of life. Of the 2,767 crew members, only 269 survived. Among the dead were the ship's captain and the commander of the unit. In addition to the battleship, during the battle the Americans destroyed 4 destroyers and a battle cruiser, on which 3,665 people drowned or were killed. In the final battle, the Yamato damaged 20 aircraft and shot down 5.

Technical miscalculations

The last battle of the Yamato showed all the shortcomings of ships of this class. First of all, it had rather weak anti-aircraft protection, despite the fact that it carried a large number of anti-aircraft artillery guns. During the entire battle, the battleship was able to shoot down only 10 enemy aircraft.

This could happen for three reasons. The first of them is insufficient combat training of artillery crews. It is known that due to a shortage of shells, the Japanese practiced shooting at balloons, which, naturally, flew very slowly. The second reason is the small mass of anti-aircraft ammunition. Their caliber was only 25 mm and each weighed 250 g. The third factor could be the low initial speed of the projectiles, which was only 6 times faster than the speed of American aircraft, and, as the battle showed, this was clearly not enough.

Nakhodki

In January 2010, sensational news appeared in the world press - Japanese film producer Haruki Katagawa, during another underwater archaeological expedition he organized, finally discovered the wreckage of the largest warship in the world that sank at the end of World War II. Now the battleship Yamato is at the bottom (see photo in this material) of the Pacific Ocean, 50 km from the nearest Japanese island.

In March 2015, during a private expedition organized by American billionaire Paul Allen, a double of the famous battleship, the ship Musashi, was discovered. It is located off the Philippine coast, at the bottom of the Sibuyan Sea at a depth of more than 1000 m.

Memory

The city of Kure (Hiroshima Prefecture), which is located on the coast of the inland sea, is famous for being the site of the Japanese naval base during two world wars. It was here that the largest warship in the history of mankind was built - the battleship Yamato. It is therefore not surprising that these days the biggest attraction of this city is a museum dedicated to the design, construction and combat history of this ship. Here you can see with your own eyes a detailed model of the battleship, made on a scale of 1:10. The Japanese sacredly honor their history, so the legendary Yamato for them is the personification of the courage and heroism of their people. The feat of its crew can only be compared with the courage of the sailors of the Russian cruiser Varyag.

The Yamato Museum is one of the most interesting and popular museums in the world. It contains exhibitions related not only to the battleship, but also to other military equipment, for example, kamikaze submarines, the Zero aircraft, as well as modern high-tech shipbuilding.

Sea-going steel monsters such as the Yamato and Musashi will forever remain in history as unsurpassed battleships in the entire era of shipbuilding. They were never given the opportunity to show the world the full power of which they were capable. Now it is difficult to predict how their fate, and indeed the future of the whole world, would have developed if they had been given the main role in Japan’s rapid progress towards the unification of all Asian lands under its leadership.

Battleship Yamato

Yamato-class battleships
大和 (戦艦)

Yamato undergoing testing. 1941
basic information
Type	Battleship
Flag State
Options
Tonnage	standard 63 200 total 72,810 t
Length	243,9/256/263
Width	36.9 m
Draft	10.4 m
Booking	board - 410 mm; traverses - 300 mm; main deck - 200-230 mm; upper deck - 35-50 mm; main gun turrets - 650 mm (front), 250 mm (side), 270 mm (roof); GK barbettes - up to 560 mm; turrets of 155 mm guns - 25-75 mm; barbettes of turrets of 155 mm guns - 75 mm; deckhouse - 500 mm (side), 200 mm (roof)
Technical data
Power point	4 TZA Kampon
Power	150.000 l. With.
Speed	27.5 knots
Sailing autonomy	7,200 miles at 16 knots
Crew	2500 people
Armament
Artillery	3x3- 460 mm/45, 4x3- 155 mm/60 (later reduced to 2x3)
Anti-aircraft weapons	6x2 - 127 mm/40 (later increased to 12x2), 8x3 - 25 mm (later - 52x3), 2x2 - 13.2 mm machine gun
Aviation	2 catapults, 7 seaplanes

The final version was approved in March 1937 and provided for the replacement of the mixed installation with a purely steam turbine one. This was due to the revealed unreliability of Japanese-made diesel units and the difficulties of dismantling such massive units.

Japanese admirals, who considered battleships the main striking force of the fleet, believed that ships of this type, if built in sufficient numbers, would provide the Imperial Navy with a decisive advantage in the proposed pitched battle with the US Pacific Fleet. Only the authoritative Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku held the opinion of the decisive role of aircraft carriers and the insignificant potential of battleships.

These ships resemble calligraphic religious scrolls that old people hang in their homes. They haven't proven their worth. This is only a matter of faith, not reality... battleships will be as useful to Japan in a future war as a samurai sword

Construction

For example, it was necessary to modernize metallurgical plants, create new floating cranes and tugs, and build a special vessel with a displacement of 13,800 tons to transport the main caliber towers. To ensure further construction of the series, the Japanese began the construction of 4 large docks, but did not have time to completely complete the work.

The next two Yamato-class battleships were ordered under the Fourth Fleet Replenishment and Replacement Program of 1939. On May 4, 1940, the battleship Shinano was laid down at the Yokosuka Navy Yard. The last ship of this type began construction on November 7, 1940 in Kura under No. 111, but never received a name. It was planned to order another ship of this type under No. 797, but it never got to the point of being laid down. On these battleships it was planned to sharply strengthen the anti-aircraft artillery by installing 20 100-mm guns in twin turrets instead of the middle turrets of 155-mm guns. The armor was supposed to be somewhat weakened in comparison with the Yamato.

Construction of Shinano was stopped in the summer of 1942 at 50% completion. The Japanese fleet, defeated at Midway, needed aircraft carriers much more, and it was decided to convert the battleship into a ship of this class. Construction of battleship No. 111 was stopped in March 1942 at 30% completion, and the hull was dismantled for metal.

The “Fifth Program of 1942” planned the construction of two more battleships No. 798 and No. 799, which were an improved type compared to the Yamato. Their standard displacement would be 72,000 tons, side armor up to 460 mm, and artillery would consist of 6,510 mm guns in two-gun turrets. It did not come to ordering these battleships.

Design

Housing and architecture

"Yamato", 1945. The auxiliary caliber side turrets were replaced by 127 mm anti-aircraft guns. Scheme

Like all Japanese ships, the Yamato had a wavy hull when viewed from the side. This shape was dictated by the desire to maximize seaworthiness and speed while minimizing the weight of the hull structures. When viewed from above, the battleship had a pear-shaped main hull with a long, narrow bow. This provided good seamanship, but made the bow structure vulnerable to torpedoes. One of the requirements for the developers was to ensure the minimum possible draft, due to which the ship's midsection turned out to be almost rectangular. Nevertheless, the Yamato's driving performance turned out to be quite good. A whole range of hydrodynamic studies was carried out, which made it possible to achieve significant improvements, in particular the installation of a bow bulb, which saved power.

