Creation of the military-industrial complex in the USSR. Historical prerequisites for the formation of the military-industrial complex in Russia. Composition of the Russian military-industrial complex

To determine what the role of the military-industrial complex is in the Russian economy, it is necessary to understand the meaning of this concept. The first person to coin the term military-industrial complex was the President of the United States of America, Dwight Eisenhower. By the concept he meant not only the scale of production of weapons and military goods, but also other structures that support the power and combat effectiveness of the state’s armed forces.

The military-industrial complex in the modern Russian Federation can be a more narrow-profile term. The Russian military-industrial complex is a structure that includes production facilities, design bureaus, and research institutes that are directly involved in the production of military equipment, guns and shells.

Connection between civil and military sectors

Military-industrial complex enterprises are not only military-oriented objects. Factories and factories that work primarily for civil society also provide the army with everything they need. These are the light, food, woodworking, and chemical industries. One of the key sectors supporting the military-industrial complex is mechanical engineering. This includes the production of vehicles, instruments, and equipment for other industries. Although these branches of the military-industrial complex are not leading in the state’s military industry, they ensure the integrity and productivity of defense facilities.

There is also feedback here. The peculiarities of the Russian military-industrial complex do not end with the work of civilian enterprises for the country's army. It so happened that in the absence of special orders, the factories of the complex are engaged in the production of household and household goods. This is mainly home appliances.

Composition of the Russian military-industrial complex

The structure of the Russian military-industrial complex includes the following components:

• research institutes that engage in theory development and design research;
• design bureaus, whose employees are responsible for creating experimental models and prototypes of real weapons;
• experimental laboratories, bases, testing grounds and airfields, where tests of technical equipment and their elements are carried out before launching into mass production;
• production facilities: factories and enterprises producing defense industry objects;
• consulting firms that help solve commercial, marketing, legal, financial and foreign economic issues.

Formations of the Russian military-industrial complex

The military-industrial complex of Russia was formed at the stage of industrialization in the Soviet Union. Increased ergonomic and strength requirements began to be imposed on the production of defense industry objects. According to government requirements, the weapon had to be as simple as possible so that any soldier without special skills could use it.

In the defense industry, highly skilled workers were highly valued, so wages and social benefits were much higher for workers in this industry.

To understand the role of the military-industrial complex in the Russian economy, you need to estimate the number of people employed in this area. At the time of perestroika, about five million people worked in the state's defense sector. This is twenty-five percent of all industrial production employees. Scientific personnel made up one fifth of all specialists.

The role of the military-industrial complex for society

All developments of the military-industrial complex are financed by the population of the country. At the same time, not all products produced by defense enterprises are necessary only for combat operations. The country, first of all, must show the power of its army to others. In this case, weapons act as a deterrent.

One of the main prerequisites for the development of the military-industrial complex is doctrine. This normative document establishes the goals and objectives of defense, defines its role in the international arena, opportunities, and threats from potential adversaries.

The Russian military-industrial complex has always been distinguished by the production of a large number of various weapons. In Soviet times, the country produced defense industry objects many times more than all potential adversaries combined.

The design and production of military equipment helps to introduce new advanced methods into other industries. Based on developments in the defense sector, modern vehicles, ships, aircraft, communications equipment and computers are produced. And this is only because they do not have sufficient potential for the defense sector.

Industry structure

The branches of the military-industrial complex of the Russian Federation include a set of production and research facilities that provide the army with everything necessary. The military-industrial complex, in addition to the production of objects, is also characterized by a leadership and management apparatus.

It is in this sector that the most qualified personnel work and the best achievements of science are collected. This is due to the fact that the military-industrial complex produces equipment of complex design.

Geographical division

Military-industrial complex enterprises are evenly located throughout the Russian Federation. Each region has at least one link that is part of the defense industry. But depending on the required conditions, different industries are based in different places.

In large cities, there are knowledge-intensive facilities that are difficult to implement and require qualified personnel. In first place is the capital - Moscow, important points for military-industrial production are St. Petersburg and Novosibirsk.

A peculiarity of the geography of elements of the defense sector is the creation of closed towns. Previously, they were listed under assigned numbers, and only now they received names. In such populated areas it is easy to ensure the secrecy regime that is necessary to preserve industrial secrets and technologies. In closed cities, as a rule, the social level is an order of magnitude higher.

The location of industrial facilities was influenced by geographical, strategic and other factors that determine the convenience of the location. For example, the development of nuclear warheads occurs in the most remote corners of the country, and military shipbuilding is developed in places with water areas. The latter include the cities of Taganrog, Severodvinsk, Komsomolsk-on-Amur. The center for the production of small arms is Tula, and the center of artillery is the Urals. Space objects are based in places remote from populated areas.

Aviation industry

Factors influencing the location of aviation industry facilities are:

• the ability to assemble a finished product from parts and assemblies;
• availability of highly professional specialists;
• convenient transport interchange.

Mostly all design bureaus are located in Moscow and the Moscow region. The only design bureau that develops the design and technology of an amphibious aircraft is located in Taganrog.

Basically, the capital is the center of the aviation industry. Companies that produce world-famous aircraft brands such as Yak, Il, Tu, Su and others carry out their work here. In the Moscow region they are engaged in the production of individual parts of aircraft.

The largest aviation facilities are located not only in Moscow, but also in Smolensk, Voronezh, Kazan, Samara, Saratov, Omsk, Irkutsk.

Rocket and space industry

The modern military-industrial complex of Russia cannot be imagined without the rocket and space industry, which is the most knowledge-intensive, expensive and complex to implement. The capital and its surrounding areas are the base for scientific research and technology development. This is explained by the fact that there is access to highly qualified personnel. It is in Moscow that specialists are developing ballistic, cruise, anti-aircraft missiles and engines.

For security and secrecy reasons, rocket and space industry enterprises are not located in close proximity to state borders.

The country's main cosmodrome is located in the Arkhangelsk region. It is from here that military artificial satellites and unmanned aerial vehicles are launched. To support this industry within the framework of international cooperation, the Russian Federation leases the Baikonur cosmodrome from Kazakhstan.

Artillery and rifle complex

The importance of the military-industrial complex in the Russian economy cannot be overestimated. Thanks to the production of unique products, the defense industry brings good income to the country's budget. One of the striking examples is small arms, namely the Kalashnikov assault rifle. It is known throughout the world and is the most widespread type of this type of weapon.

Enterprises engaged in the production of artillery and small arms are located near metallurgical plants. This is economically due to a decrease in the number of goods transport operations.

The Urals are rightfully considered the center of artillery production. It is in Yekaterinburg and Perm that the Grad, Smerch, Hurricane multiple launch rocket systems, guns, howitzers, mortars, anti-aircraft and anti-tank missiles are manufactured.

Armor industry

The influence of the military-industrial complex on the Russian economy may not be positive. For example, the armored tank industry is currently in a period of deep crisis. The authorities are trying to reorient and repurpose the facilities of this complex. Only the plant for the production of armored personnel carriers in Kurgan is distinguished by stability in its work. Many production facilities in this industry are currently engaged in armoring passenger cars.

Military shipbuilding

It is impossible to assess the role of the military-industrial complex in the Russian economy without characterizing the shipbuilding complex. Thanks to this branch of the military-industrial sector, construction companies are always provided with work. Most of the enterprises involved in the manufacture of warships are based in the central part of the Russian Federation. This is necessary to increase the level of security of such objects.

The production of submarines is now practically non-existent. The shipbuilding defense complex facilities are located in the northern capital of the state - St. Petersburg. In addition to it, the centers of ship production are Nizhny Novgorod, Severodvinsk, Kaliningrad and Komsomolsk-on-Amur.

Enterprises in this sector are characterized by a narrow focus and a monopolized market. Military shipbuilding is one of the first sectors to suffer from the economic crisis.

Nuclear industry

This sector consists of two parts:

• nuclear power;
• nuclear weapons complex.

The nuclear industry is most often secret facilities located in closed military camps. The main goal of their work is to protect the nuclear space and security of the Russian Federation. Previously, these were bases equipped with everything necessary. The people living on their territory, although they were limited in their actions, had a better standard of living.

Now the demand for nuclear products has fallen, so the enterprises are no longer so secretive. They begin to expand the range of products they produce, surprising with their versatility. Many nuclear industry facilities are engaged in the dismantling and elimination of nuclear weapons.

Uranium industry

The uranium industry plays a key role in the entire military-industrial complex. This sector includes:

• extraction of this natural resource;
• enrichment;
• metallurgy.

The main uranium deposits are located in the Irkutsk region.

Finally

In order to understand what the role of the military-industrial complex is in the Russian economy, it is necessary to analyze separately each industry included in it, because all sectors have their own characteristics and focus. For this reason, the production of some objects replenishes the country’s budget with good amounts, while others require additional funding. The defense sector provides jobs for millions of Russian citizens, is the engine of progress and helps bring the country's economy out of the financial crisis. Thanks to the achievements of the military sector, other areas of society are developing.

Soviet military power of the 1980s

The policy of “perestroika” announced by Gorbachev at the April Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee in 1985, the implementation of which was supposed to give the USSR greater dynamism of development (“acceleration”), as well as some liberalism in the political system, subject to the preservation of communist ideology, was absolutely correctly understood by the West as the beginning of the process of collapse The Soviet Union and the entire world communist system, primarily the Warsaw Pact Organization. Naturally, “perestroika” was greeted with enthusiasm in the West.

