Reasons for the breakdown of relations with Yugoslavia. Khrushchev in Yugoslavia. Tito's wife communicates with ballerinas backstage at the Bolshoi Theater
Russians and Serbs are accustomed to calling each other “brothers,” but history knows a period when Moscow and Belgrade became bitter enemies for almost ten years. Two loyal allies: Stalin's USSR and Tito's Yugoslavia - fell out as if in an instant, and the consequences of this are still felt. Which leader—Soviet or Yugoslav—is responsible for this?
Exactly 70 years ago, a resolution of the Cominform Bureau was published, which proposed that the Yugoslav communists “force their current leaders to openly and honestly admit their mistakes and correct them, break with nationalism, return to internationalism and strengthen the united socialist front in every possible way,” and if the leaders of the Yugoslav Communist Party do this unable to, it is necessary to “change” them. Belgrade predictably rejected this ultimatum, and a year later diplomatic relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia were severed until the Khrushchev “thaw”.
Despite the short-term nature and artificiality of this conflict, the consequences are still felt, so it can hardly be classified as a historical misunderstanding. Sometimes the break in relations is seen as a personal quarrel between Joseph Stalin and Josip Broz Tito, especially often within the framework of a liberal interpretation of history, where Stalin is the evil genius of Eastern Europe, and Tito is a freedom-loving patriot. Meanwhile, if there was anything personal there, it was only a small one. In general, everything is much more complicated.
How Josip made Joseph angry
By 1948, Yugoslavia had become the most loyal and largest ally of the USSR in Eastern Europe - an ally, and not an occupied territory without personal will. Moscow had high hopes for Belgrade and invested unprecedented funds in the rearmament of the Yugoslav army.
Yes, Stalin had to pull Tito down more than once when, using Moscow’s patronage, he tried to annex parts of Italy and Austria to Yugoslavia, actually provoking a military clash with the British and Americans. From Moscow’s point of view, this was a strategic mistake; from Belgrade’s point of view, it was a betrayal of an ally.
And yet, with no other European country did the USSR have such mutual understanding as with Yugoslavia. There are always problems with Poland. There is petty-bourgeois discord in Czechoslovakia. Hungary and Romania were among Germany's former satellites, and Bulgaria teetered on the brink of this status. Albania was and remains a gray zone of the Middle Ages, which even the Yugoslavs could not cope with. “The Slavs have nothing to do with these,” reported Tito in 1943 to his general Vukmanovich “Tempo,” sent to Albania to establish connections with the local communist underground.
It is not even surprising that the main reason for the rupture of Soviet-Yugoslav relations was Albania. On January 19, 1948, Tito sent a telegram to its leader Enver Hoxha with a “proposal” to provide him with a base in the south of the country for the introduction of a full-fledged Yugoslav division in order to “protect against the Anglo-American invasion” from Greece, where a civil war, little known to the Russian reader, was then going on. Actually, two mobilized divisions were already stationed on the Albanian border - in Montenegro and Macedonia.
A couple of weeks before, the leader of Bulgaria, Georgi Dimitrov, gave a lengthy interview in which he supported the idea of creating a “Balkan Federation” and - moreover - a confederation of Eastern European countries, which would include Hungary, Romania, Czechoslovakia and even Poland (they were horrified in Warsaw) . And if the Yugoslav ultimatum to the Albanians was a local story, then the interview with Dimitrov, the former head of the Comintern and the second most important (after Stalin) “figure in the international communist movement”, caused a sharp response in Europe. For Washington and London, the creation of such a strange bloc or state meant a violation of the Yalta and Potsdam agreements.
Against this background, in mid-March in Brussels, Great Britain, France, Belgium, Holland and Luxembourg signed a treaty on the Western Bloc. This was a direct response to the statements of Dimitrov and Tito - and the beginning of the creation of NATO. Stalin was furious: some military-political blocs appeared spontaneously and without regard to Moscow, and the USSR did not yet have an atomic bomb.
And other irresponsible comrades
The formal complaint against Tito was that Belgrade, with its attempt to annex Albania (no one doubted that two trained Yugoslav divisions with their combat experience would simply swallow the Albanians, like the USSR the Baltic states) did not inform Moscow. In the same way, Dimitrov did not inform Stalin when he announced his far-reaching plans to create a confederation of Eastern European countries, in which Yugoslavia was given the leading role as the most powerful militarily. But the “interview of Comrade Dimitrov” was cheerfully considered a “political mistake” and an “untimely gesture,” but the practical actions of the Yugoslavs provoked an extremely harsh rebuke, formulated in a special telegram.
The leadership of both countries - Yugoslavia and Bulgaria - was urgently summoned to Moscow for negotiations. Dimitrov went, and Tito cited poor health. He quite rightly feared for his safety.
Stalin was right about almost everything and showed miracles in terms of patience. At a meeting in Moscow, he explained to the Bulgarians and Tito’s envoys (Kardel and Djilas) that Albania was still not accepted into the UN, not recognized by the USA and Great Britain, so the introduction of Yugoslav troops there would be regarded as aggression and would give Western countries a reason to start war, therefore, “the Albanian comrades must themselves seek military assistance.” The Soviet leader even showed the guests intelligence reports about plans to deploy American troops in Greece. Even then it was clear that the communists had lost the civil war there, and the remnants of ELAS simply had to be evacuated before they were hanged on olive trees.
In general, provoking the British and Americans to intervene in the Balkans was, to put it mildly, untimely. As a compromise, Stalin suggested, if he really wanted, to create a confederation between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria and forget about the rest of the countries around them for a while. Let them live.
The Yugoslavs and Bulgarians nodded and went home.
Returning to Belgrade, the Yugoslav delegation reported on the progress of the Moscow “consultations” to the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. The materials of this meeting on the same day became the property of Soviet intelligence in Belgrade (according to various sources, the informants could have been Finance Minister Zujović and Industry Minister Andrija Hebrang, the leader of the Croatian communists). Ambassador Lavrentyev and military attache Sidorovich sent reports to Moscow, from which it followed that the leadership of Yugoslavia and Comrade Tito personally reacted negatively to Comrade Stalin’s recommendations and cursed badly. At the same time, it was decided to abandon the alliance with Bulgaria, since there is “strong Soviet influence” there - “the Bulgarians feel guilty for their position during the war” and are currying favor with Moscow.
Thus, disagreements over the tactics of absorbing the countries of Eastern Europe, the conflict turned into throwing around Marxist quotes and accusations of “deviations from the Leninist course.” Tito and Stalin exchanged a couple of sharp letters, the tone of which left no doubt that there would be no compromise. In the end, their Moscow received a “final paper” signed by Molotov, which summarized all the accusations against the “Tito-Rankovic clique”, followed by the recall of Soviet military advisers and civilian specialists. For the Yugoslavs, this turn of events was a surprise, and for some time they tried to somehow come to an agreement, but Moscow needed complete repentance on the part of Belgrade, and Tito could not agree to that.
Brother on brother
The severance of relations with Moscow did not cause either anti-Soviet or Russophobic relations in Yugoslavia. At the same time, the events of 1948-1953 are usually hushed up, but not everything was calm then.
The USSR MGB deployed 20 anti-Yugoslav intelligence centers in Eastern European countries. In the Hungarian Szeged, such a center recruited former citizens of Yugoslavia for sabotage activities against Tito, and from 500 Yugoslav officers who were studying in Soviet military universities at the time of the break in relations, they created the “Union of Yugoslav Patriots for Liberation from the Fascist Yoke of the Tito-Rankovic Clique and Imperialist Slavery.” It was headed by Major General Pero Popivoda, who Stalin personally liked, although he developed daring, but absolutely unrealistic sabotage plans. In Molotov’s memoirs (as retold by Fekliks Chuev) there is an episode where the Soviet leader greeted Popivoda with the words “so young, and already a general!”
At the same time, the newspaper “Nova Borba” began to be published in Prague - in defiance of the official Tito newspaper “Borba”. Overall, the ideological and propaganda campaign against Yugoslavia was unprecedented. The “Tito-Rankovic Clique” did not leave the pages of the Soviet press.
The number of border incidents numbered in the hundreds, and they were of a bilateral nature. While trying to cross the Yugoslav-Romanian border, Colonel General Arce Jovanovic, the former chief of staff of the NOLA, Hero of Yugoslavia, one of Tito’s personal friends, who became a “Cominform member,” that is, a supporter of the USSR, was killed.
Plans for a direct military invasion of Yugoslavia were also considered, but were rejected due to the low combat capability of the main regional allies - Bulgaria and Romania. Reviews from Soviet generals about the quality of local armies were frankly derogatory.
For its part, the General Staff in Belgrade developed a plan for “strategic defense”, starting from an analysis of the mistakes of the royal army in 1941. It was planned to retreat to the mountainous zones of Montenegro, Bosnia and Kosovo, and to launch an organized guerrilla war in the abandoned territory. This gave rise to the peculiar way of the Yugoslav People's Army, which survived until 1991 and played a special role in the wars of 1991-1995. It was divided between the personnel forces and the territorial defense army from local residents, who had different weapons, different conscription systems, and different training. As a result, already in 1991, territorial brigades composed on a national basis began to en masse go over to the side of the national republics, and the backbone of the JNA remained with Serbian conscripts, which predetermined the nature of the confrontation.
It can be said that Stalin was right in strategic terms in keeping Tito and Dimitrov from creating a “super-country”, which would have entailed an Anglo-American intervention. Or maybe it wouldn’t. Maybe this whole gigantic Eastern European structure would have collapsed in 1991 with even more noise, although much more. But in the “if” genre, the story doesn’t work.
For many Yugoslavs, the break in relations with the USSR is associated not with these strategic alignments, but with geographical name Golly Otok. The tiny island off the Croatian coast was a prison back in Austria-Hungary, and after 1948, along with the Ustashas and Chetniks, “Stanilists” and “anti-Tovites” began to be placed in the concentration camp organized there. One of Emir Kusturica’s first films, “Dad on a Business Trip,” is about exactly this. Now there is a museum on Goli Otok. However, almost the entire history of the Balkans creeps in with its exhibits from every corner, including completely unexpected ones.