The body was assembled using rivets; the use of welding was minimal and did not exceed 6%. As the main building material steel was used DS (ducol steel) increased strength. A characteristic feature of the new battleships was a deck with a minimum of equipment, which was required to protect against the muzzle gases of the main caliber guns. The command posts were located mainly in a tower-like superstructure rising 28 meters above the upper deck. Although there were extremely important centers, the superstructure was practically unarmored, with the exception of a small conning tower.

Power plant

The power plant included 4 turbo-gear units and 12 boilers, all Kampon brands. Each boiler and turbine were installed in a separate compartment. According to American experts, the power plant was technically backward and had too large dimensions. However, the Japanese did not complain about the vehicles of their battleships.

The power plant was designed for boost, at which the power reached 165,000 hp and the speed was 27.7 knots. Economic running was provided by a power of only 18,000 hp. A characteristic feature of battleships was a strict limitation in the use of electricity - steam engines were used wherever possible. Thus, with the loss of steam sources, the ship was doomed.

Booking

Formally, having the thickest armor among battleships, Yamato was not the most protected. Japanese metallurgy in the 1930s lagged behind the West, and deteriorating Anglo-Japanese relations made access to the latest technologies. New Japanese armor type VH (Vickers Hardened) was developed on the basis of the British VC (Vickers Cemented), produced in Japan under license since 1910. According to American experts who examined this armor after the war, its protective effectiveness was estimated by a coefficient of 0.86 in relation to American armor class "A". Particularly high quality British armor C.A. the Japanese model was inferior by almost a third, that is, for the equivalent of 410 mm VH 300 mm was enough C.A. .

The lag in the quality of armor material, combined with the huge size of the designed battleships, led the designers to the idea of solving the problem of security “head-on”, that is, by maximizing the thickness of the armor. Yamato-class battleships were armored according to the “all or nothing” scheme, which implied the creation of an armored citadel that protected the vital centers of the ship, provided a reserve of buoyancy, but left everything else unprotected. The Yamato Citadel turned out to be the shortest among the battleships built in the 1930s in relation to the length of the ship - only 53.5%.

War experience has shown that “soft” ends can be literally turned into a sieve even without a direct hit, and transverse waterproof partitions do not limit flooding, since they themselves can be easily pierced by shrapnel.

Having set the goal of protecting the battleship from any shells, the developers positioned the record-breaking thickness of the side belt (410 mm) at an angle of 20°. Theoretically, at distances exceeding 18.5 km, it was not penetrated by any foreign guns. Attaching particular importance to undershot hits, the Japanese placed another 200 mm thick armor belt below the main one.

The thickness of the armored traverses was significantly less than the belt, since they were located at an angle of 30°. The resulting armored box was covered with the main armored deck, which also had a record thickness - 200 mm in the central part and 230 mm at the bevels. Since only separate armored sections were located above (in front of the front and rear turrets), the fate of the ship when hit by bombs depended only on a single armored deck.

The armor protection of the main caliber turrets looked absolutely fantastic. The thickness of their frontal plate was 650 mm at an angle of 45°. It was believed that such armor could not be penetrated even when fired at point-blank range, but the Americans have their own special opinion on this matter. The roofs of the towers and barbettes also received very strong protection. The remaining parts of the ship, with the exception of the conning tower and the steering gear compartment, were practically not armored.

A general assessment of the quality of armor and its assembly on the latest Japanese battleships leaves much to be desired. This is explained, first of all, by the scale of the problems posed to the creators of the world's largest battleships... the quality of the armor as a whole turned out to be mediocre, that is, worse than it could have been with such large dimensions and thickness of the armor.

Armament

Main caliber

When developing the project, special attention was paid to ensuring fire superiority over any enemy. There were only two options to choose from: 410 mm and 460 mm (in accordance with the caliber adopted in the Japanese fleet for battleships of the Nagato type and developed for battleships of the shipbuilding program of the 20s, which were not implemented as a result of the Washington Treaty. It was known , that before the same treaty, the USA and Great Britain developed several models of 18" guns (457 mm), due to which the existing 410 mm guns were considered insufficiently powerful and the decision was made in favor of 460 mm. The development of these guns was started in 1934 and completed by 1939. In order to maintain secrecy, they were called “ 40-SK model 94" The design was a combination of modern bonded technology with archaic wire winding (due to continuity from the development of the early 20s). The barrel length was 45 calibers, the weight of the barrel was 165 tons. A total of 27 barrels were produced. Loading was carried out at a fixed angle of +3°, the rate of fire, depending on the firing range, was 1.5 - 2 rounds per minute. Each of the three gun turrets weighed 2510 tons

460 mm armor-piercing projectile. Its length is 195.4 cm.

From a ballistics point of view, a combination of a relatively light projectile for this caliber and a high initial velocity was adopted. The Type 91 armor-piercing projectile weighed 1,460 kg and contained 33.85 kg TNA. Its features were a special tip that allowed it to maintain its trajectory in water and an unusually long deceleration time for the fuse - 0.4 seconds. The projectile was designed to defeat enemy ships when undershooting, but was not very effective under normal conditions, especially when hitting unarmored parts of ships. However, due to its enormous weight and good ballistic characteristics, the projectile had high armor penetration. The initial speed was 780 m/s, the maximum range was 42050 meters.

Even more unusual was the Type 3 projectile, weighing 1360 kg. In fact, it was an anti-aircraft projectile and contained 900 incendiary and 600 fragmentation submunitions. However, American pilots considered it more showy than effective.

American pilots, against whom Type 3 shells of all calibers were mainly used, called them “more showy than effective.”

Both projectiles were too specialized. Some sources report the existence of a high-explosive shell for 460 mm guns, but no data on this was preserved in the archives, and Japanese battleships did not use such shells in battles. The paradox of history: the best Japanese battleships found themselves in the position of the Russians during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 - without high-explosive shells and with lightweight armor-piercing shells.

Fire control system

The main caliber fire was controlled by the most complex and perhaps most advanced system of the pre-electronic era, Type 98. It included the following components:

1. Five rangefinders, four of them with a record base - 15 meters. The quality of Japanese optics met international standards;

2. Two directors who provided data on the vertical and horizontal aiming angles;

3.Target tracking device;

4.Firing production device;

5.Electromechanical computer, which was the highlight of the system. The three blocks that were part of it not only made it possible to calculate data on the target course and pointing angles of their own guns, but also made it possible to introduce all kinds of corrections, including even geographic latitude and dependence on the day of the calendar.

In general, the system was very effective and, in conditions of good visibility, was in no way inferior to similar American ones based on the use of radar. However, with poor visibility and especially at night, the Japanese found themselves at an extreme disadvantage, especially towards the end of the war. After the war, American experts carefully studied this system.