Numerous voyages of the Soviet leader began around the world with various kinds of peace initiatives, which poured out as if from a cornucopia. The “peace initiatives” were perceived by the West as a recognition of the weakness of the Soviet political system. The most powerful military potential in the world, accumulated by the labor of all generations of Soviet people, was mediocrely reduced to the enthusiastic applause of the West. The 1987 INF Treaty became a shining example of Gorbachev's policy. Of course, it was necessary to reduce the exorbitantly bloated military machines of the USSR and the USA, but this had to be done with strict consideration of one’s own interests, primarily for the future. The momentary, mediocre policy on the INF Treaty in the style of “if there is war tomorrow,” as if the West will not start a war today, then tomorrow will start a war in Europe, perfectly illustrates the complete incompetence of Gorbachev and his associates in assessing the strategic situation in the world. “Perestroika” hit the army with such force that it still cannot recover.

Let's take 1989. This is the last year of “perestroika” in the style of Gorbachev, which was followed by a severe erosion of communist ideology, in fact, its collapse, and as a consequence, already uncontrollable centrifugal tendencies within the country, starting with the Baltic republics. Therefore, the year 1989 can be considered the last more or less “full” year of the existence of the USSR. The end of the 80s - the beginning of the decline of the Soviet superpower. The economy is almost completely collapsed, the political system is on its last legs, the card system is rampant in the country, the army is trying as best it can to fend off the attacks of the democratic “perestroika” press, accusing the country’s armed forces of all mortal sins, from Afghanistan to “hazing.” One after another, the country’s strategic positions are surrendering, the Berlin Wall is collapsing, the GDR is joining the Federal Republic of Germany (Gorbachev is the best German of the year), Eastern Europe is experiencing a season of “velvet revolutions”, the flow of parcels with “humanitarian aid” from all over the world to the USSR is increasing, including and pieces of chocolate with the teeth marks of well-fed Western children. The country, perhaps, has not experienced such humiliation since the conclusion of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in 1918, concluded by the Bolsheviks in order to preserve their own positions in Russia torn apart by civil war. But the Soviet Army was still trying to maintain at least the appearance of combat effectiveness, which it was finding more and more difficult.

If we take the technical arsenal of the Armed Forces, then a more or less tolerable situation was observed here thanks to the huge reserves of weapons and military equipment accumulated over decades. The powerful defense potential was still afloat, despite the sharp reduction in military orders from the state and the idleness of huge production capacities for this reason. Weapons design bureaus tried to bring new types of weapons and equipment to the required standards, sometimes based only on sheer enthusiasm. What was the Soviet military machine like in the late 80s? In December 1988, at the UN General Assembly in New York, it was announced that the Soviet armed forces would be reduced by 500 thousand people, as well as by 10 thousand tanks and 8.5 thousand artillery systems during the period 1989-90. On April 7, 1989 in London, Gorbachev announced that the strength of the Soviet armed forces as of January 7, 1989 was 4258 thousand people, including 1596 thousand in the ground forces, 437.5 thousand in the Navy, the rest in the Strategic Missile Forces, Air defense troops, air force, operational and material support forces. These figures did not include the border troops of the KGB and the internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which, according to American data, amount to approximately 430 thousand people. It soon became known that the USSR was spending 74.3 billion rubles on military expenditures, of which more than 32 billion were on the purchase of weapons and military equipment (previously the USSR recognized defense expenditures of approximately 17 billion rubles). However, Gorbachev’s figures do not fully reflect the true level of military expenditures, the vast majority of which were spent on completely different items (this publication does not pursue the study of methods for determining the true defense expenditures of the USSR. - L.N.).

The most powerful component of the country's defense was the still powerful strategic triad - the strategic missile forces, the strategic missile submarines of the Navy and the long-range strategic aviation of the Air Force. The country maintained a powerful complex for the development and production of nuclear weapons. Quantitatively, the triad in 1989 consisted of 1,390 ICBM launchers, of which 812 were equipped with MIRVs (the total number of warheads was more than 6,000 units), 926 SLBMs on 61 RPK SN (about 3,000 warheads, of which 2,500 were equipped with MIRVs) and 162 heavy strategic bomber, of which 72 are carriers of the X-55 long-range missile launcher (approximately 1000 nuclear weapons). Thus, the total strategic potential consisted of approximately 10 thousand nuclear warheads, which ensured approximately equality with the United States in the field of strategic offensive weapons.

The 80s, thanks to the huge backlog of work in the previous decade, became the time for a huge qualitative leap in the technical equipment of strategic forces. Back in 1981, the ICBM fleet reached its highest ceiling of 1,398 missiles with 6,420 nuclear warheads, of which 308 of the world’s most powerful ICBMs RS-20 (SS-18 Satan), each equipped with 10 individually targeted warheads with a capacity of 500 kt . The next stage in the development of the Strategic Missile Forces was the development and adoption of mobile strategic missile systems - RS-22 railway (combat railway combat complexes, or abbreviated BZHRK, 1987) and RS-12M "Topol" (RT-2PM) ground-based on powerful seven-axle transport and launchers on the MAZ-547V chassis (1985). At the end of the 80s, there were already more than 50 launchers of RS-22 missiles, with combat characteristics similar to the American MX, and more than 250 launchers of RS-12M missiles. RS-22s in several missile bases had the usual stationary deployment on highly protected silo launchers; Topols at that time were placed only on mobile launchers. The fleet of mobile ICBMs is the most modern component of the Strategic Missile Forces and to date has no analogues in the world.

In the 1980s, the naval component of the strategic forces developed intensively. Since 1980, giant nuclear submarines (heavy RPK SN) of Project 941 “Akula”, known in the West as “Typhoons”, have been put into operation. The boat, 170 m long and 25 m wide, has an underwater displacement of 44,500 tons, which is a record figure in the world (the largest American SSBNs have an underwater displacement of 18,700 tons). Since 1996, the last representatives of the Project 667 SSBN series - 667BDRM "Dolphin" (NATO code - Delta-4) have been introduced into the fleet. In 1989, the Navy had six Sharks and four Dolphins, which were a worthy response to the eight American Ohio.

The strategic air force also underwent a qualitative update, although not on such a scale. The main combat aircraft of long-range aviation continued to be the heavy turboprop bomber Tu-95, the fleet of which began to be replenished in 1984 with a new modification of the Tu-95MS, equipped, depending on the type of configuration, with 6 or 12 long-range missiles X-55 - analogues of the American AGM-86B "Tomahawk". But, undoubtedly, in the 80s, the biggest event for the long-range air force was the adoption of the latest heavy strategic missile carriers such as the Tu-160 with variable wing geometry, which became the largest combat aircraft in the entire history of world aviation. Its maximum take-off weight of 275 tons significantly exceeds the weight of its American counterpart B-1B - 180 tons, the combat load weight is 45 and 22 tons, respectively. New aircraft began to arrive in the Air Force in 1987 and were used to re-equip the heavy bomber air regiment based in Pryluky (Ukraine). The initial plan for the purchase of 100 Tu-160s in connection with the “perestroika” that swept into the country already in the mid-80s began to seem unrealistic. At the end of the 80s, the number of aircraft of this type, both experimental and combat, hardly exceeded 10-15 units, but the creation of the Tu-160 itself indicated that the Soviet Union had reached a new qualitative level in the development of its military aircraft industry.

The American triad also underwent significant qualitative changes. In 1982, the ground component was armed with 1053 ICBM launchers, of which 450 Minuteman-2 (nine squadrons), 550 Minuteman-3 (11) and 53 Titan-2 (six). The combat use of strategic offensive forces is carried out by decision of the US President, which is communicated to the Chiefs of Staff Committee (CHS), the highest governing body of the country's armed forces. The latter from its main command center (OKTs KNSh is located in the underground part of the Pentagon) or from a reserve one (ZKTs is located in the foothills of the Blue Mountains, 90-95 km from Washington) or from an air command post based on the decision of the president and the general operational plan for use armed forces gives command to the US Air Force SAC on the combat use of ICBMs and strategic aircraft. The SAC command post is located in the underground part of the SAC headquarters building at Offutt Air Force Base (Nebraska). It has an autonomous life support system and operates around the clock. The SAC air command post is deployed on special EC-135 aircraft, which are based at Offutt Air Force Base and alternately (one at a time) maintain round-the-clock duty in the air, having an operational group on board. In peacetime it is headed by the general on duty.

When creating and developing the US Air Force SAC control system, the main principles were considered: high efficiency, stability, reliability, flexibility and control secrecy. In the 80s, the ICBM fleet was replenished with new MX (Peasekeeper) missiles, the development of which in the 70s caused great concern in the USSR, especially the project of their placement on mobile launchers running in underground railway tunnels. This type of basing was excluded by the US Congress as extremely expensive and technically complex, and also as not meeting the cost/effectiveness criterion. As a result, the new missiles were placed in highly protected silo launchers, which previously housed the Minuteman-3 ICBMs. After modification, these silos could withstand the explosion of a nuclear warhead in the immediate vicinity of the launcher.

The Navy has been replenished with 8 Ohio-class SSBNs. In total, the American fleet had 40 nuclear submarines with 672 SLBM launchers, 640 of them were equipped with MIRVs. The number of warheads in the naval component of the triad reached 5,780, or 55% of the entire nuclear arsenal of the American strategic forces. The Air Force received all 100 of the newest B-1B bombers (deliveries were carried out in 1984-88). The strategic aviation fleet totaled 588 aircraft, of which 161 carried AGM-86B long-range cruise missiles. The main SAC aircraft remained the B-52 (there were about 260 B-52s in combat units, the rest were mothballed, but in accordance with the calculation methods of the SALT-1 and SALT-2 Treaties, they were recognized as combat-ready - it is not clear why the Americans agreed to be considered combat-ready aircraft from which equipment and assemblies were removed for spare parts).

