Now let's look at three options for the level of battles and figure out when and what tactics are best to use

I admit, I have never looked forward to seeing any museum exhibit so impatiently. And the point is not that the T-28 is a kind of monument to the era of the First World War and Tukhachevsky’s foolishness at the same time. This, unlike its heavy multi-turret brother T-35, is a tank that could actually fight and did fight.

And if the T-35 (which we’ll talk/see later) looks like a monument to engineering madness, then for some reason I don’t want to talk about the T-28 after the first acquaintance. Just a tank, although quite large.

By the summer of 1941, the T-28 was considered hopelessly outdated. I would agree, but only with regard to the multi-turret layout. Yes, if you take the T-34, it’s like a racing car next to a bus. The T-28 was rather inactive and, accordingly, did not differ in maneuverability.

The same applies to German competitors. The German medium tank of that time, the Pz.Kpfw III, had complete superiority in speed and maneuver. And this was quite natural; in comparison, the T-28 was monstrously long. His L/B ratio (the length of the supporting surface to the track width) was 2.04, while the German’s was 1.2 (for the T-34 it was 1.5). Namely, this ratio is very important: the smaller it is, the higher the maneuverability of the combat vehicle.

But in terms of armor and weapons, the T-28 could say “Hello!” any German medium tank, except perhaps the Panther. The L-10 gun (as well as the KT-28) could quite normally hit Wehrmacht tanks from a safe distance.

Strange conclusions arise. If the T-28 was so good (and it was not bad, believe me), and this is not just my opinion, then what is the problem? Why did the T-28's career end in the first months of the war?

First of all, if you look closely at the T-28, you need to do this within the general context. At that time, the tank units of the Red Army still did not have dedicated units equipped with medium tanks. Medium tanks were seen as a method of strengthening conventional tank units, nothing more.

And by June 1941, if we take it specifically, in addition to the shortage of material, tank units were a rather terrible cocktail of different types of vehicles, both new and old.

As an example, we can take the 6th Tank Regiment of the 3rd Tank Division, described in various sources, which had one battalion with the T-28, another with the BT-7, and a third with the T-26. And somewhere instead of the T-28 there could be a KV-2 or T-34.

What's the point? But the point is that when receiving a combat mission, starting from June 22, 1941, leapfrog began. BT-7 and T-34 went ahead, the rest lagged behind. The authorities shouted and demanded efficiency, the mechanic drivers burned engines and tore boxes.

Plus the already mentioned slowness and size of the T-28. And Luftwaffe air supremacy. Could a Ju-87 dive bomber, famous for its accuracy, land a bomb on a hefty, slow, and not heavily armored target? Of course he could. That's what the Luftwaffe pilots did.

I think that there was another frankly... sabotage, or something, postulate. This is the Battle Manual of the Red Army's armored forces. This document provided for only one type of combat - attack.

So the tankers of 1941 attacked, without betraying their oath and military duty. They attacked, often carrying out meaningless orders that did not correspond to the situation, under bombs and targeted enemy artillery fire.

Will anyone be surprised that out of 503 cars produced, three have survived to this day?

By the way, did the specimen we were able to visit become a monument only recently? This tank was used as a bunker on the Karelian front, where it slowly rusted. However, they took it out and brought it to Verkhnyaya Pyshma, where it was restored to running condition.

True, unfortunately, we will not be able to please you with a picture of demonstrating the running capabilities of the T-28. The tank stood and rattled while warming up, but suddenly stalled and refused to start. Well, what can I say... grandpa got capricious. Happens.

“Proof” that the tank is still capable. But - capricious, there is a little

In addition to this tank, there is also a model of the T-28 tank with a KT-28 cannon in the Central Museum of the Armed Forces in Moscow and a T-28E with screen-reinforced armor, with an L-10 cannon - in the tank museum in Parola in Finland.

T-28 from the Moscow Museum of the Armed Forces. Well, not very much compared to Pyshminsky

Let's talk about creation.

T-28 is the first mass-produced Soviet medium tank. Developed in 1930-1932 by engineers of the tank-tractor design bureau of the VoAO under the leadership of S. A. Ginzburg.

He took part in the Polish campaign, the Soviet-Finnish war and in the initial period of the Great Patriotic War.

The vast majority of the vehicles were lost in June-July 1941, but tanks were used on the Leningrad and Karelian fronts until 1944. The last combat use of the T-28 by units of the Red Army was recorded in 1944.

The history of the T-28 began in 1930, when the Soviet purchasing commission headed by S. A. Ginzburg arrived in Great Britain, whose task was to acquire the most modern types of armored vehicles and send them to the USSR for study and use in organizing their own armored tank production.

Ours were very interested in the Vickers A6 medium tank, better known as the Vickers 16-ton tank.

However, the Vickers company refused to sell the finished model of the tank due to its secrecy and put forward not the most convenient conditions for the acquisition to the Soviet side.

1. A one-time payment of 20,000 pounds sterling (about 200,000 rubles in gold) for familiarization with the design and development of tanks of this type.

2. Order from Vickers 10 tanks of this type at a price of 16 thousand pounds sterling (160 thousand rubles in gold) per tank without weapons.

Too much (from our point of view) was obvious, so it was decided to send the British to hell and build a new tank based on the information already received about the Vickers A6.

The design of the new tank was made by the design bureau of the VOAO, the main developers of which were the head of the bureau S. Ginzburg, his deputy V. Zaslavsky and design engineers O. Ivanov and A. Gakkel.

The design of the tank used both the data obtained during the study of the A6 and the experience accumulated by the designers during Soviet-German cooperation in the early 1930s (in particular, the development of the TG tank and testing of German tanks at a training ground near Kazan).

By the way, the idea of ​​multi-turreted tanks was not only in British and Soviet heads.

German and French brothers T-28.

According to the project, the tank was supposed to weigh about 16 tons and be armed with a 45-mm cannon and a machine gun in the main turret and two more machine guns in the small ones. The tank's armor was supposed to be 20 mm in the frontal part of the hull and 16-17 mm on other vertical surfaces, the thickness of the roof armor plates was 10 mm, the bottom was 8 mm.

As power plant the M-5 aircraft engine with a power of 400 hp was chosen. s., already installed on BT-2 tanks. The design was also supposed to widely use other components and design solutions of the BT-2 and T-26 already in production.

T-28 prototype

Production was organized at the Leningrad plant "Krasny Putilovets". It is worth paying attention to this point. The T-28, as an object of mass production, was a very complex machine, and Krasny Putilovets had sufficient production capacity and qualified personnel to master its production.

However, problems began almost immediately. The equipment of the MX-2 workshop, allocated for the production of the T-28, was badly worn out and poorly suited for the manufacture of tank parts that required a high standard of production. To overcome this problem, machine tools from the First World War were reactivated, modernized and put into operation; moreover, the machines were brought to the plant from other factories in Leningrad.

The organization of production of the T-28 was personally supervised by S. M. Kirov.

The first batch of 12 tanks was ready by April 1933, and already on May 1, 10 of them marched in a parade along Red Square in Moscow.

True, these tanks were accepted conditionally, since, in general, they were running models. They did not have optical sights, external or internal communication devices, and much more. So after the parade the tanks went back to the factory.

Serial production of the tank was carried out for eight years, from 1933 to 1940.

The tank hull is box-shaped, completely welded (from homogeneous armor) or riveted-welded (from cemented armor). Tanks produced in late 1936 - early 1938 and 1939-1940 had riveted-welded hulls; in other years, tanks with fully welded hulls were produced.

Functionally, the corps was divided into four sections: control, combat, power and power transmission sections. The fighting compartment was separated from the engine compartment by a partition with a hatch for access to the engine.

The vertical walls of the upper part of the driver's cabin were welded from above to the front inclined sheet between the machine-gun turrets. The front of the cabin was covered with a folding armored door with a hatch that opened upwards. The hatch had a viewing slot closed with triplex. The top of the cabin was closed by another hatch, which made it easier for the driver to get in. During Winter War On some tanks, the driver's front door was reinforced with an additional 20-mm armor plate, and a fence was welded around the cabin itself to protect the door from getting jammed by shell fragments during shelling.

On both sides of the hull, opposite the fighting compartment, there were boxes for smoke exhaust devices. On tanks different years release boxes differed in configuration. To access the smoke exhaust devices from inside the fighting compartment, there were two round holes in the sides of the hull.

Like the hulls, the main towers were produced in two types - welded and riveted-welded. The design of the main turret was identical to the main turret of the T-35 heavy tank.

The turret had an elliptical shape with a developed aft niche and was assembled from rolled armor plates 15-20 mm thick. The roof of the tower was reinforced with stiffening ribs made in the form of stampings in the form of a large star and two stripes with rounded edges.

Initially, there was one rectangular hatch in the turret roof, which was replaced in 1936 by two - a round gunner's hatch mounted under an anti-aircraft turret and a rectangular commander's hatch. In the front part of the turret roof there were two holes for periscopic devices, protected by armored caps, in the rear part on the right there was an antenna input hole.

On the outside of the tower, along the sides, a handrail antenna is mounted on eight brackets. On the right and left walls of the tower there were viewing slots, closed with triplexes, and under them there were embrasures for firing from personal weapons, closed with armored valves.

For the convenience of the crew, the main turret was equipped with a suspended floor, raised above the bottom of the hull and secured to the turret ring with four brackets. It is possible to penetrate from the driver's position at a certain angle of rotation of the turret. To be honest, I didn’t make it through.

To the right and left of the gun were high seats for the commander and gunner (respectively), which had rotating drum-type ammunition racks on their racks for 6 shells each. Between the seats, with a shift to the front of the turret, a rack for 8 shells was installed (on tanks of the first series - for 12 shells) and six magazines for machine guns. A folding seat for the radio operator (aka loader) was hinged on the rear pillar of the suspended floor.

The tower had a circular rotation. The turret rotation mechanism was equipped with electric and manual drives.

The small machine gun turrets were also identical in design to the T-35 machine gun turrets (the only difference was the absence of eye rings on the T-28 turrets).

Both towers were identical in design, round, with a protrusion in the front for a ball-mounted machine gun, and differed only in the placement of viewing slots and embrasures for firing from personal weapons. The towers were armed with one DT machine gun. The turret rotation drive is manual. Each turret could rotate from the stop against the wall of the driver's cabin to the stop against the wall of the tank hull, and the horizontal angle of fire of the machine gun was 165°. The shooter was placed on a swivel seat of adjustable height, mounted on the bottom of the hull. For landing the shooter in the roof of the tower there was one large rectangular hatch with a rounded top.

To be honest, the small towers made a depressing impression on me. For some reason they are separated from the fighting compartment by an armor plate, and it turns out that the shooters are left to their own devices in battle. Yes, theoretically, the tank has a communication system between the crew, but let’s honestly admit where there was communication in the Red Army in 1932. Yes, she was not there at all.

Driver's place. without any frills or luxury, but even a boar like the author could fit in there quite normally.

Performance characteristics of the T-28 medium tank

Combat weight, t: 25.4
Crew, people: 6
Number issued, pcs: 503

Dimensions:
Case length, mm: 7370
Width, mm: 2870
Height, mm: 2625
Ground clearance, mm: 500

Booking
Armor type: rolled homogeneous steel
Body forehead (top), mm: 30
Body forehead (middle), mm: 15
Body forehead (bottom), mm: 30
Hull side, mm: 20+10 (screen)
Hull stern, mm: 18-20
Bottom, mm: 15-18
Tower forehead, mm: 20
Gun mantlet, mm: 20

Armament
Guns: 76.2 mm KT-28 mod. 1927/32 / 76.2 mm L-10 (since 1939)
Gun ammunition: 69

Machine guns: 4-5 × 7.62 mm DT
Ammunition: 1200 rounds

Mobility
Engine: V-shaped 12-cylinder carburetor liquid cooling M-17T
Engine power, l. s: 450
Highway speed, km/h: 42
Speed ​​over rough terrain, km/h: 20-25
Cruising range on the highway, km: 180-190
Cruising range over rough terrain, km: 120-140

Climbability, degrees: 37
Wall to be overcome, m: 1.0
Ditch to be overcome, m: 3.5
Fordability, m: 1.0

In the end, you know, it was not in vain that I sought a meeting with the T-28. This is a car that does not cause rejection or any misunderstanding. Especially when you look at it after studying history. This is not the worst tank of the first half of the 20th century. Created almost from scratch. Our designers and engineers.

And the fact that the T-28 could not earn fame... Well, this is not given to everyone.

Superheavy Tank T28

Main characteristics

Briefly

Details

6.7 / 6.3 / 6.7 BR

4 people Crew

110% Visibility

forehead / side / stern Booking

305 / 50 / 50 housings

305 / 63 / 50 towers

Mobility

59.4 tons Weight

954 l/s 500 l/s Engine power

16 hp/t 8 hp/t specific

13 km/h forward
4 km/h back12 km/h forward
4 km/h back Speed

Armament

62 rounds of ammunition

15.4 / 20.0 sec recharge

5° / 19° UVN

10° / 11° UGN

1,000 rounds of ammunition

8.0 / 10.4 sec recharge

200 shells clip size

577 rounds/min rate of fire

10° / 70° UVN

140° / 140° UGN

Economy

Description

In September 1943, a program was begun to create a new heavy tank for assaulting fortifications in Europe, such as the German West Wall. The requirements were very high: 305 mm frontal armor, a 105 mm T5E1 long-barreled gun to combat concrete fortifications, and a weight of no more than 95 tons. The result was a super-heavy 86-ton turretless assault tank, called the T28. Due to the workload of the military industry, two experimental prototypes never made it to the war.

Taking into account the turretless layout, on February 7, the T28 assault was renamed the T95 self-propelled artillery mount. In the post-war period, the T95 did not fit into the concept of armored weapons, according to which anti-tank self-propelled guns should be light in weight and as mobile as possible. In June 1946, the T95 was again renamed T28, but as a heavy tank it did not suit the military due to the lack of a turret, low mobility and excessive weight, so the program was closed.

In other words, T28 and T95 are two names for the same tank, approved in different time, therefore, in articles and books, the indices T28/T95 or T28 (T95) are often used. In the game, different indices are used to distinguish configuration options: T95 with side screens and two pairs of tracks, and T28 without them. This is nothing more than a convention adopted for convenience.

Main characteristics

Armor protection and survivability

Excellent forehead armor is the main advantage of the T28. Not a single classmate is able to penetrate a 305-mm cast frontal armored part of a complex shape with an armor-piercing projectile. The armor of the gun mantlet is also impressive - 292 mm, while it partially covers the front armor part, so in some places the total thickness reaches a record 597 mm! The lower frontal part, 133 mm thick, is located at a significant angle of inclination, so it cannot be called a weak point.

305 mm armor at right angles is vulnerable to sub-caliber and cumulative shells from top post-war tanks, as well as ATGMs.

Turrets for the commander and driver. The given thickness is about 120 mm, the most vulnerable places are in the frontal projection. They perfectly catch armor-piercing chamber and high-explosive shells, which, when exploded, rain down fragments on the crew and ammunition racks.

Still, the T28 can be easily destroyed in a head-on encounter. The turrets of the commander and driver are easily penetrated by armor-piercing chamber shells even on Tigers, not to mention the IS-2. When a shell explodes inside the turrets, fragments fly in all directions and hit the crew and ammunition racks, so if you're lucky, the T28 can be destroyed with just one hit. The thickness of the hull roof is 38 mm, so large-caliber land mines KV-2 (1939), SU-152, SU-100Y or IS-2 easily break through the roof, exploding on the turrets.

If the T28 ends up in tanks such as the SU-122-54 or Jagdpanzer 4-5, then you can forget about armor altogether: post-war sub-caliber and cumulative shells with a penetration of 320-400 mm pierce the frontal armored part right through. The Strv 81 also easily penetrates the T28 head-on with its ATGMs. However, most T28 does not see post-war tanks with BR 7.7-8.0 in battles.