According to their conclusions, the devices studied were far from perfect, unreasonably complex, had numerous shortcomings, but... had high potential. Having started “for peace”, the artillery specialists ended “for health”, recommending their adoption “in view of the obvious benefits”

Medium caliber artillery

Medium-caliber artillery according to the project included 12 155-mm guns in 4 three-gun turrets. These weapons were “attached” to the battleships after the Mogami-class heavy cruisers were re-equipped with 203 mm artillery. This decision predetermined the advantages and disadvantages of weapons. On the one hand, each turret received an 8-meter rangefinder, which was very unusual for a secondary, by battleship standards, caliber, while the effectiveness of the system on a huge and stable battleship, of course, was higher. On the other hand, the towers turned out to be very cramped and extremely poorly armored. But the main disadvantage of the second caliber was the inability to fire at air targets, which significantly reduced the air defense strength of ships.

The guns themselves were very powerful for their caliber, distinguished by an enviable range, but a low rate of fire (5-6 rpm). However, they did not have to shoot at sea or coastal targets and as a result, the side turrets were replaced with more popular 127-mm anti-aircraft guns.

Long-range anti-aircraft artillery

To fire at enemy aircraft at a considerable distance, a 127-mm type 89 gun with a barrel length of 40 calibers was used. Initially, the battleships carried 12 of these guns in twin mounts. On Yamato, from March 1944, their number was increased to 24 (12x2). The gun itself was quite satisfactory, although it was inferior to the American 127 mm universal gun in muzzle velocity and rate of fire. The disadvantages of paired installations include relatively low guidance speeds. The Type 94 fire control system, based on optical rangefinders and electromechanical computers, was quite effective by the standards of the late 1930s and comparable to the American Mk37, but by the end of the war it was outdated. The main components of effective anti-aircraft fire were radio rangefinders and projectiles with a radar fuse, but the Japanese had neither the first nor the second. As a result, the anti-aircraft artillery of the battleships was never able to successfully repel massive air attacks.

Short-range anti-aircraft artillery

The short-range anti-aircraft battery can be assessed as unsatisfactory. The main anti-aircraft gun was a 25-mm type 96 gun, which, in turn, was a Japanese version of the French Hotchkiss gun. Most of these guns were located in built-in installations, initially mostly in closed ones (primarily for the purpose of protecting the crews from the monstrous shock wave when fired from the main caliber). The built installations added later were mostly open. In fact, instead of the two echelons of automatic anti-aircraft artillery that were available on the ships of the US fleet - 40-mm Bofors and 20-mm Oerlikon - the Japanese battleship had only one. Moreover, it absorbed the worst features of both: from the first - the excessive weight of the installation and a low rate of fire, from the second - a short effective range and a small volume of the projectile, which did not allow the use of remote fuses. The practical rate of fire was low, the firing range was insufficient, and the damaging effect of the projectile was too weak. The drive power of the installation (1 hp) and, as a consequence, the angular speed of guidance, especially in the horizontal plane, were insufficient. The quality of anti-aircraft gun control systems corresponded to the level of the mid-1930s, and even those were not enough. The Japanese attempt to solve the problem “head-on” by installing a maximum of guns was not successful. Although the number of light anti-aircraft guns on ships exceeded a hundred, their actual effectiveness was very low. This was especially true for manually operated single-barrel installations.

The raison d'être of their existence lay only in the moral influence on the pilots, and also on their own crew - at the moment of an air attack it is much calmer when you are busy with business and your own guns are firing around you.

As for anti-aircraft machine guns, the experience of the war showed their complete uselessness.

Equipment

The instrumentation of the battleships when they entered service was very meager by Western standards. In fact, the Yamato and Musashi had the usual set of radio stations for Japanese ships, but with significantly increased power, which made it possible to use them as flagships.

At the beginning of 1942, not a single ship in the Imperial Navy had radar. Work on this important device began in the Japanese fleet only after the capture of British radars in Singapore. In September 1942, Musashi was the first of the battleships to receive a type 21 radar. It was an extremely unreliable device that made it possible to detect surface targets at short range. Ultimately, Yamato and Musashi received sets of 6 radars of three different types by mid-1944, but all of them were used only for detecting sea and air targets. It was impossible to control the fire of either the main or anti-aircraft artillery with their help. In fact, Japanese radars of 1944 corresponded to the level of American and British ones of 1941 and were clear evidence of Japan's technical backwardness.

In addition, the Yamato and Musashi carried a set of hydrophones, generally useless for battleships. Towards the end of the war they were equipped with radio radiation detectors and infrared devices. These devices were developed based on German technology.

In general, the electronic equipment of Japanese ships was backward, which was especially evident in battles, which often took place in conditions of limited visibility or at night. This fact can be explained rather by underestimating the role of electronic equipment, because if desired, the ships could be equipped with very advanced German radars.

Crew and habitability

When commissioned, the Yamato crew numbered 2,200 people, including 150 officers, but in reality it was much larger from the very beginning. The Musashi entered the Battle of the Philippines with 2,400 men on board; the crew of the Yamato on its last voyage exceeded 3,000. This growth was caused primarily by an increase in anti-aircraft artillery personnel.

As for living conditions, the Yamato seemed to the unspoiled Japanese sailors a model of comfort. Indeed, compared to early battleships, it had 3.2³ meters of living space per crew member, and its predecessors from 2.2³ to 2.6³ meters. The battleship seemed even more comfortable compared to heavy cruisers (1.3³ - 1.5³ meters) and even more so destroyers (1³ meters). It is no coincidence that the Yamato and Musashi were nicknamed “hotels” in the Japanese fleet - after all, they even had large vats for bathing the crew.

However, in comparison with European and especially American standards, the habitability of the Yamato was completely unsatisfactory. The cockpits turned out to be cramped, the passages were narrow, and the galleys and plumbing equipment were primitive. Japanese designers considered everyday amenities for the crew as something of secondary importance, believing that the sailors of the Imperial Navy would endure any difficulties.

Combat career in 1942-1944

"Yamato"- laid down on November 4, 1937, launched on August 8, 1939, entered service in December 1941.

Although Yamato officially entered service on December 16, 1941, the ship was declared combat-ready only on May 27, 1942. As the flagship of the Combined Fleet, she formally participated in the Battle of Midway on June 4-6, 1942, but actually had no encounters with the enemy, since she was 300 miles behind the Japanese aircraft carriers.

On May 28, 1942, the Yamato moved to Truk Island, where it spent about a year serving as the floating headquarters of the United Fleet. On December 25, 1943, the Yamato, located north of Truk Island, was hit by a torpedo (charge weight 270 kg) from the American submarine Skate ( Skate), took about 3000 tons of water into the hole. The ship's combat effectiveness was seriously damaged due to the flooding of the cellar of the main caliber aft turret. In January - April 1944, Yamato underwent repairs and modernization in Kure.