As we see, the status quo was maintained in the relations between the strategic forces of the USSR and the USA thanks to the regulation of their quantitative and qualitative parameters by ceilings mutually agreed upon in the arms limitation negotiations. The preservation of the combat capabilities of the strategic systems of the USSR and the USA was ensured by the powerful nuclear complexes of both countries, which include design bureaus and laboratories for the development of nuclear weapons, factories for the production of weapons-grade plutonium and nuclear charges, mines and open-pit mines for the extraction of uranium ore (mining production plants), and naturally, nuclear test sites. Let us briefly consider the structure of the domestic nuclear complex of this period.

The development of nuclear weapons, as has been repeatedly noted, was carried out by the All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Technical Physics (formerly LIPAN, better known as the I. Kurchatov Institute of Nuclear Energy), located in Chelyabinsk-70, and the All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Experimental Physics (former OKB-11 of Yu.B. Khariton ), now transformed into a federal nuclear center in Arzamas-16. Uranium enrichment enterprises were located in Angarsk, Krasnoyarsk and Sverdlovsk (Verkh-Neyvinsk). The production of weapons-grade plutonium was carried out by the Mayak chemical plant in Chelyabinsk-40 and Chelyabinsk-65 (it included five industrial reactors), the Siberian Chemical Plant near Tomsk (two reactors) and the Krasnoyarsk Mining and Chemical Plant, also known as Atomgrad (three reactors). The extraction of uranium raw materials was entrusted to the Caspian Mining and Metallurgical Plant on the Mangyshlak Peninsula in Western Kazakhstan, and the Trans-Baikal Mining and Chemical Plant in Zheltye Vody near Krivoy Rog in Ukraine. The nuclear test sites in Semipalatinsk (Kazakhstan) and on Novaya Zemlya (White Sea) were living out their last days, having come under merciless fire from protests by pacifists and environmentalists around the world.

Referred to in military parlance as general purpose forces, other components of the armed forces (ground forces, air force and air defense, navy and others) also underwent significant technical modernization with new weapon systems and military equipment, the development of which began in the 70s or even earlier (as As a rule, these are weapons and equipment of the third or fourth generation, depending on the type of weapon). A huge backlog of promising developments and a powerful defense industry, despite the very sensitive blows of Gorbachev’s policies and his various peace initiatives in general, perhaps due to inertia, continued to meet the needs of the army and navy in weapons, spare parts and other material resources, but their volumes, of course , could not compare with the surge that the defense industry provided in more prosperous times. As you know, “perestroika” most significantly affected the moral climate in the army and its social position in society, which are well known.

The ground forces are the most numerous type of armed forces of any state that has an army (the exception is the United States, where since the beginning of the 90s the navy has become the most numerous type of armed forces, ahead of the ground forces). The Soviet ground forces consisted of several branches, the main ones being motorized rifle, tank and airborne divisions, army aviation units and military air defense. It has already been emphasized that the 80s coincided with the adoption of a new generation of highly effective military equipment and weapons. In particular, these are main battle tanks of the T-80B, T-64B and T-72B types, infantry fighting vehicles BMP-2 and BMP-3, airborne combat vehicles BMD-2 and BMD-3, new self-propelled artillery systems 2S5, 2S7, 2S9, 2S19, Smerch multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS), BTR-80 armored personnel carriers and others.

The combat capabilities of military air defense have sharply increased thanks to the arrival of such systems as the Buk air defense system, S-300V in anti-aircraft and anti-missile versions, portable Igla air defense systems, 2K22 Tunguska anti-aircraft missile and gun systems, modern means of detecting air targets and targeting them means of destruction.

The country's air force and air defense forces also switched to new generation equipment and weapons. In 1989, they included more than 500 MiG-29 fighters, about 200 Su-27s, more than 200 MiG-31s, about 250 Su-25 attack aircraft, and more than 800 Su-24 front-line bombers. Since 1984, air defense aviation has been receiving new A-50 long-range radar detection and control aircraft, developed on the basis of the Il-76 transport aircraft. The ground-based air defense component has been strengthened due to the massive arrival of new S-300P and PM air defense systems, capable of shooting down low-flying cruise missiles and high-altitude high-speed targets. According to American data, in 1989, about 1,500 S-300 launchers were already on combat duty.

The general purpose forces of the Navy were replenished with such powerful warships as heavy nuclear cruisers Project 1141 Kirov (three units), missile cruisers Project 1164 Slava (three), a new generation BOD of the Udaloy type and destroyers of the Sovremenny type. The submarine fleet continued to gain power - nuclear submarines of such types as Antey, Granit, Bars, Shchuka-B, which had very high tactical and technical characteristics, were put into operation. But the main event of the late 80s for the Soviet fleet was the sea trials of the first aircraft carrier in the history of the Russian fleet - the heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser (TAVKR) Project 1143.5 "Tbilisi" (now "Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Nikolai Kuznetsov"). In 1989, the first takeoffs and landings in the history of the Soviet Navy of shipborne versions of the MiG-29 (MiG-29K) and Su-27 (Su-33) fighters, and the Su-25 attack aircraft (Su-25UTG) took place on the deck of this aircraft carrier. The successful mastery of the TAVKR deck by naval pilots opened a new page in the history of the Russian fleet.

The defense industry of the late 80s was the most powerful sector of Soviet mechanical engineering (it accounted for 60% of physical production volume). More than 35 million people worked at the military-industrial complex. This giant “iceberg” (“Military-Industrial Complex Archipelago”) was hidden from the people by various kinds of “mailboxes” (closed cities). The arms industry structurally consisted of such powerful industries as general (space) and medium engineering (nuclear), aviation, shipbuilding, instrument making, armored vehicles, artillery and small arms, ammunition and others. The “whales” of the space industry were such giants as the Yuzhny Machine-Building Plant No. 586 (its other names are “Yuzhmash”, or NPO “Yuzhnoye”) in Dnepropetrovsk (Ukraine), which, in addition to spacecraft launch vehicles, also produced ICBMs, the plant named after. Khrunichev and Tushino Machine Plant in Moscow and a number of others, equipped with first-class technological equipment and highly qualified personnel. A powerful blow to space engineering was the curtailment of the Energia-Buran program, the implementation of which almost the entire space complex was initially aimed at (discussed below).

In the late 80s, the aviation industry reached a leading position in the world in terms of its technological level. The production of the world's best MiG-29 fighters was carried out by the Moscow Aviation Production Association (MAPO) named after. Dementyev (production of single-seat combat aircraft MiG-29A and C) and the Gorky Aviation Plant (production of two-seat combat training aircraft MiG-29UB). The latter also produced MiG-31 interceptors. Serial production of the Su-27 was established at Komsomolsk-on-Amur APO named after. Gagarin (single-seat for the Air Force and Navy), and Irkutsk APO (double combat training Su-27UB). Su-25 attack aircraft were assembled at the Tbilisi aircraft plant, Su-24 front-line bombers were assembled at the Novosibirsk APO named after. Chkalova. Tashkent APO produced heavy Il-76 transport aircraft in dozens a year. The Rostov and Arsenyevsky helicopter plants were preparing to produce new generation combat helicopters Mi-28 and Ka-50, respectively.

Shipbuilding in the USSR has traditionally been concentrated in cities such as Severodvinsk, Komsomolsk-on-Amur and Gorky (production of nuclear and diesel boats), Nikolaev - aircraft-carrying and missile cruisers, Leningrad - nuclear cruisers, BOD, destroyers, nuclear boats of some types, Vladivostok, Khabarovsk and others. The largest of them were the Northern Machine-Building Enterprise (PO "Sevmash"), the Black Sea Fiber Plant and the plant named after. 61 communards in Nikolaev, the Amur Shipyard in Komsomolsk-on-Amur and the shipyard named after. Zhdanov (“Northern Shipyard”) in Leningrad. In the 80s, the shipbuilding industry reached the peak of its development and could annually support the construction of one TAVKR of the "Tbilisi" type, 4-5 nuclear submarines, 4-5 destroyers and BOD, and annually deliver up to 30 combat ships of various classes to the fleet. Wide cooperation and integration of industry factories and related enterprises was achieved. For example, almost 2,000 enterprises and organizations from 20 industries were involved in the construction of the TAVKR Tbilisi.

The development of modern weapons has reached the highest level. For the first time, the USSR created systems that, in their combat capabilities and level of technological sophistication, not only corresponded to the latest achievements of science and technology in the world, but also began to surpass the level of weapons development in the West. The design bureaus had the best scientific and engineering personnel in the country, which ensured such a high level of domestic military technology. The creation of strategic missiles in the 80s was carried out by the Moscow Institute of Thermal Engineering (MIT), which created such types of weapons as the RS-12M Topol ICBM, RS-22, and RSM-52 SLBMs for heavy RPKs of the Akula type. Design Bureau of the Southern Machine Plant named after. Yangel developed modifications of the world's most powerful ICBMs, the RS-20. KB named after Makeeva was developing liquid-fueled SLBMs.