Content:
Soviet-Yugoslav conflict
Marshal I.B. Tito
After the end of World War II, the world was faced with a new geopolitical and military-strategic reality - the era of “ cold war" The confrontation between the two leading world groups was the main component, a kind of engine of development for many states. The very emergence of the term “Cold War” meant the determined direction of the main rivalry of the post-war years, which took shape in the main vector of confrontation along the East-West line. There is an opinion of a number of modern researchers that reducing the main differences of the warring parties to the struggle of communism and Western democracy as ideologies is demagogic in nature and serves as a kind of screen to cover up the true goals of the warring camps. It should be noted that victory in the world war turned the USSR into a national geopolitical force with traditional historical interests. Thus, the basis of the confrontation between the United States and Western European countries in relation to the Soviet Union was not the denial of the communist regime and the corresponding ideology, but the containment of Moscow as the legal successor of Russian history and Great Russia. Also, certain trends in the relationship between the two hostile blocs also affected the countries of the Balkan region, in particular Yugoslavia. In general, the Balkans played an important role in the post-war plans of both the USSR and Western partners in the anti-Hitler coalition, and it was here that the first centers of tension arose, which grew into crisis situations. While it would be wrong to say that Soviet leaders were geopoliticians in the classical sense of the word, it also cannot be denied that the Kremlin masters were well versed in the geostrategic advantages and weaknesses of the Soviet Union. At the same time, Eastern Europe was viewed by them as nothing more than a kind of “buffer” defensive line from possible manifestations aggression in the future. V.M. Molotov recalled: “In last years Stalin began to become a little arrogant, and I foreign policy I had to demand what Miliukov demanded - the Dardanelles! We conduct fire safety training for Moscow and the regions Stalin: “Come on, press on!” By way of joint ownership." I told him: “They won’t give it.” - “And you demand it.” In 1944-1945, one of the main issues in the foreign policy of both the USSR and the USA was the problem of the Black Sea Straits and the Mediterranean. Moreover, the term “Mediterranean region” in the understanding of the Soviet leadership went beyond the Mediterranean Sea itself and included, as a single whole, all the seas washing the shores of North Africa, Southern and Southeast Europe and Western Asia (the Middle East). Based on this, the indigenous Mediterranean areas were Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Albania, Bulgaria and Romania. If we approach the problem from the perspective of the concept of dividing spheres of influence in Europe directly between European countries, then we can make a distinction between “zones of influence.” In particular, Great Britain and the USSR, which include regions with a certain number of countries, whose governments would have to pursue policies that meet the requirements of the main victorious powers of Hitler's Germany. The Soviet Union could consider its maximum sphere of interests Finland, Sweden, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Romania, the Slavic countries of the Balkan Peninsula, as well as Turkey. The British (the main US ally in Europe) security sphere could include Holland, Belgium, France, Spain, Portugal and Greece. These attempts to divide zones of influence began to take shape at the final stage of the Second World War. In the first stages of the Cold War, the bulk of these states actually found themselves under pressure from the political regimes of the former allied countries in the anti-Hitler coalition. It is worth noting that the Soviet leadership sought to use the favorable conditions in connection with the victorious offensive of the Red Army in Europe to ensure the national interests of the USSR, as they were then understood by Soviet leaders, in the areas of the Black Sea Straits.
Yugoslavia, it is worth noting, stood apart in these conditions. This multinational entity, which arose as a result of the First World War through the unification of the kingdoms of Serbia and Montenegro with the former Balkan possessions of Austria-Hungary (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Slovenia and Croatia) was perhaps the only European state, along with the USSR, that really offered real resistance to the Germans. and the Italian occupiers. Also, it must be emphasized that in Nazi-occupied Yugoslavia in 1941-1945 there was a civil war of “all against all.” In particular, the Serbian Chetnik monarchists (leaders - M. Nedic, D. Letic, D. Mihajlovic, M. Djuic) fought with the Croatian Ustasha fascists A. Pavelic from the puppet state of the NDH. Communist partisans from the People's Liberation Army of Yugoslavia, under the command of the chairman of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia Josip Broz-Tito, fought against both of them. Both the Chetniks (who had several military alliances that operated largely autonomously from each other) and the Communists periodically concluded truces with the German occupation command in order to concentrate forces in the fight against the internal enemy. Until recently, in Russian historical science it was generally accepted that the main burden of the fight against the German occupation regime fell on the lot of I. Broz-Tito. Thus, under the influence of Tito’s propaganda, it was noted that, for example, the Serbian Chetniks focused all their attention on the fight against the partisan army, uniting for this purpose with both the Germans and the Ustasha. And the approach of the Red Army to the Yugoslav borders provided the communists, first of all, with the missing logistical means to defeat internal and external enemies who had been fighting the enemy for three years. However, in Lately, there is another point of view on the events in Yugoslavia in 1941-1945. According to some researchers, NOLA has intensified fighting With by German troops only in 1944, with the approach of Soviet military formations. Prior to this, the most extensive resistance to the occupiers was directly provided by the Chetnik army of Dragoljub “Draža” Mihailovic, a former colonel of the Royal Army of Yugoslavia, on whom the Yugoslav government in exile, located in London, relied.
Be that as it may, with the help of Soviet weapons and Soviet troops, the NOLA liberated part of the territory of Yugoslavia, and then, on its own, defeated the remnants of both internal and external enemies by the spring of 1945. Thus, the Yugoslav communists were able to come to power in the country and claim that they had actually independently defeated the enemy on their territory.
The first disagreements between Stalin and Tito began even before the end of the Second World War. The fact is that on May 1-2, 1945, the Yugoslav army, during successful battles on the Adriatic coast, managed to capture the city of Trieste, literally several hours ahead of the troops of the Western allies rushing there. The situation that arose could well have led to a military clash between the Yugoslavs and the Anglo-American troops. The situation was further complicated by the fact that the USSR and Yugoslavia by that time were bound by a treaty of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance, signed in Moscow on April 11, 1945. Western diplomacy tried to negotiate with the Yugoslavs on the withdrawal of their troops from the occupied zone, including Trieste. The latter were ready to provide the allies only with the port of Trieste and a number of communications, stubbornly refusing to withdraw their army and administration from the area. Having failed to achieve a result, Western diplomats moved on to action at the government level. A note was sent to the Yugoslav government, which did not even talk about the withdrawal of troops from Trieste, but about the cooperation of the Yugoslav troops with the allied command in organizing control under the leadership of the Anglo-Americans. At the same time, the United States and England notified the Kremlin of their notes, making it clear that they considered the USSR as a “patron” of the Yugoslav leaders. Tito responded negatively to the Allied note, declaring, in particular, to the secretary of the Soviet embassy in Belgrade that he would not give up Trieste under any circumstances. In response to this, a directive came from Moscow to direct the Yugoslav leadership to compromise with the Western allies. In particular, Stalin brought to the attention of Tito that the Yugoslavs needed to make concessions: agree to the establishment of Allied control in Trieste and in the territory adjacent to the city, but subject to the maintenance of the Yugoslav military presence in the disputed area. Under pressure from Moscow, Tito was forced to compromise. However, at that time Stalin was still making it clear to the governments of the United States and England that he was supporting the Yugoslavs. In a letter to Truman, he noted that the latter have a legal right to territorial claims, given the contribution they made to the defeat of Nazi Germany. As a result, on June 9, 1945, an agreement was signed in Belgrade by the ambassadors of the United States and Great Britain and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia. This agreement implied even more stringent conditions for the division of Trieste into occupation zones. The western part of this territory came under the full control of the Allied military administration, while the Yugoslavs remained only in the eastern zone. Thus, the USSR, while going into conflict with the West and supporting Belgrade’s territorial claims to Italy, still avoided an extreme aggravation of the situation and had no intention of being drawn into an armed conflict over Yugoslavia.
A negative reaction in Moscow was caused by the refusal of the Yugoslav leadership to sign a peace treaty with Italy, according to which the FPRY was to receive the territory of the Julian region, which did not satisfy the Yugoslav demands for the division of the occupied region of Trieste. Moscow, in early February 1947, informed Tito that if the Yugoslav leaders refused to sign a peace treaty, this could be used by the United States and England to prolong the presence of their troops in Italy, and that the plunder of territories belonging to the SFRY would occur. As a result, the Yugoslavs, under pressure from Moscow, signed an agreement on February 10, 1947, together with all the allied powers.
Similarly, in accordance with its own interests and agreements with the Western powers, the USSR behaved in relation to other territorial claims of Yugoslavia to neighboring countries. The fact is that the Yugoslavs also claimed to annex the Koruš region to it. This region was located in the Austrian province of Carinthia, whose population was predominantly Slovenian. After the First World War, the Koruš region belonged to Yugoslavia, but after a plebiscite held there it passed to Austria. In principle, the USSR was interested in maintaining its influence in southern Austria, because It was beneficial for Moscow to be closer to Yugoslavia than the British and Americans. However, London’s plans for the occupation of Austria included Styria and Carinthia, which were the most economically developed territories of Austria. Thus, as in the case of Trieste, the Western Allies were categorically opposed to any Yugoslav presence on Austrian territory and envisaged the most extreme measures if Yugoslav troops entered Carinthian territory. The USSR, in turn, recognized the claims of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia to the territory of southern Austria, but assumed that the latter would annex Yugoslavia by proxy, excluding a military method of solving the problem. In the summer of 1947, the Yugoslavs began independent negotiations with the British on the issue of Carinthia. This became known in Moscow, which Stalin really did not like. Taking advantage of Yugoslav independence as an excuse to resolve the problem of annexing the Koruš region, Moscow declared that it was not going to further support Yugoslav demands in Carinthia.
Belgrade's attempts to pursue an independent policy in matters of satisfying its territorial claims were of subordinate importance for the USSR, and its position depended on specific pragmatic interests in relations with the Western powers. The Soviet leadership, which felt itself a winner in the great war, at the same time could not ignore the gigantic human and material losses that the Soviet Union suffered. Based on this, it took a pragmatic course to preserve and defend “the world’s first socialist state,” counting on the understanding of these realities on the part of its allies.
It is likely that in the first post-war years Washington was inclined to regard Yugoslavia as the conductor of Soviet foreign policy in the Balkan region, and, accordingly, perceived certain steps of the Yugoslav leadership as a direct threat to its aspirations and goals in the Balkans. Americans were particularly concerned about the situation after the start of civil war in Greece in 1946. In addition, as American politicians noted, at the same time the USSR increased pressure on Turkey on the issue of revising the Straits regime. Fearing the increased influence on the situation in Greece (help for communist partisans from the Democratic Army of Greece) from Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, as well as pressure from Soviet diplomacy on the ruling regime in Turkey, G. Truman turned to the US Congress with a program to allocate funds to maintain Greek and Turkish ruling regimes. The main theses of this program were called the “Truman Doctrine,” according to which the United States could interfere in the internal affairs of any country in order to “help free countries get rid of the influence of totalitarian regimes on their politics.”