In June 1944, Yamato took part in the Battle of the Philippine Sea, and the formation, which also included Musashi and a number of other heavy ships, acted ahead of their aircraft carriers. On June 19, Yamato opened fire for the first time in a combat situation, but it later turned out that the battleship fired at its own aircraft, fortunately, ineffectively.

"Musashi"- laid down on March 29, 1938, launched on November 1, 1940, entered service in August 1942.

Until the end of 1942, Musashi underwent testing, additional equipment and combat training in Japanese waters. On January 22, 1943, she arrived at Truk and became the new flagship of the Combined Fleet. In May 1943, he was included in the formation intended to disrupt the Aleutian landing operation of the US fleet, but the Japanese delayed in deploying their forces, and the operation had to be cancelled. On March 29, 1943, the Musashi left Truk Bay evading an attack by American carrier-based aircraft, but was attacked at sea by the US submarine Tunny ( Tunny) and was hit by a torpedo in the bow. 3000 tons of water were taken, the losses amounted to 18 people. Repairs were carried out in Kura until the end of April. On June 19-23, the Musashi, along with the Yamato, took part in the battle in the Philippine Sea, but achieved no results.

The Japanese command saved its battleships for the expected general battle with the American fleet. In reality, the war in the Pacific resulted in a series of small but grueling skirmishes in which the strength of the Japanese fleet melted away while the strongest battleships defended themselves far from active combat zones. As a result, a skeptical attitude towards these ships developed in the Imperial Navy, well illustrated by a popular saying among sailors:

There are three biggest and most useless things in the world - the Egyptian pyramids, the Great Wall of China and the battleship Yamato.

"Yamato" and "Musashi" in the battle for the Philippines

In October 1944, Japanese super-battleships were finally thrown into serious battle. The Americans began landing in the Philippines and, if the operation was successful, they could destroy the Japanese defensive perimeter and cut off Japan from the main sources of raw materials and oil. The stakes were too high, and the Japanese command decided to conduct a general battle. The “Se-Go” (Victory) plan he compiled was an extraordinary achievement of operational art. Since the aircraft carrier forces of the Imperial Navy had fallen into decline by that time, the main role was assigned to large artillery ships.

The northern group, which included the few surviving aircraft carriers, was supposed to play the role of bait for the 38th Task Force, the main striking force of the American fleet. The main blow to the landing ships was to be delivered by the 1st sabotage formation of Vice Admiral Kurita. It consisted of 5 battleships, including Yamato and Musashi, 10 heavy and 2 light cruisers, and 15 destroyers. The formation was supposed to cross the San Bernardino Strait at night and attack landing craft off Leyte Island in the morning. He was supported by the smaller 2nd sabotage formation of Vice Admiral Nishimura, which was traveling through the Surigao Strait.

Battle in the Sibuyan Sea

On October 22, the 1st sabotage force went to sea and the very next day was attacked by American submarines, which sank two heavy cruisers. On the morning of October 24, when Kurita's formation was in the Sibuyan Sea, massive attacks by American carrier-based aircraft began. Due to random coincidences, the main attacks of the Americans were aimed at Musashi. During the first three hours, the battleship received at least three torpedo hits and a number of bombs. The list was corrected by counter-flooding, but the ship had already taken on too much water, had a large trim on the bow and was gradually losing speed. After 15 hours, the battleship was again subjected to powerful attacks by torpedo bombers and dive bombers and received many torpedo and bomb hits. Although the attacks ended after 16 hours, the flooding of the battleship's interior was out of control. Vice Admiral Kurita, seeing the desperate situation of the Musashi, ordered him to throw himself ashore. But it was not possible to carry out the order - at 19.36 the battleship capsized and sank. In total, Musashi was hit by 11-19 torpedoes and 10-17 air bombs. 1,023 crew members were killed, including its commander, Rear Admiral Inoguchi, who chose to die along with his ship. American losses amounted to 18 aircraft out of 259 that took part in the attacks.

Despite the loss of Musashi, Kurita's formation remained quite combat-ready, since the remaining battleships did not receive serious damage. However, Kurita hesitated and even reversed course. However, Vice Admiral Ozawa's Northern Group fulfilled its role as bait - the main forces of the 38th task force rushed towards it, leaving the northern straits unguarded. The American commander overestimated the achievements of his pilots, who reported the sinking of many Japanese battleships, and decided that the 1st sabotage force did not pose a threat. Kurita, meanwhile, received a direct order from the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet - “The formation must attack with faith in divine providence!” and moved forward.

Battle of Leyte Gulf

The formation unhindered crossed the unguarded San Bernadino Strait at high speed at night and entered Leyte Gulf. At about 6.45 the Japanese discovered the American ships. This was the northern group of the US 7th Fleet, which included 6 escort aircraft carriers, 3 destroyers and 4 escort destroyers. On the Yamato, which became the flagship of the Japanese formation, they mistook the enemy for one of the high-speed aircraft carrier groups and believed that it included cruisers. However, the Japanese entered the battle. "Yamato" for the first time in its career opened fire on a surface enemy at 6.58 from a distance of 27 km. The first salvos hit the aircraft carrier White Plains ( White Plains) and the artillerymen believed that they had achieved hits.

Subsequently, the battle came down to the Japanese pursuit of a slow-moving enemy, who responded with attacks by aircraft and destroyers. Over the next three hours, Japanese ships fired at numerous targets and counted several American aircraft carriers and cruisers sunk. Firing was hampered by periodic rain squalls and enemy smoke screens. As a result of the large difference in speed (up to 10 knots), the Japanese formation was stretched and Kurita lost control of the battle. At 10.20, the 1st sabotage formation left the battle and turned back, although the path to Leyte Gulf, where the American transports had gathered, was open.

This was the only battle in history when battleships and cruisers were held in sight by aircraft carriers, and in response they scrambled their planes. The Japanese missed their chance, losing the final battle with a score of 1:3 (they had to pay for one aircraft carrier with the loss of three heavy cruisers). This result, despite all its illogicality (too much was determined by the confusion of the Japanese admiral), became quite symbolic - the planes armed with bombs and torpedoes turned out to be stronger than the most powerful artillery.

Yamato's last voyage

Yamato's last voyage. Scheme.

Yamato explosion.

Yamato returned to its native shores only on November 22, 1944 and was immediately put into repair and modernization, which turned out to be its last and ended in January 1945. Meanwhile, the war moved to the shores of Japan. On April 1, 1945, American troops landed on Okinawa. Since the island's garrison had no chance to repel the landing, the Japanese command relied heavily on suicidal methods of struggle. The fleet did not stand aside either, proposing to use the Yamato to attack enemy landing craft despite the enemy’s dominance in the air and at sea.

