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Topic: “Main directions of policy of the European Union”

Discipline: “Ensuring the quality of education and the Bologna process”

INTRODUCTION

In accordance with the Maastricht Treaty on the European Union, which entered into force on November 1, 1993, politically, the union was divided into three pillars: the European Community, which is a supranational element and two intergovernmental elements (common foreign and security policy and general policy in the field of internal affairs and justice). politics european union

The powers granted to the Union fall under one of these components. More sensitive areas are united primarily by intergovernmental pillars. It is rare for a union to have exclusive control of an area, even in the community's core.

The Union includes twenty-eight states. The enlargement of the European Union is a very important political issue, with discussions about how large it can be expanded. While some see it as the main political instrument for promoting development, others fear the Union will become too enlarged.

Some states are outside the European Union, for example the Economic and Monetary Union includes only 17 of the 28 members, and the Schengen Agreement covers only 21 states. However, most of them are in the process of joining these blocs. A number of countries outside the union participate in a number of EU activities, such as the Eurozone, Schengen, single market or defense. Some countries have a high degree of integration, but they do not have representation in EU authorities.

1. SOCIAL POLICY

IN social sphere EU policy must fulfill three important objectives:

1) harmonization of national policies;

2) encouraging convergence and cross-country cooperation;

3) dissemination of innovative experience within the Union.

In connection with the transition to the single market, the EU Commission began to attempt to prevent the negative social consequences of restructuring the European economy.

Although the Treaty of Rome established freedom of movement of labor (Articles 48-51) and freedom of enterprise and choice of economic activity within the entire community, a series of further legislative acts were required to flesh out these principles. Now citizens of the European Union can live with their family in any member state of the Union in order to work there or look for work (Directive 68/360/EC), establish a company or provide services (73/148) and remain in the territory of this country after being hired to work (70/1251 and 72/194). In addition, workers and their families who change their country of residence and employment within the Union should have the same rights in relation to social security, housing, access to education and vocational training as native residents. Coordination of social security legislation was carried out within the framework of Regulations 71/1408 and 72/574.

Some problems still remained unresolved. Frontline workers face tax problems. There are also difficulties when hiring for work in the public sector of another EU country. The EU Commission has therefore decided to take measures to remove restrictions on recruitment in government agencies, to institutions of healthcare and education systems.

The expansion of social and economic rights within the European Union initially affected only employees and members of their families. Those who did not belong to the category of economically active population, for example, students, pensioners, still encountered obstacles when changing their country of residence. There was a sufficient means of subsistence test for prospective migrants. This problem was solved thanks to the Maastricht Treaty, which introduced EU citizenship with corresponding equal rights of free movement and choice of residence for everyone.

The introduction of EU citizenship is in itself an unprecedented action that will have far-reaching consequences. Citizenship not only provides freedom of movement and choice of place of residence within the European Union. It also gives the right to vote in government elections and the right to be elected to municipal bodies of the host country. Some countries are forced to make amendments to the constitution in this regard. Citizens also have the right to elect to the European Parliament, send petitions there on issues affecting them, and appeal to the Ombudsman. On the territory of third countries, citizens of the European Union are under the diplomatic and consular protection of all EU member states represented there. European citizenship does not exclude national citizenship, but operates on an equal basis with the latter.

European citizenship presupposes freedom of geographical movement and freedom to choose the sphere of economic activity. Naturally, the CES also pursues a policy to increase labor mobility. In particular, principles for the comparability of professional qualifications were established in such industries as hotels, catering, auto repair, construction, electric power, agriculture, and the textile industry. Minimum requirements for the level of skills required for a particular professional qualification have been defined.

Even greater progress has been made in developing a mechanism for mutual recognition of documents. Mutual recognition of diplomas of doctors, nurses, dentists, veterinary surgeons, pharmacists, and architects has been introduced. The EU Commission has developed common system recognition of diplomas subject to a minimum of three years of vocational training after secondary school. In 1985, a resolution was adopted to create a system of mutual recognition of diplomas higher education. Two programs - ERASMUS (1987) and YES (1988) - encourage youth mobility and student exchange.

The European System for the Exchange of Information in Employment - Sedoc (Regulation 68/1612) was also established. The EU Commission also proposed introducing the transferability of unemployment benefits for the period of searching for work in another EU country.

To establish fair competition in the single market, it was also considered necessary to introduce minimum European standards for the health and safety of citizens. In solving this, as well as other problems, the EU Commission worked in collaboration with representatives of workers (trade unions) and employers, as well as with representatives of European standardization organizations (CEN, Cenelec).

An important aspect of the activities of the EU Commission is the improvement of legislation on European companies (firms). KES sees this as an important factor in the economic success of any company. In 1970, in particular, a draft regulation on the status of a European limited liability company was prepared. In 1980, the Wredeling Directive was issued regarding employee consultation and information dissemination in large companies, especially MNCs. But as a result of resistance from entrepreneurs, this directive was frozen.

2. REGIONAL POLICY

The European Union as a whole has a fairly rich economic potential, but at the same time uneven development and significant socio-economic differences among its members.

The EU's regional development policy is based on the principle of solidarity between richer regions and poorer ones (political principle), as well as the development of production volumes in poor countries to maintain the overall potential of the European Union (economic principle).

This is why investing in modern infrastructure is so important, innovation activity, quality education and vocational training in weak regions. After all, thanks to this, new markets open and the economic potential of all states of the Union increases.

European regional policy aims to find opportunities and develop them from existing problems. This requires efficient and effective institutions, close cooperation between governments, business and society at every stage.

For example, as part of regional development, the transport network is being modernized and developed, which will allow for efficient and safe access to all regions and will make them more competitive in exports and imports.

Environmental programs are of no small importance. Innovative technologies in this area affect the growth of economies, not to mention the preservation natural resources and ecology.

The principles of regional development were not created by chance - over the years they have been tested and improved, and various strategies have been developed to combat economic, social and environmental problems. In addition, success also depends on EU partnerships, planning and good governance.

Regional policy requires a strategic long-term vision of the goals to be strived for. The allocation and attraction of resources must be objective, transparent and non-political. In addition, monitoring and evaluation of all ongoing activities is necessary.

Initially, there was no pan-European vision of regional problems; funding for various projects was carried out at the national level. However, over time it became clear that strategies needed to be comprehensive in order to develop weak regions and combat environmental consequences economic growth.

As a result, regional policies had to be modified to ensure equal access to opportunities for everyone.

Today, European regional policy is developing in three directions:

1) Promoting economic rapprochement between lagging and developed countries;

2) Improving regional competitiveness and employment;

3) Promote cooperation between countries to reduce economic significance national borders.

During the development of the European Union, three main sources of funding were created:

1) European Regional Development Fund, specializing in initiatives related to economic growth, employment and competitiveness;

2) Cohesion Fund (transport and environmental infrastructure, including renewable energy sources);

3) European Social Fund (investing in human capital in the field of education and training).

Regional policy is aimed at creating and developing competitive advantages of EU states in relation to the rest of the world.

According to the agreement under the Lisbon Strategy of 2000, economic growth and job creation are the highest policy priorities of the European Union. This strategy aims to make the EU the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world.

Regional policy, in addition to helping regions reach the Union average, has now become more future-oriented, mobilizing underutilized potential rather than paying compensation for past problems.

As part of this goal, climate problems are being addressed and ways are being sought to achieve the necessary balance between social, economic and environmental priorities.

Strategic programs for the regions are also constantly reviewed and adjusted to better meet today's challenges. Regional and local skills and resources are intensively used.

The next goal of regional policy is rapprochement. First of all, the EU is looking for new opportunities for rapprochement through cooperation between EU states at all levels.

The integration of new member countries is also a goal of regional development. Thus, candidates for EU membership receive preparatory assistance depending on their own economic situation, support for reform administrative system, development financing effective programs and passing all financial and technical stages before approval.

European regional policy provides meaningful investment in economic recovery. A stable, secure and targeted source of financing has been created, which is used to stimulate economic recovery in the country.

Thanks to flexible and innovative forms of financing, small and medium-sized businesses are supported.

3. ENERGY POLICY

Energy issues were one of the key factors in the creation of the European Union. Germany, France, Italy and the Benelux countries first agreed to create the ECSC, and in 1957 Euroatom and the European Economic Community emerged. However, despite the significant importance of energy issues, they did not become a separate pillar of the EU in the future. There were no separate document systems devoted to this issue. Energy policy was considered the preserve of nation states and there was no single energy strategy in the EU. This state of affairs began to change only recently.

Energy policy is decisive, since it is through it that the prerequisites necessary for the existence of any industrial production are created. In recent years, as integration processes intensify, within the European Union there has been a noticeable intensification of efforts to develop and implement a common energy policy, both within the EU and in relation to countries outside this association, and international organizations.

Energy policy, like all other EU actions, is judged by the contribution it makes to achieving the core objectives of the Maastricht Treaty - creating a single market, maintaining sustainable and sustainable energy growth, creating new jobs and prosperity for citizens.

In this regard, the most important for the energy sector is to achieve the following goals:

Total Competitiveness;

Approximation of legislation of the Member States in order to ensure the functioning of the internal market;

Development of trans-European energy infrastructures;

Reducing the Community's dependence on energy imports;

Geographical diversification of foreign supplies, ensuring their security and stability;

Introduction of energy-saving technologies and reduction of energy intensity of industrial production;

Development of alternative energy.

When considering the legal framework and objectives of EU energy policy, it is worth mentioning the conceptual provisions and objectives of energy policy prepared in the form of Green Book reports - the initial policy plan proposed for discussion. Since 1999, with the introduction of the Amsterdam Treaty, energy policy has been considered as a factor in sustainable community development.

The Energy Charter plays an important role. The Energy Charter Treaty was signed in December 1994 and came into force in April 1998. To date, the Treaty has been signed by 51 countries in Europe and Asia. The Treaty is a multilateral, legally binding instrument of intergovernmental cooperation in the field of energy. When it was created, it was intended to develop universal rules for energy trading. Energy Charter conferences are held regularly.

All EU governing bodies take part in the development and decision-making of energy policy, but the main role is played by the European Commission, one of whose members is directly responsible for developing a common EU energy policy. Issues of an operational nature are dealt with by the General Directorate for Energy and Transport.

The modern structure of energy supply sets priorities in the legal regulation of this area. Electricity, gas and oil supplies form the basis of the energy market for EU countries today, pushing all other infrastructures, including the coal market, far into the background. Analysis of EU energy legislation allows us to identify several basic principles of EU energy policy:

1) The principle of non-discrimination, which follows from the general principle of non-discrimination and for the energy sector means, first of all, non-discrimination of terms in energy supply contracts, ensuring “third party access”;

2) The principle of transparency, which ensures the “transparency” of the situation in the internal energy market, the ability for consumers to obtain information about the level of energy prices, as well as the Community’s monitoring of the supply and transit of energy resources;

3) The principle of non-harm to the environment, reflecting the need to take measures to protect environment when carrying out energy supply activities;

4) The principle of taking into account the social factor in energy policy, which requires paying attention to the dependence of the unemployment rate in the energy sector on market conditions and ensuring the safety of workers in the energy sector.

To date, the EU has developed a significant number of regulations regulating specific issues in the energy sector within the European Union and in international relations. In the field of economic instruments of energy policy, the main role is played by regulatory measures, which are legally binding for all member countries both in terms of goals and means of implementation; directives that are mandatory for EU countries in terms of achieving their goals, but not mandatory in terms of means of implementation. In addition, legally binding decisions for specific countries are being developed, as well as recommendations that are not legally binding. There are trade and technical standards, import quotas, a price management system, subsidies and investment loans.

An important stage in the development of energy dialogue is the formation of a single energy market. Since July 1, 2004, the main EU regulatory act regulating the functioning of the European gas market has been the 2003\55\EC Directive adopted on June 26, 2003 (the second gas directive), aimed at replacing the First EU\30\EC Directive of June 22, 1998 of the year.

Since July 2004, all industrial buyers have been given the right to choose gas suppliers. And since July 2007, markets have become completely open to all consumers without exception. The opening of national EU gas markets expands the legal opportunities for gas producers to directly access the European consumer, bypassing intermediaries and reseller companies. The requirements of the second gas directive became part of the national legislation of the member countries. The purpose of the directive is to accelerate the creation of a single EU gas market based on the integration of the national gas markets of EU member states.

In March 2006, the Green Book was published, which was intended to become the basis for a common EU energy policy. It proclaims the basic principles further development European energy. First of all, the stability of the energy supply of the EU, one of the world's main net importers of energy resources, was emphasized. The EU's dependence on energy imports is growing, energy prices are rising, and huge amounts of investment are needed to update infrastructure. In addition, the EU is concerned about climate change. Work is carried out in 6 priority areas:

1) Formation of a single internal energy market;

2) Security of supply;

3) Sustainable, efficient, diversified energy structure;

4) Climate change;

5) Development of new technologies;

6) Formation of a single foreign policy in energy.

4. AGRICULTURAL POLICY

The creation of a Common Agricultural Policy was proposed by the European Commission. The proposal followed the signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957, which created the Common Market. The six member countries individually strictly protected their agricultural sectors, especially what they produced, maintaining commodity prices depending on how farming was organized. Such interventions presented obstacles to free trade in goods, as rules differed across countries, and later free trade became incompatible with interventionist policies. Some member countries, especially France, and all professional farming organizations wanted the continuation of strong government interventions in agriculture. However, they could be preserved only if the policy of transferring it to the supranational level of the European Communities was harmonized.

By 1962, three main principles for conducting the CAP had been established: market integrity, preference for community products and financial solidarity. Since then, the CAP has been a central element of the European institutional system. The CAP is often interpreted as the result of a political compromise between France and Germany: German industry would gain access to French markets, and in turn Germany would help pay French farmers. Germany remains the largest contributor to the EU budget, however, France is also a budget donor, and agricultural countries such as Spain, Greece and Portugal are the largest recipients. Traditional rules also apply to newly admitted countries, limiting the subsidies they receive.

The original objectives were stated in Article 39 of the Treaty of Rome (1957):

1) Increasing productivity by promoting progress and ensuring optimal use of production factors, mainly labor;

2) Guarantee of fair living standards for the rural population;

3) Stabilization of markets;

4) Safe supply access;

5) Providing consumers with food at reasonable prices.

The EU has recognized the need to take into account social structure agriculture and both structural and natural differences between different agricultural regions and act in accordance with degree adjustments.

The CAP is an integrated system of measures that works by maintaining the level of prices for goods within the EU and subsidizing production.

Import taxes apply to certain goods imported into the EU. They are set at the level necessary to increase the world price to the EU target level. The target price is set as the maximum desired price for these goods within the EU.

Import quotas are used as a means of limiting the amount of products imported into the EU. Some member countries have negotiated quotas that allow them to sell certain goods within the EU without tariffs. This mainly applies to those countries that have had a trade relationship with that member country.

If the domestic market price falls below the intervention level, the EU buys goods to raise the price to the intervention level. Intervention prices are set lower than target prices.

Direct subsidies to farmers were intended to encourage farmers to select subsidized crops and maintain a “home-grown” supply. Subsidies were mainly paid on the land on which a particular crop was grown, rather than on the total number of crops produced. The 2005 reform developed special subsidies in favor of fixed payments, calculated only on the area of ​​cultivated land, and for the introduction of environmentally friendly pure methods farming. The reform is aimed at providing greater freedom for farmers to choose the crop for which there is greater demand and reducing economic incentives for overproduction.

Production quotas and land use payments were introduced as an attempt to prevent the overproduction of certain types of products (such as milk, grains and wine), which attracted subsidies at prices above market prices. The need to store and place surplus production was a waste of resources and led to a decline in the reputation of the CAP. The secondary market has evolved, especially for the sale of milk quotas, while farmers have made imaginary uses of "land-use payments", such as leaving unused land that is difficult to farm. Currently, payments for non-use of land are suspended, remaining subject to further decisions about their future, which leads to higher prices for some goods and increased interest in growing biofuels.

5. TRANSPORT POLICY

Transport is an essential building block of the European Community's economy. Total costs associated with the transport sector annually amount to about 1 billion euros (i.e. more than 10% of the GDP of EU countries). At the same time, the development of the EU transport system faces a number of serious problems that significantly reduce its efficiency. These primarily include:

Transport congestion of certain territories and directions, primarily - highways, some sections of the railway network, city roads, airports, etc., causing significant economic losses and a decrease in the quality of life of the population, as well as a simultaneous deterioration in transport provision in a number of peripheral territories;

Transport accident rate;

Harmful effects on the environment, public health, climate;

Significant consumption of non-renewable resources.

The problem of transport congestion in certain territories and directions first appeared in Europe in the early 90s of the last century.

It should be noted that the increase in overload and the corresponding increase in traffic congestion is the main reason for the decrease in the efficiency of the pan-European transport system, its economic competitiveness, and the increase in the number and severity of road accidents.

Congestion of transport communications and transport hubs in the EU is associated with three key factors:

1) imbalance in the development of various modes of transport;

2) lack of proper interaction between various types transport;

A separate serious problem is financing the development and improvement of the EU transport infrastructure in the context of limited funds from national budgets and the Community budget.

Transport policy is one of the most important components of EU policies.