The development of operational-tactical and tactical missiles of a new generation for the ground forces was carried out by the Kolomenskoye Design Bureau of Mechanical Engineering (the Oka and Tochka complexes), air-to-air guided missiles were the field of application of the forces of the Vympel Design Bureau, the Novator Design Bureau developed mobile Air defense systems for ground forces, MKB "Fakel" specialized in creating air defense systems for the country's air defense forces, and a number of others. The development of aircraft in the 80s was carried out by such world-famous organizations as the Design Bureau named after. A. Tupolev (now ASTC named after A. Tupolev), who created such aircraft as the Tu-160 and Tu-22M3, named after. Mikoyan (MiG Design Bureau named after A. Mikoyan) - MiG-29 and MiG-31 fighters, named after. Sukhoi (Akhmedov "Sukhoi") - Su-27 and Su-25, named after. Yakovleva - Yak-141, Antonov - An-72, An-74, An-124 “Ruslan”, An-225 “Mriya” and a number of others. The highest level of Soviet combat aircraft was convincingly demonstrated at the aviation exhibitions in Farnborough (1988) and Le Bourget (1989).

Soviet tank building continued to remain at the forefront. Design bureaus for the development of modern tanks were located in Leningrad (design bureau of the Kirov plant - T-80), Nizhny Tagil (T-72), Kharkov (T-64). The development and production of infantry fighting vehicles was carried out by the Kurgan Machine-Building Plant, which in the 80s was awarded the Order of the Red Star for great production success (it produced up to 2000 infantry fighting vehicles per year). The creation of other types of land weapons also met the highest world standards. The design of surface ships was mainly entrusted to the Northern and Nevsky design bureaus (Leningrad), and nuclear-powered submarines to such organizations as TsKB-18 "Rubin", SKB-143 "Malachite", TsKB-112 "Lazurit". In general, the level of Soviet naval weapons was also raised to a very high level. “Perestroika” did not have time to cripple the rise of domestic military technologies that had begun.

Despite lagging behind the West in such areas as the development of modern electronic equipment, especially digital, communication and control systems, the Soviet military-industrial complex successfully compensated for the weaknesses of its developments with better productivity of technical solutions and a higher degree of consideration than in the West of real combat conditions in which these systems had to be applied. And the lag in detection, communication and control systems was not as great as they tried to imagine in the West.

In order not to be considered unfounded, it is enough to cite the following facts. The USSR was not at all behind in the guidance accuracy of its strategic missiles (the technological level of domestic MIRVs was at the level of American ones). The MiG-31 was the world's first combat aircraft equipped with an electronically controlled phased array radar, which is currently only equipped on the newest American B-2B Spirit bomber (production aircraft shown). In air defense systems, the Soviet S-300P, S-300V, “Tor” and “Buk” air defense systems were almost head and shoulders superior to their Western opponents or had no analogues in the world at all. For the first time, Soviet diesel and nuclear submarines of the latest projects were not inferior to American submarines in terms of such a factor as noise level.

An experienced reader probably remembers the scandal surrounding the Japanese company Toshiba, which sold the USSR high-precision grinding machines for precise processing of large workpieces, which, as the United States claimed, were used specifically for processing propellers of new types of Soviet submarines, including seven-blade ones, which sharply reduced their noise level. “Perestroika,” fortunately, was not able to completely destroy the domestic military-industrial complex - it was so well created over the past decades. But it hit the latest developments in the military-industrial complex of the second half of the 80s, as a result of which the scientific and technical level of our weapons is currently essentially kept at the level of the 70s. But military technology, like any other branch of technology, is constantly being improved. What is now quite modern and meets the latest requirements due to continuous modernization, tomorrow will exhaust its constructive resource and become obsolete. Entire military programs that were of a strategic nature to ensure the defense capability of the state were ruined. A striking example of this is the failure of the development of the fifth generation fighter, but more on that later.

The military-industrial complex (MIC) is a set of research, testing organizations and production enterprises that carry out the development and production of military and special equipment, ammunition, ammunition, etc., mainly for state law enforcement agencies, as well as for export. http://ru.wikipedia.org

The military-industrial complex has played and continues to play a system-forming role in the economy of both regions of the Russian Federation and Russia as a whole.

In May 1915, at the 9th Congress of Representatives, the idea of ​​​​creating military-industrial committees was first formulated. In July 1915, the 1st Congress of the Military-Industrial Complex took place. In August of the same year, a regulatory legal act was adopted that assigned to the committees the functions of assisting government agencies in supplying the army and navy with the necessary equipment and provisions through the planned distribution of raw materials and orders, their timely execution and setting prices. The Central Military-Industrial Complex formed a number of sections according to industries, the number of which increased all the time. Sections were created: mechanical, chemical, army supply, clothing, food, sanitary, inventions, automobile, aviation, transportation, coal, oil, peat and forestry, mobilization, large shells, machine tools, etc. http://ru. wikipedia.org

In the 1920s, the Soviet defense industry was characterized by the restoration of large-scale industry in the USSR. Having carried out a reform of the armed forces in 1923-1924, the Soviet government also developed and implemented a reform of the military industry. The main strategic reason for the need to create a permanent branch (organization) of military-industrial production in the USSR was that, without exception, all weapons and supplies for the army must be prepared within the Republic; all military production should be based exclusively on domestic raw materials.

Reporting in 1932 on the results of defense preparation of industry in the 1st Five-Year Plan, Deputy Chairman of the USSR State Planning Committee I.S. Unshlikht stated: “In the USSR, the military industry is a systematically organized industry that unites personnel military enterprises.” Beskrovny L.G. The Russian army and navy at the beginning of the 20th century. Essays on military-economic potential. http://rufort.info/library/simonov/simonov.html

During the 20-50s, the process of development of military-industrial production and recruitment of military-industrial “cadre” and “reserve” factories went through several stages.

The first stage occupies the period from 1921 to 1930 and is characterized by the concentration of military-industrial production in separate groups of “personnel” military factories under the general leadership of one special management body under the single People's Commissariat of Industry - the Supreme Economic Council of the USSR.

The second stage occupies the period from 1930 to 1936 and is characterized by the concentration of “personnel” factories of the 1st group of military products and the dispersion of the rest (2nd and 3rd groups) across all related industries.

April 7 - May 3, 1930, the military-industrial trusts and their Main Directorate (GUVP) were abolished. From the “personnel” factories of the 1st group of military products, the following were formed: the All-Union Association of Cannon-Weapon-Machine-Gun Production (Arms Association), the All-Union Association of Cartridge-Tube and Explosive Production (Patrubvzryv). Other factories capable of producing military products, for example, shipbuilding, optical-mechanical, explosives and toxic substances, moved or remained part of civilian trusts and departments.

At the beginning of January 1932, the Supreme Economic Council of the USSR was abolished. All military-industrial enterprises of the “cadre” and “reserve”, on an equal basis, were transferred to the jurisdiction of the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry of the USSR, its headquarters and trusts, namely: aviation - to the Main Directorate of the Aviation Industry (GUAP); shipbuilding - to the Main Directorate of the Shipbuilding Industry (GUSP); military chemical - to the Military Chemical Trust (Vokhimtrest), the All-Union Trust of Organic Production (VTOP) and the All-Union Trust of Artificial Fiber (VIV); weapons, machine guns, bombs, shells, mines and torpedoes - to the Main Military Mobilization Directorate; cartridge and cartridge cases - to the Cartridge-Case Trust; guns - to the Arsenal Trust; projectiles - to the Projectile Trust; armored vehicles - to the Special Machine-Building Trust (Spetsmashtrest), optical-mechanical - to the State Association of Optical-Mechanical Plants (GOMZ). As of April 5, 1934, the list of “personnel” factories in the “military industry” approved by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks included 68 enterprises. They establish a special procedure for recruiting labor.

The functions of the coordinator of the activities of military factories in the Narkomtyazhprom system were performed by its Main Military Mobilization Directorate (GVMU), divided in 1936 into the Main Directorate of Military Industry and the Main Directorate of Ammunition.

The third stage covers the period from 1936 to 1941 and is characterized by the concentration of all “personnel” military factories and part of the “reserve” factories - first in the People's Commissariat of Defense Industry, and then in several military-industrial People's Commissariats, specially created to speed up the process of rearmament of the Army and the Navy.

The People's Commissariat of the Defense Industry was formed on December 8, 1936 by a resolution of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR. From the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry, the new People's Commissariat included: 47 aviation factories, 15 artillery factories, 3 weapons factories, 9 optical-mechanical factories, 10 tank factories, 9 cartridge-case factories, 7 tube-explosive factories, 7 shell factories, 3 production factories mine, torpedo and bomb weapons, 10 shipbuilding factories and shipyards, 23 military chemical enterprises, 16 factories for the production of electrical appliances and radio devices, 8 precision engineering enterprises, 5 battery and 3 metallurgical plants.

The fourth stage covers the period of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. and is characterized by the transformation of most of the machine-building national economic complex of the USSR into a military-industrial complex, with division into special military-industrial sectors under the leadership of the relevant People's Commissariats: weapons, ammunition and mortar weapons, aviation, tank and shipbuilding industries. The State Defense Committee (GKO) of the USSR becomes the highest body directing the activities of the entire state defense complex.

The fifth stage covers the period from 1946 to the end of the 1950s and is characterized by the modernization of the production of so-called “general military equipment” and the emergence of new types of military products, united under the general name of “special military equipment”; these are systems of jet and missile weapons and jet aircraft, samples of nuclear ammunition and various radio-electronic systems of military-technical equipment and military communications.