On the morning of April 6, 1945, a formation consisting of Yamato, 1 light cruiser and 8 destroyers set out to sea to participate in Operation Ten-ichi-go (Heaven-1). The formation was given the task of “attacking the enemy fleet and supply ships and destroying them.” In case of difficulties with returning to base, the Yamato was ordered to land on a sandbank off the coast of Okinawa and support the army units with artillery fire. It was also assumed that this raid would distract enemy carrier-based aircraft and facilitate the massive kamikaze attacks planned for April 7 on the landing craft of the American fleet off the coast of Okinawa. The plan was suicidal from the very beginning.

The Japanese formation was discovered by the enemy early in the morning of April 7. Starting at noon, the Yamato and its escort came under powerful attacks from American carrier-based aircraft (227 aircraft in total). Two hours later, the battleship, having received up to 10 torpedo hits and 13 air bomb hits, was out of action. At 14.23 local time, the bow magazine of the main caliber artillery exploded, after which the Yamato sank. Only 269 people were saved, 3061 crew members died. American losses amounted to 10 aircraft and 12 pilots.

Project evaluation

Preparing for the war for dominance over the Pacific Ocean, the Japanese clearly understood that it was impossible to compete even with the United States alone in the number of ships, especially such as battleships. The Americans, having a huge manufacturing advantage, could always build much more of them. As a result, a course was set for qualitative superiority, and it was within the framework of this concept that the Yamato-class battleships were ordered.

The criterion for assessing superiority was the largest battleship that could pass through the Panama Canal. That is, the task was to build an artillery ship superior to any possible American response to it in the same class of ships. It must be admitted that the problem was not fully solved. In terms of the totality of its artillery power and security, the Yamato was noticeably superior to the newest American battleships of the Iowa type and, to an even greater extent, to the battleships of European countries. However, it was inferior (in the limitations of the Panama Canal) to the Montana-class battleships that were being built at that time. Only the decline in the importance of battleships during the Pacific campaign did not give the Japanese battleships worthy opponents (the Montana-class battleships were not completed). And the advantage over “Iowa” was not so great, given their greater speed and numerical advantage, to talk about the complete achievement of their goals. However, history decreed that the Japanese giants went down in history as the largest and most powerful artillery ships in history.

... Approaching Yamato was mortally dangerous for any enemy, including LC Iowa, South Dakota and Richelieu, not to mention Bismarck. It’s hard to even imagine what kind of damage the ships would have received before reaching a distance of 14-16 km. .

It should be emphasized, however, that it would be incorrect to consider a duel situation between the Yamato and the American battleship. The Japanese built super-powerful ships because they could not compete in the number of battleships. During the war years, Japan commissioned 2 new battleships, the United States - 10, and here the balance of forces looks obvious.

Of course, the project was not without its shortcomings. These included, first of all, the not entirely successfully designed anti-torpedo protection. As for the shortcomings of Japanese radars and anti-aircraft systems, this was already reflected in the general technological lag behind the United States and the underestimation of these means in particular (radars were not imported from Germany, for example). Fire control systems and a ballistic computer are the pinnacle of engineering of their time. The main caliber guns were the longest-range and most powerful, but with a very low resource and a projectile that was not much heavier than that of the American opponents.

Every weapon is only as good as the one used. In this regard, the Japanese admirals have nothing to boast about. All the decisive battles of the first half of the war took place without the participation of Yamato and Musashi. The Japanese command did not even use the opportunity to intimidate the enemy with the characteristics of the ships. As a result, super battleships were thrown into battle in a situation where they strengths turned out to be unclaimed. Speaking about the death of battleships, there is no point in talking about the insufficient survivability or weakness of anti-aircraft weapons. Not a single ship could have survived such attacks, and how long they managed to hold out under the hail of blows is a credit to their builders.

Was the construction of the Yamato-class battleships a mistake? Perhaps they should have been even larger (however paradoxical this may sound in relation to the already largest battleships in history), with big amount(and possibly a larger caliber of main caliber guns), with better mine and anti-aircraft protection, in order to compensate for quantitative and qualitative indicators with maximum dimensions. Undoubtedly, Japan would have received a much greater effect if the money spent on battleships had been invested in aircraft carriers and aircraft. However, given the gap in the military-industrial potential of Japan and its opponents, we have to admit that any other solution would not have led the Japanese to their goals. Japan's decision to go to war was a mistake.

Battleships of this type marked the peak and at the same time a dead end in the development of battleships. The role of the main striking force at sea passed to aircraft carriers

Ship commanders

"Yamato":

12/16/1941 - 12/17/1942 - captain 1st rank (from 05/01/1942 - rear admiral) Gihachi Takayanagi.

12/17/1942 - 09/07/1943 - captain 1st rank (from 05/01/1943 - rear admiral) Chiaki Matsuda.

09/07/1943 - 01/25/1944 - captain 1st rank (from 01/05/1944 - rear admiral) Takeji Ono.

01/25/1944 - 11/25/1944 - captain 1st rank (from 10/15/1944 - rear admiral) Nobuei Morishita.

11/25/1944 - 04/07/1945 - captain 1st rank (posthumous vice admiral) Kosaku Ariga.

"Musashi":

08/05/1942 - 06/09/1943 - captain 1st rank (from 11/01/1942 - rear admiral) Kaoru Arima.

06/09/1943 - 12/07/1943 - captain 1st rank (from 11/01/1943 - rear admiral) Keizo Komura.

12/07/1943 - 08/12/1944 - captain 1st rank (from 05/01/1944 - rear admiral) Bunji Asakura.

08/12/1944 - 10/24/1944 - captain 1st rank (from 1/5/1943 - rear admiral) Toshihiro Inoguchi.