On March 17, 1947, in Brussels, England, France, Belgium, Holland, and Luxembourg signed an agreement on the Western Alliance, which became a milestone in the formation of the Western military-political bloc. It would therefore seem quite logical that the Soviet Union would strive to move along the path of strengthening its positions in the Balkans, where Yugoslavia could become the main support. Also, there is reason to argue that the development of the situation in the context of further deepening cooperation between Moscow and Belgrade could follow the path of establishing Soviet-Yugoslav hegemony, both in this region and in the Eastern Mediterranean. And the Soviet-Yugoslav rupture that soon followed was not only a shameful, but also a tragic milestone in the history of the relationship between two countries historically close to each other, in particular, for this reason.
At a time when relations between the USSR and Western countries deteriorated to the limit, a conflict occurred between Stalin and Tito, Yugoslavia was excommunicated from the “Socialist camp,” and a period of alienation and mutual accusations began between Moscow and Belgrade. This conflict continued until 1953, and after the death of the Soviet leader it began to decline, and relations between the two countries finally normalized after the signing of declarations in Belgrade (1955) and Moscow (1956).
In the former Yugoslavia, it was generally accepted by official political circles and historians that the conflict occurred due to dissatisfaction with the Soviet higher circles with the unique way of building socialism in the FPRY and attempts to pursue a relatively independent foreign policy in the Balkan region. According to this point of view, contradictions arose at the end of the Second World War and developed progressively, gradually leading to the final Soviet-Yugoslav break.
Interest in this problem has increased in former USSR approximately from the mid-80s, from the beginning of perestroika, and continued after the collapse of the Soviet Union and Federal Yugoslavia. In the process of moving away from the official socialist line of the Soviet leadership, declassified documents fell into the hands of domestic Slavists, in particular, secret correspondence between Moscow and Belgrade, as well as a number of other documents that shed light on the main contradictions between the leaders of the USSR and Yugoslavia during the first post-war decade. This allowed a more comprehensive look at the roots of the conflict that broke out, and gave domestic scientists grounds to argue about the ideological and political reasons for the Soviet-Yugoslav gap. Also, Russian researchers are inclined to believe that the conflict between Stalin and Tito was closely connected with the aggravation of contradictions between the USSR and Western countries and the development of specific military-political tasks of the two hostile camps in the Balkans. At the same time, it is necessary to connect the conflict between the USSR and Yugoslavia through the prism of the relationship of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) with the communist parties of the Eastern Bloc countries. These problems have received wide coverage in a number of works of domestic scientists. Some questions also remain unsolved, concerning, in particular, Stalin’s true intentions in the foreign policy pursued by the Soviet Union in the Balkans, about military-political calculations and the goals of separating Yugoslavia from the countries of the socialist camp. Questions also arise regarding a possible armed conflict between the USSR and Yugoslavia, as well as the involvement of other “people’s democracy” countries in it, and the attitude towards these hypothetical steps of the Soviet leadership in Washington, America’s use of the conflict in its strategic interests in the Balkans.
Post-war Soviet-Yugoslav relations were characterized by interaction and close cooperation. This, in particular, was noted by the Russian historian L.Ya. Gibian. Such steps, on a mutually beneficial basis, concerned both military-political relations at the end of the war (arming the NOLA at the expense of the Red Army, joint operations to liberate the country), and the participation of the USSR in post-war construction in the FPRY in the military and civilian spheres. These actions were discussed more than once at bilateral meetings in the Kremlin. From the recording of the negotiations, it becomes obvious that Moscow showed great interest in the existence of a strong Yugoslavia in the military-political sense. However, it is worth noting that even then Stalin was too worried, in his opinion, about Belgrade’s independent policy in relations with the neighboring countries of the FPRY. In particular, this concerned the prospects for signing an Albanian-Yugoslav treaty on mutual friendship and assistance. Such steps, according to Stalin, could in a certain sense lead to serious contradictions between the Balkan allies and England. But the most important thing is that Stalin expressed his wishes to coordinate the foreign policy steps of Yugoslavia with Moscow.
Nevertheless, the Soviet leadership pursued a policy of establishing Yugoslavia in the Balkan region as a powerful ally in the military-political sense. However, even then Stalin was concerned about the rash, in his opinion, foreign policy steps of the Yugoslav leadership in relation to the territories disputed with Italy and Austria, which could lead to serious consequences, including military intervention by the United States and England. Moscow, especially in light of the establishment of a nuclear monopoly by the United States in May 1945, adhered to a policy of compromise with the West during the period 1945-1947, seeking to ensure its interests in the process of peace negotiations.
In the post-war years, the Soviet Union actively developed the idea of creating a powerful military-political Balkan union, with the participation of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria in it. But already from the very origins of possible creation of this union disagreements arose between the CPY and the BCP regarding the status of the latter in the future political entity. G. Dimitrov saw the creation of a new state on the principles of a confederation, while Tito envisioned the entry of Bulgaria into the already created FPRY with the same rights as the other peoples of the Federation - Serbs, Croats, Macedonians, Slovenes and Montenegrins. Dissatisfied with the steps of Belgrade and Sofia that were not coordinated with Moscow, Stalin did not approve of plans to absorb Bulgaria into Yugoslavia already in January 1945. The Western allies also opposed the emergence of the Balkan Union at the Yalta conference, who became aware of such plans. In 1946, the Soviet leadership asked Belgrade to wait with plans to create an alliance with the Bulgarians until a peace treaty with Sofia was signed.
Also, Stalin's dissatisfaction was caused by Tito's policy towards Albania, although the patronizing tendencies of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia towards the Albanian communists were formed during the war and were generally approved by the Soviet leadership. Also, the Soviet leader did not object to Albania’s entry into the FPRY, but his position changed radically due to, in his opinion, Tito’s steps in this direction being too independent of Moscow. Although Stalin verbally supported the Yugoslav-Albanian rapprochement, subsequent events showed that the Soviet leader was against Tito's ambitions on this issue. Russian historians N. Vasilyeva and V. Gavrilov are inclined to argue that this policy of Stalin was not consistent, taking into account the civil war in Greece and the possible creation of a powerful pro-Soviet bloc on its borders.
It was the rapprochement of the three countries - Yugoslavia, Albania and Bulgaria - and the priority role of the Yugoslavs in this rapprochement that caused a negative reaction from Moscow, which sought a hierarchical principle of relations within the socialist camp with a single center and vector of mutual cooperation in the Kremlin.
On August 7, 1947, a communiqué was published on the agreements reached in the Bulgarian-Yugoslav negotiations and on the basic principles for the signing of the Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance between Belgrade and Sofia. The West clearly regarded such an event as a threat to peace in the Balkans and condemned the steps of Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. Stalin also condemned the disclosure of the text of the communique, believing that voicing the principles of the Treaty would entail interference in Yugoslav-Bulgarian relations between the United States and England. According to the Soviet leadership, the FPRY and Bulgaria made a mistake by concluding a pact, moreover, on an indefinite basis (as Tito said), despite Moscow’s warnings. The Kremlin believed that reactionary forces in the West would take advantage of the publication of the communiqué, increasing their intervention in Greece and military presence in Turkey. After Dimitrov’s “apology” and his request to Tito to annul this act, the Yugoslav leader assured Moscow that he had no intention of presenting Stalin with a fait accompli, and the tension was temporarily calmed. As a result, on November 27, 1947, in Eksinovgrad (Bulgaria), the Bulgarian-Yugoslav Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation was concluded for a period of 20 years, which emphasized the main attitude towards the recommendations of Stalin, who considered it erroneous to conclude this agreement on an indefinite basis.
In the fall of 1947, the United States and Great Britain were worried about the active assistance from Yugoslavia to the Greek communists. And they considered the signing of the Yugoslav-Bulgarian treaty a threat of intervention by socialist regimes in the civil war in Greece. The creation of a communist Provisional Democratic Government of Greece (PDG), which counted on recognition by Belgrade, Tirana, Sofia and, possibly, Moscow, and the announcement of this on the radio in Belgrade, was perceived in Washington as a threat of military intervention by Yugoslavia on the side of the Greek partisans. The United States condemned the creation of the UDPG at the UN, also starting consideration in Congress of the participation of its armed forces on the side of the Greek government and a possible reaction to such steps in Moscow. The Americans considered Yugoslavia the main culprit of the crisis in the Balkans. Washington was also concerned about the creation in Eastern Europe of a union of states with pro-Soviet regimes, especially after G. Dimitrov’s speech on January 17, 1947 on the issue of creating a federation of countries of Central and South-Eastern Europe, with the inclusion of the Balkan and Danube powers, as well as Poland, Czechoslovakia and Greece. It is this speech of Dimitrov that domestic historians are inclined to consider as a prelude to the Soviet-Yugoslav conflict that soon broke out.
This thoughtless statement allowed the West to assume that the idea of creating a giant federation was nothing more than an invention of Moscow. It still remains a mystery what prompted Dimitrov to do such a short-sighted act in the context of the outbreak of the Cold War. Moscow's response was not long in coming. In a telegram to the Bulgarian leader, Stalin called Dimitrov's statement about the creation of a federation of socialist countries harmful, since it facilitates the struggle of the Western powers with the countries of “people's democracy.” In the context of the outbreak of a crisis between the West and the countries of the socialist camp, when the consolidation of all forces was necessary, Stalin could not allow any country in the Eastern bloc to act independently. Outside the framework of the Kremlin’s course, in which the Balkan region was probably allocated a special place. The excessive and premature activity of the Yugoslavs in Greek affairs and in Albania, in the context of possible US intervention in the Greek civil war, apparently did not correspond to Moscow’s foreign policy plans. Irritation in the Soviet capital regarding Belgrade's independent actions grew, intensified by messages from Soviet envoys from Yugoslavia, who interpreted all actions of the Yugoslavs as a consequence of a negative attitude towards the USSR. There were tendencies of the Tito leadership to overestimate their own strengths and a reluctance to carry out directives from Moscow and listen to advice from the Kremlin.