In order to reduce the congestion of the transport infrastructure and the associated negative socio-economic consequences, as well as the overall increase in the efficiency and competitiveness of the transport sector, the European Transport Policy provides for the solution of the following main tasks:

Changing the ratio between different modes of transport;

Development of interaction between different modes of transport;

Elimination of natural obstacles that negatively affect the development of transportation through the development of the main transport network and improvement of traffic management on it;

Financing the development of transport infrastructure;

Implementation of a set of measures to improve transport safety;

Creation of effective mechanisms for payment for the use of transport infrastructure, ensuring compensation of the full costs of society;

Improving the functioning of passenger transport;

Improving urban transport systems and increasing the “sustainability” of their functioning;

Taking measures aimed at “mitigating” the possible negative consequences of EU enlargement;

Increasing the role of the European Union in shaping the mechanisms of international transport policy.

The European Commission has published regulations on the development of EU maritime transport until 2018. The document notes that 90% of all freight traffic between Europe and other parts of the world is carried out by sea transport. In the total volume of foreign trade turnover with third countries, according to the European Institute of Statistics, the share of maritime transport is about 87% in imports, 66% in exports, and about 30% between EU countries. Foreign trade transportation is especially important for Great Britain, Denmark, Greece, Spain and Portugal. Thus, the provision of services through maritime transport is a necessary condition in successful competition between EU member states and other countries of the world.

The EU shipping policy is characterized by the following priority areas of development:

Protecting free access to the global freight market, which provides essential benefits to an EU dependent on maritime trade;

Encouraging fair competition in the global market for transport services in order to guarantee in the future the required level of entrepreneurship;

Strengthening the competitiveness of the fleet of EU member states, designed to ensure guarantees of its survival;

Improving the conditions of employment and work of seafarers; - improving standards of maritime rescue and environmental protection.

6. FOREIGN, SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY

The European Union has its own foreign and security policy, which allows the EU to speak and act as one on international issues. In a transnational and global world, the 27 EU member states have greater influence and power when they act together as the European Union rather than individually.

The impetus for this was the Lisbon Treaty of 2009, according to which the post of High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy was created, combined with the post of Deputy President of the European Commission, and the creation of the European Diplomatic Service - the European External Action Service.

The main goal of the foreign and security policy of the European Union is to maintain peace and strengthen international security in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter; support for international cooperation; development and strengthening of democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

The EU is one of the main parties in resolving international issues, ranging from global warming and ending with the conflict in the Middle East. The core of the EU's foreign and security policy remains the use of diplomacy, supported where necessary by trade, aid, security and defense, to resolve conflicts and achieve international understanding.

In terms of economics, trade and finance, the European Union is one of the major powers in the world. The European Union plays an important role on the international stage, and its influence is growing as EU member states make more and more joint decisions in the field of foreign policy.

The EU maintains partnerships with all key players on the international stage, including new ones that have their own world views and interests. The EU is committed to ensuring that these partnerships are based on mutual interests and benefits, with each party having its own rights and responsibilities. The EU regularly holds summit meetings with the US, Japan, Canada, Russia, India and China. EU cooperation with these and other countries covers many areas, including education, environmental protection, security and defence, crime control and human rights.

EU peacekeeping missions are located in some hot spots of the world, for example, in Georgia. The EU mission in Georgia is to monitor the situation and provide humanitarian assistance to people displaced by the armed conflict. In December 2008, the EU deployed a contingent of 1,900 police and judicial officers there (EULEX mission in Kosovo) to ensure law and order in Kosovo.

The EU does not have a regular army. Therefore, within the framework of its general policy security and defense The EU relies on the forces at its disposal to:

Carrying out joint disarmament operations;

Carrying out humanitarian and rescue operations;

Providing advice and assistance in military matters;

Conflict prevention and peacekeeping activities;

Fulfilling the tasks of combat forces during crisis management, including maintaining peace and stability after conflicts.

All these tasks can contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by providing support to third countries in the fight against terrorism on their territory.

Over the past decade, the EU has launched 23 civilian and military missions on 3 continents in response to a variety of crises, from maintaining peace in tsunami-hit Aceh to protecting refugees in the Republic of Chad and combating piracy off the coast of Somalia and Horn of Africa.

Subject to Council approval, the European Union can also carry out rapid response operations using two simultaneous single battle groups of 1,500 personnel.

As with Russia, the EU is committed to strengthening ties with Belarus, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. The EU offers these countries substantial funding and the prospect of free trade agreements if they undertake political and economic reforms to strengthen democracy.

Following the 2011 Arab Spring, the EU revised its European Neighborhood Policy to express solidarity with those who stood up for democracy. Designed to strengthen the European Union's relations with its neighbors to the east and south, these policies offer political association, economic integration and increased mobility. The EU provides comprehensive support to international efforts to establish peace in the Middle East. Achieving a two-state solution in which a Palestinian state exists side by side with Israel is the EU's goal. To help both sides reach an agreement, the EU is working with the UN, the US and Russia within the Quartet.

The EU is playing a similarly active role in leading negotiations with Iran aimed at persuading Iran to dismantle its nuclear program. The EU is also strengthening relations with regional organizations, especially in Asia and Latin America. The "expanded partnership" is balanced by the economic, political, social and cultural aspects of the relationship.

Thus, the European Union is one of the three main and most developed centers modern world, along with the United States of America and Japan.

The European Union is the world's largest trading power; it accounts for almost a quarter of world trade. It is also the largest net importer of agricultural products and raw materials. The European Union also accounts for the bulk of aid to developing countries.

The European Union also works to promote peace outside its zone of stability. And in this regard, the common foreign policy of the countries of the Union helps. The EU is first and foremost a tried and tested guarantee of peace and it is for this reason that the value of the Union to people is immeasurable.

The progressive development of the EU does not at all mean that the Union has no contradictions and difficulties.

Significant problems have arisen and are arising in the process of implementing a unified agrarian policy and unified centralized prices for main types of agricultural products. The ideologists of the European Union are also concerned about the decline in the competitiveness of European goods on international markets, the reduction in the EU's share in world trade, the lag behind the United States in computerization, etc. The European Union also faces significant problems in connection with the accession of new members. But we can already say that in the EU, on the basis of economic integration, a system of relations has developed that allows us to consider the European Union as a confederal type of state entity. Further deepening of the integration of Euro-Atlantic countries is planned through closer rapprochement Western Europe, Russia and North America, where integration processes are also developing.

LIST OF SOURCES USED

1. Avdokushin E.F. International economic relations: [Text] / E.F. Avdokushin - M.: Yurist, 2005 - 342 p.

2. Zagladin N.V. World history: 20th century: [Text] / N.V. Zagladin: - M.: “ Russian word", 2008 - 485 p.

3. International economic relations / Under the general editorship of P.M. Kononova. M.: Economics, 2007 - 241 p.

4. Main directions of EU policy [Electronic resource] / Access mode: http://xreferat.ru/59/2398-1

5. Main directions of EU policy [Electronic resource] / Access mode: http://www.rodon.org/polit

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But it is not so. Addresses, dates and numbers may change, but in general, as a hint and advisor, our publications can be used at least for years to come. Therefore, we are not going to rush to update and reissue this kind of brochures. Our task is to give a general idea of ​​the topic under consideration. As for the details, it is best and most reliable to contact the compiler or publisher of the brochure for all questions of interest. Moreover, many fragments are presented very briefly and, without special consultation, can contain many underwater reefs.
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Treaty on the Constitution of the European Union

1. Internal policy of the European Union in the field of:

Economic and monetary policy,

EU finances and its budget,

Integration, social security and health care,

education and science, technology and energy, transport

and tourism, environmental protection and disaster protection,

Justice and law enforcement, anti-discrimination,

1. Foreign policy of the European Union in the field of:

Cooperation with other countries and humanitarian assistance,

Security policies,

Defense policies

3. Procedure for amending the EU Constitution

4. Qualified majority decision-making system

1. The principle of subsidiarity and the role of national parliaments

Areas of internal policy of the European Union

EU economic and monetary policy

The EU Constitution, in comparison with previously concluded agreements between its countries within the framework of the economic and monetary union, introduces certain changes in the area of ​​economic and monetary policy of the Union, primarily in terms of:

Strengthening its capacity and the member countries whose currency is the euro;

Strengthening the European Central Bank as an EU institution;

Significant simplification of the content of the transitional provisions of the agreements on common economic and monetary policy relating to countries that are introducing the euro as their national currency.

Economic and monetary policy was the subject of lengthy discussion during the Convention and the Conference of Governments of EU Member States. The consensus found made it possible for the Union to strengthen the coordination of its economic policy. Those countries whose currency is the euro will receive more autonomy in deciding issues affecting them without the participation of other countries in voting, as evidenced by the corresponding section of the EU Constitution and its protocol for eurozone countries. The EU Constitution also extends qualified majority voting to almost all provisions of the Union's economic and monetary policy.

The European Central Bank (ECB) becomes an EU body that has certain goals and objectives and a charter for its work in the system of central banks of EU member states and which is independent from its other bodies and public services of EU member states. At the same time, the ECB Council does not include the chairmen of the central banks of those EU member states that have not yet adopted the euro.

Economic policy. According to Articles III-177 and 178, the economic policy of the EU is aimed at close coordination in the member countries of the Union, their internal market and the establishment of common goals. In turn, EU member states, when implementing their economic policies, must contribute to the achievement of the common goals of the Union. We are talking about coordinating their economic policy with the principle of open market economy with free competition. Article III-179 examines innovations in the implementation of the EU common economic policy:

The European Commission can convey its opinion directly to the EU member state whose economic policy does not correspond to the main features of the EU's common policy or poses a threat to the proper functioning of the economic and monetary union (and not to the European Council, which makes the decision);

When the European Council expresses its opinion on a certain issue to any EU member state, that country does not take part in voting on it.

In case of excessive national budget deficit, the EU Constitution provides for the following changes (Article III-184):

If the European Commission is of the opinion that an excessive budget deficit exists or could appear in an EU member state, then this opinion is communicated directly to that country (and not through the European Council);

The role of the European Commission is also strengthened when deciding on excessive deficits, namely, the European Council, having received a proposal from the European Commission to overcome this deficit, can reject it only through a unanimous decision. Those. recommendations of the European Council on this issue should be based, first of all, on the opinion of the European Commission;

The very country whose excessive budget deficit is adopted by the council does not participate in voting on it (except for the issue of measures to establish the size of the deficit);

The provisions applicable to this qualified majority require no more than 2/3 of the votes of EU member states, rather than a simple majority, and 55% of the votes of eurozone member states if they represent at least 65% of the population of those states.

Monetary policy. The EU Constitution makes several changes to the Union's monetary policy. First of all, it officially defines the euro as the currency of the European Union and names it as one of its symbols (Article I-8). The EU Constitution also provides for a very clear distribution of the Union's powers in the field of monetary policy. According to it, the Union has exclusive competence in this policy of the EU member states whose currency is the euro (Article I-13). Those countries that have not yet introduced the euro retain their competence in currency matters. The institutional provisions on the tasks and objectives of the European system of central banks remain generally unchanged (Articles III-185 and 191). Article I-30 formally defines the concept of the “Eurosystem”: it is formed by the European Central Bank and the central banks of the EU member states whose currency is the euro to conduct monetary policy. The EU Constitution creates a new legal provision for the adoption of both the measures that are necessary for the introduction of the euro and, above all, measures for its ongoing use. This provision replaces the currently existing transitional provision of Article 123 of the Treaty on the European Community.

The Convention proposed granting more autonomy to EU member states whose currency is the euro, both in terms of the ability to resolve issues related to it in the European Council, and, above all, with the fact that they share a common currency. According to Articles III-194 to 196, Member States of the Eurozone may take measures to strengthen the coordination and control of budgetary discipline, develop specific guidelines for their economic policies, defend a common financial view in the relevant international institutions and ensure unified representation in them, as well as at conferences. According to these articles, only those EU member states that are part of the eurozone have the right to vote on these issues in the European Council.

The fact that EU member states whose currency is the euro are given the right to vote on relevant matters of common economic policy marks a big step forward. The fact is that with the entry of ten new countries into the European Union, its twelve eurozone countries are essentially in the minority until the remaining countries meet the criteria necessary to introduce the European currency into them. The provisions of the EU Constitution make it possible during the transition period to make certain decisions only with the help of the countries affecting them.

The subsection on transitional provisions further refers to other cases in which the rights of non-Eurozone Member States in matters of financial policy (Article III-197) are revoked, namely in relation to recommendations on multilateral controls and measures to overcome excessive budget deficits. Finally, through the EU Constitution, the role of its member states in the eurozone is strengthened when admitting other countries to it. Before the European Council makes a decision on this, it must take into account the opinion of the eurozone countries, which, for their part, develop it by a qualified majority. Articles III-197-202 on transitional provisions also establish:

• determination of the EU member states subject to an exclusive rule regarding the applicability of provisions of the EU Constitution that do not apply to these countries, as well as their voting rights (Article III-197);
• procedure for the introduction of the euro in an EU member state once the convergence criteria have been met (Article III-198);
• special provisions for EU member states, which are subject to a special rule (Article III-202).

Without introducing fundamental changes, the EU Constitution also provides for a significant simplification of these provisions, which improves their understanding and subsequent application for citizens of the Union.

The EU Constitution expands the scope of qualified majority voting. Only some provisions must continue to be adopted unanimously in the European Council, namely:

• taking measures to replace the protocol on the procedure for dealing with excessive budget deficits, which defines the convergence criteria for the introduction of the euro (Article III-184);
• the specific tasks of the European Central Bank (ECB) in the field of supervision of credit institutions (Article III-185);
• establishing the exchange rate when replacing the national currency of the relevant EU member state with the euro (Article III-198).

The EU Constitution also defines the important role of the European Parliament in extending the scope of due legislative procedure to:

• conditions and method of control of economic policy (Article III-179);
• modification of certain provisions in the statutes of the Eurosystem central banks and the ECB (Article III-187);
• measures required when using the euro (Article III-191).

EU financial policy and procedure for adopting its budget

The EU Constitution simplifies the procedure for adopting its budget, which is notable progress. This procedure refers to the method of joint decision-making during a single reading and through the mediation of the European Council and the European Parliament. In addition, the distinction between mandatory and optional expenses, as well as the establishment of a maximum annual growth rate for optional expenses, is abolished. The EU Constitution adopts multiannual financial limits, but the requirements regarding the amount of own funds remain essentially unchanged. According to the EU Constitution, the procedure for adopting its budget is described in two sections:

• Section 1, Subsection 7: Finance of the Union (Articles I-53-57). This section contains essential provisions on the principles of the EU's finances and its budget, the Union's own funds and their multiannual financial limits;
• Section 2, Subsection 6, Chapter 2: Financial Regulations (Articles III-402-415). This chapter contains precise data for multi-year financial limits, the annual EU budget plan, its implementation and lending, as well as general provisions and about the fight against deception.

In addition to the relevant provisions, the EU Constitution contains three other legal acts that are relevant for the EU’s finances and the procedure for adopting its budget, namely the budget regulation of 2002, the inter-institutional agreement on budgetary discipline and improvement of the budget procedure of 1999, and decision on the own funds system from 2002.

EU Budget and Finance Principles. These principles ensure the establishment and execution of the budget plan. According to them, all EU income and expenses must be subject to preliminary calculations for each budget year and be covered accordingly (source). Budget execution presupposes the adoption of an appropriate legal act. To ensure fiscal discipline, expenditures must be financed from own funds and within multi-year financial limits. In addition, the efficiency of budget execution and the need to combat fraud in this area of ​​finance must be ensured.

EU own funds. The EU Constitution reminds that its budget, among other expenses, is entirely financed from its own funds (Article I-54). This system of own funds is the subject of discussion in the European Council, which, after hearing this issue in the European Parliament, must unanimously make a decision on it in the form of a Union-wide law, after which, as before, all EU member countries must ratify this law. For the adoption of laws that establish provisions for the implementation of the system of own funds, only a qualified majority is required. This is what distinguishes the requirements of the EU Constitution from the current provisions on own funds of the Treaty on the European Community (Article 269).

The system of own funds (amounting to over 100 billion euros per year) includes, firstly, traditional financial revenues from customs duties and fees (imports of industrial goods, agricultural products and, especially, sugar from third countries into the EU), which amount to approximately 11.7% of all funds, secondly, value added tax, which is obtained from the application of uniform rates on the basis for calculating this tax of each EU member state agreed upon by the general provisions (i.e. on their mutual trade turnover) - approximately 14.1 % of all funds, and thirdly, a certain share of own funds from the budget of each EU member state, which is approximately 73.4% of all own funds in the EU budget (the remaining 0.8% of own funds in the EU budget comes from other sources ). However, the total amount of own funds should not exceed 1.24% of the gross national product (GNP) of all EU member countries. The amount of value added tax in different years ranged from 1.4% to 1.0%.

All major types of expenses (over 100 billion euros per year) related to the functioning of the community of European countries are covered from their own funds, i.e. their Union, namely:

• costs for the maintenance of all EU bodies (personnel, buildings and structures, energy of all types, publication of reports, reports and other data, maintenance of delegations, etc.), approximately 6% of total costs;
• expenses for the implementation of all areas of EU internal and external policy (i.e. for implementing activities in the field of education and science, health and culture, energy and transport, etc. within the EU and providing financial assistance to third countries), approximately 12% of general expenses;
• costs of implementing measures to improve the structure of the economy in EU member countries, approximately 34% of total costs;
• expenses for maintaining the agricultural sector of the economy in EU member countries, approximately 43% of total expenses;
• costs of providing financial assistance to economically weak EU member states, approximately 3% of total costs;
• expenses to compensate for the budget deficit in terms of social spending in individual EU member states, approximately 1.5% of total expenses;
• for the formation of a financial reserve, approximately 0.5% of total expenses.