Notes

All data is for December 1941.
Transcription of Japanese names is given according to the reference book by Yu. V. Apalkov.
Kofman V.L. Japanese battleships of World War II. Yamato and Musashi. P. 12.
Smith P. C. Sunset of the lord of the seas. - M.: AST, 2003. P. 94.
Named after a province in the south of Honshu Island, Nara Prefecture. The word is also used as a poetic name for Japan. Cm.: Apalkov Yu. V. P. 112.
Named after the province in the east of the island of Honshu, Kamagawa Prefecture and Saitama. Cm.: Apalkov Yu. V. P. 113
Kofman V.L. Japanese battleships of World War II. Yamato and Musashi. P. 14.
Weight of the gun is 227 tons, weight of the 510-mm armor-piercing projectile is 2000 kg Campbell J. Naval weapons of World War Two. - London, Conway Maritime Press, 2002, p. 179.
There, p. 20.
Such steel was also the main material in the construction of American and British battleships
Kofman V.L. Japanese battleships Yamato and Musashi. P. 33.
Perhaps, otherwise, Musashi could have been saved. There, p. 34.
Kofman V.L. Japanese battleships of World War II. Yamato and Musashi. P. 38. It should be added that such a high assessment of the quality of British armor is not confirmed by A. Raven and D. Roberts. Cm: Raven A., Roberts D. Battleships of the British Royal Navy of the "King George V", "Lion", "Vanguard" types. St. Petersburg, 1997, p. 10.
Vanguard-class battleship. Armor protection.
In fact, the belt could have been pierced by the guns of the Iowa-class battleships. See: Kofman, p. 37.
After the war, during field tests, the armor plates for the Shinano captured by the Americans were pierced by 406 mm shells. Kofman, p. 41.
Balakin S. A., Dashyan. A.V. et al. Battleships of World War II. P. 239.
With the American approach to ammunition design, a 460-mm projectile would weigh about 1,780 kg. See: Kofman V.L. Japanese battleships Yamato and Musashi. P. 48.
Trinitroanisole, TNT equivalent 1.06.
For comparison, the fuse of the American Mk8 armor-piercing projectile had a deceleration of 0.033 s. Armament of Iowa-class battleships
http://www.wunderwaffe.narod.ru/WeaponBook/Jap_Cr_2/25.htm
Kofman V.L. Japanese battleships Yamato and Musashi. P. 56.
There, p. 51.
There, p. 62.
Ibid., p.64.
Hygiene procedures on the vast majority of Japanese ships amounted to dousing with water on the upper deck.
In terms of habitability, the Yamato was inferior to Soviet ships. See for example: http://www.wunderwaffe.narod.ru/Magazine/MK/2003_01/03.htm
Kofman V.L. Japanese battleships Yamato and Musashi. P.79.
Nimitz C., Porter E. War at sea (1939-1945). - Smolensk, Rusich, 1999.
Balakin S. A., Dashyan. A.V. and others. Battleships of the Second World War. P. 231.
Kofman V.L. Japanese battleships of World War II. Yamato and Musashi. From 101.
Sherman F. War in the Pacific. Aircraft carriers in battle. - M.; St. Petersburg: AST, Terra Fantastica, 1999. P. 177.
Kofman V. L. Japanese battleships of the Second World War. Yamato and Musashi. P. 106.
http://www.wunderwaffe.narod.ru/WeaponBook/Jap_Cr_2/25.htm
The causes of the death of the Yamato were finally established in 1985 by an international expedition that discovered and examined the wreckage of the battleship.
Balakin S. A., Dashyan. A.V. et al. Battleships of World War II. P. 254.

Literature

Apalkov Yu. V. Warships of the Japanese fleet: Battleships and aircraft carriers. - St. Petersburg: Didactics, 1997.
Balakin S. A., Dashyan. A.V. et al. Battleships of World War II. - M.: Collection, Yauza, EKSMO, 2005.
Kofman V.L. Japanese battleships of World War II. Yamato and Musashi. - M.: Collection, Yauza, EKSMO, 2006.

Links in culture

en:Space Battleship Yamato (anime)
en:Yamato (film)

Links

Berezhnykh O. A. Battleship Yamato
Pechukonis N. N. Battleship Yamato
The world's largest model of the battleship Yamato. Museum in Japan. 64 photos.
Inright J."Shinano" - the sinking of the Japanese secret super-aircraft carrier - M.: Voenizdat, 1991. - ISBN 5-203-00584-2

: Nelson type (1927) King George V type (1940) type "Lyon" * Vanguard (1946) | : Scharnhorst type (1938) Bismarck type (1940) type "H" * type "P" * | : Littorio type (1940) | : pr. 1047 * | USSR : type "Soviet Union" * type "Kronstadt" * type "Stalingrad" * | USA : North Carolina type (1941) South Dakota type (1942) Iowa type (1943) Alaska type (1944) type "Montana" * | : Dunkirk type (1937) type "Richelieu" (1940) | : Yamato type (1941)

* - unfinished ships and projects

Warships of the Imperial Japanese Navy from to year

Following the example of Hitler's Germany, the Japanese government in 1934 ceased to comply with the Treaty of Versailles and the London Convention on the Limitation of Arms, which ordered the country not to have large warships of a class higher than a cruiser. Government officials decided that it was no longer worth obeying policies imposed from outside and it was time to follow our own course, according to which we were to begin the development and immediate construction of large warships of the battleship class.

The program for the construction of the latest warships was called “Marusai” and was personally controlled by the emperor. The Japanese took American battleships of the same class as a model, trying to surpass them in power and equipment. The shipbuilding project was kept in the strictest confidence; only a few top government officials knew the secret of construction; who exactly owned it is still unknown.

The designers and engineers who took part in the construction memorized the drawings by heart, receiving them only in separate parts. All personnel involved in the construction signed a non-disclosure agreement and were notified of the responsibility they would bear for giving secret information to spies. The Japanese fenced the shipyards where the battleships were laid with a high fence, which was almost impossible to approach because of the barbed wire. In order to ensure complete security also from the air, the base was covered with an impenetrable protective film, and the windows of nearby high-rise buildings overlooking the shipyard were bricked up.

Japanese battleship Yamato

The precautions taken were so serious that the construction began became known only after the launch of the first battleship, called "Yamato" to the water. This battleship was destined to become the flagship of Admiral Yamato and take part in the upcoming hostilities against America and its allies.

The length of the battleship was more than 263 meters, the width was almost 40 meters, the draft exceeded 10 meters, and the displacement was over 72 thousand tons. The Yamato was propelled by a steam turbine unit with four shafts. The battleship was capable of reaching a speed of over 27 knots, which was practically the maximum value for the time of its construction, since even the most modern American battleships, due to the need to navigate through the Panama Canal, were capable of reaching a speed not exceeding 23 knots per hour.

The Japanese battleship was armed with conventional and anti-aircraft guns, as well as seaplanes, used mainly for reconnaissance missions. The Yamato was launched in August 1939, but it entered service as a warship only in December 1941, just over a week after the Japanese attack on the American base at Pearl Harbor. Before embarking on combat patrols, the battleship went through a number of training tests and only in May 1942 was it recognized as a ship suitable for combat missions.

However, the Japanese were unable to boast of either its size or firepower; in the 8 years since the first rivet was laid in the Yamoto’s skin, a lot has changed, and above all - military technology; the battleship was so outdated that it could not cope with either air or with underwater attacks.

As the flagship of the Japanese fleet, Yamoto took part in the operation at Midway Atoll, but only formally, since it did not fire a single shot in this battle. At the end of December 1943, the battleship was damaged as a result of a torpedo hit, its holds were heavily flooded, and the further progress of the ship was hampered, which is why it was forced to undergo long-term repairs, which lasted almost a whole year.

Major naval battle at Midway Atoll

In the summer of 1944, the Yamato was called to participate in the battle of the Philippine Islands, near which the battleship fired its first shots at the enemy, who, as it later turned out, had not even shown up in the area, and therefore, as it turned out later, the Yamato inflicted serious damage to his own squadron.