Stalin's dissatisfaction with Yugoslavia's strengthening of its positions in Albania became especially acute. On January 19, 1948, Tito sent the Albanian leader Enver Hoxha a proposal to provide a base in southern Albania to house a Yugoslav division, in accordance with the danger of a possible Greek invasion of Albania with the support of the British and Americans. This proposal coincided with Dimitrov’s statement above and, most importantly, was not consulted with Moscow. Moscow asked for clarification whether this statement was true, which subsequently had grounds to lead to a military invasion of the Anglo-Americans in Albania. Tito confirmed Soviet ambassador in Yugoslavia, Lavrentevu, the existence of a project to station a Yugoslav division in Albania, mentioning the threat of an invasion of the southern territories of this country by troops of the Greek monarchical government with the aim of defeating the guerrillas of the VPGD. At the same time, Tito noted that if Moscow is against the movement of Yugoslav troops into Albania, then the Yugoslav leadership will definitely listen to the Kremlin’s recommendations and abandon this idea. To influence the leaders of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, the Soviet Union invited the leaders of these states to secret negotiations held in Moscow on February 10, 1947. From the Soviet side, Stalin, Molotov, Zhdanov, Malenkov, Suslov took part in them; from Bulgarian – Dimitrov, Kostov, Kolarov; Yugoslavs - Kardel, Djilas, Bakarich. As Edward Kardelj recalled, Tito refused a trip to Moscow, citing poor health, which gives grounds to assert that the Yugoslav leader had any concerns. At the negotiations, the Soviet side pointed out that it was premature to announce a Bulgarian-Yugoslav treaty, especially an indefinite one. The Yugoslavs were also criticized for their desire to introduce a division into Albania, which was not coordinated with Moscow, which could have caused intervention by Western countries, since Albania had not yet been admitted to the UN, was not recognized by the United States and England, and had not asked the FPRY to station Yugoslav forces on its territory, and this could be interpreted by the West as aggression on the part of Yugoslavia. Stalin also raised the question of the advisability of helping the Greek partisans, since he was probably already thinking about winding down the civil war there, in the face of heightened contradictions with the United States and Great Britain in this region. It is worth noting that at this time Far East a major geopolitical breakthrough was emerging - the victory of the communists in China. Kim Il Sung reported major partisan successes in South Korea and proposed to deal with Syngman Rhee in one fell swoop. Stalin did not intend to wage a war on two fronts, while the “Far Eastern option” looked preferable in order to incite anti-colonial protests in the East. Thus, it was possible to stretch the Anglo-American front of military influence and thereby protect the European part of the USSR from a military threat, as N. Vasilyeva and V. Gavrilov believe.
According to domestic researchers, a radical turn to the policy of confrontation with Yugoslavia occurred among the leadership of the USSR after it became known about the decisions of the meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia on February 19, 1948, where the Yugoslav delegation reported on its trip to Moscow. Then it was decided not to agree to the federation with Bulgaria already being imposed by the Kremlin. As a result of the extended meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia on March 1 of the same year, a statement was made by the majority of Yugoslav leaders about defending an independent position in matters of economic development of Yugoslavia and the construction of the country's armed forces. The idea of creating a federation with Bulgaria was called premature, since Soviet influence in Sofia was great, and an alliance with it could become a means of unwanted influence from Moscow on Yugoslav politics. The course to further defend the interests of Belgrade in Albania was also confirmed. Lavrentyev reported the nature of the meeting to Moscow in negative tones, which caused Stalin’s final hostile attitude towards Yugoslavia. Apparently, it was then that the Kremlin decided to take a tough course towards Belgrade.
Moscow recalled all its military representatives from Yugoslavia, explaining this by a “negative attitude” in an “unfriendly” environment on the part of the Yugoslav authorities. Also on March 19, Tito was notified of the decision of the USSR Government to recall all civilian specialists from Yugoslavia, motivated by the Yugoslav side’s refusal to provide Soviet representatives with information about the country’s economy. Also on March 19, 1948, the foreign policy department of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks prepared a certificate “On the anti-Marxist attitudes of the leaders of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia in matters of domestic and foreign policy.” The certificate provided an ideological basis for the Kremlin’s radical policy towards the FPRY. The Yugoslav leadership was accused of the following negative trends:
1) Ignoring Marxist-Leninist theory
2) Manifestation of an incorrect, unfriendly attitude towards the USSR and the CPSU (b)
3) Underestimation of the difficulties of building socialism in Yugoslavia, opportunism towards the kulaks
4) Reassessment of one’s strengths in building socialism
5) Allowing elements of adventurism in assessing future prospects and in pursuing foreign policy. Claims for a leadership role in the Balkans and Danube countries.
The main accusation in this letter was ignoring the USSR as the decisive force in the camp of socialism and people's democracy during the period of the most acute problem of contradictions with Western countries. This certificate was used to respond to Tito’s message of March 20, where he did not show repentance, but, on the contrary, in an extremely polite tone, rejected accusations of unfriendliness towards the USSR, and asked for more compelling reasons for the recall of Soviet specialists from the FPRY. The result was a response letter dated March 27, 1948, sent to Tito and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia on behalf of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and signed by Stalin and Molotov. It cited some actions of the Yugoslav government, in particular, the reduction of Soviet representatives by 60 percent, as well as imaginary accusations against the USSR by the Yugoslavs of Soviet great-power chauvinism and attempts to economically enslave Yugoslavia.
On April 12-13, at the secret plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, almost all speakers admitted the mistakes and weaknesses of the Yugoslav Communist Party, but categorically rejected accusations that Yugoslavia was acting contrary to the foreign policy line of the USSR. The response of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia to the letter of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Yugoslavia, prepared by Tito, was transmitted to the Soviet ambassador to the FPRY on April 19, 1948. The Yugoslav letter rejected accusations of an unfriendly attitude towards the USSR, and argued that the Soviet message was not friendly criticism, but a condemnation of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and its leaders, and the Communists of Yugoslavia could not accept such criticism. In turn, Staley was not inclined to a balanced and calm analysis of the disagreements that arose and did not want to tolerate at least some dissent in his ranks. The image of the Soviet leader in the eyes of communists around the world as the main fighter of all anti-imperialist forces was too infallible.
In the process of a new exchange of messages between the Soviet and Yugoslav sides in May 1948, accusations of apostasy from Marxism-Leninism and anti-Sovietism were clearly raised against Yugoslavia, which oriented Moscow towards an anti-Titov campaign within the Communist Party of Yugoslavia itself and within the Comintern. Through the prism of the conflict that broke out, and based on now known archival documents, it can be assumed that when starting the anti-Yugoslav campaign, Soviet leaders were seriously concerned about the state of affairs in a number of Eastern European communist parties that were part of the Cominform.
The flywheel of the conflict was launched at full power after the Information Bureau meeting that took place from June 19 to 23, 1948 near Bucharest. Stalin expected public repentance on the part of the Yugoslav communists, and Tito in particular. The refusal to admit their mistakes and the non-participation of the Yugoslavs in the meeting was perceived as disagreement with the general line, which entailed the excommunication of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and Yugoslavia from the socialist camp. The result of the meeting itself was the well-known resolution of the Information Bureau “On the situation in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia,” which was published on June 29, 1948 by the newspapers of eight communist parties, and the whole world learned about the conflict with Yugoslavia. In this document, the Yugoslav leaders were accused of abandoning Marxist-Leninist ideas, moving to the position of nationalism, and the existing Yugoslav regime and the Communist Party of Yugoslavia were declared to be outside the Cominform. Speaking at the V Congress of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia on June 25, Tito stated that he was striving, no matter what, to restore good relations with the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and ended his speech with a toast to Stalin. The congress resolution stated that Yugoslavia remained faithful to the basic communist principles, that it felt itself to be part of the “socialist camp,” and that disagreements would not affect the relations between people's democracies under the leadership of the USSR. Stalin's calculations for a split in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and the removal of Tito from the leadership of the country failed.
The signal for a further escalation of anti-Yugoslav propaganda was the article “Where the nationalism of Tito’s group leads in Yugoslavia” published on September 8, 1948 in Pravda. It argued that the “Tito faction,” a minority in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, had taken the path of complicity with imperialism and turned into a “degenerating clique of political murderers.” In this spirit, under monstrous slogans demanding the exposure of the “fascist-type dictatorship”, the fight against Tito’s clique – “spies and murderers” and other sets of lies and insinuations, an ideological campaign against the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and the entire FPR took place in the USSR and other countries of people’s democracy.
However, not everyone in Yugoslavia supported Tito's policies. According to Yugoslav data, out of 468,175 members and 51,612 candidates for membership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, 55 thousand communists spoke in favor of the Information Bureau resolution. Of these, 2,616 people were representatives of the country’s governing bodies, 4,183 were JNA military personnel. All of them were expelled from the party, and 16,312 people were repressed and imprisoned in special concentration camps on the islands of the Adriatic Sea - Goli Otok and Grgur. About 5 thousand people became political emigrants in the USSR and other countries.
Pressure on Yugoslavia took a variety of forms: an economic blockade, a constant threat of military force, including such elements as the creation of special sabotage detachments with the aim of bringing them into the territory of the FPRY in the form of terrorist groups. All this was part of the arsenal of “psychological warfare”, which was intended to destabilize the situation in Yugoslavia, sow fear and the threat of invasion. The USSR stopped military and economic supplies to Yugoslavia, which dealt a severe blow to the Yugoslav economy. Yugoslavia was also not allowed to participate in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance created in January, contrary to the treaties of friendship and cooperation of the FPRY with all countries of the socialist camp. In response to a note of protest on this issue from the Yugoslav government, the Soviet Union offered, in exchange for participation in CMEA, the leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia to renounce anti-Soviet policies. As a result of the economic blockade, Yugoslavia's trade deficit increased by 49 percent of Yugoslav exports. Western countries immediately took advantage of the trade vacuum in the created conditions. The internationalization of the conflict resulted in the emergence of a kind of triangle of the main interested parties: the USSR - Yugoslavia - the USA, where the latter also had their own views on the development of the situation in the Balkan region.