In 1946-1957, “personnel” military factories were concentrated in the ministries of aviation industry, weapons (since 1954, the Ministry of Defense Industry), shipbuilding industry and more or less evenly dispersed in special “bushes” in civilian ministries: transport engineering, agricultural engineering, heavy mechanical engineering, automobile and tractor industry - as the parent enterprises of partially mothballed military-industrial production: ammunition, mine and mortar weapons, special vehicles and armored vehicles. Golovanov Ya. Korolev. Facts and myths. http://rufort.info

To organize work on the creation of nuclear missile weapons, a Special Committee and three Main Directorates are created under the USSR Council of Ministers. To organize work on the creation of radar and electronic equipment, a Radar Committee is being created under the USSR Council of Ministers. Functions of the coordinator of the activities of the ministries of “defense industries”, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR, the Ministry of the Armed Forces of the USSR, the Ministry of State Security of the USSR in matters of drawing up a plan for orders for weapons and military equipment, organizing research work on defense topics, etc. carried out until 1952 by the Bureau for Military-Industrial and Military Issues under the USSR Council of Ministers, and then by the Commission of the Presidium of the USSR Council of Ministers on Military-Industrial Issues.

In 1956, the Ministry of Aviation Industry system concentrated 220 “personnel” military factories, the Ministry of Defense Industry system - 210, the Ministry of Shipbuilding Industry system - 135, and the Ministry of Radtechprom system - 216. In addition to production functions, these ministries are intensively working on the creation of new types of weapons and military equipment through the efforts of 270 pilot plants, design bureaus, research, special and design institutes.

In 1958, all research institutes, design bureaus, design bureaus and design bureaus of the Soviet military-industrial complex, together with pilot plants, were transferred to the jurisdiction of the State Committees: aviation technology, defense technology, radio-electronic technology and shipbuilding. The ministries of military industry are disbanded, and serial factories of the military-industrial “cadre” are transferred to the jurisdiction of the councils of ministers of the union republics and economic councils of economic regions.

Until the beginning of the 60s, the formation of the all-Union defense complex was completed and its development, aimed primarily at creating the country’s nuclear missile shield and means of delivering nuclear weapons, the 60s - early 80s - the powerful self-development of the Soviet military-industrial complex and its transformation into the dominant of the country's national economy, the second half of the 80s - 90s - the gradual degradation of the military-industrial complex due to the collapse of the USSR and the first attempts of the military-industrial complex to fit into new market socio-economic conditions. A. Losik, A. Mezentsev, P. Minaev, A. Shcherba. “Domestic military-industrial complex in the XX - early XXI centuries” / http://vpk-news.ru/articles/6102/ 2008

By the mid-1960s, there were nine basic defense-industrial ministries in the USSR, which, together with 10 related ministries under the leadership of the highest party bodies and the Military-Industrial Commission under the Presidium of the Council of Ministers, formed the basis of the entire socio-economic system of the USSR.

At the end of the 1980s, defense enterprises produced 20-25% of the country's gross domestic product (GDP), absorbing a huge part of material and human resources (military expenditures took up up to 60% of the country's budget). The best scientific and technical developments and personnel were concentrated in the defense industry: up to 3/4 of all research and development work (R&D) was carried out in the defense industry. Enterprises of the defense complex produced most of the civilian products: 90% of televisions, refrigerators, radios, 50% of vacuum cleaners, motorcycles, electric stoves. About 1/3 of the country's population lived in the area where defense industry enterprises were located. All this, at the same time, led to an excessive expansion of the area of ​​“unproductive” costs for the development and creation of weapons, to the detriment of the consumption sphere.

Since the beginning of the 1990s, the defense industry, together with Russian society, entered a period of economic and political crisis. The sharp reduction in appropriations led to the degradation of defense enterprises and the leaching of qualified personnel into other areas of activity (business, departure abroad, etc.). According to estimates of the Russian Ministry of Economy, in 1991-1995. 2.5 million workers left the defense industry. Military production of the defense industry decreased in 1997 compared to 1991 by almost 90%. Bystrova I.V. Domestic military-industrial complex in the twentieth century. / http://hist.msu.ru/Labs/Ecohist/OB8/bystrova.htm / 2002

Since 1999, Russia's military-industrial policy has changed in the direction of increasing financing of the defense industry, consolidating and increasing the competitiveness of the export of weapons and military equipment. To develop military-industrial policy, the Commission on Military-Industrial Issues was created under the Government of the Russian Federation on June 22, 1999. The management system was reorganized: 5 federal defense industry agencies were created (Russian Aviation and Space Agency, conventional weapons, ammunition, shipbuilding, control systems agencies).

Today, the military-industrial complex is being further formed in accordance with modern working conditions. At a meeting of the Government of the Russian Federation on January 20, 2011, the draft federal law “On Amendments to the Federal Laws “On Insolvency (Bankruptcy)” and “On Enforcement Proceedings” was considered in terms of improving the procedures used in bankruptcy cases of strategic organizations.” http://www.vpk.ru/cgi-bin/uis/w4.cgi/CMS/Item/2540012

military industrial shelf rental

Russia's military potential is initially perceived as very impressive. At the same time, not every citizen of the Russian Federation can clearly imagine the structure of the defense sector of their country. In addition, this information was not always available. Therefore, there is every reason to pay attention to the structure of the military-industrial complex.

Military-industrial complex of Russia

Regarding this topic, it is initially worth noting that the military-industrial complex can be safely attributed to an industry that has had a more than tangible impact on the development of the economy over many years of the existence of the Russian Federation.

And although some time ago such a concept as the Russian military-industrial complex was somewhat vague, in the mid-2000s progress in this area became obvious. If we talk about the current situation, it is worth mentioning the fact that the military-industrial complex has many progressive industries:

Aviation industry;

Nuclear;

Rocket and space;

Production of ammunition and ammunition;

Military shipbuilding, etc.

The following enterprises can be identified as the main players that deserve attention within the framework of the military-industrial complex:

- "Russian Technologies";

- "Rosoboronexport";

OJSC Air Defense Concern Almaz-Antey, etc.

What does the structure of the military industry look like?

Within the framework of this topic, it is necessary to initially highlight the following information: during the active 90s, the wave of privatization did not bypass the enterprises of the military-industrial complex of Russia. Therefore, if you now analyze the ownership structure of the military-industrial complex of the Russian Federation, you can easily notice that most of it consists of joint stock companies. More specifically, there are 57% of such joint-stock companies in the entire military-industrial complex. At the same time, there is no state share in 28.2% of such enterprises.

You can also refer to other data provided by the Accounts Chamber. According to this information, approximately 230 enterprises operate within the aviation industry. But only 7 of them belong to the state (we are talking about a controlling stake).

One of the key features of Russian enterprises can be identified as their jurisdiction in various forms to federal organizations. At the moment, the structure of the Russian military-industrial complex includes 5 government agencies that oversee the defense industries and are located in:

RACE. Operates in the field of communications and radio industry.

- "Rossudostroenie". Responsible for supervising shipbuilding production.

CANCER. Controls processes within the rocket, space and aviation industries.

RAV. In this case we are talking about the arms industry.

- "Rosboepripasy". This agency specializes in working with the specialty chemicals and ammunition industries.

Key elements of the military-industrial complex

If we consider the features of the Russian military-industrial complex, we cannot ignore the types of organizations that are part of it:

Design bureaus that are focused on working with prototypes of weapons.

Research organizations. Their main task is theoretical developments.

Manufacturing enterprises. In this case, resources are used to mass produce weapons.

Test sites and testing laboratories. It makes sense to talk about several important tasks here. This is the so-called fine-tuning of prototypes under real operating conditions, as well as testing weapons that have just rolled off the production line.

In order to paint a complete picture of the functioning of the military-industrial complex and identify all the facets that the Russian military-industrial complex has, it is necessary to pay attention to the fact that enterprises that are part of the defense sector also produce products that have a civilian purpose.

Now it’s worth taking a closer look at the military-industrial complex

Nuclear weapons complex

It is difficult to imagine the development of military-industrial without this direction. It includes several strategically important areas of production.

First of all, this is the subsequent production of a concentrate from these raw materials. The next important step is the separation of uranium isotopes (enrichment process). This task is performed at enterprises located in cities such as Angarsk, Novouralsk, Zelenogorsk and Seversk.

To be fair, it is worth noting that 45% of all capacities that are concentrated in Russia are located in Russia. At the same time, it is important to pay attention to the fact that the production of nuclear weapons is being reduced and the industries described above are focusing on Western customers.

Another task of this military-industrial complex is to both develop and allocate its reserves, concentrated in the Russian Federation, will last for many more years.

Enterprises operating within the nuclear weapons complex are also involved in the manufacture of fuel elements that are necessary for the operation of nuclear reactors, the assembly of nuclear weapons and the disposal of radioactive waste.

Rocket and space industry

It can rightfully be called one of the most knowledge-intensive. Just look at the cost of an ICBM (intercontinental ballistic missile) alone, for the full operation of which approximately 300 thousand different systems, instruments and parts are required. And if we talk about a large space complex, then this figure increases to 10 million.

It is for this reason that the largest number of scientists, engineers and designers are concentrated in this industry.

Aviation industry

When studying the military-industrial complex of Russia, the industries and directions of this area, attention must be paid to aviation in any case. Here it is relevant to talk about large industrial centers, since head enterprises are needed to assemble products. Others simply do not have the necessary technical base to organize the processes required for fast and high-quality production.

In this case, two key conditions must always be met: the availability of qualified specialists and well-organized transport links. The Russian military-industrial complex and specifically the aviation sector are in a state of constant development, which allows the Russian Federation to act as a major exporter of weapons, including aviation.

Artillery and small arms

This is also an important industry. The Russian military-industrial complex can hardly be imagined without the famous Kalashnikov assault rifle. This is the most widespread type of small arms currently produced in Russia.