This is how the T28 looks at trying to go over 13 km/h

Mobility

Mobility is the T28's biggest problem. The maximum speed is only 12.8 km/h, so during an attack the assault tank always crawls behind everyone else. The reverse speed is also not impressive - only 4 km/h, but the maneuverability is surprising. On the other hand, taking into account the significant weight, weak engine and length of the tracks, the T28 turns quite quickly almost on the spot. A 500-horsepower engine is clearly not enough for a 59-ton vehicle, and the specific ground pressure without a second pair of tracks is high, so driving on poor soils and terrain with elevation changes should be avoided.

Armament

Main weapon

The main armament of the assault tank is a long-barreled 105 mm T5E1 cannon. In the game it evokes conflicting feelings. On the one hand, the gun has excellent armor penetration with both sub-caliber and armor-piercing shells, as well as convenient ballistics and good horizontal aiming angles. On the other hand, due to separate-case loading and one loader, reloading on average is about 17 seconds, so you need to aim carefully and without unnecessary haste, fortunately, the armor allows this.

The following projectiles are available:

• Armor-piercing blunt-headed solid T32, penetration 248/218/190 mm at a distance of 100/500/1000 meters. They have average armor damage and excellent armor penetration. For lack of anything better, it has to be used as the main projectile.
• Armor-piercing chamber projectile with armor-piercing tip and ballistic cap T13 In terms of armor penetration at short distances it is inferior to a blunt-headed solid projectile, but it is more effective at medium and long distances. The most important plus is the explosive charge, equivalent to 177 grams of TNT.
• Armor-piercing sub-caliber T29E3, penetration 310/285/251 mm at a distance of 100/500/1000 meters. Excellent armor penetration, which allows you to pierce the forehead of the same T28 into a 305-mm armored part at point-blank range! True, with inclined armor, armor penetration drops sharply at all distances, which does not allow one to confidently penetrate heavy tanks with rational armor angles.
• High explosive T30E1, weight 15 kg, penetration 17 mm. Taking into account the armored roofs of the main rivals' hulls, armor penetration is completely insufficient.

It makes sense to take T13 armor-piercing chamber shells into battle as the main ammunition and 10-15 T29E3 sub-caliber shells just in case. There is no point in using high-explosive fragmentation shells, since they are useless against tanks, and lightly armored self-propelled guns are much more convenient to destroy with the help of the excellent Browning M2 heavy machine gun, which, thanks to its significant aiming angles, is even capable of shooting down airplanes.

Machine gun weapons

Directional and anti-aircraft machine guns not only allow you to fight aircraft, they are also effective against lightly armored vehicles. Evaluate machine gun weapons and give recommendations for their use.

Use in combat

The main problem of the T28 in combat is the sides, covered with 50-mm armor plates, immediately behind which fuel tanks and ammunition racks are located along the entire length. As a result, even a self-propelled gun can easily destroy a T28 when boarding, especially since it is simply impossible to miss a huge silhouette crawling at a snail’s speed. Due to the dense layout and crew of 4, any penetration of the fighting compartment armor is fatal. Even if the T28 survives, the assault tank with a powerful cannon and heavy-duty frontal armor will turn into a useless invalid. Hence the first rule: always expose only frontal armor to the enemy.

Another problem that makes itself felt is the two vulnerable turrets of the commander and the driver. At close ranges you can easily hit them if the T28 is facing the enemy. Indeed, why try in vain to penetrate a 305-mm frontal armored piece, when even a Tiger H1 can penetrate a turret, kill a driver and drive around an immobilized assault tank? Not only does the crew suffer greatly due to this vulnerability, but also due to the rain of fragments from exploding chamber warheads, the ammunition racks on the sides explode. In the worst case, the shell ricochets directly into the floor of the fighting compartment, turning the crew into mincemeat. The second rule of driving T28: while reloading, you should constantly turn left and right at a small angle to make it more difficult for the enemy to hit the turrets. Fortunately, the T28 spins almost in place.

Destroying a T28 head-on

Tactics

There are two ways to use the T28 in combat, and each of them has its own advantages and disadvantages:

• Long distance sniping. The T28 takes a position in open areas and uses excellent ballistics and armor penetration to shoot enemies from afar. It is almost impossible for enemy tanks to hit the turrets, especially if the T28 is constantly moving while reloading. The advantages of the tactic are obvious: the ability to safely destroy the enemy, taking advantage of the strengths of the weapon. The drawback is no less obvious: T28 does not affect the outcome of the battle at all. If the enemy captures all points, T28 will not have time to crawl and the battle will be lost.
• The T28 can be used not only as a self-propelled gun for shooting at long distances from ambushes, but also for its intended purpose as an assault tank, for which this vehicle was originally conceived. City maps such as Poland and Rhine Crossing are best suited for melee tactics. The driver of the T28 chooses a route in such a way that the sides are covered by buildings, and the allied tanks would protect against enemies from driving into the stern. Realizing excellent armor penetration and a strong forehead, the T28 can push through corridors and protect key points. Advantages of tactics: the ability to decide the outcome of the battle, real help to allies, interesting gameplay. Disadvantages: extreme vulnerability and high risk. If something goes wrong, the enemy drives into the stern or into the side, there is no chance of salvation. In addition, in close combat there is a higher chance of catching a projectile with the turret.

On different maps and in different conditions, you should choose battle tactics according to the circumstances. It is unlikely that you will be able to effectively use only one tactic on all maps in any situation.

Advantages and disadvantages

The T28 is not a universal tank, but a highly specialized tool that requires the driver to have steel endurance, nerves of stone, iron patience and complete equanimity. It is very good in some conditions and very bad in others, so even in experienced hands the T28 is very inconsistent in its results. He can crawl for five minutes and kill half the team in a minute, or he can crawl for ten minutes and die from an accidental hit on the side.

The T28 is very vulnerable to air attacks; it often does not have time to move away from falling bombs to a safe distance, and the same applies to artillery strikes. In addition, T28 requires mandatory cover; he cannot fight alone due to the danger of being surrounded. As a result, this is a completely command-dependent tank with gameplay for everyone.

Advantages:

• Excellent frontal armor.
• Excellent armor penetration with both solid armor-piercing and sub-caliber shells.
• Chamber shells with good armor protection.
• Surprisingly good maneuverability (considering the power density and heavy weight).
• An effective heavy machine gun with excellent aiming angles.

Flaws:

• Very low top speed - only 12.8 km/h forward and 4 km/h reverse.
• The commander's and driver's cupolas serve as targets for chamber and high-explosive shells.
• Separate-case loading and, as a result, long reloading.
• Weak side armor and dense layout. Any shot at the side is fatal.
• Vulnerability to artillery and air attacks.

Historical reference

In September 1943, a program began to create a new heavy tank for assaulting fortifications in Europe, such as the German West Wall. The front of the hull was supposed to be protected by 200 mm armor, and the long-barreled 105 mm T5E1 cannon, thanks to the high speed of the projectiles, could effectively hit concrete fortifications. In addition, it was planned to use an electromechanical transmission similar to the experimental tanks T1E1 and T23. The head of the arms department hoped that within 8-12 months it would be possible to build a series of 25 assault tanks, which would be just in time for the European front. However, fate decreed otherwise.

T-28 what is it - a three-turret Soviet medium tank of the interwar period. Developed in 1930-1932 by engineers of the tank-tractor design bureau of the Military Administrative Okrug under the general leadership of S. A. Ginzburg. The T-28 is the first medium tank in the USSR to go into mass production. Between 1933 and 1940, the Leningrad Kirov Plant produced 503 T-28s.

Tank T-28 - video

The T-28 was a three-turreted medium tank with a classic layout, with cannon and machine gun armament and bulletproof armor, and was intended to support infantry and qualitatively strengthen rifle and tank formations when breaking through fortified enemy positions. At the time of its appearance, the T-28 was the strongest medium tank in the world.

Since 1933, T-28 tanks entered service with the heavy tank brigades (tbr) of the Red Army, allocated from 1936 to the reserve of the High Command. As part of the Tank Brigade of the RGK, T-28 tanks were used in the Polish campaign of the Red Army and the Winter War, where they showed very high combat qualities. However, the armor protection of the tanks following the battles on the Karelian Isthmus was considered insufficient, as a result of which some of the tanks were subjected to additional shielding. By mid-1941, the T-28 was morally obsolete, but in its tactical and technical characteristics it was still superior to almost all tank models at the disposal of the Wehrmacht. As part of tank brigades of the mechanized corps of the Red Army, T-28s took part in the battles of the initial period of the Great Patriotic War, but most were lost in the first months, mainly due to technical malfunctions. The last combat use of the T-28 by units of the Red Army was recorded in 1944.

Captured T-28s were used by the Finnish troops, who remained in service with these tanks until 1951.

History of creation

The history of the T-28 began in 1930 with a visit to Great Britain by the Soviet purchasing commission headed by S. Ginzburg, whose task was to acquire the most modern models of armored vehicles and send them to the USSR for study and use in organizing their own armored tank production. One of the tanks that particularly interested the commission was the then-newest Vickers A6 medium tank, better known as the Vickers 16-ton tank. However, the Vickers company refused to sell the finished model of the tank due to its secrecy and put forward the following conditions to the Soviet side for purchasing the vehicle:

A one-time payment of 20,000 pounds sterling (about 200,000 rubles in gold) for familiarization with the design and development of tanks of this type.
- Order from Vickers 10 tanks of this type at a price of 16 thousand pounds sterling (160 thousand rubles in gold) per tank without weapons.
- Further order from the company of Carden-Loyd Mk VI tankettes and Vickers Mk E light tanks.

Such conditions were considered unacceptable by the Soviet delegation, and it was decided to abandon the purchase of the A6 and instead create a tank of this class on its own, using the experience gained from studying the A6 sample in the UK.

The preliminary design of the new tank was entrusted to the Faculty of Motorization and Mechanization of the Military Technical Academy. F. Dzerzhinsky, as well as the tank and tractor design bureau of VOAO, created on January 28, 1931. Both projects were ready by July of the same year. Based on the results of their comparison, the leadership of the Department of Motorization and Mechanization selected the project of the design bureau of the VOAO, which had the T-28 index, the main developers of which were the head of the bureau S. Ginzburg, his deputy V. Zaslavsky and design engineers O. Ivanov and A. Gakkel. The design of the tank used both the data obtained during the study of the A6 and the experience accumulated by the designers during Soviet-German cooperation in the early 1930s (in particular, the development of the TG tank and testing of German tanks at a training ground near Kazan). According to the original design, the tank was supposed to retain the general layout of the A6, weigh about 16 tons and carry armament from a 45-mm cannon and a machine gun in the main turret and two more machine guns in the small ones. The tank's armor was supposed to be 20 mm in the frontal part of the hull and 16-17 mm on other vertical surfaces, the thickness of the roof armor plates was 10 mm, the bottom was 8 mm. The M-5 aircraft engine with a power of 400 hp was chosen as the power plant. s., already installed on BT-2 tanks. The design was also supposed to widely use other components and design solutions of the BT-2 and T-26 already in production.

On September 28, 1931, the Department of Motorization and Mechanization entered into an agreement with the VOAO for the production of working drawings and the assembly of two prototypes of the T-28 by May 1, 1932. The first prototype of the tank, named T-28-1, made of non-armored steel, was completed in May and made its first test run on May 29, 1932. The prototype differed from the initial design by the installation of a more powerful M-17 engine, as well as the installation of a 37 mm PS-2 cannon instead of a 45 mm one, since the latter was still not ready at that time. On June 11, 1932, the T-28 was demonstrated to the command of the Department of Motorization and Mechanization of the Red Army. The tank received a generally positive assessment, but the military demanded the installation of a PGE diesel engine, which was under development at that time, and a 76-mm PS-3 cannon, starting with the second prototype. Taking into account these comments, as well as the test results of the first prototype, the T-28 project was radically redesigned in August - September 1932 - almost all components and systems of the tank were changed to a greater or lesser extent, with the exception of the propulsion system, since the specified diesel engine was so and was not brought to an acceptable level. After this, at the end of October 1932, without even waiting for the production of a prototype, the USSR Labor and Defense Council decided to mass produce the tank.

Mass production

To organize serial production of the T-28, the Leningrad plant “Krasny Putilovets” (formerly Putilovsky, later Kirovsky) was chosen. This was explained primarily by the fact that at that time the T-28 was a very complex machine and Krasny Putilovets had sufficient production capacity and qualified personnel to master its production. In addition, the plant already had experience in the construction of highly complex mechanisms, such as artillery guns, steam locomotives, port cranes, etc. Also important was the fact that since 1931 the plant had been producing suspension parts for T-26 tanks (gearbox elements, onboard gearboxes, etc.). At the end of November 1932, the plant received working drawings of the tank, and production began.

However, problems began almost immediately. The equipment of the MX-2 workshop, allocated for the production of the T-28, was badly worn out and poorly suited for the manufacture of tank parts that required a high standard of production. To overcome this problem, machines from the First World War were reactivated, modernized and put into operation. In addition, by personal order of S. M. Kirov, a number of machine tools from other enterprises in Leningrad were delivered to the plant.

The first batch of 12 tanks was ready by April 1933, and already on May 1, 10 of them marched in a parade along Moscow's Red Square. True, these tanks were accepted conditionally, since they needed modifications, did not have optical sights, external and internal communication devices, etc. After the parades, the tanks were sent back to the factory.

But, despite the first successes, the development of the T-28 in production was slow and faced a lot of difficulties. The first state order of the Department of Mechanization and Motorization of the Red Army, issued in 1933, provided for the production of 90 T-28 tanks. By the end of the year, the plant was able to assemble 41 cars with great difficulty. To correct the situation, a major modernization of the MX-2 workshop, in which the T-28 was assembled, was carried out; the necessary machines and equipment were ordered abroad. In addition, in the fall of 1933, a specialized tank design bureau was organized at the plant, called SKB-2, the first task of which was to modify the T-28 to speed up its production. The head of SKB-2 at that time was O. M. Ivanov.

It was possible to launch stable mass production only in 1934, when the reconstruction of the workshop was completed and strong connections with all suppliers of components for the tank. However, the final drawings and tank production technology were finalized only by the beginning of 1936. By this time, over 700 minor changes had already been made to the design of the tank. It is the long development in production that explains the fact that the T-28 produced in 1933-1935 suffered from many “childhood diseases” of armored vehicles, which is why the tanks were delayed by military acceptance, and factory repairs had to be sent to military units that had already received T-28 tanks brigades.

A positive role in the expansion of mass production was also played by the fact that in 1936 the MX-2 workshop was finally freed from outside orders - before that, in parallel with the T-28, it

The production of components for the T-28, starting in 1934, was carried out by the following factories:

Armored hulls and turrets - Izhora plant (Kolpino)
- M-17 engines - plant No. 26 (Rybinsk)
- Checkpoint - "Red October" plant (Leningrad)
- Fuel tanks, air filters, ammunition racks - plant No. 7 (Leningrad)
- Bearings - State Bearing Plant (Moscow)
- Instruments (pressure gauges, thermometers, speedometers, tachometers) - plant No. 213 (Moscow)
- Radio stations - plant No. 203 (Moscow)

The Kirov plant produced the remaining parts and assembled the tank. Serial production of the tank was carried out for eight years, from 1933 to 1940.

From the table above it can be seen that, starting from 1934, the Kirov Plant in most cases not only followed the T-28 production schedule, but also somewhat exceeded it. The sharp decline in tank production volumes in 1937 is explained by the planned adoption of the T-29 tank, a wheeled-tracked version of the T-28, but the T-29 project never left the prototype stage and in 1938 production of the T-28 was resumed in the same volume. A number of sources indicate 523 vehicles as the total number of T-28 tanks produced, but most sources agree on 503 copies. In addition to various design changes to the base model, numerous attempts were made to modernize the tank during mass production. In particular, work was carried out to improve the transmission and final drives, which resulted in the creation of the T-28A and T-28A-2 tanks (see below).