It makes sense to argue that the Soviet-Yugoslav conflict was beneficial to Moscow. The fact is that assistance to the Greek partisans was stopped due to the freezing of aid to Yugoslavia. This made it easier for the USSR to curtail communist resistance in Greece in order to pursue a policy of compromise with Western countries in this region. At a meeting in New York on May 4, 1949, in which A. Gromyko and US Assistant Secretary of State D. Rusk took part, it was decided to accept the proposal of the KKE Central Committee to cease fire and hold parliamentary elections in Greece with the participation of all political parties, including the communists. Moscow also sought, on an equal basis with the Western powers, to participate in the development of plans to stabilize the internal political situation in Greece. At the same time, on July 10, 1949, Yugoslavia closed its border with Greece, which was one of the main reasons for the defeat of the Greek partisans in August of the same year. The Kremlin immediately took advantage of this, placing full responsibility for the defeat of the Greek rebels on Yugoslavia, although the Soviet Union itself had been in favor of ending the civil war in Greece since 1947. Also, going into a conscious conflict with the FPRY, Moscow tried to comprehensively strengthen its influence in the countries of Eastern Europe, using these countries, in particular, for provocations towards the FPRY. The incitement of ethno-territorial contradictions between Yugoslavia and neighboring countries was encouraged; the Macedonian problem was especially used, designed to intensify the confrontation of Yugoslavia with Bulgaria and Greece. In particular, in Albania, special intelligence centers were created on the border areas, which were supposed to be responsible for sending armed groups to Yugoslav territory. They were supposed to conduct anti-Yugoslav propaganda, agitate the local population to flee to Albania, provoke acts of sabotage on communication lines, and carry out terrorist attacks against representatives of the Yugoslav authorities. It is also worth noting that the Government of the FPR in the period from September 25, 1948 to August 31, 1950 sent 95 notes to the governments of Albania, Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary regarding armed incidents caused by the actions of the border services of these countries. Speaking at the IV session of the UN General Assembly, E. Cardel announced 219 armed incidents on various sections of the border of the FPRY from July 1, 1948 to September 1, 1949. According to Yugoslav sources cited by N. Vasilyeva and V. Gavrilov, the number of incidents subsequently increased and amounted to:
1) In 1950 – 937;
2) In 1951 – 1517;
3) In 1952 – 2390.
According to Western sources, the number of armed conflicts of a local nature on the borders of the FPRY with its Eastern European neighbors amounted to more than 5 thousand in the period from 1949 to 1952.
To prove that they were right in alienating Josip Broz Tito, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and the FPRY from the ranks of the Information Bureau and the socialist camp in general, the Soviet leadership took up its favorite activity - searching for internal enemies, apostates from orthodox Marxism and traitors. From 1949 to 1952, a series of Kremlin-inspired exposing trials of a number of prominent party and statesmen people's democracies. In fabricated cases, they were accused of having connections with the imperialist authorities and supporting Tito’s “nationalist-fascist” regime, as well as of subversive activities against the USSR and other socialist countries. It should be noted that the conflict with Yugoslavia was used by the political elites of Eastern European countries for denunciation in order to settle personal scores and the struggle for power. In Albania, in May 1949, Koci Dzodze, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Internal Affairs of Albania, was convicted and executed. In Bulgaria, in the context of the illness and death of G. Dimitrov, a struggle against opportunism in the BCP began, the victim of which was Deputy Prime Minister Traicho Kostov. The anti-Yugoslav campaign reached particular proportions during the trial in Hungary in September 1949 of Foreign Minister Laszlo Rajk. He was accused of espionage for the FPRY, preparing a coup in Hungary and conspiracy against the USSR, as well as collaboration with the intelligence services of Western European countries.
On October 25, 1949, the Soviet government announced the impossibility of Yugoslav Ambassador K. Mrazovich's further stay in Moscow, and in January of the same year demanded the departure of the charge d'affaires. Since the end of 1949, while diplomatic relations were formally maintained, all ties between the USSR and Yugoslavia were interrupted. The example of the USSR was followed by other countries of people's democracy, which broke off treaties of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance with the FPRY.
On the part of Yugoslavia, in turn, there was a response to Moscow, expressed in a broad propaganda counter-offensive against the USSR. The Soviet leadership and the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks were accused of attempting to degenerate socialism in the USSR, a great-power, hegemonic foreign policy, and aggressive pressure on Yugoslavia. Belgrade began to be viewed as a very real possibility of an armed attack on Yugoslavia. The country introduced some measures to strengthen the combat capability of the JNA. In particular, spending on military purposes was increased by 23 percent, and a special strategy was developed that took into account the experience of guerrilla warfare. The Yugoslav army, in the event of an enemy invasion, had to retreat to the mountains, if necessary, even to the sea, in order to draw enemy troops into grueling battles. From the border areas, important industrial facilities began to be transferred inland.
However, modern scientists, in whose hands are secret documents, are inclined to argue that an armed attack by the countries of the socialist camp on Yugoslavia was not planned, although, in particular, in the West they were sure of the opposite. Border incidents were of a bilateral nature and were expressed in illegal crossing of the border on both sides. Moreover, the countries neighboring the FPRY were not only unable to carry out any military operations against Yugoslavia, but were also unlikely to be able to resist a sufficiently strong JNA. As noted in the reports of Soviet military advisers, for example, the state of affairs in the armies of Bulgaria and Romania was in a deplorable state.
In the West, the conflict between Stalin and Tito was initially treated with distrust, as they considered the break to be a cunning move by the Soviet leader for his foreign policy goals. However, this conflict soon began to be viewed in the United States from the standpoint of the global American-Soviet confrontation and its use to strengthen the North Atlantic bloc. Even with the preservation of Tito's regime, the West's interest in Yugoslavia's departure from the USSR and socialist countries was obvious. From a military point of view, the FPR, not in hostile positions, would no longer exert pressure on the Italian border, and Tito's army could be excluded from the overall balance of power of the Eastern Bloc. The leading circles of the Western powers came to the conclusion that the socialist path of development of Yugoslavia cannot be interrupted by force, and the only possible line of Western policy towards Yugoslavia should be to use the situation in its own interests, providing economic assistance to the FPRY with the expectation of obtaining concessions in the foreign policy sphere. With the outbreak of the Korean War, the situation in the Balkan region began to be considered by the United States and its allies from the perspective of the possible development of events here according to the Far Eastern scenario, as well as from the point of view of strengthening NATO in the Balkans and the Mediterranean. It is probable that even then the American government had plans to include Yugoslavia in a military alliance, along with Turkey, Greece, and Italy.
In 1950, due to the drought that befell Yugoslavia and the need to supply the population with food, the Yugoslav government was forced to turn to the American administration with a request for economic assistance. In mid-December, the US Congress approved the “Emergency Relief Act for Yugoslavia” and the allocation of $50 million for the FPR from Marshall Plan funds. England provided assistance on a loan basis in the amount of 3 million pounds sterling. In the spring of 1951, the United States, Great Britain and France developed a triple program of gratuitous assistance to Yugoslavia to cover the deficit in its balance of payments for the current year, and also agreed to coordinate their business relations with this country through economic missions in Belgrade. Negotiations were held with other creditors, in particular with West Germany. In October 1951, the World Bank provided Yugoslavia with a loan of $28 million.
In accordance with the agreement between the United States and Yugoslavia of November 14, 1951, the Americans pledged to supply military equipment and materials to the FPRY. For their part, the Yugoslavs were supposed to use American military assistance to increase their military potential, as well as export strategic raw materials and semi-finished products to the United States on preferential terms. The price for American assistance was very high, since in fact Yugoslavia had to express its readiness to perform defensive functions in the Balkans in the interests of the West. However, Yugoslavia continued to avoid direct military-political cooperation with Western countries and inclusion in the NATO system for political reasons.
According to information received by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, in 1951-1952 new trade and financial agreements were concluded with Yugoslavia or renewed by the United States, England, France, West Germany, Italy, Austria, Belgium, Sweden, and Greece. Until mid-1955, the total amount of economic assistance to this country across all lines amounted to $598.5 million. In addition, thanks to American assistance, 37 new military factories were built, and, according to domestic researchers, by January 1, 1955, Yugoslavia received the following amount of weapons from the United States:
F-84 Thunderjet jet aircraft - 40 units; bombers Dehaviland, Mosquito MK-38 - 150 units; Lockheed T-33 training aircraft – 4 units; transport aircraft Conver-340 – 3 units; Sikorsky S-51 helicopters – 10 units; medium tanks Sherman M-4 - 500 units; medium tanks Paton M-47 – 100 units; light tanks Chaffee M-42 – 84 units; artillery pieces of caliber above 75 mm - 600 units. The bulk of the artillery consisted of medium-caliber anti-aircraft guns, anti-tank guns and a small number of 155 mm guns and 203 mm howitzers of obsolete models.
It is possible to argue that the West has consistently pursued a policy of including Yugoslavia, albeit indirectly, into its military-political bloc, and this should have been served by the implementation of the idea of creating a regional union of three countries - Greece, Turkey, Yugoslavia. However, the proposals of Western diplomats for joint military planning of these countries received a negative assessment at a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia at the end of 1952. The West's policy towards the FPRY was assessed as aimed at obtaining maximum returns and operational military information from the Yugoslavs without adequate compensation and turning Yugoslavia into a dependent state. However, a tripartite treaty of friendship and cooperation was signed between the FPRY, Greece and Turkey in Ankara on February 28, 1953. This agreement was viewed in the West as an intermediate one on the path to uniting the states that signed it into a military pro-Western bloc, which would become a serious force opposing the interests of the USSR in the Mediterranean.
However, 1953 made significant adjustments to change the foreign policy direction in Yugoslavia, primarily related to the death of Stalin and the Trieste crisis.
The news of the death of the Soviet leader caught Tito on the eve of his trip to Great Britain. At the same time, on his behalf, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia V. Micunovich visited the Soviet embassy, expressing condolences on behalf of the Yugoslav leadership on the occasion of Stalin's death.
The Trieste crisis was a continuation of the Yugoslav-Italian post-war disputes over the status of the Istrian peninsula. At a conference in London in October 1953, an Anglo-American decision was made to transfer part of Trieste - zone “A” to Italian control. The conflict reached its climax when a report on this issue appeared in the press on October 8, 1953. On the same day, a number of demonstrations took place in Yugoslavia, and Tito personally spoke out in favor of maintaining positions in this region. However, at a subsequent conference in London in October 1954, it was decided to completely transfer Trieste under the control of the Italian administration, with the exception of a small zone - 11.5 km with a population of 3.5 thousand, which remained under the jurisdiction of Yugoslavia.
Apparently, the loss of Trieste contributed to the decision in Belgrade to weaken the dependence of the FPRY on the West and restore closer contacts with the Kremlin. Despite this, Yugoslavia, however, signed the Balkan Pact together with Greece and Turkey on August 9, 1954. However, due to the Greek-Turkish contradictions that soon began around the Cyprus problem, this pact actually ceased to exist. Already at this time, the Yugoslav leadership began to adapt to the existing policy in relations between the West and the socialist countries, developing the basic outlines of a policy of equidistance between the two hostile ideological camps. Subsequently, this course was called the policy of “non-alignment”. In the early 50s, Yugoslavia began to establish contacts at the UN with representatives of the countries of Asia and Africa that had recently freed themselves from colonial dependence. In the fall of 1954, Josip Broz Tito went on a friendly visit to these countries.