Moreover, outside the CIS it was adopted by 55 states. As for artillery systems, their production centers are located in cities such as Perm, Yekaterinburg and Nizhny Novgorod.

Armor industry

If you pay attention to the centers of the Russian military-industrial complex, then after simple analytics you can draw an obvious conclusion: this direction of the defense industry can be defined as one of the most developed.

The tanks themselves are produced in Omsk and Nizhny Tagil. The factories located in Chelyabinsk and St. Petersburg are at the stage of repurposing. As for armored personnel carriers, their production is carried out by enterprises in Kurgan and Arzamas.

Military shipbuilding

Without it, the Russian military-industrial complex cannot be considered complete.

At the same time, the largest production center in this area is St. Petersburg. Within this city there are up to 40 enterprises related to shipbuilding.

Regarding the topic of nuclear submarines, it is necessary to pay attention to the fact that at the moment their production is carried out only in Severodvinsk.

What you should know about military-industrial complex conversion

In this case, we are talking about changes in the military industry, and more specifically, about its transition to the civilian market. This strategy can be explained very simply: the production capacities that currently exist are capable of producing significantly more military products than actual demand requires. That is, neither Russia itself nor its current and potential clients need that much.

Given this prospect, one obvious maneuver remains: to reorient some military enterprises to produce products that are relevant in the civilian sector. Thus, jobs will be preserved, factories will continue their stable operation, and the state will make a profit. Complete harmony.

The use of the military, so to speak, for peaceful purposes is also promising for the reason that at such enterprises there is a significant concentration of advanced technologies and specialists with a high level of qualifications.

Using such a strategy, it is possible to solve at least some of the problems of the Russian military-industrial complex. At the same time, stable production of the most relevant equipment for the army is maintained.

Obvious difficulties

Based on the information presented above, it is easy to conclude that the same conversion is not an easy task. In fact, it can be considered one of the most difficult tasks facing the military-industrial complex. There are no simple solutions here by definition. In order for any progress to be observed in this area, significant efforts must be constantly made.

Another problem that we have to face is the uncertainty of the future financing of military-industrial complex enterprises. The military-industrial complex of Russia can receive funds from the state only for those enterprises that are part of any federal program or are classified as state-owned production facilities.

As for foreign investment, there is no reason to count on it confidently yet. At the same time, factories that have production lines that are already outdated or are not capable of producing a wide range of competitive products, and military products in particular, may find themselves in a particularly difficult situation.

If we try to assess the economic state of defense enterprises as a whole, we can conclude that it is very heterogeneous. The point is that there are factories whose products have a certain demand. At the same time, there are also those enterprises that are in a state of deep production crisis, regardless of the fact whether they belong to the state or not.

Nevertheless, one must be aware that the government is recording the state of some components of the military-industrial complex. This confirms the fact that the Coordination Council approved the main directions of development and stabilization of the situation.

In addition, in Russia there is an active unification of fundamental and applied scientific areas within the framework of the activities of military enterprises, which significantly increases the chances of the military-industrial complex for successful development and full-fledged functioning. Well-organized efforts are also being made to ensure maximum compliance of the products that come off the assembly line of military-industrial complex enterprises with the investment expectations of the Russian and foreign markets.

Results

It is obvious that, despite the difficult situation surrounding the military-industrial complex, there are definitely chances for a bright future and a progressive present. The government is constantly working to make the necessary changes that will allow defense enterprises to operate as efficiently as possible.

A number of publicists during the period of “perestroika” (late 1980s - early 1990s) blamed the military-industrial complex (MIC) for all the ills of the Soviet economy, for the fact that an excessive increase in military spending led ultimately to the collapse of the economic system, and then to the collapse of the USSR. What was the Soviet military-industrial complex and what role did it play in the economy of the USSR?

The Soviet defense industry, as a set of separate and interconnected types of military production, began to be created in the 1920-1930s (on the basis of previously built defense enterprises). The military-industrial complex of the USSR, as a constantly operating system of interrelations between subjects of the economic and socio-political structure of Soviet society related to ensuring the military security of the country, was formed in the post-war years, under the conditions of the Cold War.

The highest peak of “militarization” of the economy in the USSR occurred, quite naturally, during the years of the Great Patriotic War (1941–1945). The structure of industrial production has changed radically. According to rough estimates, military consumption items accounted for about 65-68% of all industrial products produced in the USSR during the war. Its main producers were the People's Commissariats of the military industry: aviation, weapons, ammunition, mortar weapons, shipbuilding and tank industries. At the same time, other basic branches of heavy industry were also involved in securing military orders: metallurgy, fuel and energy, as well as the People's Commissariats of the light and food industries. Thus, the development of the economic structure of the military-industrial complex during the war years had the character of total militarization.

One of the main tasks in the first post-war years for the USSR was the restoration of the country's economy. To solve it in conditions of economic devastation, it was necessary to find new sources of restoration and development of priority sectors of the national economy. According to official Soviet propaganda, this process was supposed to be designed to use “internal resources”, to rid the country of economic dependence on a hostile capitalist environment.

Meanwhile, this dependence remained very significant by the end of the war. An analysis by Soviet economists of the ratio of imports of the most important types of equipment and materials and their domestic production for 1944 showed that, for example, imports of metal-cutting machines amounted to 58%, universal machine tools - up to 80%, crawler cranes (their domestic industry did not produce) - 287%. The situation with non-ferrous metals was similar: lead - 146%, tin - 170%. Particular difficulties arose with the need to develop domestic production of goods that were interrupted by deliveries under Lend-Lease (for many types of raw materials, materials and food, the share of these supplies ranged from 30 to 80%).

In the first post-war years, one of the most important sources of resources was the export of materials and equipment of the so-called “special supplies” - captured, as well as under reparations and agreements from Germany, Japan, Korea, Romania, Finland, Hungary. Created at the beginning of 1945, the Commission for Compensation for Damage Caused by the Nazi Invaders made a general assessment of the human and material losses of the USSR during the war years, developed a plan for the military and economic disarmament of Germany, and discussed the problem of reparations on an international scale.

Practical activities for the removal of equipment were carried out by the Special Committee under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, as well as special commissions of representatives of economic departments. They compiled lists of enterprises and equipment, laboratories and research institutes that were subject to “seizure” and sent to the USSR as reparations. By the resolution of the Council of People's Commissars "On the dismantling and removal to the Soviet Union of equipment from Japanese power plants, industrial enterprises and railways located on the territory of Manchuria", the management of this work was entrusted to the authorized Special Committee under the Council of People's Commissars M.Z. Saburov. By December 1, 1946, 305 thousand tons of equipment from Manchuria with a total value of 116.3 million US dollars arrived in the USSR. In total, during the two years of work of the Special Committee in the USSR, about 1 million wagons of various equipment were exported from 4,786 German and Japanese enterprises, including 655 military industry enterprises.

By the summer of 1946, there were about two million prisoners of war in the USSR - a huge reserve of labor. The labor of prisoners of war was widely used in the Soviet national economy (especially in construction) during the first post-war five-year plan. At the same time, German developments in the field of the latest types of weapons of mass destruction aroused the greatest interest on the Soviet side. German technical advances and the work of specialists were actively used in the initial stages of domestic rocket production, the nuclear project, and in military shipbuilding.

Eastern European countries also played a role as suppliers of strategic raw materials in the early stages of the creation of the nuclear industry in the USSR, especially in 1944–1946. As uranium deposits were explored, the Soviet authorities took the path of creating joint stock companies to develop them, under the guise of mining companies, in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Romania. To develop the Bukovskoe deposit in Bulgaria, a Soviet-Bulgarian mining society was created at the beginning of 1945 under the leadership of the NKVD of the USSR. The deposit became the main source of raw materials for the first Soviet nuclear reactor.

Eastern bloc countries continued to be the most important source of uranium until the early 1950s. As the “curator” of the military industry from the Central Committee, N.A. Bulganin, said in his speech to the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Party on July 3, 1953, the state was “well supplied with uranium raw materials,” and a lot of uranium was mined on the territory of the GDR - “maybe no less.” than the Americans have at their disposal."

The main resource for the post-war restoration and increase in the economic power of the USSR was the mobilization potential of the centralized planned economy to concentrate forces and resources in the areas of highest priority from the point of view of the country's leadership. One of the traditional levers of mobilization remained the tax policy of the state. At the end of the war, in the fourth quarter of 1945, the state seemingly gave relief to the population by reducing the war tax by 180 million rubles, but at the same time a war loan was organized (subscribed by peasants) for 400 million rubles. Food prices were increased in September 1946 by 2–2.5 times. In 1948, the amount of agricultural tax increased by 30% compared to 1947, and in 1950 by 2.5 times.

One of the resources for economic mobilization was mass forced labor. The NKVD camp system became the basis for the creation of the nuclear and other branches of the military industry. In addition to imprisoned compatriots, in the late 40s, the labor of prisoners of war was widely used, and a system of organized recruitment of labor from various segments of the population was also used. A unique semi-compulsory form was the labor of military builders and specialists, the importance of which especially increased after the abolition of the system of mass camps in the mid-50s.

In the first post-war years, it was impossible to maintain the size of the armed forces and the size of defense production on a wartime scale, and therefore a number of measures were taken to reduce military potential. From June 1945 to the beginning of 1949, the army was demobilized. In general, by the end of 1948 - beginning of 1949, the Soviet Army was reduced from more than 11 million to 2.8 million people.