The unexpected failure did not dampen the ardor of the Japanese command, but among the sailors of the Japanese fleet the idea arose that battleships were of exactly the same benefit as the pyramids of Egypt, the study of which is interesting, but does not bring any significant benefit to humanity.

In October 1944, after another inspection and repair, Yamato was once again sent to the Philippines in order to prevent the landing of American troops as part of a squadron that included another battleship of this class, Musashi. The Japanese forces were in many ways superior to the American fleet, but the latter, in addition to cruisers, battleships and battleships, had fairly well-armed aircraft carriers, against which the Japanese ships were simply unable to defend themselves.

The Philippines had two naval battles with the participation of the Yamato - the battle in the Sibuyan Sea and the battle in Leyte Gulf. In both battles the battleship took Active participation, firing at enemy aircraft carriers, but as further research showed, the Yamato team was unable to fire a single accurate shot; all the shells missed. In retaliation, the Americans scrambled planes and almost completely destroyed the Japanese fleet; Yamato miraculously managed to escape and return for repairs to Japan.

Battle in the Sibuyan Sea of the battleship Yamato

In April 1945, the Americans began landing on the Japanese island Okinawa, in order to prevent their actions, the battleship Yamato was recalled from repair; it was intended to attack the landing American troops, which was not just stupid, but suicidal, since American aviation would not allow a single step to be taken in this direction. On April 6, Yamato and 9 other ships, including a battle cruiser and destroyers, were to launch an attack on the enemy’s fleet and auxiliary ships, trying to divert air forces while the Americans were attacked by Japanese kamikazes. If this maneuver turned out to be a failure, the Yamato was ordered to jump onto the sandbank and from there continue to provide fire cover for the Japanese paramilitary formations.

On the morning following the receipt of the order, the Yamato and the squadron it led were discovered by the Americans on the approaches to Okinawa, they were immediately attacked from the air and most of the ships were sunk, including the flagship. Of the more than 3 thousand crew members, just over two hundred sailors managed to survive. The losses of the American side did not exceed 10 aircraft shot down by the Yamato crew, and this despite the fact that its firepower was designed for hundreds of similar aircraft.

This was the last mission of the best battleship of the Japanese fleet; its brother, the Musashi, was sunk by American aircraft a few months before the events off Okinawa.

On April 6, 1945, the giant Imperial Japanese Navy battleship Yamato put to sea to make her final stand. His fate was predetermined, and the team of 3,063 people put on clean clothes and white suicide armbands in advance. And what could this doomed giant then oppose to his enemy today?

Yamato was the most powerful battleship of World War II. The first of the battleships of its series, it was laid down on November 4, 1937 at the Navy shipyard in Kura, launched on August 8, 1939, and officially entered service on December 16, 1941. It was declared fully combat-ready only on May 27, 1942.

Before World War II, Japan's economy could not compete with the industries of the United States and Great Britain. Unable to overcome the quantity of weapons, the Japanese decided to focus on quality.

In 1935, Mikado, Emperor of Japan, approved the A140 project for the construction of a battleship with a displacement of 72 thousand tons and a length of 263 m. The power plant had a capacity of 153 thousand hp. With. provided a speed of 27.7 knots, consuming 63 tons of fuel per hour.

Nine monstrous 460mm guns threw 1300kg shells over a distance of 42km.

The Japanese were wrong. They miscalculated the size of the battleship and made a mistake with the type of ship itself. If instead of two giant battleships (“Yamato” and “sister ship” - “Musashi”) with monstrous guns, five or six battleships one and a half times smaller were built, there would be more sense.

The Yamato's heavy-duty shells penetrated American aircraft carriers and exploded in the water without causing fatal harm to the enemy.

And it was necessary to build aircraft carriers. And not gigantic, but middle class, but larger. The Japanese did not go this route, perhaps due to a shortage of pilots. But in this case, there was no point in starting a war at all that had no chance of being won.

The outstanding Japanese admiral Isuroku Yamamoto, a participant in Tsushima and the hero of Pearl Harbor, understood this very well. He made every effort to negotiate peace with the Americans, but they needed war. After the United States imposed an embargo on oil supplies to imperialist Japan, war became inevitable.

The defeat of the US battle fleet gave Japan a six-month respite. For unknown reasons, Admiral Futida did not destroy the infrastructure of the naval base at Pearl Harbor, therefore, after quickly replacing losses in battleships, which was ensured by powerful American industry, America was able to resume active fighting on the Pacific Ocean.

The most interesting thing is that before the Japanese raid on Pearl Harbor, all the aircraft carriers left there, which subsequently destroyed the entire Japanese fleet.

After the defeat in the Battle of Midway Atoll, Japan had no chance of victory at sea.

On April 6, 1945, Yamato entered the ocean. With a small escort (light cruiser Yahagi and six destroyers). There was no air cover. By this time, the Japanese air fleet was almost completely destroyed. The squadron went to the aid of the besieged garrison of the island of Okinawa.

5 heavy and 4 light aircraft carriers of the US Navy operated against the Japanese squadron. Initially, in this situation, the Japanese did not have the slightest chance of salvation. And the crew of the battleship understood this.

227 aircraft took part directly in the attacks on Yamato (280 aircraft were sent, 53 did not reach the target). A third of the carrier-based aircraft were fighters, whose air cannons could not harm the half-meter armor of the battleship. That is, two hundred carrier-based aircraft destroyed the entire Japanese squadron in two hours. The second blow was not needed.

The attack began exactly at 10:00. By two o'clock in the afternoon, the Yamato went on board and exploded at 14:23.

American losses amounted to 10 aircraft (four torpedo bombers, three bombers, three fighters). About 20 more vehicles were damaged by anti-aircraft fire, but were able to return to their ships.

It turns out that to destroy the Yamato and its escort, two Essex-class aircraft carriers, each based on a hundred aircraft, would be enough. Most likely, 40 aircraft would have been enough to destroy the battleship, since in those days air defense systems could not repel the attack of even that many bombers.

This conclusion is confirmed by the results of the naval battle on October 24, 1944 in the Sibuyan Sea off the Philippines, when the 38th US Navy Task Force destroyed a squadron of Japanese battleships and heavy cruisers. Yamato's sister ship, the super battleship Musashi, was also sunk. The Japanese squadron had 7 battleships, 11 cruisers and 23 destroyers. And not a single aircraft carrier!

On the American side there was a squadron of heavy aircraft carriers "Essex", "Intrepid", "Franklin", "Lexington" and "Enterprise", as well as 5 light aircraft carriers: "Independence", "Cabot", "Langley", "San Jacinto" and Bellew Wood.

The next morning, October 25, the Japanese squadron was badly battered by six escort carriers, small ships built to civilian shipbuilding standards.

Such was the price of the mistake of the Japanese admirals, who underestimated not only aircraft carriers, but also the enormous power of American industry.