The ideological proximity of the Tito regime to the USSR and the countries of Eastern Europe, as well as the expectation of certain benefits after the normalization of relations with the Soviet Union, influenced, according to domestic experts, the decision of the Yugoslav leadership to meet Soviet initiatives to resume interstate ties. On June 6, 1953, the Yugoslavs agreed to the Soviet proposal to exchange ambassadors. In the USSR, anti-Yugoslav propaganda was stopped, newspapers of the Yugoslav political emigration stopped publishing, and its organizations were dissolved. In June 1954, the Central Committee of the CPSU sent a letter to the Central Committee of the Union of Communists of Yugoslavia (the new name of the former Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia) proposing a complete normalization of relations, for which it was proposed to hold a Soviet-Yugoslav summit meeting. On November 26, 1954, the plenum of the Central Committee of the SKY approved Moscow’s proposal for rapprochement. However, a statement was made that Yugoslavia was not going to return to the socialist camp, at the same time, there was also no talk of the Yugoslavs renouncing socialism and transitioning to capitalism.
As a result of diplomatic contacts, an agreement was reached to hold a summit meeting of the leaders of the two countries in Belgrade in May 1955. It is also worth noting that the Yugoslav issue was used by N.S. Khrushchev to fight his political opponents within the CPSU Central Committee. On May 26, 1955, the First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee arrived in Belgrade, where, in a speech at the airport, he noted that all the materials on which the grave accusations against Yugoslavia and insults against it were based were fabricated, in his words, by “enemies of the people” - Beria , Abakumov and others. The Soviet leadership, therefore, did not intend to reveal the real causes of the conflict. On June 2, 1955, both sides signed the Belgrade Declaration, which determined that henceforth Soviet-Yugoslav relations should be built on the principles of complete equality, non-interference in internal affairs, independence and sovereignty, territorial integrity and the cessation of propaganda and disinformation that sow distrust and interfere international cooperation.
The new Ambassador of Yugoslavia V. Mičunović arrived in Moscow on March 24, 1956, thus diplomatic relations between Belgrade and Moscow were fully restored. In the middle of the same year, a decision was made, also not long in coming, to dissolve the Information Bureau. However, although relations were resumed, Yugoslavia did not undertake any partnership obligations in relation to the socialist camp.
It should be noted that for the United States, Yugoslavia continued to play an important role in politics in Eastern Europe after overcoming the conflict with the Soviet Union. Independence from Moscow, the state of equal distance from the two blocs, the economic path of building “managerial socialism”, separate from the rest of the socialist countries, served for the West to maintain the previous course towards Yugoslavia, taking into account its disintegrating role in the communist world. This explains why Western politicians were satisfied strategic importance Yugoslavia in the conditions of the Cold War, using this country, its role in the socialist world, in one’s own interests, encouraging the development of “Yugoslav nationalism”, a special path in politics and economics pursued by Belgrade.
JOSEP BROZ TITO:
“For our people, the conflict and especially the resolution undoubtedly represented a severe trauma, because we in Yugoslavia, despite numerous doubts, still believed in the Soviet Union, believed in Stalin... We are not ashamed of these illusions... They played a positive role, testifying to our deep belief in progress and socialism. In the June days of 1948, when Stalin trampled them so mercilessly, so roughly, it was terribly difficult for us. But we have not lost faith in socialism, but we have begun to lose faith in Stalin..."Dedijer V. Novi prilozi za biografiju Josipa Broz Tita. T.3. S. 362. Beograd, 1984.
S. Vukomanovic-Tempo, member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia in 1948:
“The news of the conflict with the USSR was greeted by Yugoslav communists with great confusion and misunderstanding, and the unshakable faith in Stalin and his authority among ordinary Yugoslav communists forced the Yugoslav leadership not to mention his name as the leader of the anti-Yugoslav campaign.”Vukmanovic-Tempo S. Revolucija koja tece. Knj. 2. S.79. Beograd, 1981.
E.Yu.Guskova, doctor historical sciences, head of the Center for the Study of the Contemporary Balkan Crisis at the Institute of Slavic Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences.
“Speaking about Montenegro and the Montenegrins, one cannot help but pay tribute to this people, who throughout history have carried in their hearts an ardent love for Russia. During the difficult years of discord between political leaders, when it was impossible to even mention Russia, Montenegrins whispered about it to their children and grandchildren. Few people in our country know that 6,560 Montenegrins - the elite, the flower of the nation - were convicted in 1948 and spent many months in the casemates of Goly Otok because they remained loyal to Russia. They could not renounce Moscow, and to the investigator’s question: “Are you for Tito or for Stalin?” They answered: “I am for Russia.”From the book: Guskova E.Yu. History of the Yugoslav crisis (1990-2000). P. 587. M., 2000.
Ivanovsky Sergey
Severance of relations between Yugoslavia and the USSR
At first it seemed that the FPRY would cooperate closely with the USSR, but in practice everything turned out to be not so simple, and a conflict began to brew between the two countries. The fact is that the “peasant leader” (as Josip Broz Tito was called by V.M. Molotov), although he was a convinced communist, did not always follow “Moscow’s orders.” He believed, not without reason, that during the war the partisans received relatively little support from the USSR, and in the post-war years, despite all the promises of I.V. Stalin, the USSR did not provide sufficient economic assistance to Yugoslavia. On the other hand, the active foreign policy of Marshal Tito (he received this title in 1943) did not please Stalin and his circle.
On June 28, 1948, the contradictions that had been accumulating for a long time broke out. It happened as follows. On June 19–23, a meeting of the Cominform (Communist Information Bureau of Communist and Workers' Parties) was held near Bucharest, at which the issue of the actions of the Yugoslav leadership was discussed. The Yugoslav communists refused to come to it. On June 28, the Czech communist press was the first to publish the final communiqué of this meeting, which stated that the Communist Party of Yugoslavia had taken the wrong path in the field of foreign and domestic policy and in its relations with the USSR, and Comrade Tito personally was condemned for revisionism, Trotskyism and other ideological errors.
Portraits of J. Stalin and J. Tito at the May Day demonstration in Belgrade. 1946
This communiqué had the effect of a bomb exploding: the long-simmering conflict and split became public.
After this, the Yugoslav communists decided that capitalism posed less of a threat to the independence of Yugoslavia than the Soviet Union, and they effectively broke with the communist united front. As a result, Yugoslavia gained freedom to develop plans for its own path to building a socialist society. For their part, in the USSR Tito began to be called an “imperialist spy”, and Belgrade - “an American center of espionage and anti-communist activity.”
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Head of Yugoslavia Josip Broz Tito, who managed to independently, with the support of Western countries, and not just the Soviet Union, form armed forces to fight the Germans during the Second World War, owed his rise to Stalin to the least extent of all the Eastern European communists.
Unlike other Eastern European communist governments, it did not face the problem of diplomatic recognition from the US and Britain. In the first post-war years, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia occupied a special, more influential position in the communist bloc. The Yugoslav capital, Belgrade, was chosen as the location Cominform– heir Comintern.
The main Cominform newspaper was published here - “For a lasting peace, for people's democracy!”
Josip Broz Tito.
Tito avoided following half-public agreements on spheres of influence in the Balkans, which were concluded by the USSR and Western powers during the war years behind the backs of the Balkan countries themselves. However, Belgrade did not question the leadership of the Soviet Union in the world communist movement. In Yugoslavia, industry and banks were nationalized and the private sector was destroyed.
Following the example of Moscow's other Eastern European vassals, it refused to take part in the Marshall Plan.
The hour of truth. History of the Soviet-Yugoslav conflict
The reason for the conflict between Belgrade and Moscow was the intention of Tito and the leader of the Bulgarian communists G.
Dimitrov to create a federation of southern Slavs in the Balkans, which would help resolve the Bulgarian-Yugoslav contradictions over Macedonia. This federation could be attractive for other neighbors to join. In Europe at that time the issues of concluding a multilateral convention on the Danube were discussed.
If the federation project had grown to the scale of Balkan-Danube cooperation, then the center of Eastern European politics would have shifted to Yugoslavia and a semblance of dual-centeredness would have appeared in the “socialist camp.” This did not suit Moscow.
The USSR first supported the “soft” version of the federation proposed by Dimitrov, according to which Bulgaria and Yugoslavia were equal parts of it.
But Tito advocated a more rigid project - a single state.
Pug Tito. Soviet cartoon from the era of Stalin's conflict with Yugoslavia
From mid-1947
Stalin began to accuse the leaders of Yugoslavia of seeking to achieve an exceptional position. Meanwhile, Dimitrov and Tito began to talk about a pan-Balkan unification, including Romania, Hungary, Albania and Greece (if the Communists win it).
G. Dimitrov even admitted the possibility of including Poland and Czechoslovakia.
On February 10, 1948, Yugoslav and Bulgarian leaders were invited to Moscow, where they were told that a foreign policy not coordinated with the USSR was inadmissible, and Stalin’s conversation with Tito took place in an insulting tone for the latter. Dimitrov gave in to the pressure, but Tito did not. After a closed exchange of letters that lasted several months, Stalin demanded that the issue be brought before the Cominform.
On June 28, 1948, at a meeting of the Cominform in Bucharest, a resolution was adopted “On the situation in Communist Party Yugoslavia." The Communist Party of Yugoslavia was expelled from the Cominform, and the leaders of the latter called on the “healthy forces” within the Yugoslav Communist Party to remove Tito.
The CPY rejected the resolution. Soviet-Yugoslav relations were broken. Moscow stopped trade with Belgrade and recalled economic advisers from Yugoslavia.
Throughout Eastern Europe, a hunt began for “Titoists” and supporters of national models of communism.
Its victims were prominent communists: Lucretiu Patrascanu (Romania), Laszlo Rajk (Hungary), Traicho Kostov (Bulgaria), Koçi Dzodze (Albania). In Poland, for “right-wing nationalist deviation” he was removed from his post and subjected to house arrest Wladyslaw Gomułka – general secretary Central Committee of the ruling Polish Workers' Party (before its unification with the socialists). In Yugoslavia, the break with Stalin and the persecution of the “Titoists” in other countries led to retaliatory persecution of the Cominform members by Tito.
All these repressions greatly undermined the reputation of the USSR in the West.
Therefore, after Stalin's death N. Khrushchev hastened to normalize relations with Yugoslavia. At the same time, Tito retained greater independence from Soviet influence. Yugoslavia was not included in any Comecon, neither in Warsaw Pact. Yugoslav socialism differed greatly from Soviet socialism in the presence of elements of self-government at the enterprises of labor collectives and closer ties with the capitalist West.