Design

The T-28 was a medium tank with a classic three-turret layout with two-tier weapons. The engine and transmission compartment was located in the rear of the tank, and the control compartment, combined with the combat compartment, was in the front. The tank had bulletproof armor. The tank's crew consisted of six people: a driver; commander, who also served as a turret machine gun shooter and cannon loader; a radio operator who also served as a second loader; gunner and two machine gun turret gunners.

Armored Corps

The tank hull is box-shaped, completely welded (from homogeneous armor) or riveted-welded (from cemented armor). Tanks produced in late 1936 - early 1938 and 1939-1940 had riveted-welded hulls; in other years, tanks with fully welded hulls were produced. During 1938, tanks with both types of hulls were produced. The body was assembled from rolled armor plates with a thickness of 13 to 30 mm, butt welded together. To increase the driver's visibility and reduce dead space in front of the tank, the front part of the hull was beveled. In order to increase security, the joints of the upper front inclined, frontal vertical and front sheet of the bottom were covered with additional corners.

Functionally, the corps was divided into four sections: control, combat, power and power transmission sections. The fighting compartment was separated from the engine compartment by a partition with a hatch for access to the engine. The vertical walls of the upper part of the driver's cabin were welded from above to the front inclined sheet between the machine-gun turrets. The front of the cabin was covered with a folding armored door with a hatch that opened upwards. The hatch had a viewing slot closed with triplex. The top of the cabin was closed by another hatch, which made it easier for the driver to get in. During the Winter War, on some tanks the driver's front door was reinforced with an additional 20-mm armor plate, and a fence was welded around the cabin itself to protect the door from being jammed by shell fragments during shelling.

On both sides of the hull, opposite the fighting compartment, there were boxes for smoke exhaust devices. On tanks of different years of production, the boxes differed in configuration. To access the smoke exhaust devices from inside the fighting compartment, there were two round holes in the sides of the hull. The frame of the engine, primary transmission of the fan and gearbox was welded to the bottom of the body along the engine compartment. For strength, the frame was reinforced with two struts on each side, which simultaneously served as a support for the radiators. To the right and left of the sub-engine frame in the transmission compartment there were vertical niches for gas tanks. On the roof of the engine compartment there was a hinged hatch with an air intake hood in the middle. To the right and left of the hatch there were blinds that provided air access to the radiators. A muffler was installed on the roof behind the engine compartment, covered with an additional armored shield.

A fan was installed above the transmission compartment in a removable armor plate, covered on top with an armored cap with blinds, the configuration of which also varied depending on the year of manufacture of the tank. At the bottom of the hull there were 7 hatches for access to various engine and transmission units, as well as an emergency crew evacuation hatch through the bottom.

Towers

The tank's turrets were placed in two tiers. On the first there were two small machine-gun turrets, on the second - the main turret with cannon armament.

Like the hulls, the main towers were produced in two types - welded and riveted-welded. The design of the main turret was identical to the main turret of the T-35 heavy tank. The turret had an elliptical shape with a developed aft niche and was assembled from rolled armor plates 15-20 mm thick. The roof of the tower was reinforced with stiffening ribs made in the form of stampings in the form of a large star and two stripes with rounded edges. Initially, there was one rectangular hatch in the turret roof, which was replaced in 1936 by two - a round gunner's hatch mounted under an anti-aircraft turret and a rectangular commander's hatch. In the front part of the turret roof there were two holes for periscopic devices, protected by armored caps, in the rear part on the right there was an antenna input hole. On the outside of the tower, along the sides, a handrail antenna could be mounted on eight brackets. On the right and left walls of the tower there were viewing slots, closed with triplexes, and under them there were embrasures for firing from personal weapons, closed with armored valves. In the front part of the turret, a 76.2-mm cannon was mounted on trunnions; to the right of it, a DT machine gun was placed in an independent ball mount (horizontal firing angle ±30°, elevation angle +30°, descent angle - −20°). In the rear wall of the aft niche of the turret there was a vertical slot for a yoke mounting of a machine gun, instead of which a standard ball mounting was introduced in 1936. In addition, a radio station was located on the right wall of the niche. For the convenience of the crew, the main turret was equipped with a suspended floor, raised above the bottom of the hull and secured to the turret ring with four brackets. The floor was covered with a corrugated rubber sheet on top. To the right and left of the gun were high seats for the commander and gunner (respectively), which had rotating drum-type ammunition racks on their racks for 6 shells each. Between the seats, with a shift to the front of the turret, a rack for 8 shells was installed (on tanks of the first series - for 12 shells) and six magazines for machine guns. A folding seat for the radio operator (aka loader) was hinged on the rear pillar of the suspended floor.

The tower had a circular rotation. The turret rotation mechanism was equipped with electric and manual drives. The last 13 production tanks, produced in 1940, had conical main turrets, also similar in design to the conical turret of the T-35 tank. However, unlike the T-35, only the main turret was conical - the machine gun turrets retained their cylindrical shape.

The small machine gun turrets were also identical in design to the T-35 machine gun turrets (the only difference was the absence of eye rings on the T-28 turrets). Both towers were identical in design, round, with a protrusion in the front for a ball-mounted machine gun, and differed only in the placement of viewing slots and embrasures for firing from personal weapons. The towers were armed with one DT machine gun. The turret rotation drive is manual. Each turret could rotate from the stop against the wall of the driver's cabin to the stop against the wall of the tank hull, and the horizontal angle of fire of the machine gun was 165°. The shooter was placed on a swivel seat of adjustable height, mounted on the bottom of the hull. For landing the shooter in the roof of the tower there was one large rectangular hatch with a rounded top.

Shielding

The use of T-28 tanks in the Winter War revealed the inadequacy of their armor, as a result of which a scheme for additional shielding of the tank was developed. The tanks were shielded in the factory by welding additional armor plates 20-30 mm thick to the tank hull and turrets. Shielding made it possible to increase the thickness of the armor of the frontal parts of the tank hull to 50-60 mm, and the turrets and upper parts of the sides to 40 mm. This significantly increased the vehicle's security, although it had a negative impact on its dynamic characteristics, since the tank's weight increased to 32 tons. Shielding of tanks was carried out at the Kirov plant in 1940. Shielded tanks received the index T-28E (“shielded”). It was planned to shield all available vehicles (over 400), but, according to documents, a total of 111 tanks were shielded, of which 103 were completely shielded and 8 were partially shielded. Most of the shielded vehicles went to units of the Leningrad Military District (about 80%), 15% of the vehicles went to the Kiev OVO, and only two vehicles went to the Western OVO.

Armament

The main armament of the T-28 was a 76.2 mm tank gun. Initially, the tanks were armed with a KT-28 (“Kirov Tank”) model cannon from 1927/32. Specially designed for the T-28, the gun used a modified oscillating part of the 76 mm regimental gun of the 1927 model with the following changes:

The rollback length has been shortened from 1000 to 500 mm;
- the amount of liquid in the knurl has been increased from 3.6 to 4.8 l;
- the slides are strengthened by thickening their walls from 5 to 8 mm;
- a new lifting mechanism, foot trigger and new sighting devices have been introduced that meet the working conditions of the tank crew.

The KT-28 gun had a barrel length of 16.5 calibers. The initial speed of the 7-kilogram high-explosive fragmentation projectile was 262 m/s, and that of the 6.5-kilogram shrapnel projectile was 381 m/s. The gun was installed in the frontal part of the main turret in a mask on axles. The maximum gun elevation angle was +25°, declination - −5°. The lifting mechanism of the gun is sector type, manual. The KT-28 gun was intended to combat enemy firing points and unarmored targets, and fully satisfied the tasks assigned to it. The power of its armor-piercing projectile, due to its low initial speed, was very low. It must be said that the outright weakness of the KT-28 cannon in the fight against armored targets was the source of many complaints from the military. In fact, the tank designers themselves considered the KT-28 gun as the main weapon as a temporary measure - subsequently it was planned to arm the tanks with the 76.2 mm PS-3 universal tank gun. However, for a number of reasons, it was never developed to an acceptable level and put into production.

From 1938 until production ended in 1940, the T-28 was armed with the new 76.2 mm L-10 tank gun. The L-10 gun had a 26-caliber barrel and a higher initial speed compared to the KT-28 (555 m/s), which allowed its armor-piercing projectile to penetrate armor up to 50 mm thick at a distance of 1000 m at an impact angle of 60° to normals. This significantly increased the combat capabilities of the tank, although the L-10 was noticeably inferior to the KT-28 in terms of reliability and ease of use. In addition to newly produced vehicles, tanks that arrived at the Kirov plant for repairs were re-equipped with the L-10 cannon. There is no exact data on the total number of tanks armed with L-10 cannons, however, according to available data, it can be assumed that by 1941, about 300 T-28 tanks (out of approximately 450 available) were armed with the L-10 cannon. To aim the gun at the target, a TOP telescopic sight of the 1930 model and a PT-1 periscope sight of the 1932 model were used.

The gun's ammunition consisted of 69 unitary rounds, placed in stowages on the sides of the hull (49 pieces), in a rack on the suspended turret floor (8 pcs.) and in rotating drum installations under the seats of the commander and gunner (6 pcs. each) (the use of a rotating ammunition rack - a characteristic feature of the T-28 and T-35 tanks). The ammunition load of tanks with KT-28 guns included only high-explosive fragmentation and shrapnel shells, and tanks equipped with L-10 guns also included armor-piercing shells.

The T-28's auxiliary armament consisted of four 7.62 mm DT machine guns located in ball mounts. One of them was located in the frontal part of the main turret in an autonomous installation, to the right of the gun, the other was located in the aft niche. Initially, the stern machine gun did not have its own installation, but was removable (on a rope mount) and fired through a vertical embrasure covered with an armored cover. Beginning in 1936, a standard ball mount was installed in the aft niche of the turret. One machine gun was installed in small turrets, each of which had a horizontal aiming sector of 165°. On tanks of the latest series, a P-40 anti-aircraft turret with a DT machine gun equipped with a collimator sight for firing at air targets was also installed on the gunner's hatch (thus, the total number of machine guns on the tank was brought to five).

The machine guns' ammunition capacity was 7938 rounds in 126 disc magazines of 63 rounds each. Magazines for machine guns of the main turret were placed in racks on the sides of the hull and in the aft niche. The layout of magazines for machine guns of small towers was decided in an original way - on both sides of the driver on the right and left sides there was one drum rotating in a vertical plane, in each of which 40 magazines for machine guns were stacked (8 sectors of 5 magazines each).

Engine and transmission

The tank engine is a V-shaped aviation carburetor M-17T water-cooled, with an operating power of 450 hp. With. at 1400 rpm. The maximum power was 500 hp. With. at 1450 rpm (attempts to install a diesel engine on the tank were unsuccessful). Compression ratio - 5.3, dry engine weight - 553 kg. There are two carburetors, type KD-1 (for each group of cylinders). Water cooling of the engines was carried out using radiators with a total capacity of 100 liters. On cars of the first series, radiators had a different number of sections. Two gas tanks with a capacity of 330 liters each were located along the sides in the transmission compartment. Fuel supply is under pressure, using a gas pump. Gasoline of the B-70 and KB-70 brands was used as fuel. The oil pump is gear-type (on tanks of the first series - piston). Ignition is from magneto. The tanks of the first series used Scintilla magnetos, and the subsequent ones used Elektrozavod magnetos.

The transmission consisted of a main dry friction clutch, a five-speed gearbox (five forward gears, one reverse), multi-disc dry side clutches and two-row final drives with band brakes. The gearbox had a locking device that prevented gear shifting when the main clutch was not disengaged.

Chassis

The suspension was developed mainly according to the type of the Krupp tank and consisted of a box-shaped tracked frame, riveted or welded to the hull armor, inside which all suspension elements were located. The undercarriage for one side consisted of 12 paired small-diameter road wheels, interlocked using balancers in 6 carriages with spring suspension. The carriages, in turn, are interlocked into two trolleys, suspended from the body at two points.

The outer diameter of the support roller is 350 mm. Initially, all road wheels had rubber tires. Beginning in 1936, all-metal rollers without tires began to be installed on two carriages in the busiest part of the tank (4th and 5th). There were also 4 rubberized support rollers with a diameter of 280 mm. The drive wheels are lantern gear with a pitch circle diameter of 720 mm and 17 teeth, rear-mounted. Gears are removable. The guide wheels are cast with a stamped steel rim and a rubber band. The outer diameter of the wheel is 780 mm. The tensioning device is screw-type, using a crank. The fine-link caterpillar chain, 15,800 mm long, consisted of 121 cast steel tracks. Track width - 380 mm, length - 170 mm, track pitch - 130 mm.

Electrical equipment

The machines of the first batch were equipped with imported electrical equipment with a voltage of 12 V, but then, from the end of 1933, they switched to domestic equipment with a voltage of 24 V. The generator power is 1000 W. The interior lighting and electrical equipment of the vehicle included 3 driver's panel lamps, 2 portable lamps, 6 plug sockets (3 in the main tower, one each in the small ones and one in the transmission compartment), 4 lampshades (2 in the main tower and one each in the small ones) .

To illuminate the road at night, the tank had two folding headlights equipped with armored casings (similar to those used on the T-26). At the rear of the tank, on the fenders, there were two rear marker lights with hinged covers. Also, a number of tanks were equipped with two spotlights for night shooting (the so-called “combat light headlights”), located on the gun mantlet, either directly above its barrel or on both sides of it. To submit sound signals there was a vibrator-type buzzer “ZET”.

Surveillance and communications equipment

The observation equipment on the T-28 consisted of simple viewing slits, closed on the inside with a replaceable triplex glass block, which provided protection from bullets, shell fragments and lead splashes when fired by armor-piercing bullets. One viewing slot was located on the sides of the main turret, on the outer sides of the machine-gun turrets and in the driver's hatch cover. In addition, the tank commander had a periscopic panoramic observation device PTK, protected by an armored cap.

For external communications, all T-28 tanks were equipped with radio stations. Early tanks were equipped with a 71-TK radio station, which provided communication over a distance of 18-20 km. Since 1935, the 71-TK-2 radio station with a communication range increased to 40-60 km began to be installed on the tank, but due to unreliability (the radio station constantly overheated), it was replaced in 1936 by the more advanced 71-TK-3, which became the most widespread tank radio station of the pre-war years. On cars produced in 1933-1935, there were problems with the shielding of electrical equipment, which resulted in strong radio interference. Later, by blocking the electrical circuit using capacitors, it was possible to get rid of the interference. Most T-28s were equipped with a handrail-type antenna; only tanks produced in 1939-1940 began to be equipped with whip antennas. For internal communications, the T-28s were equipped with a TPU-6 tank intercom (tankphone) for all six crew members. The machines of the first series were equipped with a “Safar” type device.

Optional equipment

Fire-fighting equipment included a stationary fire extinguisher with carbon tetrachloride with a capacity of 3 liters, installed under the right radiator and activated by a special button from the driver’s or tank commander’s seat. In addition, there were two hand-held fire extinguishers. The tank was equipped with two TDP-3 smoke exhaust devices installed on the sides in special boxes.

Spare parts

Outside, spare parts were attached to the tank hull, consisting of two 15-ton jacks, two shovels, an ax, a two-handed saw, two crowbars, a special steel bar for removing rollers, tow ropes, tarpaulin, spare rollers and a spare lower suspension carriage. The layout of spare parts varied significantly depending on the year of manufacture. A special grid for laying tarpaulin was mounted on some of the tanks.

Main serial modifications

T-28-1- pre-production sample (1932). Armament: 37-mm cannon model 1932 and three DT machine guns.

T-28 model 1933- the first production model produced in 1933-1934. Armament: 76.2 mm KT-28 cannon and 4 DT machine guns. 41 cars were produced.

T-28 model 1934- the main production model produced in 1934-1938. Armament: 76.2 mm KT-28 cannon and 4-5 DT machine guns. 266 cars were produced.

T-28 model 1938- the main production model produced in 1938-1940. Armament: 76.2 mm L-10 cannon and 5 DT machine guns. 131 cars were produced.