Procedure for drawing up and approving the EU budget. The budget year in the Union begins on January 1 and ends on December 31. The Treaty on the EU Constitution simplifies the previous situation, because From now on, the European Commission must propose to the European Parliament only the final draft budget, and not its preliminary version. The procedure for drawing up and approving the EU budget plan is as follows:

• before July 1st – each EU body submits an estimate of its expenses for the planned year. The European Commission combines all individual cost estimates into a general estimate in the draft expenditure part of the budget;
• before September 1 - the European Commission submits a draft budget for the planned year to the European Parliament and the European Council;
• before October 1 – the European Council determines its point of view regarding the draft budget and communicates it to the European Parliament;
• within 42 days after the transmission of the European Council’s opinion on the draft budget to the European Parliament - there are three possible scenarios of action. The European Parliament agrees with the opinion of the European Council, and then the all-Union law establishing the budget plan for the next year is recognized as adopted. The European Parliament does not make any decision, and then the all-Union law establishing the budget plan for the next year is also recognized as adopted. The European Parliament, by a majority of its members, accepts changes to the draft budget and sends its amended version to the European Council and the European Commission, then the procedure for adopting the budget plan is repeated, which requires the immediate convening of a conciliation commission of the European Parliament and the European Council.
• After the amended version of the draft budget is received by the European Council, two deadlines are possible: a) within 10 days and b) within 21 days - i.e. There are two possible scenarios of action here after the convening of the conciliation commission of the European Parliament and the European Council. Within 10 days, the European Council informs the European Parliament that it agrees with all changes in the draft budget, and therefore the conciliation commission does not meet, and the all-Union law establishing the budget plan (with amendments made to it) for the next year is recognized as adopted. Or, within 21 days, the conciliation commission must come to a consensus on the proposed changes to the draft budget. This requires a qualified majority, both from representatives of the European Parliament and from the European Council. If it is not possible to achieve unity of opinion in the conciliation commission in this way, then the European Commission must submit a new draft budget for consideration.
• Within 14 days after reaching a unanimity of opinion in the conciliation commission, several scenarios of action are possible here. The European Parliament and the European Council approve the general draft budget, or only one of these EU bodies will approve it, and the other body will not make any decision, or both of these EU bodies will not make any decision, anyway, in these cases, the all-Union law on establishing the budget plan for the next year is recognized as accepted. If the common draft budget is rejected by both EU bodies, then the European Commission proposes a new draft budget. Or if one of these EU bodies rejects the draft budget, and another EU body approves it or does not make any decision, then the European Commission also proposes a new draft budget.
• Within 14 days after the approval of the draft budget by the European Parliament and its rejection by the European Council - in this case, the European Parliament can decide within 14 days whether to confirm all of its changes to the draft budget or only some of them. If at least one change in it is not confirmed, the point of view agreed upon in the conciliation commission regarding the position of the draft budget, which is the subject of the change, is adopted, and then the all-Union law establishing the budget plan for the next year is recognized on this basis as adopted.
• The final moment of the procedure for adopting the budget for the next year - the President of the European Parliament confirms that the all-Union law on the EU budget has been finally adopted.

Execution of the budget plan. The latest innovation that concerns the procedure related to the budget plan is the annual preparation by the European Commission of a report on its implementation (Article 3-408) and its submission to the European Council and the European Parliament. The report should make it possible to assess the implementation of the budget plan in connection with the procedure for reducing the financial burden and, on this basis, begin to develop a draft budget for the next year. To this end, the European Commission, together with the European Court of Auditors and under the control of the European Parliament, supervises the implementation of the budget plan so that budget funds are allocated to activities and needs in strict accordance with the positions of this plan and in accordance with the accepted procedure for their use.

Other areas of EU internal policy

In the field of integration. At the beginning of the third section of the EU Constitution there are generally applicable provisions on the integration and close interrelation of EU member states. Article III-115 explicitly states that the European Union is built on the recognition of the close connection of its member countries in the implementation of activities in various fields of domestic policy, and its most important goals in the implementation of this policy are:

• combating discrimination of any kind on the basis of gender, race or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation;
• animal protection (according to the relevant protocol to the former European Community Treaty);
• promoting higher levels of employment, providing adequate social protection, combating social divisions, achieving higher levels of general and vocational education and in protecting people's health.

The EU Constitution also creates the legal basis for the adoption of laws establishing principles and conditions, incl. economic and financial type, which can serve as the basis for the provision of services of general economic interest.

Domestic market. The chapter of the EU Constitution, which is dedicated to this area of ​​internal policy, consists of 7 sub-chapters (implementation of the internal market, free access to it and free circulation of services, free circulation of goods, capital and payments, competition rules, tax regulations and general provisions). Although all these provisions are already fully contained in the European Commonwealth Treaty, nevertheless, they are also included in the text of the Constitution

The legal basis for facilitating free access to the internal market for all EU Member States has been extended to the area of ​​social benefits for both employees and self-employed persons (Article III-136). However, it should be noted that here the principle of unanimity in decision-making has been abandoned and in the future decisions will be made by a qualified majority. At the same time, it is emphasized that these legal grounds should not apply to other categories of EU citizens, for example, students, pensioners. In addition, it is permitted to an EU Member State which considers that if a draft legal act adopted (by a qualified majority) regarding social guarantees significantly violates its social security system or is likely to cause damage financial condition country, it can apply to the European Council with a proposal to defer the legislative procedure for it for at least 4 months.

Regarding the free circulation of capital, a new paragraph has appeared in Article III-158 regarding limited national tax measures in relation to third countries, which are adopted by any EU member state with the approval of the European Commission or the European Council. Article III-160 provides a new legal basis for the adoption of laws on the application of necessary administrative measures to limit the free circulation of capital and freeze the deposits of their owners or holders (individuals and legal entities, groups or non-governmental organizations) as preventive measures in the fight against terrorism and related activities.

Articles III-165 and 168 categorically provide that only the European Commission, within the framework of its powers, can develop and recommend for implementation regulations on competition rules for enterprises and the provision of state aid to them. When providing it, it is indicated that the European Council, within 5 years after the entry into force of the EU Constitution, may, by its decision, cancel the provision on the compatibility of economic assistance to any EU member state with its financial contribution to the Union budget, and also supplement this provision with a categorical indication of specific areas for directing this assistance, for example, towards structural changes in the economy, improving the financial or social situation in the country. Article III-191 deals with additional measures to avoid distortions in the field of economic competition, and Article III-173 deals with national measures that affect the EU internal market and may interfere with its normal functioning. Therefore, this article of the EU Constitution gives the right to the council of economic ministers of the EU member states, through a model Union-wide law, to regulate the application of these national measures and requires a unanimous decision when allowing any exceptions.

Article III-176 provides for a new legal principle for the adoption of Union-wide laws or general laws on measures for the establishment and protection of the European legal basis in connection with the right to intellectual property, as well as the enactment of central provisions for the admission, coordination and control of this right. These provisions should also regulate the use of languages ​​in all areas of the functioning of the EU.

Employment and access to the labor market. The provisions in this area of ​​EU internal policy (Articles III-203-209) have not been fundamentally changed in the Union Constitution in comparison with the European Commonwealth Treaty. It should, of course, be noted that ensuring the coordination of political and economic measures carried out by EU member states in the field of employment is recognized only as a special power of the Union. Currently, as is known, issues of free access of citizens of EU member countries as employees to the labor market of any country are regulated by national or bilateral labor law. The Treaty on the accession of new European countries to the EU provides for transition periods from one to 7 years for free access of its citizens as employees to the common labor market. At the same time, for Central and Eastern European countries the so-called model “2 + 3 + 2”, i.e. three phases of the transition period. During the first two years of this period, free access to the common labor market of these countries is impossible. During this period, national or bilateral regulations on access to the labor market continue to apply to them. Thus, the remaining (ie old) EU member states can decide when they will open their labor market to citizens of the new countries based on their national measures. After the first phase, the old EU member states are obliged to inform the European Commission by means of a corresponding communication whether they wish to continue to maintain the transitional provisions agreed in the treaty on the accession of new countries to the EU on national measures to limit free access to their labor market for the next three years or grant them the right to free access to the labor market. Old EU member states that, after 5 years, want to continue (i.e. for another two years) national provisions on access to their labor market (due to difficulties in it), must again inform the European Commission about this. But the transition period of 7 years remains the deadline; after its expiration, the old EU member states can no longer restrict free access to their labor market to citizens of newly admitted countries.

The Treaty on the Accession of New European Countries to the European Union, in terms of access to the labor market of the old EU member states, applies to employees and members of their families from among the citizens of the new EU member states. These employees are considered to be “migrant” in the sense of EU general law, who in principle only have a legal claim to enter into an employment relationship in undertakings located in the territory of the old EU member states. In contrast, employees are citizens of new EU Member States who are sent for a limited period of time by their employer (i.e. not on their own initiative) from one enterprise located in their home country to another enterprise located in a different but old Member State EU, receive the right within this limited period to work in it. There are no restrictive rules for operating as a self-employed person (i.e. setting up your own enterprise); you just have to comply with the legal provisions of the relevant Member State in addition to the professional and trade legal provisions of the relevant Member State, as well as the legal provisions regarding residence in that country. .

It should also be noted that from the first day of a new European country's accession to the EU, the access of its citizens to the labor market of the old EU member states as employees improves. This lies in the fact that they receive the so-called. preferences (benefits) of the European Community regarding employment regarding citizens from third countries. These benefits provide for the possibility of accepting citizens of European countries that have joined the EU to work for vacant jobs in the old EU member countries, the availability of which is confirmed by the European Employment Service (EURES - European Employment Services system) or, accordingly, the state employment agency of the given country. In addition, the EU accession treaty provides that legal employment in the old EU member states, under certain conditions, leads to unrestricted access to its labor market. To do this, you must work in it continuously for at least 12 months from the date the new country joins the EU.

Cooperation in economic, social and territorial areas of domestic policy. Article III-213 of the EU Constitution provides for the cooperation of its countries in the field of social security with the help of the European Commission, which is given the right to initiate initiatives in this area of ​​internal policy within the framework of the concept of open coordination (establishing directions for social development, developing social indicators, regular monitoring and assessment of the state and etc.) and informing the European Parliament about this. Article III-223 states that by the time the Treaty on the EU Constitution was signed, the members of the European Council had established the first provisions on the EU structural fund (financial resources for implementing structural changes in the economies of EU member states) and the fund for assistance to its lagging countries in the general budget of the EU. Funds from these funds are allocated on the basis of unanimously adopted decisions by the European Parliament (later - on the basis of decisions taken by a qualified majority therein).

Article III-231 deals with the general organization of EU agricultural markets, which should be regulated through European law or a series of model laws, and also indicates the objectives of the implementation of the common agricultural and fisheries policies, measures to establish agreed prices for products, the withdrawal of additional profits, financial assistance and quantitative restrictions. These measures, at the proposal of the European Commission, are adopted by the European Council without being heard by the European Parliament. The necessary financial resources for the implementation of these measures and the provision of financial assistance are provided from the agricultural fund of the EU general budget.

Similar to the cooperation of EU member states in the social field, cooperation between countries in the field of science, space exploration and technological research is carried out through the European Commission (Articles III-248-255). According to them, the European Commission is given the right to take initiatives in this area of ​​internal policy within the framework of the concept of open coordination (establishing directions for scientific progress, developing technological indicators, sharing experience, regular monitoring and assessment of the situation, etc.) and informing the European Parliament about this. Funding to facilitate joint programs scientific research and specific programs of individual EU member countries are allocated by the European Council at the proposal of the European Commission and in agreement with the European Parliament from the corresponding item of expenditure of the general EU budget.

Article III-256 discusses the legal basis for the development of common measures for the reliable provision of energy supplies to EU member states (use of different energy sources, creation of a common energy supply structure, taxation issues), which should be summarized by the relevant European law (or a series of model laws).

Cooperation of EU member states in the field of vocational education, youth and sports, healthcare, protection from natural disasters, environmental protection, tourism and other areas of domestic policy (Articles III-278-284) aims to coordinate relevant national activities, develop common goals and relevant standards and provide organizational and financial assistance in carrying out certain activities from the EU general budget.

PolicyE.C.in the field of justice and internal affairs

Article I-42 of the EU Constitution contains general definitions of its space of freedom, security and rights: “The Union offers its citizens a space of freedom, security and rights without internal restrictions.” At the same time, this article distinguishes between the scope of the Union as a whole, namely, its legislative field, and the operational cooperation of EU member states (taking into account the specifics of the field of national justice and internal affairs). Article III-257 contains the following principles implementation of this cooperation:

• subsidiarity (i.e. complementarity, in which the European Union as a whole undertakes only those tasks that its individual countries cannot do) and respect for the legal traditions and regulations of EU member states;
• solidarity in the implementation of common policies in the areas of political asylum, immigration and external borders;
• mutual recognition of judicial and non-judicial court decisions in the field of civil and criminal law.

The role of national parliaments is established in Articles I-42 and III-259. In this system, national parliaments participate in the adoption of regulations through ratification of an agreement. But because This legal instrument is no longer in force in the EU Constitution, but in the future it provides for three measures that will continue to ensure an important role for the parliaments of EU member states in monitoring and implementing justice and home affairs policies:

• reliance on an early warning system in the field of subsidiarity, measures within which can be taken at the request of the parliaments of a quarter of the EU member states;
• participation in the political control of Europol (the pan-European police service) and evaluation of the activities of Eurojust (the pan-European justice management service);
• information on the content of the results of the mutual evaluation system in cooperation with the European Commission.

The latter measure (Article III-260) provides for the application of a system that has already been in practice in recent years. This system allows for the concrete implementation of EU justice and home affairs policies through pan-European police and judicial authorities (justice authorities), while at the same time requiring mutual recognition by all EU member states. In addition, in the future, national parliaments will be kept abreast of current affairs in this area of ​​domestic policy through mutual consultations of their internal security committees (successors to the former “coordination committees of 36”, named after the article number in the European Commonwealth Treaty). Article III-261 of the EU Constitution provides for a “de facto” redefinition of the tasks of these committees, namely, it instructs to prepare the work of the European Council in the field of police cooperation and justice cooperation and to promote and strengthen operational cooperation between the relevant services of the EU Member States in their field internal security. This concept of internal security is part of the space of freedom, security and law throughout the EU. Article III-263 deals with other, non-operational types of cooperation between these services of EU Member States. At the same time, the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice in the field of justice and internal affairs includes making decisions regarding violations that EU member states may commit in this area. Article III-377 contains special provisions to control the validity or proportionality of measures taken by the police or other criminal prosecution authorities to maintain public order and protect internal security.

General policy on asylum, immigration and external borders. According to the Treaty on the EU Constitution, in this area of ​​its internal policy, the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibilities between all EU member states is enshrined (Article III-268), as well as in the matter of financial relations in this regard, since the Treaty on the European Community provides for this principle only to share responsibility for the reception of refugees and the protection of expelled persons in the event of mass flows. At the same time, the European Commission is given a monopoly on the development of legal provisions in this area of ​​internal EU policy, as well as control of relevant statements from EU member countries. All measures in this area of ​​domestic policy are taken in accordance with pan-European laws and the relevant legislative procedures of the European Parliament by a qualified majority, in addition to urgent measures in the event of massive refugee flows, on which the European Parliament must, of course, consult with the European Commission.

Article III-265 contains important changes regarding the protection of the external borders of the EU in comparison with the provisions of Article 62 of the Treaty on the European Community, namely:

• application of the concept of an “integrated border guard system for external borders”, with the help of which cooperation in this area of ​​internal policy should intensify in the future, both at the legislative level and in practice, with the prospect of the possible formation of common border guard units that should be supported in their activities at national level;
• simplifying the provision of visas and other short-term residence permits;
• respect for the jurisdiction of each individual EU Member State regarding the geographical location of its borders, in full compliance with international law.

Article III-266 contains the concept of the “common European asylum seeker provision”, which provides for third-country nationals the following:

• general procedure for granting and revoking the single status of a political asylum seeker;
• general procedure for granting and withdrawing uniform subsidiary status protection from political persecution.

To protect refugees in the event of a massive influx, the European Union does not create a special rule; its Constitution provides only the possibility of adopting a temporary general rule subject to the provisions of the Geneva Convention, as well as taking measures through partnerships and cooperation with third countries in terms of managing the flow of immigration of persons and asylum seekers and their temporary protection.

The Common Immigration Policy (Article III-267) covers the effective management of immigration flows and introduces a provision that gives the Union the exclusive right to accept agreements for the expulsion and repatriation of persons who are illegally present in any of its countries. At the same time, the most important innovation concerns persons who are legally present in one of the EU countries, namely, from now on the Union can establish measures through which it provides assistance and support to the efforts of an EU member state regarding the integration of immigrants into it. In addition, Article III-267 provides a uniform legal basis for determining the rights of third-country nationals. EU member states, however, retain jurisdiction over the number of third-country nationals they accept who seek employment there. This provision is especially important because it sets the most important condition in favor of national jurisdiction when general characteristics concept of immigration policy, although it does not concern access to the labor market for third-country nationals already living in an EU Member State, nor the pursuit of other purposes by the immigrant (including family reunification and study). This article of the EU Constitution does not make any changes compared to Article 63 of the Treaty on the European Community in terms of combating illegal immigration and the introduction of criminal measures for this, with the exception of measures to combat human trafficking.