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Background and causes of the conflict
The emergence of the Soviet-Yugoslav conflict in 1948.
preceded by events that dated back to the middle of 1947. As N.S. Khrushchev noted in his report “On the cult of personality and its consequences” on February 25, 1956. at a closed meeting of the XX Congress of the CPSU, Stalin became “in last period more capricious, irritable, rude, his suspicion especially developed...”
Stalin was irritated by the independence of Tito, whose strong personality contrasted with the gray impersonality of other communist leaders in Eastern Europe. J. Tito enjoyed great authority and strong influence due to his successful partisan leadership during the Second World War. After the end of the war, I. Tito visited many countries in Eastern Europe.
According to F. MacLean, Tito used these trips to discuss problems of mutual interest and signed agreements, often without coordination with Moscow. One of the issues discussed was the creation of the Balkan Federation. This behavior of the Yugoslav leader caused a negative attitude from Stalin.
In the current international situation, Stalin believed that it was necessary to maintain due caution and prudence. He did not hide his dissatisfaction when the Soviet state was presented with a fait accompli.
Stalin with E. Kardel, Stalin approved of the Yugoslav intention after the ratification of the peace treaty with Bulgaria. Sign an agreement with it similar to the one with Albania. The Soviet leadership officially informed the Yugoslav and Bulgarian governments not to enter into a Yugoslav-Bulgarian treaty.
Until the restrictions associated with the peace treaty cease to apply. The head of the Bulgarian government G. Dimitrov and I. Tito, taking into account these wishes, and not wanting to give Western countries a reason to disrupt the ratification of this treaty, chose not to disclose the text of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation... However, in the official protocol of the negotiations that took place from July 30 to August 1, 1947 ., published on August 2, the fact of the development of a Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between the two countries was made public.
It was also stated that the agreement is of unlimited duration.
Having learned about this, Stalin sent a telegram to Tito in which he called the conclusion of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance a mistake, since the peace treaty had not yet entered into force. As claimed by the Soviet leadership, such a step contributed to the strengthening of military intervention in Greek and Turkish affairs against Yugoslavia and Bulgaria.
The official ceremony of signing the writing of the treaty between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria on November 27, 1947. The Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance underwent changes related to the wishes of Stalin.
The contract was concluded for 20 years.
The signed agreement was perceived in Western countries as a direct threat to Greece. They also perceived the intensive cooperation between Yugoslavia and Albania negatively.
In reality, Yugoslav-Albanian relations were not perfect. There were many contradictions associated with trade and economic relations between the two countries.
As part of these controversies, the Yugoslav government accused the chairman of the State Planning Commission of Albania, Nako Spira, as an “agent of imperialism.”
A split emerged in the Albanian leadership related to the economic issue, and another accusation was brought against Nako Spiru “of chauvinistic anti-Yugoslav activities, of seeking to impose economic autarky, of establishing ties with class enemies and even of espionage activities.” The charges brought against him led to the suicide of Nako Spiru.
In a conversation between Stalin and M. Djilos in January 1948, Stalin said: “So the members of the Central Committee in Albania are killing themselves because of you! This is very bad, very bad." M Djilo tried to explain the situation, emphasizing that Nako Spiru was against the unification of Albania with Yugoslavia.
In response, Stalin stated that the Soviet government agreed to the unification of Yugoslavia with Albania.
January 21, 1948 A message arrived in Moscow from the USSR Ambassador to Yugoslavia A.I. Lavrentiv, which stated that “the Yugoslavs have resolved the issue of redeploying the 2nd rifle division to Albania in the area of the city of Korça." This issue was resolved without the participation of Soviet military advisers to the Yugoslav army. E. Hoxha argued this behavior with the need to protect Albania from attack from Greece.
Stalin was not satisfied with this behavior of Yugoslavia and Albania; moreover, he believed that such a step in the West would be regarded as occupation.
We found that the emergence of the Soviet-Yugoslav conflict was preceded by a number of events related to the relationship between the two countries.
The causes of the conflict were a number of differences between the USSR and Yugoslavia related to the conduct general policy Communist Party, contacts of Yugoslavia, with countries and parties of Eastern Europe without coordination with the Soviet leadership.
Relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia during the conflict
Since the summer of 1948
the conflict between the USSR and Yugoslavia became obvious. From June 19 to June 23, 1948 A Cominform meeting took place in Bucharest. At it, the participants adopted a resolution “On the situation in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia.” It said that the leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia “... has recently been pursuing an incorrect line in the main issues of foreign and domestic policy, representing a departure from Marxism-Leninism...”, “the leadership of the Yugoslav Communist Party is pursuing a policy unfriendly towards the Soviet Union and the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) ...”, “in their policies within the country, the leaders of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia move away from the positions of the working class and break with the Marxist theory of classes and class struggle...”, etc.
At the end of the resolution, a solution was put forward; it was that if the current leadership does not admit its mistakes, then it should be replaced with a new one.
At the V Congress of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, Soviet accusations were unanimously rejected, and Tito’s policies received full support.
In response to this, Stalin denounced the agreement of April 1945. From that moment on, the Yugoslav government was viewed as hostile.
An exchange of notes in the summer of 1949 brought additional heat to the conflict.
regarding the arrest in Yugoslavia of Russian emigrants who lived there after the October Revolution and received Soviet citizenship.
They were accused of anti-Yugoslav activities.
The final dissolution of diplomatic relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia took place on October 25, 1949.
Initially, the Soviet government counted on the “healthy forces” of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, which would be able to remove Tito from power.
When it became obvious that this option was impossible, military-political pressure was organized on Yugoslavia; any provocation threatened to escalate into open conflict. According to indirect data, the invasion was to be carried out in three directions, from the territory of Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria.
Actions from the Adriatic Sea were also quite likely. Both large-scale operations and “targeted actions” were discussed. They could be carried out as Soviet army, and the armed forces of the countries of “people's democracy”. It was planned to involve the intelligence service in the operation.
The Yugoslav leadership began to view the USSR as a serious source of danger, and therefore came to the conclusion that Western countries were a means of defense against the USSR.
In November 1952 The Communist Party of Yugoslavia was renamed the SKYU. In the fall of 1949, Yugoslavia joined the Security Council as a non-permanent member, thereby gaining international recognition.
Due to new circumstances, the USSR had to abandon the plan to overthrow Tito by military means.
According to Pavel Sudoplatov, in the proposal proposed to him for development at the end of February 1953. The Kremlin “dossier” on Tito contained “Molotov’s idiotic resolutions: to look for Tito’s connections with pro-fascist groups and Croatian nationalists.”
“Khrushchev’s people – Savchenko, Ryasnoy and Epishev” were also involved in the operation.
The assassination of Tito was supposed to be carried out by intelligence officer Joseph Grigulevich; he was one of the perpetrators of the murder of Trotsky. One of the options for committing the murder was that Grigurevich, at a reception with Tito, should hand him a box with a diamond ring, which contained a mechanism with a deadly gas.
All plans related to the assassination attempt on Tito were not carried out, and with the death of Stalin, they were all canceled.
Despite all the efforts of the USSR, it was not possible to carry out a military intervention in Yugoslavia.
The first reason for the failures is the incorrect bet of the Soviet leadership on the internal forces of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, which supposedly could act as a powerful force against Tito.
The second reason is the active cooperation of Yugoslavia with Western countries.
Conflict resolution
After Stalin's death in 1953. The CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet government came to the conclusion that the severance of relations with Yugoslavia caused damage to both the interests of Yugoslavia, the USSR and the entire international communist movement. The USSR took the initiative in restoring relations. As part of these efforts, the Soviet government already in 1953.
invited the Yugoslav government to resume economic ties and restore contacts in the field of science and culture, which received a positive response from the Yugoslav side.
In June 1954 The Central Committee of the CPSU sent a letter to the Central Committee of the United Kingdom of Yugoslavia with a proposal to carry out a complete normalization of relations, and it was proposed to hold a Soviet-Yugoslav summit meeting.
it was decided to accept the proposal to hold a summit meeting. As a result of diplomatic contacts, an agreement was reached to hold a meeting in Belgorod at the end of May 1955. summit meeting between the leaders of the two countries. Based on the results of the negotiations, which took place from May 27 to June 2, 1955. The parties came to the conclusion that the period when good relations were broken was a thing of the past, and mutual readiness was expressed to remove all obstacles preventing the normalization of relations.
As a result of the negotiations, the Belgrade Declaration was adopted. The declaration emphasized the importance of observing the principles of cooperation, respect for sovereignty, independence, etc. in relations between states.
In 1955 The Soviet Union canceled Yugoslavia's debt in the amount of over $90 million. The USSR provided Yugoslavia with new loans for development.
J. Tito's visit to Moscow took place. At this meeting, a Declaration on relations between the CPSU and the United Kingdom was signed. The declaration emphasized that the Belgorod Declaration had a better influence on the development of international relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia.
It should be noted that the restoration of international relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia was long-term, and at a certain stage was characterized by a decline.
The reasons for the decline were varied. The final restoration of relations occurred in 1988.
Thus, it was established that the USSR and Yugoslavia came to the conclusion that the severance of relations was a mistaken step.
The process of restoring relations was quite long time, the reasons for this were varied.
Severance of relations with Yugoslavia
After the end of World War II, J.B. Tito, who came to power in Yugoslavia with the support of England and the USSR, became Stalin’s faithful ally. At Tito’s personal request, in the summer of 1945, the best operatives from Moscow were sent to his security.
In the spring of 1947, a decision was made in Yugoslavia to transition to the construction of socialism in the country. After the adoption of the Yugoslav Five-Year Plan, the USSR began providing technical assistance for industrialization. One of the first conflicts between Stalin and Tito occurred over Albania - without even informing his senior comrade, Tito demanded that the Albanian government provide military base in the south of the country to station Yugoslav troops there defending Albania from a possible attack by the Greek army.
Tito's future plans included the unification of Yugoslavia with Albania. But Stalin, who at that moment did not want to aggravate relations with the West, opposed Tito’s initiative, and he had to curtail his plans regarding Albania. Soon, another serious reason for the conflict between the USSR and Yugoslavia appeared - at a press conference held on January 17, 1948 in Sofia, the leader of the Bulgarian communists G. Dimitrov announced plans to create a confederation of Balkan and Danube states, including Poland, Czechoslovakia and Greece.
Meanwhile, the governments of many Western European countries then accused the USSR of organizing assistance to the communist partisans of Greece, waging an armed struggle against their government.