T-28 model 1940- a tank with a conical main turret manufactured in 1940. Armament: 76.2 mm L-10 cannon and 5 DT machine guns. 13 copies were released.

T-28E- shielded version of the T-28 tank. Shielding of previously built vehicles was carried out in 1940. A total of 111 tanks were screened.

T-28A- “high-speed” tank T-28. By redesigning the final drive and gearbox, it was possible to increase the speed of the tank to 56 km/h on the highway and 46 km/h on the road. From June to December 1936, 52 vehicles were produced as part of the production of serial tanks. Further production of tanks of this modification was curtailed due to the planned adoption of the T-29 tank.

Experimental samples

T-28A-2- one of the “high-speed” T-28A tanks, experimentally equipped with a modified transmission design, which made it possible to reach a speed of 65 km/h on the highway. Released in the fall of 1936.

T-28PH(T-28 underwater) - a serial tank on which equipment for overcoming water obstacles up to 4.5 m deep along the bottom was installed on a trial basis (1937).

In order to ensure the possibility of underwater navigation, the hull of the T-28PH tank and its armament were sealed, and special devices were installed to supply the engine with air and remove exhaust gases under water. The equipment was manufactured in the workshops of the NIBT test site in Kubinka. The tank was tested in August - December 1937 in natural reservoirs of the Moscow region. The crew worked in light diving apparatus of the IPA-2 and IPA-3 types. A total of 27 runs were made at various depths. The total duration of the tank's underwater voyage was 6 hours 35 minutes, of which 4 hours 44 minutes were with the engine running. At the same time, the duration of a single dive was increased to 60 minutes, and continuous operation of the engine under water was increased to 27.

However, there was an emergency. On September 4, 1937, in the 18th minute of the fourth race, at a depth of 2780 mm, the engine, which had previously been working normally at 1000-1100 rpm, began to have interruptions, spontaneously changing the speed. After 40-50 seconds, an explosion occurred in the engine compartment of the tank. Due to the sharp pressure drop, the fastenings of the driver's hatches, the right small turret, the gunner's hatch of the main turret and the sub-engine hatch were torn out, and the sealing of a number of seals on the blinds was also broken. As a result, the tank was filled with water. Fortunately, there were no casualties - the crew managed to leave the car.

Based on the test results, it was concluded that this type of underwater equipment has a number of design flaws and, in general, does not fully comply with the presented tactical and technical requirements. At the same time, even with the most superficial elimination of the identified defects, the underwater navigation of the T-28 was considered quite possible. If all the shortcomings were eliminated, the T-28PH could be successfully used when crossing water barriers up to 4 m deep and up to 1 km wide at a maximum current speed of up to 1 m/s. The commission that conducted the tests found it necessary to produce a reference sample of the T-28PH in a factory environment. However, there is no information about subsequent developments on the T-28PH.

Vehicles based on the T-28

T-29- an experimental medium wheeled-tracked tank, created according to a layout similar to the T-28 and using its components and assemblies. Armament: 76.2 mm KT-28 cannon (PS-3 or L-10) and 4-5 DT machine guns. Several prototypes were produced.

IT-28- an engineering bridge-laying tank designed in 1936-1940. In the spring of 1940, T-28 No. 1638 was experimentally converted into IT-28. Instead of towers and a turret box, an octagonal wheelhouse was installed, on which a 13.3 m long double-track bridge with a bridge drive and aiming levers was installed. Based on the test results, it was found that the bridge erection time was 3-5 minutes, and the strength of the drive mechanisms and the bridge itself was sufficient to pass tanks weighing up to 50 tons. The vehicle's own weight was 24 tons, and the armament consisted of 2 DT machine guns. The vehicle was assessed positively by the military in principle, but the identified shortcomings required improvement, which was never carried out. All further work on IT-28 was curtailed.

SU-8- project of an anti-aircraft self-propelled artillery mount based on the T-28 tank (1935). Armament: 76-mm anti-aircraft gun model 1931 and DT machine gun.

152.4 mm self-propelled mortar- project of a self-propelled artillery installation (1932). The chassis of the T-28 tank was used. Armament: 152-mm mortar model 1931 (NM) and two DT machine guns.

152.4 mm self-propelled coastal gun- project of a self-propelled artillery installation for coastal defense (1933). The chassis of the T-28 tank was used. Armament: 152 mm B-10 naval gun.

SU-14 and SU-14-1- self-propelled artillery units (1935, 1936). Created using components and assemblies of T-28 and T-35 tanks. Armament respectively: 203-mm howitzer B-4 or 152-mm naval gun B-10. Two prototypes were produced.

Tank-electric minesweeper based on T-28- experimental electric minesweeper for creating passages in minefields (1940). Instead of the main turret, the tank was equipped with a wheelhouse with a generator and other equipment. The generator created an ultra-high frequency electromagnetic field in front of the tank, which made it possible to detonate mines with electric detonators. On April 14, 1940, the electric minesweeper passed successful tests, but for a number of reasons was not put into mass production. Later, a similar vehicle was designed on the basis of the KV-1 tank.

Motor armored car- armed armored tire. Created using units, components and gun turrets of the T-28 tank. Armament: three 76.2 mm KT-28 cannons (or L-11, which were replaced by F-34 during the Great Patriotic War), 8 DT machine guns and 4 Maxim machine guns. 2 copies were released.

Object 112- a medium tank project, which was a T-28 with a suspension similar to the T-35 heavy tank. Developed by the design bureau of the Kirov plant under the leadership of Kotin in 1938.

In addition, the turrets of T-28 tanks were used to arm armored boats of Project 1124. Also, already during the Great Patriotic War, turrets and elements of the T-28 hulls were used in the construction of some armored trains (for example, armored train No. 1 “Fascist Fighter” from the 6th ODBP and armored train No. 2 "Dzerzhinets" from the 48th ODBP) and during the construction of long-term firing points in the Leningrad area.

Weapons tested on the T-28 base

76.2 mm L-11 cannon - created at the Kirov plant design bureau in early 1938 to replace the L-10 cannon as the main armament of the T-28, as well as to equip promising heavy and medium tanks. It was tested on the T-28 tank in 1939 in parallel with the F-32 cannon created for the same purposes, showing approximately similar results to the latter. However, due to its greater complexity and cost, it was not accepted for service.

76.2 mm F-32 cannon - created at OKB-92 of the Gorky Artillery Plant No. 92 under the leadership of V. G. Grabin. It was intended for the same purposes as the L-11 and used in its design the swinging part of the 76.2 mm F-22 divisional gun. It was tested on the T-28 in parallel with the L-11 in 1939 and showed approximately comparable results. Due to its lower cost and greater manufacturability, based on test results, the choice was made in favor of the F-32, and in January 1940 the gun was adopted by the Red Army. However, the planned rearmament of the T-28 was never carried out.

85-mm F-30 cannon - developed under the leadership of Grabin at the beginning of 1939 as a high-power tank gun. At the beginning of the summer of 1939, a sample of the gun was tested in a cart and on an artificial rollback on a T-28 tank (the gun was installed in the turret). It was decided not to carry out firing tests, since when using the gun the calculated recoil reaction to the shoulder strap exceeded the permissible limit.

95-mm F-39 gun - developed at OKB-92 of the Gorky Artillery Plant No. 92 on the basis of the 85-mm F-30 gun at the beginning of 1940. In the fall of 1940, it was tested by cart and on an artificial rollback in the turret of the T-28 tank (apparently the same one that was used to test the F-32 and F-30 guns).

57-mm ZIS-2 (ZIS-4) gun - developed under the leadership of Grabin as an anti-tank gun (ZIS-2), then used in the T-34-57 tank destroyer (ZIS-4).

Equipment tested on the T-28 base

Press-action roller mine trawl - tested on the T-28 in May - July 1939. The trawl made two passages in front of the tank tracks, each 600 mm wide. During the tests, it turned out that each roller carriage is capable of detonating 2-3 anti-tank mines of the TM-35 type, loaded with 2600-2800 g of metal, after which it needed to be restored. The trawling speed reached 10-12 km/h. It took 1 hour 40 minutes to install the trawl on the tank. dimensions tank with trawl were: length - 8160 mm, width - 3216 mm. Trawl weight - 2110 kg. Based on the test results, it was concluded that, despite a number of positive qualities of the trawl, its design needs to be improved in order to achieve greater survivability (10-15 explosions under the carriage) and maneuverability. It was considered necessary to produce 2-3 samples for field testing and conduct them in 1940 in summer and winter conditions, but no further tests were carried out.

Striker mine trawl TR-28 - tested on T-28 in July - August 1940. The trawl was developed by engineers Belogurov and Koloev based on the experience of the Winter War and was intended to provide 3.5 m wide passages in minefields. The trawl consisted of a drum, to which cables with weights at the ends were attached, and a chain drive driven by a tank idler. Rotating, the cables with loads hit the ground and caused the detonation of mines. Tests have shown that the trawl design is successful in principle, but needs improvement.

KV ditch plow - tested on the T-28 in November 1940. It was intended for quickly opening trapezoidal trenches of incomplete profile (about 0.5-0.6 m deep) behind a moving tank to shelter infantry in battle. The tests showed good results, but further development of the KV plow was stopped.

Torsion bar suspension - tested in February - March 1939 as part of the design and engineering work of SKB-2 for the SMK tank. For testing on the serial T-28 (serial number 1552), the standard suspension was removed and a torsion bar was installed. The torsion shafts were placed directly under the bottom of the car, and to limit the stroke of the balancers, steel stops with rubber dampers were installed. During testing, the tank covered 1,851 km. Three types of road wheels were tested, differing in diameter, weight and type of elastic element. Tests showed the overall reliability of the torsion bar suspension, which in a modified form was used on experimental SMK and KV tanks. In addition, torsion bar suspension was recommended for use in the construction of new T-28s, but T-28s with torsion bar suspension were never put into production for a number of reasons.

Operation and combat use

Red Army

In 1933, the first 10 T-28 tanks entered service with the 2nd separate tank regiment of the Leningrad Military District, then into the 1st, 3rd and 4th tank regiments. On December 12, 1935, by order of the People's Commissar of Defense, tank regiments were deployed into separate heavy tank brigades (abbreviated ttbr or tb). In accordance with this order, the tactical brigade consisted of three linear tank battalions, a training battalion, a combat support battalion and other units. The Ttbr included 54 T-28 tanks, 16 BT tanks, 18 T-26 tanks and 3 BKhM-3 flamethrower tanks, as well as numerous vehicles. The brigade's personnel consisted of 1,400 people.

A total of 4 tank brigades were formed - the 1st, 4th, 5th and 6th (based on the 1st, 3rd, 4th and 2nd separate tank regiments, respectively). The 1st Tank Brigade was stationed in Smolensk (Belarusian Military District), the 4th Tank Brigade in Kyiv (Kiev Military District), the 5th Tank Brigade in Kharkov (Kharkov Military District) and the 6th Tank Brigade named after. S. M. Kirov - in Slutsk (Leningrad Military District). It is interesting that the 5th Tank Brigade, in addition to the T-28, was armed with T-35 heavy tanks. By order of the People's Commissar of Defense of May 21, 1936, heavy tank brigades were allocated to the reserve of the High Command (RGK). The main purpose of these units was defined as “qualitative reinforcement of rifle and tank formations when breaking through fortified enemy positions.” In accordance with this purpose, a program was developed according to which the personnel of the Tank Brigade were trained. Tanker training for the T-28 was carried out in the 2nd reserve tank brigade of the Leningrad Military District, the Oryol Armored School, as well as at the Leningrad armored courses for improving command personnel.

In accordance with the Charter of the Red Army, the calculation of the combat crew of the T-28 tank as of January 1936 looked like this (original spelling and punctuation preserved):

Tank commander (lieutenant) - located in the main turret No. 1 to the right of the gun near the periscope. Fires from a diesel engine, loads a gun with the help of a radio operator, and commands a tank.
- Junior tank technician (military technician 2nd rank) - placed in the front of the tank in the control compartment. Directly controls the movement of the tank and is responsible for its technical condition. Outside of combat, he supervises the training of driver mechanics and mechanics.
- Driver mechanic (sergeant major) - located in turret No. 2 (left machine gun), fires a machine gun, and provides engine maintenance.
- Artillery turret commander (junior platoon commander) - located in turret No. 1 on the left, fires from a 76-mm gun. Responsible for the state of the tank's weapons. Outside of combat, he supervises the training of machine gunners.
- Commander of machine gun turret No. 3 (separate commander) - located in turret No. 3 (right machine gun), fires from a machine gun. Provides care for the tank chassis.
- Radiotelegraph operator (detached commander) - located in tower No. 1, serves the radio station, and helps load the gun in battle.
- Junior driver mechanic (junior platoon commander) - located outside the tank. Provides constant care, cleaning and lubrication of the transmission and chassis in pre-combat conditions and after combat.
- Motor operator (junior technical staff) - located outside the tank. Provides constant engine care, cleaning and lubrication.

A column of T-28 tanks from the 90th tank battalion of the 20th heavy tank brigade is moving to the attack line. Area of ​​height 65.5 on the Karelian Isthmus. The lead vehicle (produced in the second half of 1939) has a whip antenna, improved periscope armor and a box for smoke exhaust devices with inclined sides.

In 1939, the heavy tank brigades were transferred to a new staff and also changed their numbering: the 5th Tank Brigade became the 14th, the 4th Tank Brigade became the 10th, the 1st Tank Brigade became the 21st, and the 6th Tank Brigade became 20th named after Kirov. Until 1939, T-28s were not used in combat, but they repeatedly participated in military maneuvers and exercises (for the first time in January 1934). At the same time, there were often positive reviews about the tactical and technical characteristics of the tanks, but there were complaints about the quality and reliability of the vehicles. In addition, from 1933 until the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, T-28s regularly took part in military parades on May 1 and November 7 in Moscow (Red Square, about 20 vehicles), Leningrad (Palace Square, 10-12 vehicles) and Kiev (Khreshchatyk, 10-12 cars). In September 1939, the 10th and 21st tank brigades (98 and 105 T-28 tanks, respectively) took part in the “Liberation Campaign” to Western Ukraine. The 10th TB operated as part of the Ukrainian Front, the 21st TB - as part of the Belarusian Front. Despite the fact that there were practically no military clashes with the enemy during the campaign, the T-28 tanks performed very well, covering 350-400 km on the march and demonstrating very satisfactory reliability.

Complex camouflage schemes in the painting of the T-28 tanks that were in the Tank Brigade were practically not used. As a rule, tanks were painted with 4BO olive paint, standard for Red Army armored vehicles. In winter, temporary camouflage was applied with washable white paint.

In the Winter War

The 20th Heavy Tank Brigade named after S. M. Kirov, armed with T-28 tanks, took part in the fighting on the Karelian Isthmus during the Soviet-Finnish War of 1939-1940 (data on the participation of the 10th Tank Brigade in the fighting in Karelia is not are true). The brigade consisted of 105 T-28 tanks, as well as light tanks BT-5 (8 units), BT-7 (21 units), flamethrower tanks BKhM-3 (11 units), 20 armored vehicles, numerous trucks and 2926 personnel.

During the battles on the Mannerheim Line, T-28 tanks were used for their intended purpose - to support infantry when breaking through fortified enemy positions. Moreover, despite the fact that the T-28 was created according to the requirements of the early 1930s, their use in general was very successful, especially in comparison with the T-26 and BT tanks. In particular, the T-28 easily moved through snow 80-90 cm deep, overcame ditches, scarps and other anti-tank obstacles well, the firepower of the guns was quite enough to effectively fight bunkers and even small bunkers, and the multitude of machine guns made it possible to create a real shower of lead. However, at the same time, the armor of the tanks did not allow them to effectively withstand anti-tank artillery fire, in particular, 37-mm Bofors guns.