Legal cooperation in the field of civil cases. As in Article 65 of the European Community Treaty, this legal cooperation is limited to border crossing duties, but only if they are required for the smooth functioning of the internal market of the EU member states. The principle of mutual recognition of judicial and extra-judicial decisions is adopted by the EU Constitution Treaty as the cornerstone on which this cooperation rests. Of course, indications of similarity measures are very important, because The list of areas in which the EU can take such measures is expanded to include types of measures that guarantee a higher level of access to the law, the removal of obstacles to the proper course of civil proceedings, the development of alternative measures to resolve controversial issues and support for improving the professional qualifications of justice officials. However, all legislative measures taken in this area of ​​cooperation between EU member states require a qualified majority vote and a joint decision, with the exception of the aspect of family law with the payment of fees for crossing state borders, where complete unanimity is required. But Article III-269 of the EU Constitution contains a provision according to which the Council of Ministers of Justice of the EU member states, by unanimous decision, can develop this aspect of the law according to due legislative procedure.

Legal cooperation in the field of criminal cases. According to the EU Constitution, in this area of ​​legal cooperation, provision is made for the adoption of a Union-wide Law or a series of general laws through the ordinary legislative procedure (i.e. through the European Parliament with the development of a draft by their Council of Ministers of Justice of the EU member states and with monitoring of their implementation by the European Court of Justice). It must be ensured that if any Member State considers that a Union or general law concerns a fundamental aspect of its criminal law system, it may apply to the Council to interrupt the regular legislative process. After discussing this request, the European Council must, within 4 months, withdraw the draft law from the European Parliament and transfer it to the European Commission to consider the grounds for the inconsistency of the draft law with the criminal law system of the country making such a request and, if necessary, propose a new draft law. If the European Council does not do this within 4 months or, after 12 months of discussing other options for the draft law, does not make any decision, then a third of the EU member states can initiate a process of enhanced cooperation to develop a draft law acceptable to all EU member states.

Legal cooperation covers the harmonization of legal provisions through relevant decisions in areas of criminal law such as criminal procedure, substantive criminal law, crime prevention, pan-European justice and prosecutorial services. In terms of criminal proceedings, the EU Constitution in Article III-270 provides for three areas of cooperation:

• admissibility of means of evidence on a reciprocal basis between EU member states (however, without bringing them to uniform characteristics and their uniform assessment);
• the rights of an individual in criminal proceedings;
• rights of the victim of a criminal crime.

In each case, it is necessary to ensure maximum approximation to the provisions of the criminal law of the relevant EU Member State and, at the same time, to take into account the differences between their traditions and legal systems.

In terms of substantive criminal law, Article III-271 gives the Union the right to establish crimes and penalties in the field of particularly serious criminal offenses, such as: terrorism, drug trafficking, organized crime, human trafficking, sexual harassment of women and children, arms trafficking , money laundering, corruption, counterfeiting of means of payment, computer crime. Of course, this list is not exhaustive, therefore the Council of Ministers of Justice of the EU member states, on a unanimous basis and with the consent of the European Parliament, can expand it. In addition, the European Council may adopt (of course, only unanimously) regulations for the establishment of crimes and criminal penalties for them in the relevant area of ​​​​criminal law (in particular substantive), if the applicability of these norms is demonstrated as necessary for the effective implementation of Union policy in that area of ​​law. in which mutual conformity of measures has already been successfully achieved. This criterion concerns, above all, the fight against racism and hostility towards foreigners, fraud and deception in relation to the financial interests of the Union, tax evasion, crime related to encroachment on the environment, and counterfeiting of currency.

Article III-273 of the EU Constitution provides the legal basis for measures to prevent criminal offenses and also provides for the possibility of promoting and supporting these measures. However, it is not necessary to ensure full compliance of these measures with the legal and administrative regulations of EU member states.

Article III-273 also expands and clarifies the operational jurisdiction of the European Justice (i.e. the European Courts of Justice), which, according to Article 31 of the Treaty on the European Community, can require EU member states to initiate criminal investigations (with due regard, of course, to national provisions and traditions), propose criminal prosecution measures to their state authorities and coordinate these measures. In doing so, the Charter of Fundamental Rights must be respected and oversight must be exercised by the European Court of Justice.

According to Article III-274 of the EU Constitution, the European Council, by unanimous decision and with the consent of the European Parliament, can, and based on the powers of the European Justice, use the European Public Prosecutor's Office, but only to combat criminal offenses that harm the financial interests of the Union. The main tasks of the European Public Prosecutor's Office are to investigate, prosecute and prosecute the perpetrators and participants of these criminal offences. The EU Constitution also provides the opportunity for the European Council to expand the tasks of the European Public Prosecutor's Office in the fight against serious crimes related to crossing state borders. But this requires the unanimous consent of the European Parliament and the hearing of reports on the work of the European Prosecutor's Office by the European Commission.

Police cooperation. The areas of this cooperation are addressed in Article III-275 of the EU Constitution. It refers to the coordination of operational measures by the relevant government bodies, since non-operational measures require preliminary discussion and decision-making on them by a qualified majority in the European Council (Article III-276). The provisions of Article III-276 regarding Europol (European Police Service) correspond to Article 30 of the Treaty on the European Community. These provisions strengthen administrative powers in cases where criminal offenses concern two or more EU Member States and give Europol the ability to organize, coordinate and carry out investigations jointly with the competent authorities. government services EU member countries. However, on the condition that Europol carries out only operational measures with the consent of and in cooperation with these services. The use of coercive measures remains the exclusive prerogative of national police authorities. The activities of Europol are controlled by the European Parliament together with the national parliaments of EU member states. A prerequisite for the work of Europol is strict adherence to the provisions of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and supervision by the European Court of Justice.

Protocols. This section of the EU Constitution contains protocols that define the scope of application of certain provisions, for example in relation to border controls, asylum seekers and immigration, for some EU member states (UK, Ireland, Denmark), as well as in connection with legal cooperation EU member states in the field of civil affairs and with EU police cooperation in terms of collection, storage, processing, evaluation and exchange of information between the relevant public services of EU member states.

Areas of foreign policy of the European Union

Goals and methods of implementation. Article I-12 of the EU Constitution specifies the powers to develop and implement joint foreign and security policies of the Union member states, including the gradual establishment of a common defense policy. The EU's foreign policy is aimed at achieving mutual political solidarity among its countries, exploring issues general meaning and the implementation of enhanced cooperation in all its fields to ensure the strategic interests and objectives of the Union (Article I-40). Compared to the Treaty of European Union, its Constitution contains two important changes, namely the introduction of the post of EU Foreign Minister and the organization of the European External Service (Foreign Affairs). The main task of this minister is to participate in determining the main directions of EU foreign policy and implementing them. He acts as the plenipotentiary representative of the EU in its external relations with third countries and international organizations, which are currently entrusted to the President of the European Council. The EU Foreign Minister must coordinate the activities of EU member states in various international organizations. The European Foreign Service supports the minister's efforts in his work, for which it has a general secretariat and a commission from authorized persons national diplomatic services of EU member states.

According to the EU Constitution, this commission no longer has the right to make proposals in the field of EU foreign policy. It should only provide support to the initiatives of the Union Foreign Minister. Decision-making in the field of foreign policy occurs, as before, with the help of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the EU member states, in which everyone has the right of veto. However, in strictly defined cases, a decision is made by a qualified majority, for example, when considering a proposal by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Union, who makes it at the special request of the European Council (Article III-300). Moreover, each member of this council who does not agree with the relevant decision can express his opinion on this matter, in which he must give significant reasons due to the national policy of the state he represents. The EU Foreign Minister then acts as a mediator through whom a solution acceptable to all is reached. Then this decision is transferred to the European Council, which must unanimously approve it. The Council of Foreign Ministers of EU member states can take general decisions on issues such as:

• actions carried out by the Union in the field of its foreign and security policy;
• provisions justifying the general point of view of the Union;
• methods of action that allow these actions to be carried out and the provisions regarding the general point of view to be put into practice.

All costs for the implementation of this policy are financed within the general EU budget, with the exception of costs for military and defense-political activities. But the EU Constitution provides for the possibility of adopting a pan-European decision that will allow budget funds to be allocated for the implementation of initiatives within the framework of the common security and defense policy, including actions to prepare humanitarian actions, maintain peace, use special units to save people, overcome crisis situation etc. In addition, for the preparation and conduct of such actions, financial resources are used from a special fund formed from contributions from EU member states (Article III-313).

Although the European Court of Justice does not have special powers in the field of foreign policy, it can consider claims that come to it from individuals and legal entities challenging the legality of the application of restrictive measures against them proposed by the Council of Foreign Ministers of EU member states. This chamber is also authorized to verify the compliance of international treaties, incl. and in terms of foreign policy, the provisions of the EU Constitution.

EU defense policy. An integral part of the common foreign and security policy of EU member states is their joint defense policy. As is known, the military power of EU member states and their ideas about internal and external security and necessary defense differ significantly from each other. This makes it necessary to introduce provisions into the EU Constitution to ensure flexibility and acceptability for all EU member states of arrangements that at the same time respect their political obligations. And, of course, lay down the principle of unconditional unanimity when making decisions in this area of ​​policy.

The Treaty on the EU Constitution provides, in addition to the tasks specified in Article 17 of the Treaty on European Union, other tasks, such as measures for armament, military advice and support, for the prevention of conflicts and the implementation of measures to stabilize the situation in the event of a conflict. And most importantly, the EU Constitution specifies the tasks for the joint fight against terrorism (Article III-309). Article I-43 of the EU Constitution contains a solidarity condition, according to which a Member State of the Union that has been subjected to a terrorist act or natural or man-made disaster, can count on the help of all its other countries. In this case, the Union shall mobilize all means at its disposal, including military ones, to support the country concerned (Article III-284).

Article I-41 of the EU Constitution contains a mutual defense clause. It talks about the corresponding responsibilities of all its countries in terms of mutual defense, i.e. If any EU member state is subject to an armed attack by third countries, then all other EU countries are obliged to provide it with the necessary assistance and support by all means at their disposal, including military ones. If this obligation violates the neutrality of any EU member state, then this assistance is provided in close cooperation with NATO.

According to Article III-310 of the EU Constitution, the European Council can entrust the implementation of a military mission to a group of EU member states that are ready for this and have the necessary capabilities for such a mission. These countries must coordinate their military mission with the Union Foreign Minister. In addition, in order to strengthen the military capabilities of EU member states and rationalize their actions, the EU Constitution provides for the establishment of a European Agency for the development of their defense capabilities, military research, acquisition and equipping of weapons (European Defense Agency). This agency acts under the instructions of the Council of Defense Ministers of the EU member states, and all countries of the Union can participate in its work at will (Article III-311). Decisions in this agency are made by a qualified majority, and its location and mode of operation are determined by itself.

Opportunities not provided for by the Treaty of European Union regarding ever-increasing cooperation in the field of security and defense policy are addressed in Article III-312 of the EU Constitution. The fact is that this article provides for the possibility of organizing close cooperation between EU member states, in which each of them develops its military capabilities according to modern criteria and assumes the responsibilities contained in the corresponding protocol of the EU Constitution. EU Member States that would like to take part in such cooperation must inform the European Council and the EU Foreign Minister. Within three months, a union-wide decision on such cooperation and a list of countries participating in it are adopted by a qualified majority. Article III-312 preserves the possibility of later joining this cooperation and, conversely, withdrawing from it. In addition, the participation of any state in this cooperation is excluded if the European Council decides that this state does not meet the criteria for military cooperation.

The EU Constitution supports the prohibition of spending on activities in the field of defense policy at the expense of the Union budget. These costs are covered, as before, by the corresponding line of the gross national product of each EU member state. Of course, the EU Constitution provides for the possibility of the European Council adopting a Union-wide decision, which should ensure the allocation of funds from the Union budget in case of urgent need for financing of Union initiatives in the field of its security and defense policy. However, a special fund is being established, formed from contributions from EU member states, to finance preparations for military actions and to carry out other tasks in the field of joint defense. All issues related to the creation of this fund are decided by the Council of Defense Ministers of the EU member states by a qualified majority.

Procedure for amending the EU Constitution

Normal procedure for changes. Article IV-443 of the EU Constitution contains provisions on the general (usual) procedure for amending it. This article provides for various innovations against the previous rule established by Article 48 of the Treaty on European Union. The first innovation allows the European Parliament to propose proposals to amend the EU Constitution. This puts the European Parliament on equal footing in this regard with the European Commission and the EU member states that already have this right. The second innovation concerns the convening of a European Convention (assembly), which should consist of representatives of national parliaments, leaders of EU member states and representatives of their governments, the European Parliament and the European Commission. The purpose of this convention is to test proposals to amend the EU Constitution and, through a conciliation procedure, adopt recommendations for a conference of governments of EU member states, which is convened by the President of the European Council. The European Council may, however, by a simple majority and with the consent of the European Parliament, decide not to convene the Convention if minor changes are involved. In this case, the European Council receives a mandate to hold only a conference of representatives of the governments of EU member states, who must develop the necessary changes. Regardless of the procedure used, changes only come into force when all EU member states ratify them in accordance with the provisions of their national constitutions.

Simplified procedure for changes. This procedure is discussed in Article IV-444 of the EU Constitution. According to it, the European Council is provided with two so-called general transitional conditions: to use a qualified majority when making a decision or the ordinary legislative procedure in an area for which the EU Constitution provides for unanimity or a special legislative procedure. According to the EU Constitution, national parliaments have the right to express their own opinion: with each proposed application of one of the transitional conditions by the European Council, representatives of national parliaments must be heard. If at least one of the national parliaments rejects the application of the transitional condition (within 6 months), the corresponding decision is not made. Moreover, the transitional conditions apply only to the third section of the EU Constitution on the areas of its domestic and foreign policy. Moreover, these conditions are not involved in decisions on issues of military or defense policy. The European Council makes decisions only unanimously after agreement with the European Parliament, which, in turn, decides by a simple majority.

The EU Constitution contains further specific transitional provisions for certain areas of Union policy. The European Council, after hearing in the European Parliament, can unanimously decide that a special legislative procedure through the ordinary procedure (equivalent to the transition to qualified majority voting) is applicable in such areas of domestic policy as social (Article III-210), environmental protection (Article III- 234) and family law (III-289). The European Council may also, by unanimous decision, extend qualified majority voting to the area of ​​common foreign and security policy (Articles I-40 and III-300). In both of these cases, the EU Constitution does not provide for the involvement of national parliaments. Finally, the EU Constitution provides for the possibility of changing the content of certain protocols by adopting a Union-wide law by the European Parliament or a law by the European Council. This applies to the statutes of the European System of Central Banks, the European Investment Bank, the EU Court of Justice, the procedure for excessive budget deficits, and the transitional provisions of both protocols through the opening treaties.

Simplified procedure for changes concerning provisions on the internal policy area of ​​the Union. Article IV-445 of the EU Constitution provides for a simplified procedure for amending the provisions of the relevant subsection on domestic policy Union. In this context, you need to know that the Convention, when developing the draft EU Constitution, did not propose any substantive changes in the field of internal policy of the Union, but only limited itself to adapting them to other areas of its policy within the framework of the changes proposed in them. Therefore, the Convention considered it appropriate to adopt a simplified procedure for amending this subsection of the EU Constitution, so that it would be easier to do this later. However, this procedure may in no case extend to the powers vested in the Union under the EU Constitution.

As in the normal procedure, the government of each EU member state, the European Parliament and the European Commission proposes to the European Council draft amendments to the relevant provisions of the subsection of the EU Constitution on its internal policy. The European Council may adopt an appropriate all-Union decision in which it will approve all or only part of the proposed changes. Thus, the European Council unanimously makes decisions only after hearing proposals in the European Parliament and the European Commission, and on issues such as institutional changes in the field of monetary policy, and after hearing them in the European Central Bank. However, it is not necessary to convene a Convention or a conference of governments of EU member states to amend the relevant part of the EU Constitution. All that is required is a unanimous decision of the European Council, which must then be ratified by all EU member states.

Qualified majority decision-making system

The qualified majority system is described in Article I-25 of the EU Constitution. The previous system, in which each member state of the Union had a certain number of votes, is replaced in the EU Constitution by a double majority system. A qualified majority is valid in the future as sufficient when a decision is supported by 55% and at least 15% of the EU member states and this majority simultaneously represents at least 65% of the population of the Union. But this position needs clarification. With 25 EU member states, the number of 15 of them is 60% of their total. If new countries join the EU, then this provision loses its meaning, because already with 26 countries, 55% of their total number corresponds to the number 15 (rounded to the nearest whole number). Thus, this provision is, as it were, a transitional condition.

According to Article I-25, there is also a provision in which the European Council makes decisions mainly by a qualified majority. However, its chairman and the chairman of the European Commission do not participate in the voting. The EU Constitution stipulates that the qualified majority system will come into force on November 1, 2009, when the new European Commission will be formed after the 2009 European Parliament elections. From 2004 to 2009, the currently existing system, which was established by the Nice Treaty, was in effect. The EU Constitution adopts the provisions of the Protocol “On transitional provisions for the bodies and institutions of the Union”, which is attached to it.

The general double majority rule is supplemented by several special conditions for exceptional cases, namely:

• cases in which the European Council makes decisions not on proposals from the European Commission or the EU Foreign Minister;
• rule for the so-called “blocking minority”;
• special transitional condition with a slight majority.