In the first post-war years, the country's leadership also proclaimed a policy of restructuring industry into civilian production. After the reorganization of the management system in May 1945, the number of defense people's commissariats was reduced, and military production was concentrated in the people's commissariats of armaments, aviation, shipbuilding industry, agricultural and transport engineering (in March 1946 they were renamed ministries).

The implementation of the policy of reducing military production and increasing the output of civilian products began already at the end of 1945 and was under the personal control of the Deputy Chairman of the State Defense Committee (later Chairman of the Bureau of the Council of Ministers) L.P. Beria, who during the war years concentrated in his control over industry. However, his instructions on the “conversion” of enterprises to civilian production were quite contradictory. On the one hand, he gave threatening instructions to directors of enterprises who were accustomed to working in emergency military conditions and had difficulty transitioning to civilian production. At the same time, Beria ordered to maintain and increase the production of a wide range of military products - gunpowder, explosives, chemical ammunition, etc.

In 1946–1947 The production of a number of types of conventional weapons - tanks and aircraft - was significantly reduced. The leaders of the defense industry resisted the policy of “conversion”: Ministers D.F. Ustinov, M.V. Khrunichev, M.G. Pervukhin and others attacked higher authorities, right up to Stalin himself, with requests to preserve “unique” military production and increase output new types of defense products. Attempts to demilitarize industry led to a deterioration in the industrial sector of the economy, which was already destroyed by the war. Within 6–9 months from the beginning of industrial restructuring, the output of civilian products only to a small extent compensated for the decline in military production. This led to a decrease in the total volume of production, a deterioration in quality indicators, and a reduction in the number of workers. Only in the second quarter of 1946 did the volume of military production stabilize, civilian production increased, and a gradual increase in production volume began.

According to official sources, the post-war industrial restructuring was completed already in 1947, as evidenced by the following figures:

According to official data, military production amounted to 24 billion rubles in 1940, 74 billion in 1944, 50.5 billion in 1945, 14.5 billion in 1946, 1947 The level of 1946 was maintained. However, these figures must be treated with a certain degree of conditionality: they rather show general dynamics than are reliable in absolute terms, since prices for military products have been reduced repeatedly since 1941.

In general, the process of reducing military production affected mainly rapidly obsolete weapons of the past war type, which were not required in the same quantities. In 1946–1947 the share of civilian and military products has stabilized. Already in 1947, plans for the production of civilian products began to decrease in a number of defense ministries (shipbuilding, aviation industry), and from 1949 there was a sharp increase in military orders. During the first post-war five-year plan, the range of “special products”, i.e., military products, was almost completely updated, which paved the way for the rearmament of the army and navy that began in the 50s.

For example, at the end of the 40s, a long-term plan for the production of armored vehicles was developed until 1970. After the failure to fulfill the tank production program in 1946–1947, a sharp drop in their production in 1948, starting from 1949, a constant and steady increase in production in this industry. In connection with the war in Korea, since 1950 the production volumes of aircraft equipment have increased sharply.

Already in 1946, the Council of Ministers adopted a number of resolutions on the development of the latest weapons, decisions on developments in the field of jet and radar technology. The construction of warships, mothballed during the war, was resumed: a ten-year military shipbuilding program was adopted, and the construction of 40 naval bases was planned. Extraordinary measures were taken to create the Soviet atomic bomb. All this was explained primarily by the need to eliminate the gap in the military field with the United States, which became the main enemy of the USSR in the Cold War that was flaring up in these years.

Along with the traditional defense ministries, emergency bodies were created under the Council of People's Commissars (since March 1946 - the Council of Ministers of the USSR) to manage new programs in the USSR: the Special Committee and the First Main Directorate (on the atomic problem), Committee No. 2 (on jet technology), Committee No. 3 (Radar). The emergency, mobilization and experimental nature of these programs necessitated the concentration of the resources of various departments in special supra-ministerial management bodies.

In general, “demilitarization” was more of a sideline of the post-war industrial restructuring; The main strategic direction of its development was the development and build-up of the latest types of weapons. Plan for the development of the national economy of the USSR for 1951–1955. for military and special industries provided for a significant volume of supplies of all types of military equipment, increasing from year to year, with special attention paid to preparing facilities for the production of new types of military equipment and strategic raw materials, replenishing special production capacities switched after the end of the war to other sectors of the national economy farms.

For six defense-industrial ministries (aircraft industry, armaments, agricultural engineering, transport engineering, communications industry, automotive industry), on average, the output of military products over the five-year period was supposed to increase 2.5 times. However, for some types of military equipment, a significantly greater increase was planned: for radar and armored equipment - 4.5 times. The production of atomic “products” increased on a more significant scale, which was planned separately even from all other types of military products. To eliminate bottlenecks and imbalances in the national economy and to create new industries for the production of weapons - jet technology and radar equipment - the plan outlined the volume of capital investments in the main sectors of the defense industry in the amount of 27,892 million rubles.

Moreover, in the early 50s this plan was repeatedly adjusted upward. In March 1952, the size of capital investments in the military and defense-industrial departments was noticeably increased. Adjustment of plans in general was a characteristic feature of the Soviet planning system. During the period under review, a kind of military-industrial revolution began in the country, accompanied by an increase in military spending, an expansion of defense programs and a simultaneous increase in the influence of the professional military elite on the decision-making process on defense issues. Since the beginning of the 50s, plans for the production of various types of conventional weapons of modernized models have increased - tanks, artillery self-propelled guns, aircraft; forced rearmament of the army began.

According to official data, the strength of the USSR Armed Forces increased in the early 50s to almost 6 million people. According to recently declassified information from the archives, the quantitative composition of the central apparatus of the War Ministry on September 1, 1952 increased compared to the pre-war figure - on January 1, 1941 - by 242%: 23,075 people against 9,525. The unwinding of a new spiral of the arms race was connected primarily with the aggravation of the international situation in the late 40s - early 50s (Berlin crisis, the creation of NATO, the Korean War, etc.).

Despite the new growth in the military programs of the USSR in the early 50s, by this time the military-industrial complex had not yet gained the political weight that would allow it to have a decisive influence on the policies of the Soviet leadership. In 1953–1954 a stable course towards military confrontation with the West gave way to a contradictory period in economic and military policy. In 1954–1958 there was a decrease in military spending and an increase in the share of the consumption sector in the gross national product.

A number of historians connected the course towards restoring the rights of civil consumers with the reformist plans of G.M. Malenkov, who headed the Council of Ministers of the USSR during these years, others - with the activities of N.S. Khrushchev, who became the First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee in September 1953.

In contrast to the growth of military programs in the previous years 1950–1952, the second half of 1953 and 1954 were already marked by a shift towards civilian production and consumerism. For example, the plan for survey and design work for the War Ministry for 1953 was initially 43,225 million rubles, and then was reduced to 40,049 million, i.e., by more than 3 million rubles. The plan for military and special industries for 1954 was also adjusted downward: the growth of production in 1954 compared to 1953, instead of 107% according to the plan and 108.8% according to the application of the War Ministry, was reduced to 106.9 %.

When assessing the dynamics of the gross national product, one should take into account the decrease in wholesale prices for military products by 5% since January 1, 1953, as well as the increase in civilian products. The decrease in the volume of gross output of a number of ministries in 1953 and according to the draft plan for 1954 was also explained by a decrease in the output of defense products and an increase in the output of consumer goods, which had lower wholesale prices. In general, the production of consumer goods in 1953 and 1954 significantly exceeded the production volume envisaged for these years according to the five-year plan for 1951–1955.

The trend towards reducing military spending continued in subsequent years, when Khrushchev’s influence in the top leadership increased, until the establishment of his autocracy in the summer of 1957. During the period 1955–1958. USSR military spending was reduced by a total of one billion rubles. By mid-1957, the size of the army and navy had decreased by 1.2 million people - to approximately 3 million people, due to the program announced by Khrushchev to reduce the traditional branches of the Armed Forces (in particular, Stalin's plans to deploy conventional naval forces and weapons) and shifting priorities towards missiles, electronics and nuclear weapons.

According to some Western estimates, during the first three years of Khrushchev's rule, the share of military spending in the country's gross national product (GNP) decreased from 12 to 9%, while the share of the consumption sector increased from 60 to 62% of GNP. In 1959, rising costs for the production of new weapons reversed this trend, and Soviet military spending again increased to 1955 levels, although due to the rapid growth of gross national product during this period, the percentage of military spending in GNP remained the same. After 1959, their share of GNP began to slowly but steadily increase. Military spending again took priority in the economic policy of the Soviet leadership. According to Western estimates, in the time interval from 1952 to 1970. The period of the highest growth rates of military expenditures of the USSR was 1961–1965, when the average growth rate reached 7.6%.

At the same time, the lion's share of military expenditures was spent on the production and operation of the latest weapons and their systems, and not on the maintenance of troops. This trend of predominantly increasing costs for military equipment became more and more obvious under the conditions of the scientific and technological revolution.

The period of the late 50s - early 60s was characterized by the search for new principles for organizing the management of the national economy of the USSR, including the defense industry. By the time of the reorganization of national economic management undertaken by N.S. Khrushchev in 1957–1958. The main weapons production programs were concentrated in the Ministry of Medium Engineering (nuclear program), the Ministry of Defense Industry (renamed in 1953 from the Ministry of Armaments), the Ministry of Radio Engineering Industry (created in 1954), as well as in the ministries of the aviation and shipbuilding industries. At the end of the 50s, the system of sectoral ministries was abolished, defense industry enterprises, like other sectors of the economy, were transferred to the jurisdiction of local economic councils. To organize research and development work on the creation of weapons, State Committees on aviation technology, defense technology, shipbuilding and radio electronics, and the use of atomic energy were created.