The role of the 20th Tank Brigade in the breakthrough of the Mannerheim Line is difficult to overestimate. Thanks to skillful and energetic leadership, the brigade fought much more effectively than other units. At the same time, it was possible to organize good coordination of the actions of the tank brigade with other branches of the military (however, there were problems in its technical implementation, which sometimes caused high losses). The command of the Red Army highly appreciated the actions of the 20th Tank Brigade during the Winter War - in April 1940, by Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the brigade was awarded the Order of the Red Banner of Battle and henceforth was called the Red Banner. 21 tankers were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, 613 people were presented with orders and medals.

One of the T-28s captured by the Finns during the Winter War and put into service Finnish army, 1940. The tank has already been repainted in the camouflage of Finnish tank units (almost vertical blue stripes on a white background).

There are 564 personnel, of which 169 are irrevocable;
- in the material part - 482 tanks, of which 155 were hit by artillery fire, 77 were blown up by mines, 30 burned, 21 drowned in swamps or lakes, 2 were captured by the Finns, and 197 tanks failed due to technical reasons.

However, out of 482 T-28s lost during the battles, 386 tanks were restored and returned to service, that is, over 80%. Such a high percentage of restored vehicles is explained by the good work of the repair and recovery service of the brigade, a good supply of spare parts and the proximity of the Kirov plant - the manufacturer of the T-28. At the same time, a total of 172 T-28 tanks took part in the battles in Karelia - 105 as part of the 20th Tank Brigade at the beginning of the war, and another 67 new tanks were received by the brigade during the fighting. That is, on average, each T-28 that participated in the war failed, was restored and returned to service at least twice (individual tanks - up to five times). Irreversible (non-recoverable) losses of T-28 tanks at the end of the war amounted to 32 vehicles (30 burned and 2 captured). However, only 19 tanks were written off. The rest continued to be registered in the Red Army!

Thus, the use of the T-28 in the Winter War showed that, subject to proper use and a good supply of spare parts, these tanks are a powerful, reliable and maintainable vehicle, despite difficult climatic conditions, shelling and minefields. It was also concluded that the T-28 tanks were insufficiently protected, which led to the development of a shielding scheme for them.

Soviet medium tank T-28 abandoned in locality due to a malfunction of the chassis. The car was produced in 1936-1937.

In the Great Patriotic War

By the summer of 1941, the T-28 was already obsolete from the point of view of design ideas (especially in comparison with the new Soviet medium tank T-34), but in armament the tank was superior to all vehicles available to the Wehrmacht at that time, and only slightly in armor protection. second only to the PzKpfw IV (the shielded T-28Es were superior in armor to all armored vehicles available to the Wehrmacht). However, not all available tanks were in combat-ready condition - the wear and tear of most of the vehicles and the chronic shortage of spare parts for them affected them, of which the Kirov Plant produced less and less due to the transition to the production of other vehicles.

In addition, one tank was located at factories No. 92 and 174. Another one, in the IT-28 version, was at the NIABT training ground in Kubinka. Thus, by the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the Red Army had 484 units of T-28 tanks, of which 37 were empty armored boxes; About 250 vehicles were fully combat-ready (however, growing problems with spare parts make it possible to revise this figure downward to approximately 200 vehicles). Most of them were located in the western military districts (KOVO, POVO, LVO, ZapVO).

By the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the staffing and organizational structure of the units that had the T-28 also underwent significant changes. Beginning in the summer of 1940, there was a gradual transition of the armored forces to a new organizational scheme - heavy tank brigades were gradually disbanded, and tank divisions were formed from their personnel and equipment as part of mechanized corps. For example, the 20th Red Banner Tank Brigade, which participated in the Winter War, was transformed into the 1st Red Banner Tank Division of the 1st Mechanized Corps, and some of its tanks were transferred to the 3rd Tank Division of the same corps. Other heavy tank brigades were transformed in a similar way.

T-28 tanks were actively used in the initial period of the war, but almost all of them were lost in the first months of hostilities. In addition to illiterate use, lack of fuel and ammunition, and general disorganization of the Red Army units, the main reason for losses was the technical deterioration of most tanks and the almost complete lack of spare parts for them. For example, the “Report on the combat activities of the 10th Panzer Division on the front of the fight against German fascism for the period from June 22 to August 1, 1941” contains the following data on the T-28s available in the division:

According to their technical condition, T-28 tanks had a power reserve of up to 75 hours on average. For the most part, they required engine replacement and, due to their technical condition, could not be used in a long-term operation. By June 22, there were 51 T-28 tanks, of which 44 were withdrawn on alert. The almost complete lack of spare parts immediately had a detrimental effect during the war. Machines often broke down due to the slightest technical faults.

Soviet medium tank T-28, destroyed by its own crew in a populated area. The car was produced in 1938-1940.

In accordance with this document, out of 51 T-28 tanks lost by the 10th TD of the 15th Mechanized Corps during the specified period, only 4 vehicles were knocked out in battle, another 4 failed while performing a combat mission, 4 were left operational from -due to lack of fuel and lubricants, 3 went missing, and 2 got stuck on obstacles. The remaining 32 tanks failed due to technical reasons and were abandoned.

At the same time, practice has shown that with proper use, T-28s (especially shielded T-28Es) are capable of effectively fighting all types of enemy armored vehicles and resisting fire from small-caliber anti-tank artillery and anti-tank rifles. T-28s were also noted for acts of heroism by Soviet tank crews. For example, on July 3, 1941, a T-28 under the command of tank forces major Vasechkin with a crew of driver Dmitry Malko and three cadets made a raid on Minsk, which had already been captured by the Germans, ramming enemy trucks, shooting down infantry, destroying the enemy with cannon and machine gun fire. A group of soldiers and a truck on the street were destroyed. Voroshilov, a column of motorcyclists on the street. Ulyanov, concentration of enemy manpower and equipment on the street. Yanka Kupala and in the park named after. Gorky. Having used up its ammunition, the tank began to leave the city and was stopped only on the eastern outskirts by fire from an anti-tank battery. Major Vasechkin died after getting out of the burning car. The driver, senior sergeant Dmitry Malko, managed to leave the tank and make his way across the front line to his own. The commander of machine gun turret No. 3, cadet Nikolai Pedan, was captured and released in 1945. Loading cadet Fyodor Naumov was hidden by local women in the underground, after which he made his way to the partisans. The further fate of the last cadet, Alexander Rachitsky, is unknown.

In the autumn and winter of 1941, surviving T-28s continued to be seen sporadically at the fronts. General Lelyushenko recalled that he obtained “16 T-28 tanks without engines, but with serviceable guns” from an abandoned training ground and used them as fixed firing points in the Borodino-Mozhaisk direction. At least one of these tanks destroyed at least four enemy tanks. A small number of these vehicles took part in the Battle of Moscow. By the spring of 1942, T-28s were available only in the Leningrad Military District (about 20 vehicles). The relative “longevity” of the T-28 in the Leningrad Military District is explained, first of all, by the proximity of the Kirov plant, which still had a stock of spare parts for them, and, secondly, by the fact that the LVO units contained mainly shielded T-28E tanks , which posed a serious problem for German tanks and anti-tank guns. T-28s were actively used in the defense of Leningrad (including as fixed firing points). Their last combat use as part of the Red Army was recorded in the winter of 1944 - in the operation to lift the siege of Leningrad.

German rangers of the 97th Mountain Infantry Division pass by a Soviet T-28 medium tank that fell from a bridge over the Vosushka River near the village of Kozluv, Ternopil Region. This tank is shielded. The vehicle is probably from the 3rd battalion of the 16th tank regiment of the 8th tank division of the 4th mechanized corps of the Southwestern Front.

Captured T-28s in the Finnish troops and the Wehrmacht

Captured T-28s were used by the Finnish army. During the Winter War, the Finns captured two practically serviceable vehicles (from the 20th Tank Brigade), and in August 1941, 10 more (from the 107th Regiment). Of these vehicles, seven were repaired and put into service. One of the vehicles had Soviet shielding, the rest were shielded by the Finns, and the Finnish shielding scheme in some places differed significantly from the Soviet one. In particular, the armor protection of the gun mantlet was strengthened (in addition, there were attempts to rearm the T-28 with shortened captured Soviet F-22 guns, however, to no avail). The T-28 seven were in service with the only Finnish tank brigade, in which they participated in the fighting in Karelia in 1941-1944, in particular, during the Finnish defense of Vyborg. After Finland left the war, in 1945, one T-28 was converted into a repair and recovery vehicle. T-28 tanks were in service with the Finnish army until 1951.

There is virtually no data on the use of captured T-28s by the German army. Only a few photographs of the T-28 with Wehrmacht insignia have survived, and most likely they show the same vehicle. At the same time, the tank managed to receive an official designation in the Wehrmacht - Panzerkampfwagen 746 (r). This suggests that if these tanks were used by the German army in combat, their use was sporadic, and the number of tanks used did not exceed 10 units (most likely 3-4 vehicles). In addition, it is reliably known that one technically serviceable captured T-28 was delivered by the Germans to the tank training ground in Kummersdorf and carefully studied. The further fate of this car could not be established.

One T-28 was captured by Hungarian troops in the summer of 1941, but apparently was not used in battle. In January 1945, this tank was captured by Red Army units near the arsenal building in Budapest, where it may have been stationed since 1941. In addition, it is known that two captured T-28 tanks are in the Romanian army. These cars were also captured in the summer of 1941 and installed in one of the squares in Bucharest for public display. The information found in some sources about the sale of two T-28 tanks to Turkey does not have any confirmation and most likely does not correspond to reality.

Soviet medium tank T-28, destroyed on the road by its own crew. The rear of the tank was destroyed by an explosion. The sloth wheel on the port side is missing. Most likely, the car was destroyed due to an irreparable malfunction and the impossibility of organizing evacuation. A tank from the 1st or 3rd Tank Division of the 1st Mechanized Corps of the North-Western Front. A column passes by a tank German troops. The characteristic features are a shielded tank with an L-10 cannon, manufactured in 1939.

Machine evaluation

The T-28 as a whole was a successful machine, quite advanced for its time. Despite the dead-end nature of the multi-turret layout, the composition and arrangement of the T-28’s weapons can be considered optimal. Three towers, placed in two tiers, with independent control, were able to provide effective support for infantry with massive fire. At the same time, it is important that the commander had the ability to effectively control fire and adjust it, which, for example, was impossible on the T-35, the commander of which was physically unable to control its five turrets in battle. Finally, the two machine gunners in the front turrets not only fired their machine guns, but also helped locate targets, which ultimately contributed to the tank's survival. The tank had adequate armor for its time, which reliably protected the crew and mechanisms from bullets and shell fragments, and if shielded, the tank was able to withstand small-caliber anti-tank artillery shells. The speed and maneuverability of the vehicle were also very advanced for its time, especially in the T-28A modification with an improved gearbox and gearbox.

At the same time, for its time the T-28 tank was a very complex machine and had significant shortcomings, especially in the engine and transmission systems. The chassis also wore out quickly: springs burst, suspension parts failed, and final drive gears broke. The tanks had difficulty passing the acceptance test, and then a stream of complaints from the troops began to arrive at the plant. In particular, the “unfinished” vehicles of the first series, produced in 1933-1935, suffered from these shortcomings (however, in those years, low production standards were a common problem in Soviet tank building - even the much less complex T-26 produced in 1933-1935 had numerous flaws and technological defects ). Thanks to a number of alterations and improvements made to the design of the vehicle during its production (in particular, strengthening the shock absorbers of the undercarriages, the use of road wheels with internal shock absorption, constant improvement of engine and transmission units), the shortcomings of the tank were significantly reduced, but it would be impossible to eliminate them completely failed. This was largely due to both the meager aggregate base and rather low technology and production standards. And the troops themselves were not always ready to receive and operate such complex combat vehicles.

When used skillfully and well supplied, the tank demonstrated high efficiency even in difficult operating and combat conditions, which was once again confirmed during the Winter War. Undoubtedly, four and a half hundred T-28s, mastered by the troops, technically serviceable and staffed with trained crews, would have been a serious obstacle for the Wehrmacht troops, but this did not happen due to problems with the supply of spare parts and the disbandment of heavy tank brigades on the eve of the war.

At the same time, the increase in the power of anti-tank artillery by the end of the 1930s created the need to increase the thickness of the tank's armor. This brought the idea of ​​a multi-tower layout into a dead end, from which it was never destined to escape. Attempts to develop a tank similar to the T-28, with anti-ballistic armor, clearly illustrated this fact - the weight and dimensions of the tank increased sharply. Shielding finished tanks, which partially solved the problem of projectile resistance, also led to a decrease in vehicle mobility. The last Soviet multi-turret tanks - SMK and T-100 - also clearly demonstrated these disadvantages, and the T-34 and KV-1, which appeared in 1940, finally buried the idea of ​​​​a multi-turret layout.

German soldiers examine a damaged and burnt-out Soviet shielded T-28 tank manufactured in 1939 with an L-10 cannon from the 3rd Tank Division of the 1st Mechanized Corps of the North-Western Front.

Comparison with foreign analogues

Based on a combination of the main evaluation parameters - mobility, armament and armor protection - in the 1930s the T-28 tank was the strongest medium tank in the world. At the same time, at the time of the start of production of the T-28, there were practically no serial analogues for it - for example, the tank units of France at that time were equipped almost exclusively with FT-17 light tanks, and German armored forces did not yet exist at all. Serial tanks comparable to the T-28 began to be produced in other countries only a few years later.

The English cruiser tank Vickers Mk I, also known as the Vickers A9, was essentially a “cousin” of the T-28, since it was a development of the Vickers 16-ton design and also had three turrets. Although development of this vehicle began in 1934, the first production tank left the factory floor only in 1937. According to the English classification, the tank was a cruising tank, and its speed - 40 km/h on the highway and 24 km/h on the highway - corresponded to the speed of the T-28, as well as its cruising range - about 200 km on the highway. At the same time, the tank’s maneuverability was lower than its Soviet “relative” - for example, the width of the ditch overcome by the Vickers Mk I was 2.25 m versus 3.2 m for the T-28. Due to armament with a 40-mm OQF cannon, the Mk I was superior to the T-28 with the KT-28 gun in the fight against armored targets, without having any advantages over the L-10. But the lack of shells other than armor-piercing shells for the gun left the tank with only three 7.7-mm Vickers machine guns to fight other targets. The armor of the English tank - the front of the hull was 14 mm and the side was 6 mm - was already anachronistic for 1937 and was completely inferior to the Soviet tank. Things were somewhat better in terms of armor protection for the next English cruiser tank, the Vickers Mk II (A10) - the hull front was increased to 30 mm, which corresponded to the frontal armor of the T-28. However, the tank’s armament, compared to its predecessor, was reduced by one machine gun (machine-gun turrets disappeared from the tank), and its mobility generally dropped by almost half (25 km/h on the highway and 12 km/h on the road), as well as cross-country ability - the tank could not get over a ditch wider than 1.8 m. Thus, British tanks of the corresponding period were noticeably inferior to the T-28 in most parameters (if not all). Even later British tanks, such as the Matilda or the Covenanter, were superior to the T-28 only in one parameter (armor protection and mobility, respectively), being noticeably inferior in others.

The German side in the range of medium tanks of the 1930s is represented by a very odious vehicle called Neubaufahrzeug, also known as Nb.Fz. This tank, the first full-fledged copy of which was built in 1935, also had a multi-turret layout (an artillery turret and two machine gun turrets) and was positioned by the Germans as heavy. Actually, this was only the tank’s armament - it consisted of 75-mm and 37-mm guns mounted in a pair in the main turret, as well as three machine guns. The option of installing a short-barreled 105 mm gun was considered. But, superior to the T-28 in terms of armament, Nb.Fz. was noticeably inferior to him in mobility and even more noticeably inferior to him in armor, which the German had was 15-20 mm. At the same time Nb.Fz. They were experimental machines and were built in only three copies (excluding prototypes). The later German tanks PzKpfw III (modifications D, E) and PzKpfw IV (modifications D), which the T-28 encountered during the Great Patriotic War, were already approaching the Soviet tank in terms of armor protection (but not its shielded version T-28E ), however, they were still inferior to him in cross-country ability and firepower.