If the European Council or the functional council of ministers takes a decision other than on a proposal from the European Commission or the Minister of Foreign Affairs, a majority of at least 72% of the EU member states acts as a qualified majority if they represent at least 65% of the Union's population. The number of EU member states required is also higher here than in other cases. This provision is already contained in existing treaties: if the European Council does not act at the request of the European Commission (primarily in the field of common foreign and security policy, as well as in police and judicial cooperation during the consideration of criminal cases), then a qualified majority is carried out by at least 2/3 EU member states (Article 205 of the Treaty of the European Community and Articles 23 and 34 of the Treaty of European Union). The EU Constitution takes into account the underlying position of this idea, and therefore the estimate of the degree of majority increases from 2/3 to 72% of EU member states.

According to the EU Constitution, a blocking (decision-making) minority requires at least four members of the European Council. This condition should be understood in the sense that in this way it is possible to take into account the demographic weight of the various EU member states. Without this condition, three of the four populous EU member states (Germany, France, Italy and the UK) would always form a blocking minority, because their demographic weight is more than 35% of the population of the Union. This condition works in favor of finding a solution in the European Council, because the formation of a blocking minority is difficult. This condition can also be understood as a guarantee against the possible dictates of large EU member states. In the practical work of EU institutions, this condition probably does not exist. of great importance, because This kind of clear distinction between large and small EU member states is never made in practice.

A special condition also applies in the case when the qualified majority turns out to be insignificant (i.e. almost marginal), which makes the decision taken far from indisputable. The EU Constitution resorts to a compromise here, i.e. to the formula adopted back in 1994, which is valid until the new procedure for calculating the weight of votes comes into force. This formula provides that the European Council will continue to make decisions on the basis of the adoption of a legal act in the event that it is required by an EU member state. A condition for making such an application is that the Member State concerned represents:

• a quarter of the number of EU Member States required to form a blocking minority, or
• three-quarters of the population of the Union, which are required to form a blocking minority.

This provision also, of course, applies in cases where the qualified majority achieved is insignificant.

The European Council will always do everything in its power to find, within a reasonable period of time, at the request of its members, a solution acceptable to all. To do this, the President of the European Council, with the support of the European Commission and other members of the Council, must take all necessary steps to find such a solution. However, it should be pointed out that a forced deadline (prescribed by the EU Constitution, Union law or its regulations) cannot be assigned through an application (request) if this may adversely affect the search for an appropriate solution. The decision also does not grant the right of veto to any EU member state in the European Council. Indeed, in practice, such a decision may have little significance, because The European Council in its daily work tries to find, whenever possible on the basis of full agreement and most often without formal voting, consensus. This procedure comes into force on November 1, 2009, when the transition to the new double majority rule takes place, and will remain in effect until 2014. After this, the European Council can make a union-wide decision, i.e. a decision based on a qualified majority to abolish this order.

The principle of subsidiarity and the role of national parliaments

Subsidiarity(i.e. addition, when the whole, for example, a federal state or an association of states, undertakes to perform only those tasks that cannot be performed by its parts, i.e. individual regions states or individual countries of their union) is the basic principle in the exercise of the powers of the European Union. It serves as the basis for deciding whether the Union can intervene or whether it should be left to its member countries. According to this principle, the Union may act in policy areas that do not fall exclusively under its jurisdiction only when the objectives of measures taken by Member States cannot be fully achieved or when, due to the scope of these measures or the impact of these measures, throughout the entire territory of the Union, it is better to carry them out himself. The second decisive element for the exercise of powers is the principle proportionality. Following this principle, the Union must implement only measures that, both in content and in form, serve to achieve the goals established by the EU Constitution.

Currently, all bodies and institutions of the Union operate in accordance with existing agreements based on these two principles. The same principles are laid down in the EU Constitution, but with significant innovations in mind: national parliaments must directly participate in monitoring the proper application of the principle of subsidiarity. Thus, the EU Constitution restores the active role of national parliaments, primarily in terms of transmitting information to them and taking into account their opinions when making decisions by any bodies of the Union. Thus, these bodies, up to and including the European Parliament, cannot, through their initiatives, cause any damage to any EU member state, and national parliaments always have the opportunity to intervene in the legislative process and, if necessary, slow it down. The Annex to the Treaty on the EU Constitution contains relevant protocols, which deal with the role of national parliaments in the European Union and the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality in the exercise of powers by EU bodies.

According to these protocols, national parliaments have the opportunity, through their governments, to bring claims to the European Court of Justice if these principles are violated during the adoption of legislative acts. Each national parliament can check the proposals of the European Commission and convey to it its opinion on their content. Moreover, if a third of the European Parliament shares this opinion of the national parliament, then the European Commission or the relevant EU body must re-check its proposal and, if necessary, make clarifications to it. The European Commission should send directly to all national parliaments not only all consultation documents, but also the program for the development of legal acts or the political strategy that it will propose to the European Parliament and the functional councils of EU ministers, not to mention the legislative proposals themselves. Likewise, these EU ministerial councils must communicate to national parliaments and governments the agenda of their meetings and their results. The European Court of Auditors must also submit its annual reports to national parliaments, and in urgent cases, for example, if an EU member state has an excessive budget deficit, send it (as well as all other EU member states) its proposals for overcoming it .

The EU is the world's largest trading power; it accounts for almost a quarter of world trade. It is also the largest importer of agricultural products and raw materials. The EU also accounts for the bulk of aid to developing countries.

In accordance with the Lomé Convention, the EU has cooperation agreements with 69 African countries, Caribbean Sea and the Pacific Rim, which includes most of the world's poorest countries. The EU has concluded bilateral agreements of various types with approximately 60 more countries.

In general, the EU maintains diplomatic relations with more than 130 countries. It participates in the work of the OECD and has observer status at the UN. It takes part in the annual summit meetings of the seven leading Western states - represented by its four largest members - France, Germany, Great Britain and Italy, as well as the President of the EU Commission, which directly represents the Union. The EU has been an active participant in the CSCE (now OSCE) process from the very beginning.

The level of “openness” of the EU economy, measured by export and import quotas, is significantly higher than in other centers of the world economy. However, EU countries as a whole depend on outside world, due to which they have to satisfy 45% of their energy needs and the most necessary raw materials. The export quota averages about 25%. For individual, especially small, Western European countries, dependence on the foreign market is even more significant.

The majority (up to 2/3) of the trade of EU countries is accounted for by mutual trade (for all EU countries this figure exceeds 50%, and for small countries - 70%), about 10% - for trade with other European member countries OECD, about 7% - for trade with the USA, about 4% - for trade with Japan, about 12% - for trade with developing countries.

In addition, other countries are important markets for the Union's products, since the EU is the largest exporter of agricultural products. European food and textile companies are world leaders in their industry. The European chemical industry traditionally occupies a strong position. It supplies about 2/3 of all manufactured goods exports to world markets, compared with 15% for the United States and 5% for Japan. The EU is the largest exporter of mechanical engineering products; even without taking into account intraregional turnover, Western European countries account for almost 30% of its world exports (Japan - 18%, USA - 13%). The EU occupies a very strong position in the field of telecommunications and aerospace equipment, optoelectronics. The Western European aviation industry, which exports almost 1/3 of its output, accounts for about 1/4 of the world civil aircraft market. On the other hand, the EU remains in a negative balance in trade in high-tech information equipment and consumer electronics.

Industrialized countries remain the EU's main trading partners among third countries, of which the United States and Japan can be distinguished. The main trading partner from the EU countries is Germany.

Industrial goods account for about 80% of EU countries' total imports from the United States. Manufacturing and transportation equipment is the most important group of goods imported from the United States, accounting for about 1/2 of the EU countries' total imports from the United States. Imports of raw materials (SMTK 0-4) account for 13.5% of total EU imports from the USA.

Imports of the three most important groups of goods imported from the US, which include office equipment and computers, other industrial goods and electrical equipment, account for about 30% of total EU imports from the US. Imports of office equipment and computers from the United States account for 37% of total EU imports of this product. Products whose import demand is largely met by imports from the United States include oilseeds (49% of all imports of this product into EU countries are provided by imports from the United States), measuring instruments (48.4%), chemical materials and products , n.e.s. (not previously classified anywhere) (44.4%), electric generators (43.9%) and other transport equipment (43%).

Exports of industrial goods account for about 86% of total exports from EU countries to the United States, while exports of manufacturing and transport equipment account for about 45%, and raw materials for about 10%.

The main products exported to the US from EU countries are vehicles (about 10% of total exports from EU countries to the US). About 20% of total vehicle exports from EU countries go to the United States. The next important group of goods exported to the United States are electric generators and special equipment. These three product groups accounted for 23% of total EU exports to the US. Products exported primarily to the United States include power generators, office equipment, and computers and beverages.

EU countries import 4 groups of goods from Japan (vehicles, office equipment, electrical equipment), n.e.s. and audio and television equipment, which account for more than 60% of all EU imports from Japan. Vehicle imports account for about 25% of all EU imports from Japan and more than 50% of total vehicle imports.

EU exports to Japan are less homogeneous than imports, and the list of exported goods is wider. As with imports, the largest group of goods exported to Japan from EU countries are vehicles. They account for about 1/6 of total EU exports to Japan and 1/12 of total EU vehicle exports. In addition to vehicles, the largest product groups in exports are medical equipment, pharmaceutical products and other industrial goods.

The EU has a well-established bilateral trade relationship with Switzerland, based on the existing free trade agreement of 1972. Since 1994, the EU and Switzerland have organized negotiations covering a wide range of specific sectors. Seven new agreements in the areas of free movement of people, air and land transport, scientific and technological cooperation, agriculture came into force in the summer of 2002. Since June 2001 - negotiations in various areas of statistics, the environment, trade in agricultural products and cooperation against fraud, including while tax negotiations were just beginning. In April 2002, the European Commission proposed opening negotiations with Switzerland in four new areas, including the establishment of an FTA in the services sector.

Trade relations with Asia continue to be an important priority. The Asia-Europe Economic Meeting (ASEM), established in 1996, links the EU and 15 Member States with Japan, China, Korea, Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Brunei in a dialogue process aimed at facilitating trade and improving investments between all partners. Most recent Trading Plan Aid Action defines a variety of goals, intends to reduce and eliminate barriers to organize trade in the areas of standards, customs, IPR, SUNSIC, and electronic commerce. In trading terms, ASEM's Asian partners account for approximately 26% of global exports in 2000, with the EU being their largest partner and the EU having the second largest importing region.

The long-term and continuity of Russian-European cooperation is already ensured today by a strong international legal and international political treaty base. Although, as in any large and complex international process, various alternatives are possible, the main prospect of economic relations between Russia and Europe emerges quite clearly. This is a stable partnership for years and decades to come, which will ensure the gradual development of a single economic space that includes Russia in the EU zone.

The main areas of application of efforts both by each of the parties and bilateral ones for a sufficiently long period are also clear. These include the development of new joint programs for energy cooperation, including the supply of Russian gas to Europe (a third of the pan-European demand), oil, and electricity; new space cooperation projects; system of mutual measures in the field of nuclear safety; other scientific and technical projects that are covered by the Framework Agreement on Scientific and Technical Cooperation between the EU and Russia, signed in 2000.

Economic ties between the EU and Russia, as well as similar relations between other states and integration entities, are far from idyllic. Specific economic (and political) interests constantly collide and give rise to conflicts. EU countries make claims against Russia, including quite fair ones, talking about the excessive closedness of the Russian market and excessive protectionism, the imperfection of laws, corruption and theft, which impede a civilized investment policy. Russia condemns the EU for discrimination against Russian exports of goods and capital, excessive severity of anti-dumping measures and other foreign trade restrictions left over from the Cold War against countries with what was then called centralized economies.

There are also “painful” points in Russia’s relations with the EU; the points of view of the parties do not always coincide.

The main concerns of the Russian side:

anti-dumping procedures;

quotas for the supply of Russian steel products;

a ban on the import of lynx and wolf skins into the EU;

restrictions on access to the EU market Russian goods nuclear cycle;

conditions for the provision of space launch services to Russia;

provision of “social” preferences by the European Union to Russia;

planned EU enlargement and possible Negative consequences for Russia from this expansion.

The main problem associated with the EU's anti-dumping investigations against Russia remains the lack of full recognition of the Russian economy's market status.

The criteria for “marketization” proposed by the EU are overly strict, ambiguous, and, moreover, inadequate to the previously taken steps by the EU towards the CEE and Baltic countries. It was assumed that the CES amendments in the field of anti-dumping in relation to Russia would allow Russian enterprises to receive fairer conditions for conducting anti-dumping investigations, but in practice these amendments did not bring the expected results.

The situation with unconditional recognition of the market status of the Russian economy is significantly aggravated after the adoption by the Council of the EU of the Regulation, which contains a provision providing for the preservation of the status of a country with a non-market economy in relation to Russia and other CIS countries and after accession to the WTO. The Russian side insists on revising this wording.

The main concerns of the European side:

measures taken by Russia to regulate the alcohol market;

insufficient presence of EU financial institutions in Russia;

regulation of the Russian insurance market;

issues of protection of intellectual property rights;

issues of standardization, certification and confirmation of conformity of goods and services;

Russia's introduction of a number of export duties, in particular on waste and scrap of ferrous and non-ferrous metals;

uncertainty and lack of transparency in trade regulation practices at the regional level;

Russia's ban on the import of table eggs from the EU;

Russia's collection of fees for aircraft overflights along the Trans-Siberian highways.

However, the existing comprehensive legal framework and especially the everyday practice of interaction help to level out disagreements and eliminate difficulties. Evidence of this is a 3-3.5-fold increase in the volume of foreign trade between Russia and the EU over the last decade and an increase (albeit in a much more modest amount) of European investment in Russia.

Foreign economic relations of Russia with the EU countries and the USA.

Thus, the European Union is the main market for Russian exports, as well as the largest supplier of imported goods to Russia. The most important trading partners of Russia in the European Union are Germany (trade volume of 15 billion dollars) and Italy (9.1 billion dollars). These two countries account for about 40% of Russian exports to Europe and 30% of European imports come from them. The United States is Russia's fifth trading partner after Germany, Belarus, Ukraine and Italy, but trade turnover with the United States is 7.5 times less than with the European Union.

Russia's role as a trading partner for the European Union is much more modest. Russia is the EU's fifth largest trading partner. Russia accounts for only 2.8% of exports and 4.6% of imports of EU countries. However, for certain product items, the importance of Russia is significantly higher. For example, Russia provides 17% of European energy imports.

The structure of Russian exports to the EU is dominated by fuel and raw materials (up to 90%), and mainly consumer goods and equipment are imported (estimated at 66-67%).

Energy resources account for 67% of Russian exports to the EU. The leaders in terms of volumes of fuel and energy raw materials imported from Russia are Germany and Italy: more than half (54%) of all energy resources exported to the European Union are supplied to these two countries. A significant portion of Russian exports of metals (35%), wood and pulp (30%), and chemical products (24%) are supplied to EU markets.

In the list of goods with the largest share of trade, nuclear reactors are in the top three. Presumably, this reflects the import of radioactive waste for processing in Russia or the import of raw materials for the production of nuclear fuel. The rating of other key goods reflects the features of the structure of foreign trade described above.

Trade turnover registered by the State Customs Committee increased by more than a third, while trade turnover with the EU increased by 44% over the same period, and the USA by only 5%. Imports from the EU grew by about 32% over two years, but in trade with the European Union there was an increase in exports from Russia (by 48%).

Among the main problems in the development of trade relations between Russia and the countries of the European Union and the United States, the following can be noted.

The entry of new members into the European Union will mean the extension of EU trade norms and standards to them, and, as a result, possible limitation of markets for Russian exports.

Russia's ratification of the Unified Energy Charter will mean liberalization of access to Russian transport infrastructure and may lead to a decrease in Russian energy exports.

Thus, the European Union is Russia's main trading partner and accounts for more than 50 percent. of all trade of the Russian Federation. On the other hand, Russia is the fifth most important trading partner of the EU after the USA, Switzerland, China and Japan and accounts for about 5 percent. of all EU trade.

The structure of bilateral trade reflects the comparative advantages of the two economies, with fuel and commodities making up the bulk of Russian exports and capital and finished industrial and consumer goods imported from the EU. Currently, Russia provides more than 20% of the EU's demand for imported fuel. A significant part of Russian goods supplied to Community markets is included in the EU's General System of Preferences (GSP), under which import duties are lower than the MFN rates.

The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) governs political, economic and cultural relations between the EU and Russia. Under the terms of the PCA, Russia enjoys most favored nation status, which means there are no quantitative restrictions on exports except for some steel products (representing just 4% of bilateral trade). At the same time, the EU and Russia signed a Joint Statement addressing Russia's concerns regarding EU enlargement, in particular in the areas of tariffs, steel, trade protection, agricultural and veterinary issues, energy and the transit of goods.

The EU is slowly and with difficulty emerging from the crisis. Against this background, in 2012 a number of multidirectional trends emerged to an even greater extent. The first is integration, gradually leading the EU towards federalization. This also applies to institutional changes, where progress has been made. The second trend can be characterized as “disengagement”: against the backdrop of deepening integration, there is an even greater qualitative stratification of the EU member countries.

The demarcation occurs at two levels (according to H. Van Rompuy's definition of two-tears): the first is between the eurozone and the non-eurozone, the second is the stratification between countries that are better and worse adapted to the processes of integration and globalization.

At the same time, the second group includes both old EU members (Italy, Spain, Greece, Portugal) and new ones. The old “others” are the countries most affected by the crisis.