In general, Khrushchev’s reform led to a certain decentralization and the establishment of ties between defense and civilian enterprises, expanding the geographical and social framework of the Soviet military-industrial complex. According to N.S. Simonov, enterprises engaged in the serial production of defense products were included in the system of regional economic relations and were emerging from the state of production and technological isolation. Local economic authorities were given the opportunity to place orders for them that met local needs. Defense industry enterprises even began to show a tendency towards economic independence, which was manifested in the establishment of real contractual relations with the customer - the Ministry of Defense - on pricing issues.

At the same time, in the conditions of decentralization of defense industry management, the coordinating role of the most important state body at the supra-ministerial level - the Commission on Military-Industrial Issues under the Presidium of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, recreated in December 1957 - has strengthened. It was led in turn by the largest leader of the Soviet military-industrial complex D.F. Ustinov, V.M. Ryabikov, L.N. Smirnov. The Commission became the main governing body of the defense industry in the period 60 - 80-ies.

The return to the ministerial system after the dismissal of N.S. Khrushchev at the end of 1964 contributed to the strengthening of the centralized planning principle in the management of the defense industry. Another “gathering” of military-related enterprises into centralized bureaucratic sectoral ministries began. In particular, in 1965, the Ministry of General Mechanical Engineering was created, which concentrated work on rocket and space technology (previously, these developments were scattered across enterprises of a number of ministries). As a result of the 1965 reform, the so-called “nine” defense-industrial ministries were finally formed, in which military production was mainly concentrated (ministries of aviation industry, defense industry, general engineering, radio industry, medium engineering, shipbuilding industry, chemical industry, electronic industry, electrical industry). They were also adjacent to 10 related ministries, which were also involved in the production of military and civilian products.

The economic structure of the military-industrial complex was actually the supporting structure of the entire socio-economic system of the USSR. According to data at the end of the 80s, military-industrial complex enterprises produced 20–25% of the gross domestic product (GDP), absorbing the lion's share of the country's resources. The best scientific and technical developments and personnel were concentrated in the defense industry: up to ¾ of all research and development work (R&D) was carried out in the military-industrial complex. Enterprises of the defense complex produced most of the civilian products: 90% of televisions, refrigerators, radios, 50% of vacuum cleaners, motorcycles, electric stoves. About 1/3 of the country's population lived in the area where defense industry enterprises were located.

At the same time, the best scientific and technical personnel and achievements were concentrated in the military-industrial complex. The military-industrial complex became a kind of “locomotive” of the Soviet economy.

When analyzing the dynamics of military expenditures of the USSR, you can turn to the data given in the book “The Domestic Military-Industrial Complex”, written by representatives of the defense industry in 2005. The authors highlight “the first thirty-year period in the history of the Cold War” as key for the analysis, since “ it reflects the dynamics of our efforts to eliminate the military-technological lag of the USSR (and then the entire SVD bloc) from the NATO bloc led by the USA, which ended in the early 70s.” In addition, by the beginning of the final stage of the Cold War (1976-1990), the management system of the country’s defense complex acquired, according to the authors of the book, a completely new quality: a “transition from planned development of certain types of weapons and military equipment to long-term - to program-target planning in accordance with the tasks of the Armed Forces of the USSR."

According to the reporting data of the USSR Ministry of Defense, given in 1989, when the USSR State Planning Committee began developing the project “Program for the Conversion of Defense Industries for the Period until 1995”, military expenditures of the USSR in 1944–1972. were the following values ​​(in billion rubles): 1944 - 13.7 billion rubles, 1946 - 7.3, in 1949 - 7.9, in 1950 - 8.3, in 1952 - 10.9, in 1956 – 11.7, in 1957–1959 – 11.3 billion per year, in 1961 – 11.8, in 1962 – 12.9, in 1966 – 15.8, in 1967 – 16.7, in 1970 – 23.2, in 1972 – 26.2 billion rubles.

The authors of the book draw attention to the relatively low values ​​of the annual absolute increase in defense spending (on average at the level of 1.5-2 billion rubles per year). At the same time, in the late 70s. the annual increase in US defense spending, according to their data, ranged from 7.3 to 12.2 billion dollars, and during the period of greatest aggravation of Soviet-American relations in the early 1980s they reached $28 billion per year .

At the same time, as indicated in the book, the average annual growth rate of defense spending during the period of eliminating the gap between the USSR and the USA amounted to 3.6%, while the average annual rate of development of the national economy as a whole for the six post-war five-year plans, according to - from the book by N.K. Baibakov “From Stalin to Yeltsin” amounted to about 11.8% (from 22.5% in the fourth five-year plan to 5.7% in the ninth). “Deviations from the average growth rate of defense spending” reflect, according to the authors of the book, the impact of the events of the Cold War, as they show in the following graph:

According to the authors, in the fourth five-year plan (1946 - 1950), the negative “emissions” are explained by the restructuring of the national economy of the USSR in a peaceful way, and only at the end of the five-year plan and during the next there were positive “emissions” associated with the creation of USSR nuclear and missile industry.

In the seventh (1961-1965) and eighth (1966-1970) five-year plans, “emissions” are explained by “the need to strengthen our air defense and the beginning of the development of missile defense systems (ABM) in response to the United States achieving twenty-fold by 1964 advantages in nuclear missile weapons. And only by the beginning of the Ninth Five-Year Plan (1971 - 1975) the USSR reached approximate parity with the United States in nuclear missile weapons, which made it possible to focus on the accelerated creation of missile defense systems and the construction of new generation nuclear submarines.”

When comparing the average growth rates of defense spending over five-year plans with similar indicators of growth in national income, it turned out that the former always (except for the eighth five-year plan) did not exceed the latter: in the fourth five-year plan - 5.6% versus 22.5%; in the fifth five-year plan - 6.9% versus 17%; in the sixth five-year plan - 0.3% versus 10.9%; in the seventh five-year plan - 4.9% versus 6.5%; in the Eighth Five-Year Plan - 10.0% versus 7.8% and in the Ninth Five-Year Plan - 5.6% versus 5.7%.

The final 15-year stage of the Cold War, which coincided with the beginning of the eleventh five-year plan for the development of the national economy of the USSR (1976), according to the authors, was distinguished by the stability of the growth rate of defense spending in the period from 1976 to 1985 (5.0-5 .3%) against the backdrop of a slight slowdown in the growth rate of national income in the same period (4.3 - 3.6%). However, in the twelfth five-year plan (1986-1990), defense spending at the average annual growth rate decreased to 1.6% compared to 2.4% for the national economy as a whole.

In our opinion, the greatest “unproductive” burden for the Soviet economy was not the expenses for the “internal” needs of the Soviet military-industrial complex, but the expenses for military, economic, and ideological “assistance” to foreign efforts. The Soviet military-industrial complex became the most important supplier of weapons for the countries of the “third world” and the “socialist camp”. In the early 80s of the USSR, 25% of weapons and military equipment produced in the country were exported abroad. The size of military supplies was considered top secret information for many years, which was partially revealed to the Russian public only in the early 90s. During the post-war period, the USSR participated in armed conflicts and wars in more than 15 countries (by sending military specialists and contingents, as well as supplies of weapons and military equipment in order to provide virtually free “international assistance”, including:

A country	Period of conflict	Debt of the corresponding USSR country (billions of dollars)
North Korea
	1960–1963 August 1964 – November 1968 November 1969 – December 1970
	1962–1964
	June 5–13, 1967 Oct 6–24 1973
Cambodia	April 1970 – December 1970
Bangladesh	1972–1973
	November 1975 – 1979
Mozambique	1967 – 1969 November 1975 – November 1979
Afghanistan	April 1978 – May 1991
Nicaragua	1980 – 1990

In general, by the beginning of the 80s, the USSR became the world's first arms supplier (in terms of supply volume), ahead of even the United States in this regard. The Soviet military-industrial complex went beyond the boundaries of one state, becoming the most important force in the world economy and international relations. Another thing is that military supplies were mainly “on loan” (and most countries never returned these debts to us) and were the most important factor in undermining the economy of the USSR.

After the failure in military-industrial policy in the 1990s, over the past two years the historical traditions of integrated management of military-industrial affairs and the system of state defense procurement have gradually begun to be recreated. There has been a tendency towards the revival of the former greatness of the domestic military-industrial complex, which has largely retained its scientific, technical and production potential and can become the basis for the progressive development of the Russian economy at the modern world level of science and technology.

Simonov N.S. Military-industrial complex of the USSR in the 1920-1950s: rates of economic growth, structure, organization of production and management. M., 1996. P. 152

Based on documents from the funds of the Russian State Archive of Economics (RGEA).

State Archive of the Russian Federation. F. 5446. Op. 52. D. 2. L. 45–116 (hereinafter referred to as GARF).

Right there. L. 31.

According to RSAE documents.

See: Military Soviet Policy. P. 21–22.

See: Bezborodov A.B. Power and the military-industrial complex in the USSR in the mid-40s - mid-70s // Soviet Society: Everyday Life of the Cold War. M.- Arzamas, 2000.- P. 108.

See: Simonov N.S. Decree. op. pp. 288–291.

Zaleschansky B. Restructuring of military-industrial complex enterprises: from conservatism to adequacy // Man and Labor. 1998. No. 2. P. 80–83.

Domestic military-industrial complex and its historical development // Ed. O.D. Baklanova, O.K. Rogozin. - M., 2005. P. 31.

Right there. pp. 32–33.