As for France, its armored units, starting from 1935, had Char B1 infantry tanks, which in terms of mass were classified as medium and, in a number of sources, heavy tanks. The most numerous modification of this tank, Char B1bis, had, like the German Nb.Fz., two guns of 75 and 47 mm caliber, with the 75 mm mounted in the front hull plate. The power and mobility of its machine gun armament, however, was much inferior to the T-28 - the Char B1bis carried only two 7.5 mm machine guns. In terms of armor protection, the French tank was superior to the T-28 and was comparable to the T-28E, but the mobility of the B1bis was inferior to that of the Soviet tank. In addition, the real effectiveness of the B1bis was reduced by the extreme functional overload of the tank commander, who was forced to simultaneously control the tank as a whole, fire from the turret gun, and, in addition to this, coordinate fire from a 75-mm gun.

Surviving copies

As of 2014, it is known that there are 5 copies of the T-28 tank in its entirety, as well as a number of tank parts:

Russia - 2 cars:

Tank model 1936 (the only surviving vehicle with a KT-28 gun), on display in the open air of the Central Museum of the Armed Forces in Moscow;
- a 1938 model tank, restored by the Rearguard search club. A tank hull, adapted for a firing point, was discovered near the village of Lembolovo Leningrad region in the early 2000s, and was exhibited for some time in the Sestroretsky Frontier museum complex (Sestroretsk city, Kurortny district of St. Petersburg). It was subsequently restored to running condition using a number of original spare parts that originally belonged to other T-28 tanks. It is assumed that in the future the tank will go to the “Combat Glory of the Urals” museum.
The exposition of the Central Museum of the Great Patriotic War on Moscow's Poklonnaya Hill contains a small turret that supposedly belonged to the T-28 tank.

Finland - 3 cars:

Two tanks of the 1938 model, shielded (with original and Finnish shielding), on display at the Tank Museum in Parol.
- a 1938 model tank, shielded (Finnish shielding), on the territory of a military unit in Mikkeli.
- The remains of another T-28 (a pile of debris) were preserved at one of the military training grounds in the Hämeenlinna area - apparently, the tank was used as an artillery target.

Soviet medium tank T-28, abandoned due to a malfunction on the territory of a technical park in Lvov. The territory of the park was adjacent to Yanovskaya Street (now Taras Shevchenko Street) and was located along Zaliznychna Street (Zheleznodorozhnaya, in Polish times - Perackego Street). The vehicle is part of the 4th Mechanized Corps.

Tactical and technical characteristics of the T-28 tank

Crew, people: 6
- Manufacturer: Kirov plant
- Layout scheme: classic, three-tower
- Years of production: 1933-1940
- Years of operation: 1933-1944 (in the USSR), 1940-1951 (in Finland)
- Number of issued, pcs.: 503

Weight of the T-28 tank

Dimensions of the T-28 tank

Case length, mm: 7370
- Case width, mm: 2870
- Height, mm: 2625
- Ground clearance, mm: 500

T-28 tank armor

Armor type: rolled homogeneous steel
- Housing forehead (top), mm/deg.: 30
- Housing forehead (middle), mm/deg.: 15
- Body forehead (bottom), mm/deg.: 30
- Hull side, mm/deg.: 20+10
- Hull feed, mm/deg.: 18-20
- Bottom, mm: 15-18
- Housing roof, mm: 10
- Tower forehead, mm/deg.: 20
- Gun mask, mm/deg.: 20
- Tower side, mm/deg.: 20
- Tower feed, mm/deg.: 20
- Tower roof, mm: 10-15

Armament of the T-28 tank

Caliber and brand of gun: 76.2 mm KT-28 mod. 1927/32 / 76.2 mm L-10 (since 1939)
- Gun type: tank
- Barrel length, calibers: 16.5 (KT-28) / 26 (L-10)
- Gun ammunition: 69
- Sights: telescopic TOP mod. 1930, periscope PT-1 mod. 1932
- Machine guns: 4-5 × 7.62 mm DT

T-28 tank engine

Engine type: V-shaped 12-cylinder carburetor liquid cooling M-17T
- Engine power, l. pp.: 450

Speed ​​of the T-28 tank

Highway speed, km/h: 42
- Speed ​​over rough terrain, km/h: 20-25

Cruising range on the highway, km: 180-190
- Cruising range over rough terrain, km: 120-140
- Specific power, l. s./t: 17.7
- Suspension type: fully interlocked, with vertical springs
- Specific ground pressure, kg/cm²: 0.62

Films about tanks where there is still no alternative to this type of weapon for the ground forces. The tank was and will probably remain a modern weapon for a long time due to its ability to combine such seemingly contradictory qualities as high mobility, powerful weapons and reliable crew protection. These unique qualities of tanks continue to be constantly improved, and the experience and technology accumulated over decades predetermine new frontiers in combat properties and achievements of the military-technical level. In the eternal confrontation between “projectile and armor”, as practice shows, protection against projectiles is increasingly being improved, acquiring new qualities: activity, multi-layeredness, self-defense. At the same time, the projectile becomes more accurate and powerful.

Russian tanks are specific in that they allow you to destroy the enemy from a safe distance, have the ability to make quick maneuvers on off-road, contaminated terrain, can “walk” through territory occupied by the enemy, seize a decisive bridgehead, cause panic in the rear and suppress the enemy with fire and tracks . The war of 1939-1945 became the most difficult test for all humanity, since almost all countries of the world were involved in it. It was a clash of the titans - the most unique period that theorists argued about in the early 1930s and during which tanks were used in large quantities virtually all warring parties. At this time, a “lice test” and a deep reform of the first theories of the use of tank forces took place. And it is the Soviet tank forces that are most affected by all this.

Tanks in battle have become a symbol of the past war, the backbone of the Soviet armored forces? Who created them and under what conditions? How did the USSR, which had lost most of its European territories and had difficulty recruiting tanks for the defense of Moscow, was able to release powerful tank formations onto the battlefields already in 1943? This book is intended to answer these questions, telling about the development of Soviet tanks “during the testing days ", from 1937 to the beginning of 1943. When writing the book, materials from Russian archives and private collections of tank builders were used. There was a period in our history that remained in my memory with some kind of depressing feeling. It began with the return of our first military advisers from Spain, and only stopped at the beginning of forty-three,” said former general designer of self-propelled guns L. Gorlitsky, “some kind of pre-storm state was felt.

Tanks of the Second World War It was M. Koshkin, almost underground (but, of course, with the support of “the wisest of the wise leaders of all nations”), who was able to create the tank that a few years later would shock the German tank generals. And not only that, he not only created it, the designer managed to prove to these military fools that it was his T-34 that they needed, and not just another wheeled-tracked "motor vehicle." The author is in slightly different positions, which formed in him after meeting the pre-war documents of the RGVA and RGEA. Therefore, working on this segment of the history of the Soviet tank, the author will inevitably contradict something “generally accepted.” This work describes the history of Soviet tank building in the most difficult years - from the beginning of a radical restructuring of the entire activity of design bureaus and people's commissariats in general, during the frantic race to equip new tank formations of the Red Army, transfer industry to wartime rails and evacuation.

Tanks Wikipedia, the author would like to express his special gratitude to M. Kolomiets for his assistance in selecting and processing materials, and also thank A. Solyankin, I. Zheltov and M. Pavlov, the authors of the reference publication “Domestic armored vehicles. XX century. 1905 - 1941” , since this book helped to understand the fate of some projects that was previously unclear. I would also like to remember with gratitude those conversations with Lev Izraelevich Gorlitsky, the former chief designer of UZTM, which helped to take a fresh look at the entire history of the Soviet tank during the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union. For some reason today it is common for us to talk about 1937-1938. only from the point of view of repression, but few people remember that it was during this period that those tanks were born that became legends of the wartime...” From the memoirs of L.I. Gorlinky.

Soviet tanks, a detailed assessment of them at that time was heard from many lips. Many old people recalled that it was from the events in Spain that it became clear to everyone that the war was getting closer and closer to the threshold and it was Hitler who would have to fight. In 1937, mass purges and repressions began in the USSR, and against the backdrop of these difficult events, the Soviet tank began to transform from “mechanized cavalry” (in which one of its combat qualities was emphasized at the expense of others) into a balanced combat vehicle, simultaneously possessing powerful weapons, sufficient to suppress most targets, good maneuverability and mobility with armor protection capable of maintaining its combat effectiveness when fired upon by the most massive anti-tank weapons of a potential enemy.

It was recommended that large tanks be supplemented with only special tanks - amphibious tanks, chemical tanks. The brigade now had 4 separate battalions of 54 tanks each and was strengthened by moving from three-tank platoons to five-tank ones. In addition, D. Pavlov justified the refusal to form three additional mechanized corps in addition to the four existing mechanized corps in 1938, believing that these formations were immobile and difficult to control, and most importantly, they required a different rear organization. The tactical and technical requirements for promising tanks, as expected, were adjusted. In particular, in a letter dated December 23 to the head of the design bureau of plant No. 185 named after. CM. Kirov new boss demanded that the armor of new tanks be strengthened so that at a distance of 600-800 meters (effective range).

The newest tanks in the world, when designing new tanks, it is necessary to provide for the possibility of increasing the level of armor protection during modernization by at least one stage...” This problem could be solved in two ways: Firstly, by increasing the thickness of the armor plates and, secondly, by “using increased armor resistance." It is not difficult to guess that the second way was considered more promising, since the use of specially strengthened armor plates, or even two-layer armor, could, while maintaining the same thickness (and the mass of the tank as a whole), increase its durability by 1.2-1.5 It was this path (the use of especially hardened armor) that was chosen at that moment to create new types of tanks.

Tanks of the USSR at the dawn of tank production, armor was most widely used, the properties of which were identical in all areas. Such armor was called homogeneous (homogeneous), and from the very beginning of armor making, craftsmen sought to create just such armor, because homogeneity ensured stability of characteristics and simplified processing. However, at the end of the 19th century, it was noticed that when the surface of an armor plate was saturated (to a depth of several tenths to several millimeters) with carbon and silicon, its surface strength increased sharply, while the rest of the plate remained viscous. This is how heterogeneous (non-uniform) armor came into use.

For military tanks, the use of heterogeneous armor was very important, since an increase in the hardness of the entire thickness of the armor plate led to a decrease in its elasticity and (as a consequence) to an increase in fragility. Thus, the most durable armor, all other things being equal, turned out to be very fragile and often chipped even from the explosions of high-explosive fragmentation shells. Therefore, at the dawn of armor production, when producing homogeneous sheets, the task of the metallurgist was to achieve the maximum possible hardness of the armor, but at the same time not to lose its elasticity. Surface-hardened armor with carbon and silicon saturation was called cemented (cemented) and was considered at that time a panacea for many ills. But cementation is a complex, harmful process (for example, treating a hot plate with a jet of illuminating gas) and relatively expensive, and therefore its development in a series required large expenses and improved production standards.

Wartime tanks, even in operation, these hulls were less successful than homogeneous ones, since for no apparent reason cracks formed in them (mainly in loaded seams), and it was very difficult to put patches on holes in cemented slabs during repairs. But it was still expected that a tank protected by 15-20 mm cemented armor would be equivalent in level of protection to the same one, but covered with 22-30 mm sheets, without a significant increase in weight.
Also, by the mid-1930s, tank building had learned to harden the surface of relatively thin armor plates by uneven hardening, known from late XIX century in shipbuilding as the "Krupp method". Surface hardening led to a significant increase in the hardness of the front side of the sheet, leaving the main thickness of the armor viscous.

How tanks fire video up to half the thickness of the slab, which was, of course, worse than cementation, since while the hardness of the surface layer was higher than with cementation, the elasticity of the hull sheets was significantly reduced. So the “Krupp method” in tank building made it possible to increase the strength of armor even slightly more than cementation. But the hardening technology that was used for thick naval armor was no longer suitable for relatively thin tank armor. Before the war, this method was almost not used in our serial tank building due to technological difficulties and relatively high cost.

Combat use of tanks The most proven tank gun was the 45-mm tank gun model 1932/34. (20K), and before the event in Spain it was believed that its power was quite sufficient to perform most tank tasks. But the battles in Spain showed that a 45-mm gun can only satisfy the task of fighting enemy tanks, since even shelling of manpower in the mountains and forests turned out to be ineffective, and it was only possible to disable a dug-in enemy firing point in the event of a direct hit . Firing at shelters and bunkers was ineffective due to the low high-explosive effect of a projectile weighing only about two kg.

Types of tanks photos so that even one shell hit can reliably disable an anti-tank gun or machine gun; and thirdly, to increase the penetrating effect of a tank gun on the armor of a potential enemy, since using the example of French tanks (which already had an armor thickness of about 40-42 mm), it became clear that the armor protection of foreign combat vehicles tends to be significantly strengthened. There was a sure way for this - increasing the caliber of tank guns and simultaneously increasing the length of their barrel, since a long gun of a larger caliber fires heavier projectiles with a higher initial velocity over a greater distance without correcting the aiming.

The best tanks in the world had a large-caliber gun, also had a larger breech, significantly greater weight and increased recoil reaction. And this required an increase in the mass of the entire tank as a whole. In addition, placing large-sized rounds in a closed tank volume led to a decrease in transportable ammunition.
The situation was aggravated by the fact that at the beginning of 1938 it suddenly turned out that there was simply no one to give the order for the design of a new, more powerful tank gun. P. Syachintov and his entire design team were repressed, as well as the core of the Bolshevik design bureau under the leadership of G. Magdesiev. Only the group of S. Makhanov remained in the wild, who, since the beginning of 1935, had been trying to develop his new 76.2-mm semi-automatic single gun L-10, and the staff of Plant No. 8 was slowly finishing the “forty-five”.

Photos of tanks with names The number of developments is large, but mass production in the period 1933-1937. not a single one has been accepted..." In fact, none of the five air-cooled tank diesel engines, work on which was carried out in 1933-1937 in the engine department of plant No. 185, was brought to series. Moreover, despite the decisions the highest levels about the transition in tank building exclusively to diesel engines, this process was constrained by a number of factors. Of course, diesel had significant efficiency. It consumed less fuel per unit of power per hour. Diesel fuel was less susceptible to fire, since the flash point of its vapor was very high.

New tanks video, even the most advanced of them, the MT-5 tank engine, required a reorganization of engine production for serial production, which was expressed in the construction of new workshops, the supply of advanced foreign equipment (they did not yet have their own machines of the required accuracy), financial investments and strengthening of personnel. It was planned that in 1939 this diesel would produce 180 hp. will go to production tanks and artillery tractors, but due to investigative work to determine the causes of tank engine failures, which lasted from April to November 1938, these plans were not implemented. The development of a slightly increased six-cylinder gasoline engine No. 745 with a power of 130-150 hp was also started.

Brands of tanks had specific indicators that suited tank builders quite well. The tanks were tested according to new technique, specially developed at the insistence of the new head of ABTU D. Pavlov in relation to combat service in wartime. The basis of the tests was a run of 3-4 days (at least 10-12 hours of daily non-stop movement) with a one-day break for technical inspection and restoration work. Moreover, repairs were allowed to be carried out only by field workshops without the involvement of factory specialists. This was followed by a “platform” with obstacles, “swimming” in water with an additional load that simulated an infantry landing, after which the tank was sent for inspection.

Super tanks online, after improvement work, seemed to remove all claims from the tanks. And the general progress of the tests confirmed the fundamental correctness of the main design changes - an increase in displacement by 450-600 kg, the use of the GAZ-M1 engine, as well as the Komsomolets transmission and suspension. But during testing, numerous minor defects again appeared in the tanks. Chief designer N. Astrov was removed from work and was under arrest and investigation for several months. In addition, the tank received a new turret with improved protection. The modified layout made it possible to place on the tank more ammunition for a machine gun and two small fire extinguishers (previously there were no fire extinguishers on small tanks of the Red Army).