The majority of young “other EU members” suffered significantly less (for different reasons, as we wrote about in previous forecasts). But in a situation where their powers at the supranational level are “taken away”, they either seek support from stable neighbors (Sweden) or unite in small groups: thus, the activity of

The Visegrad Group, which emerged more than 20 years ago, and one of its main goals was the accession of member countries to the EU and NATO. Thus, within the EU, along with federalization and deepening integration, there is a process of subregionalization.

Crisis phenomena recent years- both financial and economic in Europe, and political in the Middle East and North Africa - were reflected in the ideological sphere, where multidirectional processes are also increasingly clearly observed. Against the backdrop of the dominance of tolerance and political correctness, even in the most prosperous countries, the growth of nationalism, already legally represented, continues not only at the national, but also at the supranational level, for example, in the European Parliament.

In 2012 most of At the time, the leaders of the European Union were absorbed in the fight against the consequences of the economic crisis. The sense of chaos noted in 2011 has subsided. The President of the European Council, H. van Rompuy, was forced to warn governments against complacency, recalling that the solution to the accumulated problems is urgent. But the conditions for rapid adoption of agreed decisions have not yet developed:

Caused by severe economic situation protests in many member states are reducing the base of support for any agreements that are reached at the EU level, and populist forces are easily turning the EU into a target for harsh criticism. In November 2012, Europe saw its largest protest in decades - a general strike called by the European Trade Union Confederation, which saw millions of people from 23 EU countries take part in demonstrations to express dissatisfaction with fiscal austerity measures and cuts in public spending.

Serious disagreements remain on the problems of financing the activities of the European Union, and at the extraordinary November and December summits of EU leaders it was not possible to reach a compromise on the draft long-term budget for 2014-2020.

The UK's idea of ​​cutting costs is supported mainly by seven other donor countries, through whose payments a decisive part of the EU budget is formed. They are opposed at the negotiations by a group of 16 countries chaired by Poland and Portugal, on the development and support of which the European Union spends many billions of euros annually. It is possible that the member countries will not be able to agree on the budget for the next seven-year plan even within a year. In this case, in 2014 the EU will have to live according to the 2013 budget, increased by 2% taking into account inflation.

A growing divergence in the vectors of internal political development of the leading EU countries, primarily France, Germany and the UK, has become noticeable. The personal temperament of the leaders of these countries also does not contribute to their compatibility.

Only towards the end of 2012 did an open discussion begin about the strategic prospects of the EU and the possible formation of a full-fledged federal structure, the mention of which had previously been avoided.

In foreign policy, the EU's modest capabilities were further limited by election campaigns in key partner countries Russia and the United States, which temporarily reduced the ability to negotiate and carry out long-term planning.

A significant part of the unfinished negotiations on anti-crisis policy issues, possible changes to the legal framework and the details of the institutional structure of the EU moves to 2013. Due to the dynamics of the political process in the leading EU member states (federal elections in Germany, postponed decisions on the UK's strategic course), significant shocks should not be expected during the year. The EU will be preoccupied with the problems of restoring economic growth, and the political forces in power will chalk up any signs of improvement in the economic situation. In 2013, the release of resources necessary for the implementation of new large-scale projects in the field of foreign policy and security policy is not planned.

At the end of November, the European Commission presented a blueprint for moving towards a “genuine” economic and monetary union, pointing out its current incompleteness.

A set of measures to strengthen economic mechanisms, if implemented, will entail greater political unity. Changes may be required to the fundamental treaties that form the EU's legal framework. In these conditions, some countries will strive for greater cohesion, but the UK will try to create the opportunity for itself to remain in the common economic area and decision-making bodies of the EU, refusing to fulfill obligations in other areas.

Key decisions in the EU continue to be made by the heads of state and government of member countries. In a stable situation, they would hardly agree to strengthen the position of the EU communitarian bodies, but if such a step is recognized as the only instrument capable of providing a way out of the crisis, most countries will agree to take it.

Since EU countries failed to agree on a new seven-year budget framework in 2012, this work will need to be accelerated and completed in the first half of 2013.

The compromise will likely not contain provisions that fundamentally change the nature of the EU's financial provision, but during the negotiations governments will be able to demonstrate their willingness to fight for the rational use of taxpayers' money. The task of leading EU politicians and institutions is to prevent the framework budget from turning into a stagnation budget under the influence of austerity measures. Despite the many challenges, EU officials remain confident of success. The common understanding does not disappear that all EU member countries and partners are interested in preserving and strengthening the European Union and the eurozone.

In the longer term, we can assume that, despite all the difficulties and internal contradictions experienced by the European Union, a fairly long period of EU enlargement will now be followed by a period of deepening processes of integration and consolidation. Today, the EU, according to a number of analysts, is on the verge of another “restart”, the first of which was in 1986, and the second in 1992. Evidence of this is the return to the slogan of the Federation of Nation States. However, in this case, most likely, the final formation of a Europe of “two speeds” is inevitable: representatives of the first will focus on the interstate nature of the state, and the second on the national one. This process will go hand in hand with increasing internal differentiation in the EU, and within member states (Belgium, Great Britain-Scotland, Spain-Catalonia). european union economics politics

Institutional reforms in the EU. The role of J. Barroso

The year 2012 was marked by a number of significant institutional changes in the architecture of the European Union and the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) as its key element.

In conditions when the leaders of the EU member states were forced to exercise caution, refraining from ambitious initiatives, the President of the European Commission, J. Barroso, tried to take on the role of a strategist. In his annual State of the EU address, he called for the creation of a “federation of nation states.” The term “federation” directly likens the EU to a state and is therefore sharply rejected by Eurosceptics, whose positions are quite strong in a number of EU countries. However, a careful reading of the projects introduced by the EU institutions in 2012 to improve the management of the main spheres of the Union’s life activity indicates an undoubted tendency towards its “federalization”.

The current composition of the European Commission should serve until 2015.

Accordingly, if the institutional initiatives put forward in 2012 are successfully implemented, Barroso has a unique chance to earn the laurels of one of the most influential and successful chairmen of the European Commission.

In the autumn of 2012, in various documents of the European Commission, the European Parliament, and speeches of the President of the European Council, the Project for a “deep and true Economic and Monetary Union” was presented - an ambitious long-term plan (at least 5 years) to create a truly integrated full economic, banking and budgetary (fiscal) union. The plan assumes a more binding coordination of the processes of developing and making national decisions in the field of macroeconomic and budgetary policies actually at the supranational level (i.e., with the direct participation of supranational institutions), as well as transferring to them the competence to authorize national measures, as well as oversee their implementation. This also applies to tax and employment policies.

Economic discipline must be complemented by greater solidarity within the new union. It is planned to create an autonomous eurozone budget, including to support those countries that are carrying out painful structural reforms.

A number of priority measures are planned for 2013, allowing their adoption in the form of secondary EU law and aimed at strengthening supranational supervisory and enforcement mechanisms in the economic and fiscal spheres. Thus, it is planned to accelerate the implementation of the so-called “package of six legislative acts”, strengthening the enforcement mechanisms of the Stability and Growth Pact, as well as establishing a new instrument for the prevention/correction of macroeconomic imbalances, the growth of which was characteristic of the EMU economies throughout the “zero” years. As part of this reform agenda, the European Commission is lobbying for the speedy adoption of a “double package” aimed at strengthening supervision over the development and implementation of the budget policy of eurozone states.

It is also expected that the provisions of the intergovernmental Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in EMU will be included in secondary EU law. This logic is embedded in the “double package” bills. The Treaty itself, which is currently being ratified, stipulates that government budgets must be balanced or have a surplus. Article 3 (paragraphs 1e and 2) of the Treaty prescribes the establishment of a correction mechanism at the national level, that is, in addition to the Stability and Growth Pact, where the launch of a procedure for eliminating excessive deficits is authorized by the Council.

The budget pact requires the incorporation of its rules into national legislation, preferably of a constitutional nature. It is noteworthy that the Treaty will enter into force upon ratification by 12 of the 17 states that are part of the euro area. This principle of “ratifying majority” speaks of a general trend in the development of the EU, associated with the formation of a more cohesive “core” surrounded by a less “advanced” periphery.

As for the “banking” union, the main measure planned in the short term will be the launch of a unified supervisory mechanism for the activities of banks. Supervision will gradually extend to all euro area banks, starting with the largest. A new single framework for bank supervision, in which the ECB will play a key role, will allow banks to be recapitalized directly through the European Stability Mechanism, which began operating on October 8, 2012. A single set of rules is being developed banking. After the creation of a supervisory mechanism, it is planned to establish a unified mechanism for restructuring problem banks. The Growth and Employment Pact with a budget of 120 billion euros, adopted at the June summit of the European Council, is already being implemented.

It is planned to establish a new financial instrument to support structural reforms and invest in the development of energy, transport, and telecommunications infrastructure.

The main forces of progress towards a “banking, fiscal and political union” were the countries of the European “core” - Germany and France. Despite differences among their leaders over how to save the eurozone, the EU's founding countries are united in their determination to deliver "more Europe." This commitment was confirmed in the official statement "The Future of Europe", published on 18 September 2012 after a meeting in Warsaw of the foreign ministers of the eleven member states. In addition to France and Germany, the meeting was attended by representatives of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland and Portugal. The scale of institutional and policy changes proposed by ministers is more ambitious than the rejected EU Constitution. The ministers proposed returning to the idea of ​​a President of the European Union elected by direct elections in the member states; strengthen the powers of the Foreign Policy Service; create a European border police and even a European army; abolish the principle of unanimity in matters of common foreign and security policy in order to harmonize it.

Implementing such a reform would require a revision of the Lisbon Treaty. Bearing in mind that not all member states signed the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union initiated by Germany at the beginning of the year, the ministers put forward an unprecedented proposal: to approve future versions of the EU treaties not unanimously, but by a qualified majority in order to these treaties could be valid, albeit only in the states that ratified them.

The EU faces extreme complex tasks. However, the financial and economic crisis also created the preconditions for their solution, strengthening the federalist aspirations of the leaders of the European Union.

Germany remains the main donor and driver of integration. The crisis clearly revealed the existing divergence between areas subject to supranational (communitarian) regulation and areas based on intergovernmental cooperation, including common foreign and security policy. However, progress towards fiscal, banking and political union, plans for a deeper reform of the institutional structure of the European Union than in the Lisbon Treaty will inevitably entail a strengthening of the common foreign and security policy.

The weakness of peacekeepers. The European Union regularly demonstrates a lack of coherence foreign policy courses of its members and low efficiency in defending once defined priorities. First of all, this is noticeable in the example of the EU policy regarding regional conflicts.

The EU is most concerned about “hot spots” located near its borders, in particular in the post-Soviet space. At the same time, in mediating the settlement of the Transnistrian conflict, the European Union is noticeably inferior to the initiative of Russia and the United States (the latter actively use the OSCE institutions). The EU's calculation is less about direct mediation than about the beneficial impact of the process of rapprochement between Moldova and the EU on the conflict, but noticeable results here can only appear in the medium term. In the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, none of the mediators are able to counteract the growing tension. The EU is represented in the settlement process only indirectly - through the member countries participating in the OSCE Minsk Group: France (co-chair of the group), Germany, Italy, Sweden and Finland. In Georgia, the EU remained the only actor providing an international presence in the conflict region through its observation mission, which, however, does not have access to the territory of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and, apparently, will not be able to obtain it in the near future. Increasing the scope of the mission is also not part of the EU's plans.

Even more problematic for the EU, as well as for other international actors, is the impact on the Middle East settlement process. The European Union is forced to reckon with strong lobby groups supporting each side. The EU border mission at the Rafah checkpoint between Egypt and the Gaza Strip, formally launched at the end of 2005, is not functioning and, most likely, will not be able to resume its work due to Israel’s position in this regard. The differences between the EU and Israel deepened as a result of the vote in the UN General Assembly on November 30, 2012 on the issue of granting observer country rights to Palestine. Among the EU countries, only the Czech Republic supported the Israeli position, while there is no talk of unity of approaches within the EU, since 14 member countries supported the Palestinian application, and 12 abstained.

On Iranian issues, the EU tried to play an active role, but could not prove its effectiveness as a mediator. Neither the United States nor Russia have any significant hopes for a settlement with the participation of the EU.

The EU failed to take advantage of the unique opportunities to increase its role in North Africa that emerged as a result of the Arab Spring. This situation is unlikely to change in the coming year. Leading EU countries prefer to act in the region on a bilateral basis, without using communitarian mechanisms. The formally launched EU mission to provide humanitarian assistance to resolve the conflict in Libya has not begun work.

Weakened by internal contradictions, the new political regimes of the states in the region are not yet inclined to consider the EU as a support for their own development.

The EU presence in Afghanistan, where there is a limited police mission and EU member states participate in the International Security Assistance Force, will be reduced. The EU will be able to influence what is happening in this country only indirectly, through partnerships with the United States, Russia, China and the countries of Central Asia.

In relations with Russia - the EU in 2013, as shown, in particular, by the last Russia-EU summit in December 2012, it is unlikely that there will be significant progress or breakthroughs in the main areas - energy, visa, modernization - innovation. There are also no conditions for signing a new basic agreement. At the same time, showwillgoon Russia, for which Europe is not only the main trading partner (50% of turnover in goods, more than 40% in services, more than 70% of the volume of accumulated investments in the Russian economy), but also the main external resource for modernization, in 2013 even at the stage of emerging from recession, we will have to continue to deal with a weakening global player. Partly, the crisis state of Europe was to Moscow's advantage. The rivalry in the European NIS was practically irrelevant. Under these conditions, in August 2012, with an agreement on a free trade zone between Ukraine and the EU not yet signed, Russia managed to “pressure” Kyiv to ratify the agreement on a free trade zone with the CIS. Taking into account the priority of the goal of creating a free trade area with the European Union, Russia took into account European legal norms and included them in the rules of the Customs Union and the Common Economic Space. In general, Russia’s integration efforts in the post-Soviet space do not raise objections in Europe and are not viewed there as an obstacle to signing a new Russia-EU treaty. At least at the political level, there are no statements about Russia’s neo-imperial plans in the CIS.

The European Union made significant efforts to solve the problems that prevented Russia from joining the WTO, which was one of the main foreign policy achievements common to the EU and the USA

Russia in 2012. WTO membership (as well as plans to join the OECD) removes a significant number of trade and economic disagreements that impede the signing of a new agreement with the EU.

It was the weakening of the international positions of the EU, the offensive in the economic sphere of China, roughness in relations with the United States, the financial and economic crisis, as well as issues that arose in 2012 in connection with alternative energy sources that strengthened European approaches to Russia, although this is not articulated , a component of the “compulsion of partnership”. Moreover, on the issues that most concern Russia - visas, energy and modernization.

Europe, at the insistence of Russia, has adopted and is implementing a plan for “joint steps” to transition to a visa-free regime for short-term trips of citizens. However, it is unlikely that it will be possible to achieve a visa-free regime in 2014, as the Russian Foreign Ministry planned.

Problems with alternative energy sources (decline in enthusiasm for shale gas, unpreparedness to receive LNG and the unstable situation in the Persian Gulf, where it mainly comes from) have already resulted in giving the Nord Stream, which has come into operation, the status of European transport networks. Negotiations on the same issue are also ongoing regarding South Stream, which, in addition to southern European countries, has been joined by France, Germany, Italy, and Austria. That de facto takes these major projects beyond the scope of Russia’s disagreements with the EU over the EU’s Third Energy Package. At the December 2012 Russia-EU summit, the issue was acute. However, the absence in the foreseeable (5-7 years) of a real alternative for the exporter and importer, as well as the interest of large European companies that have invested in these energy projects, it can be assumed that, despite the likely negative information background, the parties will reach a compromise. At the same time, prejudices will remain strong for a long time, defeating sound economic calculations regarding Russia and its business (as was the case in 2012 in the case of the participation of the Russian private mineral fertilizer producer Acron in a tender for the purchase of a stake in the Polish company Azoty Tarnow ").

Europe and, to an even greater extent, Russia are faced with the need for reindustrialization, and in the context of a growing demographic crisis, an influx of migrants, and deepening religious and civilizational contradictions (“failure of multiculturalism”). In this regard, especially against the backdrop of Europe’s skeptical, negative attitude towards Russian internal political affairs and different understandings of the essence of modernization, the real breakthrough in 2012 was the reconciliation of the Russian Orthodox Church and the Polish Church.

Bilateral relations are improving. In 2012, a visa-free regime was established between the Kaliningrad region and the adjacent Polish voivodeships.

The practice of relations with the European Union shows that Russia will have to continue to use both institutional and bilateral formats and mechanisms for developing relations with its European neighbors. At the same time, as in relations with many CIS countries, Russia is faced in Europe with the phenomenon of changing generations of elites. First of all, this concerns possible changes in connection with the upcoming elections in Germany in 2013.

Generational shifts in society are also important. This means, firstly, the need for an even more pragmatic approach to relationships. Secondly, a correct and thoughtful change in historical guidelines in appeal to the young and middle-aged generations of Europeans both with regard to the Second World War and the velvet revolutions of the 90s

For some mysterious reason, they often forget that on that stormy snowy day the prayer of departure was read not for the “Father of the Fatherland,” not for the emperor, and not for the “King of All Great and White and Little,” but for God’s servant Peter. That is, per person. With all his sins and virtues.

Waiting for change

Creation of a regular army and navy

By the end of the reign Petra- 200 thousand ground forces, not counting 100 thousand Cossacks. 48 battleships and 788 galleys and other ships of the Navy. Refusal to use foreign mercenaries as personal security for the sovereign.