Paradoxically, defeated and capitulated Japan did not forget how to build giant ships. In 1976, the Japanese company Sumitomo Heavy Industries Ltd. (SHI) completed construction and launched the Knock Nevis supertanker with a length of 376.7, a width of 68.9 and a side height of 29.8 meters. Its deadweight was 418,610 tons. Subsequently, the length of the tanker was increased to 458.45 meters.

Japan, which has not lost its shipbuilding capabilities even today and is increasing its aggressive intentions, may well build a giant battleship, not necessarily larger in size than the Yamato and Musashi, but with the same powerful armor and modern air defense systems, for example, an air defense system with the Aegis system.

Such a missile battleship, of course, will not be completely unsinkable for twelve American carrier strike groups, but it will take much longer to deal with it than with the Yamato, defenseless against torpedoes and heavy bombs.

The fact is that the half-meter Yamato armor is too tough for modern anti-ship weapons on strike bombers.

Anti-ship Harpoons will only slightly scratch the Yamato's armor. The only reliable way to quickly sink such a battleship today is to use super-heavy concrete-piercing bombs like the GBU-28, which can only be carried by heavy F-15E fighter-bombers.

Moreover, it will become possible to bomb a battleship only after its air defense systems are completely suppressed.

The torpedoes that made the main contribution to the sinking of the Yamato and Musashi are not in service with the UAG today. And to use them, you need to get close. Modern systems Air defense made it unnecessary to use torpedoes, the effective range of which did not exceed 10 miles.

So it is quite possible, if not the revival of armored battleships, then certainly equipping modern attack ships with steel armor, which will make them invulnerable to anti-ship missiles.

If, say, a small armored boat with hypersonic missiles is sent against the newest American attack destroyer Zamvolt with composite light bulletproof armor, then the Zamvolt will sink after the first hit. And the armored boat will have a chance to get away with only scratches. +

This, of course, is an exaggerated picture of future naval battles. But the fact that the Yamato with modern air defense systems and the Aegis system could destroy more than a dozen American aircraft from a modern Nimitz-class supercarrier can hardly be questioned. Moreover, even just covering the Nimitz’s takeoff deck with a Yamato salvo would have made the existence of the entire carrier strike group meaningless.

The moral here is this: the winner is the one who correctly identifies strategic trends and competently balances his forces with the capabilities of a potential enemy.

A few years after the end of the First World War in the naval departments different countries we started talking about linkorah. It was believed that these warships were still the main strength of any fleet.

Designed for combat in close combat formation. It is armed with offensive and defensive combat weapons, concentrated to the most rational extent: artillery, armor and unsinkability are in the first place, speed and range are in second place. The requirement for the maximum possible simultaneous strengthening of offensive and defensive means is all the more easily fulfilled the larger the warship, since on a larger ship a significant percentage of the total mass can be allocated to all these means: this explains the increase in displacement battleships during their evolution.

Taking a course to strengthen its armed forces, Japan in 1934 decided to no longer adhere to the 1930 London Agreement on the Limitation of Naval Arms and adopted the so-called Marusai Program, according to which it was planned to build a number of new warships for the Imperial Navy, including several battleships, and paramount importance was attached not to quantity, but to the quality of new military equipment.

The basis for the development of new battleships laid down the idea of superiority over similar American ships, which, according to Japanese experts, due to the mandatory condition of passing through the Panama Canal, should have limited tactical and technical data: a displacement of no more than 63,000 tons, armament of guns with a caliber of no more than 406 mm and a speed of up to 23 nodes The lead ship was supposed to be battleship "».

battleship «»

Construction battleships Yamato and Musashi » was conducted in the strictest secrecy. High fences were built around the slipways, covered with camouflage nets on top, and the windows of nearby buildings facing the shipyard were bricked up. The shipbuilders were required to sign a non-disclosure agreement regarding what facility they were working at. In addition, the work was organized in such a way that none of the workers had a complete picture of the object, and even the designers were given only separate parts of the design documentation. A strictly limited circle of people had a complete understanding of the project.

The battleship Yamato was launched on August 8, 1940, and entered service in December 1941

The combat career of battleships of this class is not particularly eventful. Battleship Yamato, being the flagship of Admiral I. Yamamoto, during the battle at Midway Atoll, having received a message about the defeat of the Japanese carrier forces, left the battle without using its huge guns. Battleship « Musashi » held the flag of Admiral M. Koga, who became commander of the United Fleet after the death of I. Yamamoto. Both warships were near Truk Island almost all the time.

On December 25, 1943, while north of the island, battleship "» was hit by a torpedo from the American submarine Skate. This incident prompted improvements in mine protection on ships of this type.

During the war in the Pacific, when aviation began to convincingly prove its leading role in military operations at sea, the huge guns turned out to be useless, and both Japanese battleships were soon sunk by American carrier-based aircraft.

battleship Yamato

battleship Musashi - in August 1942

Since November 23, 1944 battleship "» was based in Japan, from where he left on his last campaign in April 1945. He took part in Operation Tenichigo. The goal of the operation is to reach the American landing site on the island of Okinawa, where American troops invaded on April 1. During the collision with American aircraft, three torpedoes hit the battleship. The auxiliary steering gear was damaged. Battleship « » shot down one torpedo bomber. Some time later, two more torpedoes hit the warship, causing damage to electrical equipment, causing part of the artillery to be disabled. The ship's position had not yet become critical, but its reserves of survivability and stability were on the verge of exhaustion. Then the final attack began, during which at least four torpedoes hit the ship. On a battleship « » at this time only one propeller shaft was working, and soon all the boiler rooms were flooded and abandoned by the staff. The ship immediately lost speed. The roll to the left side reached 15-16 degrees.

battleship Yamato explosion of cellars

When the battleship « » lay on board with a list of about 80 degrees, there was a monstrous explosion that was heard for many miles around. The reflection of this explosion was seen on the ships of the American unit located several tens of miles from the scene of the tragedy on the island of Kagoshima. A column of smoke rose above the warship to a height of 6 km and looked like a “nuclear mushroom”. The flames of the explosion rose 2 km. Undoubtedly, only the explosion of the cellars (approximately 500 tons of explosives) could produce a similar effect, but what caused the explosion is unknown. Some American experts believe that the explosion occurred due to an armor-piercing bomb hitting the tower and through it into the main cellars. The explosion led to terrible losses among the battleship's crew « Yamato." Of the 2,767 crew members, 2,498 people died, including the formation commander and the ship's commander. In total, in the battle, in addition to the battleship Yamato, a battle cruiser and four destroyers were destroyed, on which 3,665 people died or drowned. In my last fight battleship The Yamato shot down only five and damaged twenty aircraft, and the formation destroyed ten aircraft in total: four dive bombers, three torpedo bombers and three fighters.