At the same time, the Soviet Union opposed the upcoming unification of the western zones of occupation of Germany and the creation of the Federal Republic of Germany...
A week after his speech at the press conference, Dimitrov received a telegram from Stalin: “It is difficult to understand what prompted you to make such careless and ill-considered statements at the press conference.”
A week later, Tito also received a similar telegram from V.M. Molotov (on instructions from I.V. Stalin): “...You consider it normal for Yugoslavia, having a mutual assistance agreement with the USSR, to consider it possible not only not to consult with the USSR about sending its troops to Albania, but not even inform the USSR about this in a subsequent manner?
For your information, I inform you that the Soviet government accidentally learned about the decision of the Yugoslav government to send your troops to Albania from private conversations between Soviet representatives and Albanian workers.
The USSR considers this order abnormal. But if you consider this order to be normal, then I must declare, on behalf of the USSR Government, that the USSR cannot agree to be presented with a fait accompli. And, of course, it is clear that the USSR, as an ally of Yugoslavia, cannot be held responsible for the consequences of such actions committed by the Yugoslav government without consultation and even without the knowledge of the Soviet government...”
But Stalin’s scolding of the junior partners was not limited to these telegrams - three days later V.
M. Molotov (on instructions from I.V. Stalin) sent the following devastating telegrams to the leaders of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. This time Dimitrov was accused of interfering with the foreign policy of the Soviet Union: “Unsuccessful interview with Comrade. Dimitrov in Sofia gave rise to all sorts of talk about the preparation of an Eastern European bloc with the participation of the USSR... In the current situation, the conclusion by the Soviet Union of mutual assistance pacts directed against any aggressor would be interpreted in the world press as an anti-American and anti-British step on the part of the USSR, which could to facilitate the struggle of the aggressive forces of the USA and England."
Six days later, on February 10, 1948, the Bulgarian government delegations arrived in Moscow (G.
Dimitrov, V. Kolarov and T. Kostov) and Yugoslavia (E. Kardel, M.
Djilas, V. Bakarich; “sick” Tito did not come) held tripartite negotiations. In addition to Stalin, V. M. Molotov, A. A. Zhdanov, G. M. Malenkov, M. A. Suslov took part in them.
Joseph Vissarionovich told Dimitrov: “You and the Yugoslavs don’t report your affairs, we find out about everything on the street.
You present us with fait accompli!” Molotov assented: “And everything that Dimitrov says, that Tito says, is perceived abroad as being said with our knowledge.”
The next day, an agreement between the USSR and Bulgaria and Yugoslavia on mandatory consultations on foreign policy issues was signed.
Seventeen days later, on March 1, an extended meeting of the Politburo opened in Belgrade, at which Tito crossed “the boundaries of what is permitted”, saying the following: “Yugoslavia has confirmed its path to socialism. Russians look at their role differently. The question must be looked at from an ideological point of view.
Are we right or are they right? We are right... We are not pawns on a chessboard... We must rely only on our own strengths.” During further discussion, Tito agreed with the opinion of one of the members of the Yugoslav Politburo that “the policy of the USSR is an obstacle to the development of the international revolution.”
In addition, the USSR delayed the supply of weapons to Yugoslavia, and the Yugoslav government refused to provide the USSR with confidential economic information about the country. The USSR unilaterally terminated the consultation protocol, stopped sending technical equipment and canceled business trips to Yugoslavia for its specialists.
On May 5, 1948, J.V. Stalin sent a letter to the Yugoslav leaders, which, in his opinion, should have put them in their place: “We believe that the unwillingness of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia to honestly admit its mistakes and consciously correct them lies in the excessive arrogance of the Yugoslav managers. After the successes achieved, their heads began to spin... Comrades Tito and Kardelj say in their letter about the merits and successes of the Yugoslav Communist Party that the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks previously recognized them, but is now keeping silent.
This is not true. No one can deny the merits and successes of the CPY. They are undeniable. However, the merits and successes of the communist parties of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania are no less... And yet the leaders of these parties behave modestly and do not shout about their merits, unlike the Yugoslav leaders who buzzed everyone’s ears with their irrepressible bragging ... The successes of the Yugoslav Communist Party are explained not by any special qualities, but mainly by the fact that after the destruction of the headquarters of the Yugoslav partisans by German paratroopers, at a time when the people's liberation movement in Yugoslavia was experiencing a crisis, the Red Army came to the aid of the Yugoslav people, defeated the German occupiers, liberated Belgrade and thereby created the conditions for the Yugoslav Communist Party to come to power... If comrades Tito and Kardelj had taken this circumstance into account as an indisputable fact, they would have made less noise about their merits and would have behaved with dignity and modesty.”
Meanwhile, in Yugoslavia, on Tito’s instructions, Politburo member S. was arrested.
Žujović and other prominent Yugoslav communists who openly supported the position of the Soviet Union. The Yugoslav party was purged and many of the local communists were arrested and sent to concentration camps.
At the behest of Stalin, publications appeared in the Soviet and socialist press condemning the “nationalist” Tito. But each of the leaders had already made his choice, and Tito did not back down, as Stalin’s faithful supporter G. Dimitrov did...
Since the summer of 1948 the conflict between the USSR and Yugoslavia became obvious. From June 19 to June 23, 1948 A Cominform meeting took place in Bucharest. At it, the participants adopted a resolution “On the situation in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia.” It said that the leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia “... has recently been pursuing an incorrect line in the main issues of foreign and domestic policy, representing a departure from Marxism-Leninism...”, “the leadership of the Yugoslav Communist Party is pursuing a policy unfriendly towards the Soviet Union and the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) ...”, “in their policy within the country, the leaders of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia move away from the positions of the working class and break with the Marxist theory of classes and class struggle...” Stalin I.V. Works, T.18.- Tver. 2006, p. 642, etc.
At the end of the resolution, a solution was put forward; it was that if the current leadership does not admit its mistakes, then it should be replaced with a new one.
At the V Congress of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, Soviet accusations were unanimously rejected, and Tito’s policies received full support. In response to this, Stalin denounced the agreement of April 1945. From that moment on, the Yugoslav government was viewed as hostile.
Additional tension in the conflict was brought by the exchange of notes in the summer of 1949 regarding the arrest in Yugoslavia of Russian emigrants who lived there after the October Revolution and received Soviet citizenship. See ibid. They were accused of anti-Yugoslav activities
The final dissolution of diplomatic relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia took place on October 25, 1949.
Initially, the Soviet government counted on the “healthy forces” of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, which would be able to remove Tito from power. When it became obvious that this option was impossible, military-political pressure was organized on Yugoslavia; any provocation threatened to escalate into open conflict. According to indirect data, the invasion was to be carried out in three directions, from the territory of Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria. Actions from the Adriatic Sea were also quite likely. Both large-scale operations and “targeted actions” were discussed. They could have been carried out both by the Soviet Army and the armed forces of the countries of “people's democracy” Romanenko S., Ulunyan A. How Joseph and Josip quarreled // Top Secret-2002- No. 7. It was planned to involve the intelligence service in the operation.
The Yugoslav leadership began to view the USSR as a serious source of danger, and therefore came to the conclusion that Western countries were a means of defense against the USSR. In November 1952 The Communist Party of Yugoslavia was renamed the SKYU. In the fall of 1949, Yugoslavia joined the Security Council as a non-permanent member, thereby gaining international recognition. Due to new circumstances, the USSR had to abandon the plan to overthrow Tito by military means.
According to Pavel Sudoplatov, in the proposal proposed to him for development at the end of February 1953. The Kremlin “dossier” on Tito contained “Molotov’s idiotic resolutions: to look for Tito’s connections with pro-fascist groups and Croatian nationalists” See ibid. “Khrushchev’s people - Savchenko, Ryasnoy and Epishev” were also involved in the operation. See ibid.
The assassination of Tito was supposed to be carried out by intelligence officer Joseph Grigulevich; he was one of the perpetrators of the murder of Trotsky. One of the options for committing the murder was that Grigurevich, at a reception with Tito, should hand him a box with a diamond ring, which contained a mechanism with a deadly gas.
All plans related to the assassination attempt on Tito were not carried out, and with the death of Stalin, they were all canceled.
Despite all the efforts of the USSR, it was not possible to carry out a military intervention in Yugoslavia. The first reason for the failures is the incorrect bet of the Soviet leadership on the internal forces of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, which supposedly could act as a powerful force against Tito. The second reason is the active cooperation of Yugoslavia with Western countries.
Chapter 3. Conflict resolution
After Stalin's death in 1953. The CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet government came to the conclusion that the severance of relations with Yugoslavia caused damage to both the interests of Yugoslavia, the USSR and the entire international communist movement. The USSR took the initiative in restoring relations. As part of these efforts, the Soviet government already in 1953. invited the Yugoslav government to resume economic ties and restore contacts in the field of science and culture, which received a positive response from the Yugoslav side. Girenko Yu.S. Soviet-Yugoslav relations. - M., 1983, p. 136
In June 1954 The Central Committee of the CPSU sent a letter to the Central Committee of the United Kingdom of Yugoslavia with a proposal to carry out a complete normalization of relations, and it was proposed to hold a Soviet-Yugoslav summit meeting.
At the plenum of the Central Committee of the SKYU held on November 26, 1954. it was decided to accept the proposal to hold a summit meeting. As a result of diplomatic contacts, an agreement was reached to hold a meeting in Belgorod at the end of May 1955. summit meeting between the leaders of the two countries. See ibid. Based on the results of the negotiations that took place from May 27 to June 2, 1955. The parties came to the conclusion that the period when good relations were broken was a thing of the past, and mutual readiness was expressed to remove all obstacles preventing the normalization of relations. As a result of the negotiations, the Belgrade Declaration was adopted. The declaration emphasized the importance of observing the principles of cooperation, respect for sovereignty, independence, etc. in relations between states.
In 1955 The Soviet Union canceled Yugoslavia's debt in the amount of over $90 million. See also there, the USSR provided new development loans to Yugoslavia.
From June 1 to June 23, 1956 I. Tito's visit to Moscow took place. At this meeting, a Declaration on relations between the CPSU and the United Kingdom was signed. The declaration emphasized that the Belgorod Declaration had a better influence on the development of international relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia.
It should be noted that the restoration of international relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia was long-term, and at a certain stage was characterized by a decline. The reasons for the decline were varied. The final restoration of relations occurred in 1988.
Thus, it was established that the USSR and Yugoslavia came to the conclusion that the severance of relations was a mistaken step. The process of restoring relations took quite a long time, the reasons for this were varied.