In Rus' it is ordered to cut beards. Russian lubok Photo: Public Domain

It is forbidden to bleach, blush and generally abuse women's cosmetics; marry a girl without her consent; wear beards; write abbreviated names in official documents (Vanka, Sashka); to kneel before the sovereign; take off your hats to your superiors in winter. Instead, it is recommended to: wear European dress, attend theaters and circuses, smoke tobacco, organize public holidays with the participation of women.

Encouraging your own industry

Numerous bans on the import of a significant range of goods into Russia - from cast iron and iron to fabrics. Encouragement of own industry and private initiative. At the beginning of Peter's reign there were 15 manufactories, at the end - more than 300. Russia begins to export cast iron, non-ferrous metals, linen, gunpowder and weapons.

Introduction of compulsory service for nobles

Moreover, by the age of 15, noble children must learn to read and write. Without a certificate of “training,” a nobleman was not given “eternal memory” - permission to marry. This is how the famous Mitrofan appeared: “I don’t want to study, but I want to get married!”

God is above all

So what was Pyotr Alekseevich Romanov like? What do we know about him as a person? It's not offensive enough. No, of course, everyone knows that he shaved the beards of the boyars. I smoked a pipe. He loved carpentry. He had a fair sense of humor - he ordered the bells to be melted down for cannons, and when the patriarch began to complain - they say, because of “this unrighteous act” many icons cried blood - he allegedly said: “Look at me! Lest the priest’s asses cry with blood!”

But Peter was a very pious man. Another thing is that his religious feeling almost literally corresponded to the old Russian proverb: “Pray to God, but don’t trust the monks.” So, after the capture of Narva, Peter visited the city magistrate, where advisers and, importantly, pastors gathered. I asked about their wishes. They asked to preserve their ancient rights, lands and privileges. The king promised to fulfill everything, but asked: “Have you forgotten anything?” The city fathers rejoiced: “We don’t need anything else.” Peter’s answer was pious and instructive: “Rights, privileges and lands I will leave to you. But, since you yourself have forgotten God, I am depriving you of your churches.” The churches of Narva were returned only during the times Anna Ioannovna, 30 years later.

Peter really did not stand on ceremony with churches, and this is often blamed on him. They say he forbade the construction of churches in Siberia, and also did not order the establishment of house churches. This is true. But he did not follow the example of other sovereigns for the piety of his subjects. One of the points of his church reform was the supervision of attendance at services. The law established a minimum of confessions and communions - 12 times a year, on major holidays. If someone was absent from confession without a good reason - a fine of 5 rubles. For the laziness of slaves or serfs, their owners were punished, but at a triple rate. Considering the market price of a cow is 2 rubles. 50 kopecks, it is not surprising that the Russians very soon acquired the fame of the “most Christian” people.

At the same time, Peter issued a decree prohibiting people from falling on their knees before the sovereign and taking off their hats near the palace. He reasoned like this: “Why humiliate the title of man? This is worthy only before the Lord. More zeal and loyalty to me and the state - this is the honor befitting a king.”

What about the bells torn from the belfries? Peter showed a peculiar sense of humor here too. The Tsar gave a significant part of the cannons taken from the Swedes to the Church, ordering them to be made into bells to replace those requisitioned earlier.

Construction of St. Petersburg. Painting by George Pesis (1958). Photo: Public Domain

Rupee per tooth

Hungry for life, Peter did not observe most of the fasts. But there was a good reason for this. Many people know about the Tsar’s “nervous attacks.” In addition, he also suffered from a rare form of allergy. Peter's body did not tolerate fish. None and never, which actually doesn’t fit well with his love for the sea and water. Therefore, the Patriarch of Constantinople, by a personal decree, released the Russian autocrat from his posts.

In general, his eating habits can hardly be called royal. He ate little but often, about every two hours. The menu is surprisingly simple. Cabbage soup, jelly with horseradish and garlic, suckling pig with sour cream, fried beef with soaked apples or pickles. Corned beef, boiled pork, ham, rye sour bread, sauerkraut, grated radish, boiled turnip. In the morning on an empty stomach, and then before each meal - a glass (143.5 g) of aniseed vodka. For food - kvass. A wealthy Russian man ate approximately the same way. But most of all, Peter loved pearl barley porridge. By the way, with his light hand This is what the Russian soldier mainly feeds on.

However, sometimes the king amazed those around him with his immoderate appetite. But this was dictated by his passion for medicine. When Peter was treated at the waters in the Belgian town of Spa, he was prescribed a diet of fruits and vegetables. In full accordance with the saying about a fool who, while praying, will bruise his forehead, the Russian Tsar ate 6 pounds of cherries and 4 pounds of figs in one sitting. After which he drank 20 glasses mineral water. The treatment, of course, did not work.

In the same way, the tsar’s own exercises in the field of surgery were not always successful. Peter performed several simple operations such as amputation of limbs to great effect. But I remember something else. So, in Holland he treated a patient with dropsy merchant's wife, Frau Borscht. The king released the water, and the woman felt better, but died the next day.

The Russians also benefited from the royal bounty. After Peter received his diploma as a surgeon, few nobles risked taking time off from service due to illness. The emperor always carried a set of tools with him and immediately put them to use. He drew blood, put leeches behind his ears, but especially liked to pull out teeth. The orderlies carried behind him a bag containing up to a thousand teeth pulled out by the monarch. But, being fair, Peter always rewarded those who suffered from his healing with a certain amount - 1 ruble for a tooth, a chervonets for the opening of blood.

You can talk about Peter for a very long time. Here is his pathological fear of cockroaches, and love for low ceilings, and hatred of ostentatious luxury, and assault, and amazing performance... When the Russian Tsar first went abroad, one of the most educated women of her time, Elector of Hanover Sophia, responded about him like this: “This is a very good man and at the same time very bad. Morally, he is a full representative of his country.”

A century and a half later Fedor Dostoevsky continued the German woman’s thought: “The man is wide, too wide, I would narrow it down...”

Personality and character

Peter combined opposite character traits. At the same time, he was hot-tempered and cold-blooded, wasteful and thrifty to the point of stinginess, cruel and merciful, demanding and condescending, rude and gentle, calculating and rash. All this created a kind of emotional background against which the state, diplomatic and military activities Petra.

For all the diversity of Peter’s character traits, he was a surprisingly integral person. The idea of ​​serving the state, in which the king deeply believed and to which he subordinated his activities, was the essence of his life. It permeated all his endeavors. If we keep this in mind, then the apparent inconsistency and sometimes contradictory nature of his activities acquire a certain unity and completeness.

Peter considered the beginning of this service not the time of accession to the throne (1682) and not even the year of the removal of Princess Sophia from the regency (1689), or, finally, not the death of his brother Ivan (1696), with whom he formally shared power, but participation in the affairs of state meanings.

In 1713, in connection with the summer campaign of Russian troops in Finland, an interesting correspondence took place between Peter and Vice Admiral Kruys. The vice admiral warned the tsar against direct participation in naval and landing operations, which were always life-threatening. To these entreaties, the tsar replied: “I have been serving this state for more than eighteen years (which I don’t write about at length, since everyone knows it) and I have been in many battles, actions and ballagers (that is, sieges), everywhere I have been asked from good and honest officers so as not to be absent."

So, Peter, according to his calculations, began serving “this state” 18 years ago, that is, in 1695. Much later, when materials for the “History of the Northern War” were being collected, the tsar made a clarification in his own note: “he began to serve as a bombardier from the first Azov campaign, when the towers were taken.”

Thus, the amusing games and Kozhukhov maneuvers, in which the tsar served as a drummer and bombardier, his first hobbies in shipbuilding, the construction of the Pereyaslavl fleet, and the journey to Arkhangelsk, in his mind, remained outside the scope of “service.” Peter did not include all these events in his own track record, apparently on the grounds that these events did not result in results of national significance.

Peter combined a broad interpretation of his service as a state service with a narrower one. When counting the time of service at sea, he was guided by slightly different criteria. In the same 1713, reporting about an unprecedented storm on the Baltic Sea, Peter writes: “True, at the age of 22, when I began serving at sea, I only saw two or three such storms.” Consequently, the tsar began his naval service from the time of the construction of the Pereyaslavl flotilla. This flotilla did not carry out any combat operations, however, Peter believed that even then he was performing naval service, but had not yet “served this state.”

Peter's epistolary legacy also reveals his misconception about how one should approach service - with full dedication, with ignoring personal, so to speak, private interests for the sake of state interests, with a willingness to sacrifice life for the sake of achieving goals of national importance.

In his daily activities, Peter often acted in two capacities. When the tsar “served” as a bombardier, captain, colonel, or shipmaster, apparently he considered himself a private person and bore the name Pyotr Mikhailov. Being in the rank of Schoutbeinacht, and then vice admiral, he demanded that he be addressed in the fleet not as a sovereign, but as a person bearing a naval rank: “Mr. Schoutbeinacht”, “Mr. Vice Admiral”.

As a private person, he attended family celebrations of his colleagues, buried people whom he highly valued during his lifetime, and also participated in the games he invented of “Prince Caesar” and “Prince Father.”

When the king built a ship, stormed a fortress, or quickly covered vast distances to take personal part in some business, he worked, and he worked not so much in order to make a personal contribution to the matter, but in order to inspire others with his example , to show the need, although exhausting, but extremely useful. This kind of activity acquired an instructive and pedagogical character.

The educational significance of personal example was perhaps most clearly described by one of the “chicks of Petrov’s nest,” Peter’s younger contemporary Ivan Ivanovich Neplyuev. After returning from abroad, where Neplyuev, among others, studied naval affairs, he had the opportunity to take an exam for the Tsar. “At 8 o’clock the sovereign arrived in a one-wheeler and, walking past, said to us: “Great, guys.” Then after a while they let us into the assembly, and the Admiral General (that is, the tsar) ordered Zmaevich to ask separately from now on who knows what about navigation. Then, when it was my turn (and I was, according to the agreement between us, one of the last), the sovereign deigned to come up to me, without allowing Zmaevich to do the problem, he asked: “Have you learned everything why you were sent?” that I answered: “Most merciful sir, I have been diligent to the best of my ability, but I cannot boast that I have learned everything, but rather I consider myself an unworthy slave before you, and for this reason I ask, as before God, your generosity towards me.” While saying this words, I knelt down, and the sovereign, turning his hand to the right, gave me a kiss and at the same time deigned to say: “You see, brother, I and the king, but I have calluses on my hands, and that’s all because: to show you an example and even in my old age to see me worthy helpers and servants of the fatherland."

Understanding Peter’s behavior, collecting facts related to his military and state activities, Feofan Prokopovich created a theory, the meaning of which was that “warriors are worthy of a great king, and a king is worthy of eating great warriors.”

Peter's external democracy did not mislead anyone about the true nature of his power. And Peter himself did not at all seek to pass himself off as the people's king. He knew for sure that in his state there was a “noble” class and a “vile” class. There is an abyss between them: the first rules, the second obeys. Peter headed for strengthening the position of the ruling class. In life, Peter remained an absolute monarch in all cases: when he performed the duties of a ship master, and when he was incognito as part of the great embassy, ​​and when he led a battalion of the Novgorod regiment into an attack during the Battle of Poltava, and when he ordered the burning of the cities of “thieves” - Bulavinites, and when he spent his leisure time at a cheerful party with friends, and when, finally, he was present at the christening of a soldier of the bombardment company, Ivan Vekshin, to whom, from his generosity, which was not at all royal, he presented a gift of only three red rubles.

But Peter still sometimes consciously tried to emphasize his two completely different hypostases, as, for example, in cases of a deliberately respectful attitude towards his superiors during the launching of ships.

Once, as a private citizen, in this case a surgeon, he attended the funeral of his patient. The patient suffered from dropsy, and the doctors, no matter how much they tried to help her with surgical intervention, could not do anything. Peter took up the matter, he managed to release the water, he was very proud of this, because patented surgeons only came out with blood, but the patient soon died.

As a private person, he also participated in the funeral of a four-year-old baby. The father of this baby, an English merchant, arranged a magnificent ceremony, as if the deceased were some noble or honored person. The long procession walked on foot all the way to the cemetery. Peter was among the funeral participants only because he was the godfather of the deceased.

Peter was exceptionally thrifty when it came to spending money on personal needs, and at the same time did not skimp on expenses for his wife’s wardrobe and the construction of palaces. In this regard, an interesting conversation took place between the Tsar and Fyodor Matveevich Apraksin. Apraksin noted that the gifts given by the tsar to godfathers, mothers in childbirth and others are so insignificant, “that it is a shame for our brother to give such.” Peter countered Apraksin’s reproach with the following reasoning:

This does not happen at all from stinginess, but because: 1) in my opinion, the most capable way to reduce vices is to reduce needs, then I should be an example to my subjects in this; 2) prudence requires keeping expenses in line with income, and my income is less than yours.

Your income consists of millions,” Apraksin objected.

My own income consists solely of the salary I receive for the ranks that I wear in the land and naval services, and from this money I clothe myself, support myself for other needs, and use it for gifts.

Here are the same two incarnations of Peter: the sovereign of a powerful power, whose country residence in Peterhof should not be inferior to Versailles, and Peter Mikhailov, a zealous owner who lives on a salary and sets an example of an economical life for his subjects.

Peter's prudence, bordering on stinginess, was striking to everyone who had the opportunity to observe him in Everyday life. The English resident Mackenzie reported to the government in 1714: the king “could always ask everyone whether he, the sovereign, allows himself the pleasures available to the monarch of such vast domains, the ruler of such a large people, whether he spends on his person more than his own salary received by place occupied in the army and navy? I heard that the tsar’s expenses are precisely such that he is so prudent not only in his own personal expenses, but also allows his family to spend per year no more than what they receive as a vice admiral and general."

Peter's idea of ​​the common good

So, Pyotr Mikhailov took on the responsibilities of a private individual, and the behavior of this private individual served as a kind of standard to follow. We can glean information about Peter’s different quality from normative acts. The military regulations informed his subjects that “His Majesty is an autocratic monarch who should not give an answer to anyone in the world about his affairs, but has the power and authority to govern his states and lands, like a Christian sovereign, according to his will and good will.” In another act, this idea is expressed even more briefly: “The power of monarchs is autocratic, which God himself commands to obey.” Before us is an autocrat, the owner of unlimited power by anyone, who ruled the subjects of a huge country according to his own “benevolence.” The task of the monarch Peter Alekseevich, as he presented it, is to command in order to achieve the ultimate goal: the common good of his subjects.

The idea of ​​the “common good” was first expressed by Peter in 1702 in a manifesto on the conscription of foreigners into Russian service. Despite the fact that the manifesto was compiled on a private occasion and was intended for readers outside the country, it can rightfully be called a document of programmatic significance. Peter intended to govern in such a way “so that each and every one of our faithful subjects could feel what our single intention is for their well-being and increase in their interests.” Peter expressed this thought almost two decades later more clearly: “We must work for the common benefit and profit, which God places before our eyes both inside and outside, from which the people will be relieved.”

What did Peter mean by “common benefit and profit”, what is the real meaning of these words? It is not possible to give a clear answer to the question posed, primarily because, apparently, the tsar himself did not have this clarity, at least we do not find it in the laws he issued. The concept of “common good” appeared in acts appropriate to the occasion, and depending on the specific situation and the goals pursued by the act, it was filled with different content. And yet, comparing these acts issued in different time and in various ways, we can recover the collective meaning of the "common good." It meant the development of trade, crafts and manufactures, the observance of justice, the eradication of “untruth and burden” in tax collection and recruiting, and the protection of the security of the country’s borders and the integrity of its territory. All this taken together was supposed to ensure an increase in the “well-being” of the subjects, their life “in peace.”

Class division of Russia under Peter 1

In Peter's time, the entire population of the country was sharply divided into two categories - tax-paying and privileged, each of which consisted of classes. The tax-paying population included peasants and townspeople, and the privileged population included nobles and clergy. Life in the “carefree” life of each class was filled with a special content, which determined social inequality in advance: the “carefree” life of a serf peasant developed completely differently than the “carefree” life of a nobleman.

Under Peter, the class structure of feudal society remained the same as under his predecessors, but the content of class responsibilities changed. Innovations, to briefly define their essence, consisted of an increase and expansion of duties in favor of the state. They affected all classes, including the privileged nobility. There is no need to prove that the burden of state duties affected the fate of the peasant, merchant, nobleman and monk differently.

In the class hierarchy, peasants occupied the lowest level. The hardships of war, the construction of industry, the construction of fortresses and cities, and the maintenance of the state apparatus fell primarily on the shoulders of the peasants. New ones were added to the previously existing taxes and duties - conscription, mobilization for construction work, numerous taxes special purpose(ship, dragoon, ammunition, saddle, clamp, etc.). Submarine conscription was considered especially burdensome - the need to supply carts for transporting goods and recruits to the theater of military operations, as well as permanent conscription - the obligation to provide recruits not only with accommodation, but also with food.

The interests of the “state” demanded that the peasant economy not be completely undermined by landowner duties. It was precisely this consideration that guided Peter when he prepared the order “On the care of farmers,” which says that farmers “are the essence of the artery of the state, and just as through the artery (that is, a large vein) the whole human body is nourished, so the state is the last, for which it must to take care of them and not burden them beyond measure, but more importantly to protect them from all attacks and destruction, and especially to those serving people to deal decently with them.” The peasant was seen here primarily as a serviceable taxpayer and supplier of recruits. A farmer, ruined by exorbitant taxes, cannot fulfill these main duties, and therefore will cease to be the artery of the state, ensuring its viability.