US tanks as part of modernization work, on one production model of the tank in 1938-1939. The torsion bar suspension developed by the designer of the design bureau of plant No. 185 V. Kulikov was tested. It was distinguished by the design of a composite short coaxial torsion bar (long monotorsion bars could not be used coaxially). However, such a short torsion bar did not show good enough results in tests, and therefore the torsion bar suspension was further work did not immediately pave the way for itself. Obstacles to be overcome: climbs of at least 40 degrees, vertical wall 0.7 m, covered ditch 2-2.5 m."

YouTube about tanks, work on the production of prototypes of the D-180 and D-200 engines for reconnaissance tanks is not being carried out, jeopardizing the production of prototypes." Justifying his choice, N. Astrov said that the wheeled-tracked non-floating reconnaissance aircraft (factory designation 101 or 10-1), as well as the amphibious tank variant (factory designation 102 or 10-2), are a compromise solution, since it is not possible to fully satisfy the ABTU requirements. Option 101 was a tank weighing 7.5 tons with a hull according to the type of hull, but with vertical side sheets of cemented armor 10-13 mm thick, since: “The inclined sides, causing serious weighting of the suspension and hull, require a significant (up to 300 mm) widening of the hull, not to mention the complication of the tank.

Video reviews of tanks in which the tank’s power unit was planned to be based on the 250-horsepower MG-31F aircraft engine, which was being developed by industry for agricultural aircraft and gyroplanes. 1st grade gasoline was placed in the tank under the floor of the fighting compartment and in additional onboard gas tanks. The armament fully corresponded to the task and consisted of coaxial machine guns DK 12.7 mm caliber and DT (in the second version of the project even ShKAS is listed) 7.62 mm caliber. The combat weight of the tank with torsion bar suspension was 5.2 tons, with spring suspension - 5.26 tons. Tests took place from July 9 to August 21 according to the methodology approved in 1938, with special attention being paid to tanks.

Hello, dear tankers! Today we continue to look at the US tank destroyer branch, and today we have one of the most incomprehensible and terrible Tier 8 vehicles. Terrible not only for the enemy, but also for the driver. This is a machine that does not forgive mistakes. A machine that, if used correctly, can bring panic and fear into the enemy’s formation. This is one of the most incomprehensible, creepiest, most unexpected cars in the game. Meet T28.

Well, the car is level 8. Despite its level, this vehicle does not find a place in companies, like many other tank vehicles. This machine is designed for terrible random bending, but you will have to try hard to bend everyone individually. Many drivers of this PT and the next one also pay with nerves, and many get a lot of fun. Therefore, if you do not like very slow and armored vehicles, then it is better to stop at the T25 AT. This car differs from its predecessor in all respects and in each individual respect. It’s worth trying to play on this machine, perhaps even on the OT (general test) right away in the top configuration, but if the machine is not for you, then it’s better not to torture yourself and the allied team - nerves are more expensive. It is also worth considering the fact that T95 is a truly terrifying continuation of T28 (in two senses of the word “terrifying”, for whom you decide). The value of this horror is 2,580,000 credits and 87,000 experience. The numbers are quite normal for level 8, so there is nothing scary or unattainable about them. From experience, this is even slightly less than the alternative T28 prototype. However, since the machine is quite demanding on the hands and does not forgive mistakes, we immediately need to install additional equipment, seat a good crew and apply camouflage. We will talk about the equipment later, but now expect to spend at least 1,000,000 credits on its purchase, since the previous machine was light, and this is a heavy PT with completely different class modules. As for the crew, everything is quite simple, but with its own moments. I have already said more than once that the higher the level of the vehicle, the more strongly the crew influences its characteristics. Therefore, I highly recommend transferring the crew from the previous vehicle, since the specialties are completely the same. I advise you to transfer immediately with a 100% level of proficiency in your main specialty; this can be achieved in several ways:

• The most convenient way is to retrain everyone for gold. The perks for us and our predecessors should match, so you don’t even have to reset them. It will cost you 200 * 5 = 1,000 gold.

• An alternative option is retraining for silver up to 100%. Here we will have to sacrifice a small amount of experience, since we will be forced to reset the crew's skills and retrain them. Thus, part of the experience in the “plus” will cover the entire penalty amount, and in addition to this we will be able to choose new perks and skills. It will cost us 40,000 * 4 = 160,000 silver.

I also highly recommend applying camouflage to your car. We are a PT, which already means that we have a bonus to camouflage, and in combination with camouflage we will get a good increase... It will cost 80,000 * 3 = 240,000 credits for 30 days. For level 8 it's not that expensive.

Equipment

Here is the car's research tree

Of course, the already discovered pre-top gun and radio station cannot but rejoice. However, if you have already upgraded the alternative AT T28 prototype, then the gun and engine should already be open.

As usual, the choir room must be opened and installed immediately to increase the load-carrying capacity of the machine. We will also significantly increase the turning speed and maneuverability on different soils, which in turn is extremely important for a PT with our dynamics.

Both the top-end engine and the stock one do not achieve sufficient power to achieve more or less normal speed at our weight. Yes, a top engine is important, but on this tank the game is not based on dynamics, so a top gun will be more useful for us.

Well, we obviously won’t have enough of a stock radio station to play at our levels, so we definitely immediately install a top-end one, since it was opened a very long time ago and is quite light in weight. It will be quite enough for us.

This tank has a terrible, very terrible top gun. Of course, many will say that the BL-10 will be better, but this is not so. Firstly, accuracy is better here, and secondly, one-time damage does not always make the difference. There are many situations when it is more important to inflict 100 - 200 units. damage is faster than inflicting 700 - 800, but wait 15 seconds... We have more than enough penetration even with basic shells, so we won’t have problems with penetrating Mouses, Is-7s and Slippers. The damage is also quite good, and with a high rate of fire we can add more and more damage. As for the pre-top gun, it’s not enough for us, but be patient and gradually upgrade the top gun, in the end you’ll get what you wanted and the game will become much more enjoyable.

Leveling up

It is better to open and install modules in this order

1. Radio station
2. Chassis
3. Top gun
4. Engine

The last 2 points can be swapped if you find it too unbearable to drive with a stock engine.

Advantages and disadvantages of the car in the top configuration

pros

• Low silhouette
• Excellent armor in the frontal projection
• Great weapon
• Good shooting accuracy on the move

Minuses

• Poor side and stern armor
• Weak dynamics
• No tower

Balance weight

We find ourselves in battles of levels 8 - 10. In principle, we don’t care who we punch holes in, but we don’t care what kind of artillery we catch blanks from. However, we feel comfortable anywhere if the ultimate machine is about you and you know how to play it.

Profitability

A successful game with PA will bring us a small farm. All this is thanks to the vehicle’s good survivability and the ability to inflict high damage on any opponents. However, this is all when using ordinary shells and consumables; with premium ones you will be at a disadvantage. The game without PA will also be little different from the last option.

Tactics

Well, get used to the fact that you are a mobile pillbox. We have extremely weak dynamics, so we need to very carefully choose the direction where to go from the very beginning. We are unlikely to be able to return to base, not to mention changing the flank. It’s also worth noting that our body is quite long, which means that it won’t be difficult to punch you into the side projection, and it won’t be difficult to hit you either. We should be wary of artillery because cardboard sides and sterns and splashes will go through just fine. Also, due to the low speed, we simply will not be able to quickly change position. Our worst enemy is ST at short distances, they can simply get in from the side and hurt us. Shoot down the tracks with them, crit the engine, do whatever you want, but don’t let them in your area. Well, this PT is probably all about its features. I will only say that you need to think carefully before every action, turn, shot. The game on this PT is built with the help of brains, not hands and experience, which is also important.

Optional equipment

Everything is standard here, but with some features

• Rammer
• Drives
• Fan/lining/optics/mesh - depending on the playing style. Personally, I would put a liner, we don’t have dynamics anyway, so we won’t lose anything, but the art will have to try harder when dealing damage. With such a lining, even a direct hit can only be an injection.

Equipment

Also standard

• Repair kit
• First aid kit
• Fire extinguisher

Crew Perks

Commander

1. Sixth Sense
2. Disguise
3. The Brotherhood of War

Gunner

1. Disguise
2. Sniper
3. The Brotherhood of War

Driver mechanic

1. Disguise
2. Virtuoso
3. The Brotherhood of War

1. Disguise
2. Radio interception
3. The Brotherhood of War

Charging

1. Disguise
2. Non-contact ammunition rack
3. The Brotherhood of War

Vulnerabilities of the machine

Orange- commander, gunner, loader
Red- engine, tanks, transmission
Green- easily penetrated zones
White- ammunition rack
Blue- driver mechanic.

And finally, a few videos of the car

to Favorites to Favorites from Favorites 4

Dear colleagues, on the Internet I came across an article by B.N. Sukhinenko. “Tank T-28. A different look." I found the article extremely interesting, which is why I am posting it for the “judgment” of my respected colleagues.

Preface by the author

I hope readers are aware of some of the original materials previously published online. These include: “1941. Soviet history", "T-28. A tank for the price of margarine", "T-28. Design and manufacturability", "Tank aircraft engine M-17". In these articles, the author did not take on faith the “truths” related to the Soviet T-28 tank. The decision was right. As always, the “newspaper chatter” turned out to be completely false. In particular, traditional “misconceptions” include well-known statements about the “high cost” of the T-28, the “low-tech” nature of its design and the “general unreliability” of the tank.

In addition, the following materials were tested on several forums: “Legendary T-34”, “Forgotten T-28”, “Medium “medium” tank”, “Alien M4” and “What is “modernization”?” The test result cannot be called successful. Perhaps because of the “non-traditional orientation” the materials were received with hostility. Perhaps the opponents were motivated by other motives. In essence, these works made an attempt to consider the “tank situation” during the Second World War from a different, unbiased point of view.

Of course, all the listed articles and messages in no way pretend to be an “objective” analysis. However, the author believes that the works are sufficiently reasoned for an unbiased reassessment of the usual and “irrefutable truths” on the issues of “the obvious advantages of the T-34”, “the clumsiness of the outdated T-28”, “the weight classification of tanks”, “the stupidity of American designers” and "the limit of tank modernization." Recently, two videos have been compiled and edited: “T-28 Tank” and “T-28 vs. Panther.” The videos show famous story and possible prospects for the development of the T-28 tank during the Second World War and, most importantly, during the Great Patriotic War. In particular, the author has no doubt that if production continued and the corresponding modernization of the T-28, the potential of the “plywood shed” by 1943 would be higher than that of the notorious “Panther” (Pz.VD). Perhaps in the near future a third video will appear on the screens: “T-28 - the main tank of the Red Army.” From the title of the story, its content is also clear - the author is confident that back in the early 40s, the T-28 fully met the definition of “main battle tank.” Of course, completely regardless of the fact that this term itself appeared only a quarter of a century after the complete disappearance of the T-28 from combat reports. “Objective reality does not depend on the opinion of the individual.”

1. SO IT WAS, SO IT COULD BE...

Not having the time and space to repeat all the initial data and conclusions (see the above-mentioned works), the author, nevertheless, considers it necessary to present some conclusions here.

1.1. General remarks:

1a) The removal of the T-28 from production was in no way connected with “obsolescence”, “exhaustion of the concept”, “complexity” and “futility of this tank in modern combat conditions”. Not at all. The reality of everyday and combat operation (“Polish Campaign” and “Winter War”) undeniably demonstrated the reliability and maintainability, mobility and combat effectiveness of the T-28. The reasons for the cessation of tank production lay in a different area.

1b) The main performance characteristics of all implemented tank upgrades (T-28/33; T-28A/36; T-28/38; T-28E/40) fully met the requirements of combined arms combat at each current moment in time (World War II, in particular ). These data are summarized in table 1.

Table 1. Tactical and technical characteristics of T-28 tanks

*Notes:
1) combat weight: T-28/33 = 25.2 tons; T-28A = 26.5 t; T-28/38 = 27.8 t; T-28E = 32.0 t;

2) t – ground clearance in m; p – pressure on solid soil in kg/cm2; N – specific power in hp/t (M-17L engine throttled to 500 hp, power of the original M-17b = 680..715 hp; Mcr = 320 kg*m); P – thrust in the corresponding gear in t (Mcr = 240 kg*m at 850..900 rpm, 180 kg*m at 1650 rpm); V – emergency speed in V gear in km/h (thrust in V gear at 1650 rpm = 2.8 t; T-28A = 2.0 t, i.e. almost the maximum for achieving a speed of 56 km/h) ;

3) until 1938, the T-28 was equipped with a KT-28 cannon, later - an L-10; the weight of the shells was 6.2..6.7 kg; D – gun caliber in mm; n – practical rate of fire “from a standstill” in rpm; V – projectile speed in m/s; t500 – normal armor penetration at a distance of 500 m in mm (line by line according to A. G. Solyankin and others - 30, 30, 40, 40 mm per 1000 m);

4) armor thickness normal to the sheet in mm; equivalent VLD T-28E (35 mm) = 83 mm;

5) of course, it makes no sense to consider the performance characteristics of the T-28 in isolation from similar enemy vehicles; the table shows an example of the most dangerous German tank in 1941; combat weight of Pz.IIIJ = 21.5 tons.

It should be emphasized that since 06/01/1940 (Resolution of the Council of People's Commissars/Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks No. 888-330ss) the T-28 tank has not been produced or modernized. While its opponent, the Pz.IIIJ, went into production only in March 1941. That is. the German tank was 9 months “younger” than the T-28E.

1c) The dimensions of the T-28 (7.44 × 2.87 × 2.62 m) seemed “terrible” only against the background of small tanks (T-26, Pz.IIF) and wedges (T-38, Pz.IB). Moreover, the only really big difference was the length of the tank. The width and height were smaller than those of competitors and opponents. It is enough to mention B1bis (6.52×2.50×2.79) or KV-1 (6.75×3.32×2.71). In this regard, the ground clearance of the tanks is also of interest: T-28 = 0.55 m; B1bis and KV-1 = 0.45. The T-28 looks even less “barn-like” compared to later tanks such as the Tiger or Panther. To complete the excursion into the “tram” dimensions of the BTT, the author proposes to compare the T-28 with the most popular domestic combat vehicles. The entire BTT in Figure 1 is made on the same scale.

Of course, over the past 70 years, the tactics of using armored vehicles have undergone significant changes. But in terms of the theater landscape, the changes are unlikely to be so global as to significantly affect the dimensions of military equipment. However, Figure 1 clearly demonstrates the fact that the dimensions of modern BTTs prevail over the similar dimensions of the T-28. The gray stripe at the top of the vehicles shows the achievable height after the promising modernization of the T-28 (2.25 m). Such a significant reduction in the height of the tank could be achieved by compensating for excess ground clearance (0.55 compared to 0.48 m of a modern BTT) and excessive hull height (1.40 versus 1.10 m for the KV-1). True, to achieve such a result, the T-28 designers would have to abandon the “outdated concept of a multi-turret layout.” By the way, it was not difficult to overcome the “natural craving” for “multi-tower”, because in 1940, all Soviet tanks put into service were single-turret.

1d) Another unfounded complaint about the T-28E is its combat weight, which reached 32.0 tons. Now this tank is called “medium-heavy”. The fact is that, according to the domestic classification of the 40s, this tank turned out to be 2.0 tons heavier than the upper limit of “average” vehicles. Oh, this “progressive weight classification”! In particular, B1bis (32.0 t) is still in the “heavy weight”. In this regard, it remains to be recalled that when the T-34/85 tank reached the same weight (32.0 tons), Soviet classifiers quickly moved the upper limit of “medium weight” from 30.0 to 40.0 tons! It is clear, “in accordance with the changed requirements of the battle.” As they say, “I can do what I want”! Of course, such situational variability of the principle clearly indicates the bias of the domestic classification and its technical unprincipledness. Or, in other words, incorrect calculations and falsity of assessment (prostitution of the fundamental principle). In further reasoning this unsuitable principle is ignored.