This idea also permeates other decrees of Peter, which to one degree or another affect the peasant issue. Peter, for example, obliged the governor to identify which of the landowners was ruining their estates by collecting exorbitant duties from the peasants. They should have been reported to the Senate so that it would transfer these estates to the management of other persons - relatives of the ruinous landowner.

The repeatedly issued decrees to search for fugitives and return them to their former owners ultimately also pursued the interests not of the individual landowner, but of the state, that is, the landowner class as a whole. The flight of the peasants was a form of their protest. Accompanied by a spontaneous redistribution of peasants among landowners, it caused direct damage to the state, as well as to the peasants who remained in their previous places of residence; The government demanded from them the payment of taxes and the supply of recruits, including those for fugitives. As a result, arrears grew and the number of unsupplied recruits increased. That is why the government waged a merciless fight against the fugitives.

Thus, the “common good” in relation to the peasant meant the preservation of his ability to fulfill the entire complex of state duties of the noble-bureaucratic state. This goal was pursued by the legislation, when to some extent it “protected” the peasant both from the ruinous landowner and from the abuses of the local administration. Only a single decree is known, dictated by the protection of the interests of the peasants themselves, but even that was of a recommendatory nature. The Tsar appealed to the conscience of the small-scale nobles who sold children from their parents “like cattle,” as a result of which “there is a lot of outcry.” Peter indicated that “this sale to people should be stopped,” but immediately made a reservation: “...and if it is impossible to completely stop it, then at least out of need they sold it to whole families or families, and not separately.”

The content of the “common good” is interpreted somewhat differently in relation to the urban population. Townspeople, like peasants, were taxpayers and suppliers of recruits, but townspeople, in addition, provided the treasury with additional income in the form of duties from trade and crafts. Hence Peter’s concerns, rooted in the past, about the development of trade and merchants.

Peter's father, Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich, considered developed trade to be the basis for the prosperity of the state and therefore patronized the merchant class. Peter considered trade a necessary branch of the economy, but by no means decisive. Studying the experience of other states, Peter believed that these states “prosper and grow rich” from the development of “merchants and all kinds of artists and handicrafts.” “Artists and handicrafts” in those days meant crafts and manufacturing. The “service” of townspeople in manufacturing was one of their new responsibilities generated by the time of transformation. Peter did not hesitate to take coercive measures to involve merchants in large-scale industry. “They won’t want to, although they will be in captivity” - this is how the idea of ​​​​transferring to private individuals a state-owned enterprise that produced cloth was expressed laconically. The expediency of the compulsory measure was dictated by the desire “to avoid buying an overseas uniform in five years.” The merchants, “who were assigned to that cloth factory as a company,” had to be taken to Moscow “in captivity” by specially sent soldiers.

The “common benefit” of the townspeople was thus closely intertwined with the interests of the noble state. The greater the prosperity of the merchant and industrialist, the greater his trade turnover, the larger his industrial economy. But the richer the merchant, the more diverse the areas of application of his capital, the more income he brings to the state.

Ultimately, the “well-being” of a city dweller depended on what share of his income the state seized for its own benefit.

Practice has revealed an insoluble contradiction between the “carelessness” of the townspeople and the growing needs of the state for money needed to wage war, build a fleet, and build cities and fortresses. Under these conditions, the “interests” of the merchant and industrialist were sacrificed to the state. It has been established that for about two decades of the new century, Peter did not spare the merchants and numerous extortions and duties in favor of the state ruined many of them. Only six or seven years before his death, the tsar awarded industrialists a number of important benefits and privileges that contributed to the growth of manufactories. These include granting large industrialists the right to trade duty-free products of their enterprises and to buy serfs into factories. The courtyards of the owners of manufactories, in addition, were exempted from the billets of military commands and submarine duty. It goes without saying that only an insignificant part of the urban population could take advantage of the listed privileges. “Carelessness” for the rest of the townspeople meant their fulfillment of their duties, their ability to safeguard the state interest.

Changes in the position of the clergy and monasteries under Peter 1

The idea of ​​state interest also penetrated into the monastic cell, radically changing the entire way of monastic life. The well-fed and idle life of the “royal pilgrims,” as the black clergy was called in those days, and the splendor of the church were ensured by the labor of the monastery peasants. Monastic estates have long been the subject of attacks by the state and landowners, and the life of the inhabitants of the cells, far from Christian ideals, was subjected to severe criticism. However, practical steps did not go further than measures that limited the growth of monastic land ownership and denunciations of the immoral behavior of monks. Peter forced the black clergy to serve the state interest. It is enough to compare two personal decrees, separated from each other by almost a quarter of a century, to reveal Peter’s stable attitude towards the living conditions of the monastic brethren. In a decree of 1701, he set as an example the ancient monks, who “with their own industrious hands, produced food for themselves and lived a communal life, and fed many beggars with their own hands.” Today’s monks, the king reasoned, “have consumed their own alien labors, and the early monks have fallen into many luxuries.” In the decree of 1724, Peter also believed that most of the monks “are parasites,” because they lead an idle life and care only about themselves, while before they were tonsured they were “three-feders: that is, to their home, the state and the landowner.”

Monasteries were first forbidden to buy and exchange land, and then they were deprived of the right to dispose of income from estates, monastics were put on meager rations, the same for rulers and ordinary brethren, they were forbidden to keep paper and ink in their cells. “For the eternal and temporal benefit of people,” monks and nuns had to engage in “arts”: carpentry, icon painting, spinning, sewing, lace weaving and other things “that are not contrary to monasticism.” The main innovation was that the monasteries were obliged to support crippled and decrepit soldiers and officers, as well as schools, from their income. Introducing these innovations, Peter reasoned: “Our monks have become fat. The gates to heaven are faith, fasting and prayer. I will clear their path to heaven with bread and water, and not with sterlets and wine.”

The meaning of the changes in the way of life of the monastic brethren and in the economic activities of the monasteries was to use monastic income for the needs of the state. Life in the “carelessness” of the black clergy meant, as we see, a real deterioration in its position. No wonder this clergy did not accept the reforms and condemned the activities of Peter.

The position of the white clergy also changed. Parish priests could not successfully fulfill the role of spiritual shepherds, being in darkness and ignorance. Hence the decrees that ordered the children of priests and deacons to study in Greek and Latin schools, as well as the prohibition for uneducated children to take “father’s places.” One of the decrees even provided for forced education: “And those who do not want to be in teaching, forcefully take them into schools, and teach them in the hope of a better priesthood.”

It is characteristic that Peter expanded the responsibilities of the nobility.

In the time of Peter, the idle life of nobles in estates was replaced by dangerous service in regiments and on ships located in the theater of war, where they had to storm fortresses and participate in battles with the superbly trained army of the Swedish king. The nobleman had to put on an officer’s uniform and carry out hectic service in the barracks and offices, which he considered as burdensome as it was ruinous, because the manor’s household was left unattended.

Many nobles sought to evade service, as well as from fulfilling another duty introduced by Peter - the duty to study.

The educational institutions organized by Peter resembled barracks, and the students resembled recruits. The contingent of students in schools and academies that graduated highly qualified specialists was recruited from the nobility forcibly. Referring to the Maritime Academy, a contemporary noted that “in vast Russia there was not a single noble family that would not undertake to send a son or other relative from 10 to 18 years of age to this academy.” In the instructions for the Naval Academy, established in 1715, there is a paragraph written by Peter himself: “To calm the shouting and disorder, select retired good soldiers from the guard and be one of them in each chamber during the training, have a whip in their hands; and if any of them the students will become outrageous, they will be beaten, regardless of what their surname is, under severe punishment, whoever beckons,” that is, makes an indulgence.

An unknown author left a story about how the noble minors, in order to avoid studying at the Navigation School, where they were assigned, entered the Spassky Monastery. However, they failed to stay in the monastery. When Peter found out about their act, he ordered them all to beat piles on the Moika River, where hemp barns were being built. Such nobles as Menshikov and Apraksin tried in vain to persuade the tsar to reverse his decision. Then Apraksin, calculating the time when Peter would pass by the construction, took off his caftan, hung it on a pole so that it would be visible, and began to beat piles. Peter noticed the admiral working and asked: “Why are you hitting piles?” He replied: “My nephews and grandchildren are building piles, but what kind of person am I, what advantage do I have in my relationship?” After the described episode, the minors were sent abroad for training.

This story can hardly be classified as fictitious or overgrown with legendary details. Peter really was constantly interested in the education of the noble minors, delved into all the details of their distribution to educational institutions and monitored their success in mastering the program.

Business trips abroad under Peter 1

The sending of noble minors abroad was widespread. At first, young people mastered mainly navigation, shipbuilding, and military affairs. Over time, they began to study architecture, painting, park design, oriental languages, etc. abroad. The Tsar highly valued the successes of those who showed diligence. In April 1716, Peter met painters who were heading to Italy to improve their skills. This is what he wrote about this to Catherine in Danzig: “I came across Beklemishev and the painter Ivan. And when they come to you, ask the king to tell him to write off his person, as well as others, whatever you want.” Peter ends the letter with words expressing pride in the fact that among the Russian people there were painters who possessed high skill: “so that they know that there are good masters from among our people.” “The Painter Ivan” is Ivan Nikitin, the son of a priest, a talented portrait painter who skillfully wielded a brush even before his trip to Italy.

Studying abroad was considered difficult and sometimes entailed material deprivation. Staying in a foreign land was complicated by lack of knowledge of the language. Hence the attempts to quickly leave for their homeland, which the tsar severely suppressed.

One of the volunteers, Ivan Mikhailovich Golovin, after a four-year stay in Italy to study shipbuilding and Italian language returned to his homeland and appeared before the king-examiner. The answers revealed complete ignorance of the subject. “Have you even learned Italian?” - asked the king. Golovin admitted that he did not succeed here either. "So what did you do?" - the king asked. “I smoked tobacco, drank wine, had fun, studied music and rarely left the yard,” the volunteer answered candidly.

Apparently, hoping for the intercession of his brother field marshal, Vasily Petrovich Sheremetev disobeyed Peter’s command, which forbade volunteers to get married, and, instead of equipping his son for a long journey, arranged a wedding. The Tsar sternly reminded that the decree must be observed by both the field marshal's brother and his nephew. Here is the order in connection with this incident that Tikhon Nikitich Streshnev received in 1709: “immediately send Vasily’s son on the proper path and do not give him more than a week’s time; and he, Vasily, for that guilt, having taken away his rank, went to work as a policeman, and his wife evo - to a spinning house; and to seal the Moscow and country yards, and so that they work directly like simple ones."

On the contrary, the tsar experienced genuine joy when one of the noble minors himself showed interest in science, especially naval science. Nikita Zotov's son Konon decided to enlist in the navy, about which he wrote a letter to his father, the contents of which became known to the tsar. Peter hastened to support Konon’s intentions, sending him the following message: “Yesterday I saw a letter from your father, written from you to him, in which the meaning (that is, the meaning) is that you will be trained in the service that belongs to the sea. Which is your desire We very kindly accepted and can say that we have not heard such a petition from a single person from the Russians, in which you were the first to appear, since it very rarely happens that one of the young, leaving fun in the company, would of his own free will want to listen to the noise of the sea. In other matters, we wish you that the Lord God may bless you in this (extremely significant and almost the first in the world revered) deed and happily return you to your fatherland in due time.”

Domestic schools and the education of students abroad have changed year after year National composition military and civilian specialists of the country. The number of students in educational institutions was quite significant by the standards of that time. The staff of the Navigation School provided for the education of 500 students. This set was achieved in 1705. 300 people studied at the Naval Academy, 400 - 150 people studied at the Engineering School, several dozen people studied medicine at a special medical school. In Uraya, the children of artisans studied mining in mining schools.

Created network educational institutions made it possible to free the officer corps from foreigners. After the Prut campaign, Peter dismissed over 200 foreign generals and officers. Their number in the regiments should not exceed a third of the officers. After three years, foreign officers were subjected to an examination, and all those who failed were subject to dismissal. As a result, in the 1920s, nine-tenths of the officer corps consisted of Russian officers.

The ingenuity of the nobles, who sought to evade training, and especially from service, knew no bounds, but Peter did not remain in debt, inventing various punishments for such nobles. Among the profit-makers, informers appeared who specialized in identifying infidels—the so-called nobles who were hiding from inspections and service. Peter encouraged the activity of informers with a promise to give the property and villages of the netchik to the one who exposed him. The tsar promulgated the first decree with such a promise in 1711. Subsequently, the king periodically repeated this, and seduced any informer with “his belongings and villages,” “no matter how low his rank, or even his servant.”

One-off punitive measures against individual nobles and groups of nobles gave way to a series of decrees issued in 1714. They should, according to Peter, cause significant changes in the social appearance of the ruling class.

Why catch individual netchik nobles? - Peter reasoned. It is much easier to create such conditions for them that they themselves would strive to take a place in the barracks and offices. The main hope of stimulating the interest of the nobles in the service rested on the Decree on Single Inheritance. This is perhaps the first decree of Peter, the promulgation of which was preceded by a study of the procedures for inheriting property by other nobles countries. At the same time, this is undoubtedly the first decree that marked the beginning of the tsar’s work “with a pen.”

A nobleman, as written in the decree, is obliged to serve “for the benefit of the state.” For this purpose, a procedure was introduced for the inheritance of immovable estates, entirely transferred to only one son. The remaining sons, finding themselves without estates and, therefore, without means of subsistence, had to “seek their own bread through service, teaching, trading, and other things.”

The decree on single inheritance was supported by other acts that pursued the same goal. One of them forbade marriage to noble minors who had not mastered the elements of numbers and geometry. Another did not allow nobles who did not serve as privates in the guards regiments to be promoted to officers. Still others were allowed to acquire estates only after seven years in the military, or 10 years in the civil service, or after 15 years in trade. Those who did not serve or trade anywhere were forbidden to buy villages, “even to death.”

Peter used another means to attract nobles to serve. He periodically arranged reviews for them. Sometimes certain groups of nobles were called in for this purpose. So, in 1713, a review was appointed for the netchiks, that is, nobles who did not appear for service in the two previous years. In 1714, minors aged 13 years and above were called to the inspection. The two reviews were of a general nature; all nobles were required to appear at them, regardless of age and position. The first of them - no documents have survived about it - took place in 1715. Another was carried out in 1721 - 1722 and left behind a lot of monotonous questionnaires about each nobleman, which have not yet been studied.

The reviews identified nobles who stubbornly evaded service, and significantly changed the careers of those representatives of the privileged class who were distinguished by their diligence and abilities. During the reviews, underage children were also taken into account: some were assigned to schools and sent to study abroad, others were assigned to the regiments where they served.

However, even Peter was unable to force all the nobles to serve and study. Their abundance testifies to the non-compliance with the royal decrees. The issuance of a new decree, repeating threats to netchiks, indicates that the previous decree of similar content was not implemented.

In 1715, a certain Mikhail Brenchaninov reported to the Tsar about the Yaroslavl landowner Sergei Borzov, who, although younger than 30 years old, “was a shelterer in his house, but did not serve in your, the sovereign’s, service with the regiment.” The king’s resolution followed: “If less than 30 years, then for such contempt of the decree, give everything to this informer.”

The famous publicist of Peter the Great's time, Ivan Tikhonovich Pososhkov, met “many, many healthy young men,” each of whom “could have driven five enemies alone,” but instead of serving in the army, taking advantage of the patronage of influential relatives, they found lucrative positions in the civil administration and “live with bait business." Pososhkov portrayed the colorful figure of the nobleman Fyodor Pustoshkin, who “has already grown old, but has never been in any service.” He bought himself out of service with rich gifts or pretended to be a holy fool. However, as soon as the messenger left the outskirts of the estate, Pustoshkin “will put aside his foolishness and, having arrived home, like a lion roars.”

The above allows us to reveal the concept of “common good” in its two meanings: the way it seemed to Peter, and the way it really was.

Peter proceeded from the idea that harmony and “prosperity” would come when each of his subjects unconditionally fulfilled the duties assigned to him. Only then are successes in trade and industry possible, the observance of justice, and the relief of the people from all burdens and obligations. The “common good” is ultimately the ability of subjects to serve the state.

But the fact of the matter is that the theorists of the “common good,” including Peter, took the social inequality that existed at that time as their starting point. It came into conflict with idyllic ideas about general prosperity.

The peasant, serving the state, had to cultivate arable land, pay taxes, supply recruits, and bear duties in favor of the landowners. The peasant's service to the state of Peter was accompanied by increasing hardships. Although the service of a nobleman became more burdensome, it ultimately brought him additional income: in addition to the corvée and quitrents he received from the peasants, a cash salary paid by the state was added. Let us recall that the revenue side of the state budget was largely provided by taxes levied on the same peasants and urban artisans.

It is clear that under these conditions the “common good” was a fiction. Only the nobles and the richest part of the merchant class took advantage of its fruits.

Under Peter's successors, the nobles were gradually freed from the duties that Peter had imposed on them. The systematic onslaught of purely class noble interests on the “state interest” under Catherine II culminated in the famous manifestos of the noble “Mother Empress” “On the granting of freedom to the Russian nobility” and “Charter granted to the nobility,” which turned the nobles into a parasitic class. It was in the new conditions, when the noble minors were freed from the obligation to serve and study, that the character of Fonvizin’s comedy, Mitrofanushka, could appear.