1.2. "Technical details":

2a) The declared “clumsiness” of the T-28 is based on a pretentious assessment of the ratio of the length of the supporting surface of the caterpillar to the track (for the T-28 - 2.04). Without going into details of calculating the required turning force of the tank (very simple, it must be said), as well as for an adequate attitude to the capabilities of the “outdated balance suspension”, Figure 2 shows a page from the “GABTU Manual”.

2b) The final verdict on the “tractor” suspension of the T-28 tank was made by M. V. Kolomiets: “...The tank’s suspension, for all its cumbersomeness, generally worked reliably...” . By the way, the side projection area of ​​the “bulky” T-28 chassis is 1.5 times smaller than that of the Panther. Unfortunately, with all the mentioned advantages, the springs of the T-28 struts broke quite often. Alas, wire with a diameter of 20 mm is not the best solution for the springs of a 30-ton tank. In addition, the tungsten steel required for the springs was unnecessarily expensive. In order to finally overcome doubts about the performance of balancer suspensions, it is worth paying attention to the Pz.IV and Sherman. As they say, “a tank cannot live by a torsion bar alone!” And the T-34 did not have torsion bars.

2c) Until the mid-40s, the M-17 aircraft engine remained the most powerful, reliable and cheapest tank engine in the USSR. A comparison of the technical characteristics and cost of the M-17 (19,000 rubles) and B-2 (61,000 rubles) shows the unconditional operational advantages of the first. More sloganeering than real claims to the engine do not stand up to criticism. In particular, the strict use of “high-octane aviation gasoline” for the M-17L, put forward as the main drawback, is complete nonsense. E.E. Mitkov says that an engine with a compression ratio of 5.3 is capable of working

“...on everything that burns, including light diesel fuels in proportion with alcohol or kerosene in a ratio of 1:1.7/1.8 in volume fractions...”.

Against this background, the opinion of some “specialists” about the disruption of the fuel balance of the USSR due to the expansion of M-17 production is nothing more than another attempt to “multiply the entities” and “obfuscate the idea” of the discussion about the prospects for the production of the T-28. By the way, the no less intrusive declaration of the increased fire hazard of carburetor engines in combat conditions also has no basis in reality. It should be noted that about 80% of armored vehicles from the Second World War were equipped with gasoline engines. And they fought.

2d) The most original mechanism of the T-28, the fan drive, consisted of a “primary drive”, a “secondary drive” and a fan. As effective as the tank's cooling was, its design was just as complex. Mechanism weight (without fan) ~ 180 kg, price ~ 8100 rub., i.e. the specific price was 44 rubles/kg (M-17F ~ 34 rubles/kg). The “secondary drive” even included a special clutch that protected the mechanism from sudden changes in engine speed. Of course, there was nothing like this in all the “newest and most advanced ideas” domestic tanks. By the way, cooling a closed MTO BTT remains a difficult problem to this day.

2e) Taking care of combat ergonomics, the designers of the T-28 equipped the tank with a three-man turret (the T-34/76 tank had a two-man turret), rotating ammunition racks (in the “newest” tanks there were shells everywhere, including on the floor of ammunition in boxes), suspended Polik and “wide” shoulder straps. For reference, the shoulder strap diameters “in the clear” of some tanks of the Second World War: T-28 – 1620 mm; T-34/76 – 1420 mm; KV-1 – 1530 mm; Pz.VD – 1650 mm.

1.3. Manufacturability of the T-28 tank

Another “common place” of criticism of the T-28 to this day remains its notorious complexity, especially in comparison with the “technological” KV and T-34. Of course, whoever claims this is either biased or understands absolutely nothing about technology.

3a) The thickness of the armor (along with its chemical composition and heat treatment) has a direct impact on the cost of the technological processes of its manufacture, subsequent cutting and assembly of armored boxes. There is obviously a sharp increase in labor intensity with increasing armor thickness. The range of armor for domestic armored vehicles in 1940: T-28 - 30, 20, 18, 15, 10, 5 (screens - 30, 20, 10) mm; T-34 – 45, 40, 20, 16, 15, 13; KV - 75, 60, 40, 30. For the T-28 tank, rolled products of maximum thickness (30 mm) were used mainly for the manufacture of screens (compare with 45 mm for the T-34 and 75 mm for the KV).

3b) Complicating the shape of armored boxes to a no lesser extent than the thickness of the armor inevitably leads to an increase in labor intensity. And if the shape of the T-28 hull can be reasonably criticized in the area of ​​installation of machine gun turrets (even to the point of abandoning the “multi-turret concept”), then the assembly of the “coffin-shaped” hull of the T-34 caused incomparably greater difficulties. The least complex was the KV body (see also item 3c). In turn, the T-28 turret shape was the simplest of the compared tanks.

3c) The complex design of armor elements not only increased the cost of the technology, but also led to a large percentage of defects. The contour of the vertical walls of the T-28 turret is almost identical cross section locomotive boilers. By the way, the thickness of the side (20 mm) was adopted based on the technological capabilities of the standard equipment of locomotive factories - rotary bending machines (sheet thickness up to 49 mm from steels with ob = 45 kg/cm²). Is it worth reminding that the front plates of the T-34 turret and hull, as well as the rear of this tank, were made of 40..45 mm armor steel. The forehead, rear of the hull and KV turrets were bent from 60..75 mm sheet!

3d) Of course, opponents of the T-28 never tire of repeating the thesis about assembling the tank using rivets. With this statement they are trying to prove (impose!) that the tank design is unsuitable for mass production. To their shame, it should be noted that the armor plates of the T-28 hull and turret were welded much more often and earlier than riveted. The “progressive welding” technology on this tank was developed long before the appearance of the T-34 and KV. The T-28E screens were also WELDED to the main armor. Here it should be clarified that welding thin sheets (20..30 mm) caused less damage to the heat-affected space than welding thick rolled products (45..75 mm).

3e) The declared complexity of the components and mechanisms of the T-28 is an outright “newspaper canard.” In fact, these units were no different in their manufacturability from similar devices in other domestic tanks. The convenient rotating ammunition racks installed in the turret under the crew seats were somewhat original.

1.4. Prospects for expanding T-28 production

The nouveau riche of the modern “tank Internet” do not think at all about what they write in their messages. Online incognito, it seems to them, allows them to say whatever they want without any unpleasant consequences. Alas, this “Internet anonymity” is gradually turning interlocutors into talkers. Obviously, the “virus of irresponsibility” could not but affect the T-28 tank. In terms of the topic of this subsection No. 4, this relates to the problem of expanding T-28 production at domestic enterprises. As it turned out, according to “Internet specialists,” there was NOTHING in the country in 1940! Neither industrial enterprises, no qualified personnel, no equipment. Of course, this is just idle talk. Let me remind you that in 1940 the Wehrmacht had not yet surrounded Leningrad, had not bombed Gorky (Luftwaffe), had not occupied Kharkov and had not reached the Volga. All this happened much later. But in 1942, thousands of tanks were produced even at carriage factories. Moreover, on evacuated equipment “in the open air” and in the cold. And the tanks were made exclusively by “unskilled teenagers and women.” What prevented the “peaceful” USSR from starting a “tank program” a year before the war? And make tanks in equipped factories by the hands of male professionals?

4a) Of course, at LKZ, instead of manufacturing KV, it was possible to expand the production of T-28. In this case, all the technological advantages of the “medium” tank mastered by the plant made it possible (when using 5 workshops for this work, as in the case of KV) to reach a production scale of more than 1000 tanks per year. Let us still leave this plant at the mercy of “the best heavy tank of the initial period of the war.” There is no point in arguing with the APPROVED statement: “...KV, in any case, it’s better...”

4b) The second manufacturer, quite ready to produce tanks, was the Krasnoye Sormovo plant. As you know, this plant produced the first 173 T-34 tanks, albeit with great difficulty (and large defects), in 1941. And in 1943 it reached an annual output of 3000 units. Having begun preparations for production of the T-28 in June 1940, this plant in 1941 could produce up to 2000 tanks. Let me remind you that in 1943 the Sormovo T-34 weighed 30.9 tons, which is quite comparable to the combat weight of the T-28E (32.0 tons). Some “lack of weight” of the T-34 mod. 1941 was fully compensated by thinner rolled products for the T-28. And before 1943, there was no need to overload the T-28 to 32.0 tons.

4c) A less obvious, but most promising manufacturer of the modernized T-28 could be the Kolomna Locomotive Plant. Not even that. Based on the industrial potential of 1940, Kolomna could well have become the “tank city near Moscow” of the USSR. Even short list factories in the city shows the wide possibilities for tank production in this city.

In first place, of course, is the bullpen, which worked even in 1917..1923. In 1917, the plant employed about 17,000 people (the author did not find later data). It is interesting to note the “human factor” - in 1938..1939. the director of Kolomzavod was V. A. Malyshev. By the way, there is an opinion in the “tank network” that this plant was unable to assemble even the T-40. To put it mildly, the strangeness of such a statement is that KPZ created the 120-ton steam locomotive IS back in 1932. But, as has now been “irrefutably established”, he could not handle a 6-ton wedge in 1941... What comments can there be? Only Figure 3. By the way, the figure clearly shows the diameter of the driving wheels of the locomotive - 1850 mm, which is identical to the largest diameter of the shoulder strap of the T-28 tank. It would be interesting to know on what machines the Kolomna residents (as well as the Lugansk and other steam locomotive builders of the USSR) sharpened wheels of this diameter in 1932, if, as the “researchers” claim, in 1941 there was only ONE boring machine left in the country for shoulder straps with a diameter of more than 1500 mm?

The second place in terms of capacity was occupied by the State Artillery Repair and Experimental Plant. After the war - ZTS. In addition to repairing guns of 76..152 mm caliber, this plant also carried out “deep modernization” of weapons. The total number of employees in 1937 was about 5,000 people. On the basis of one of the GAROZ workshops in 1942, the Shavyrinsky mortar design bureau of the People's Commissariat of Armaments was organized.

The city's third largest machine-building plant was the gramophone factory, with an annual output of more than 350,000 gramophones.

In 1940, a tire repair plant was built and fully equipped in Kolomna. But it was never put into operation. According to the recollections of old-timers, in 1940 several specialists with their families came from Moscow to the plant. But by the spring of 1941 they had disappeared. One can only guess where and why the engineers disappeared at that time.

The Vtorchermet enterprise opened in the summer of 1941. There were plans and workers, but they did not have time to equip it with the proper equipment. However, the plant processed more than 15,000 tons of scrap metal almost manually by the end of the year. Need I say that the bulk of this metal came from broken tanks?

Finally, not taking into account the clothing and furniture factories (although both wooden and textile products were required to equip the tanks), we note the Shchurovsky cement plant with an annual output of more than 130,000 tons of cement. As you know, on the eve of the war, a research and development program was carried out to create composite steel-concrete armor. M. N. Svirin writes that a package of two 15 mm layers of steel armor and a 30 mm layer of concrete showed strength equivalent to 60 mm of steel armor. The experiments were stopped with the outbreak of the war, but the commission's conclusion emphasized the difficulty of molding the concrete layer to the profile of armored hulls and towers.

4d) The general trend The pre-war tank industry consisted of a division of labor. In addition to engines and weapons, the cooperation produced electrical equipment, optical instruments, as well as... armored hulls and turrets. There is no need to break this established tradition. Moreover, between the cities of Kolomna and the city of Gorky in the cities. Vyksa and Kulebaki were two metallurgical enterprises. These enterprises are located in the iron ore deposit area. The Podolsk Cracking and Electric Locomotive Plant is less interesting due to its thin rolled products. On the other hand, the Podolsk factories of sewing machines and batteries were very promising for production cooperation.

2. PERSPECTIVE OF TRADITION

No matter how intrusive this may be, we have to remind you that the main argument about the “plywood” and “barn-likeness”, as well as about the “unreliability” and “complexity” of the T-28 tank, is what all “major researchers” draw from the Internet, mainly , from Wikipedia (the author’s attitude towards this resource is very respectful), as well as several lines from the works of M. V. Kolomiets. These “experts” never bother to read the entire text.

Using the standard technique of extracting convenient material from the context, modern “professionals” (militant ignorance) have the audacity (or rather stupidity) to contrast the T-28 of the first releases (only 41 tanks were manufactured in 1933) and the T-34/85 (T-34 /76 – 35,000 units and 11,500 units T-34/85 in 1944). The result of such a comparison is quite obvious. Without dwelling further on the bias, engagement and banal falsity of such oppositions, let us remember that in real story Over the 8 years of production, the T-28 tank underwent 5 upgrades.

In 1933, the first production model appeared (we will assign it the index T-28/33). In 1936, LKZ produced a series of 52 “high-speed” T-28A tanks. Since 1938, new tanks were equipped with the L-10 gun. Let's call this tank T-28/38. During the overhaul, tanks of previous series were also re-equipped with this gun (alas, less reliable than the KT-28). The last tanks in 1940 were assembled with conical “large” turrets - T-28/40. And finally, following the results of the “Winter War”, tanks of various series were shielded with additional armor - T-28E.

In other words, if someone wants to compare two “medium” domestic tanks, then you are welcome - go ahead to the Cuban training ground with the T-28E (of course, based on the T-28A with the L-10 cannon) and the T-34/40 with the L -eleven. What do you think the result will be? By the way, let the “factory representatives” calculate the costs of producing the “small-scale and complex” T-28 (248,000...287,000 rubles) versus the “massive and technologically advanced” T-34/40 (429,000...510,000 rubles). If you really want to object to the present cost of the “experimental T-34”, then remember the price of the “serial” T-34/76 in 1942 at UZTM (274,000 rubles) and at plant No. 174 (312,000 rubles) .

But let’s leave this thankless task - comparing “ours”. It’s better to contrast the T-28 with the “enemy” tanks. And we will not be afraid of the “gloomy Teutonic genius”; we will plan to modernize the T-28 to a level comparable to the performance characteristics of the notorious “Panther”. Do you think this is impossible?

First of all, let's discuss the terms of the project. The main thing is minimal changes in the design of complex components and mechanisms (engine, gearbox, gearbox, power steering unit, power supply unit, chassis). It is proposed not to change these units at all. True, instead of the M-17L it will be necessary to install the M-17T (from the BT-7), and later the M-17F (from the T-35). Thus, modernization will mainly affect armored vehicles (with minimal modifications) and weapons (anything is possible here). Naturally, it is necessary to strengthen the shoulder straps. But this should be done not in 1941, when the shoulder straps “had nothing to bore,” but in 1943.

The first two illustrations in Figure 6 demonstrate the real change in the protection and armament of the tank from the first series of T-28/33 to the latest - T-28E. Below, in the same figure, are three upgrades that were not actually implemented (intermediate tank models are omitted to save space). The first potential modernization (T-28N) is associated with the abandonment of the “outdated concept of a multi-turret layout.” Those. in principle, this is just removing the machine gun turrets and lengthening the front sheet of the driver's cabin (more correctly, the upper frontal part of the hull) according to the KV type. The year it was completed was 1940. Such work could have been done with major renovation tanks.

At the second stage, it was necessary to cut 150 mm off the height of the hull and lengthen the upper frontal sheet. In this case, even rearmament with a heavier gun (F-34) and increased protection only slightly increased the weight of the tank.

The last traditional modification of the T-28 is associated with more significant work, but the time of its implementation is 1943. In addition to the obvious rearmament with the ZiS-S53 (or D-5T) gun, it is necessary to significantly reduce the height of the hull (from 1250 to 1100 mm). There is nothing complicated or impossible in this work. Let me remind you that the hull height of the BT-7 and KV-1 was 1100 mm. As you know, both of these tanks were equipped with an M-17 engine. The first was planned from 1935, the second was forced in 1941. In both cases (both 13-ton and 47-ton tanks) there was enough space “under the hood” to accommodate the engine and transmission. There is no doubt that such a solution could be implemented for a 32-ton vehicle, especially since the T-28 had a larger hull width. The only drawback is the transfer of the fan to the GF type BT, T-34 and KV. This arrangement of the fan worsened cooling.

The weight balance shows that adequate transformations of the armored hull and turret of the T-28, as well as minor changes in the mechanical equipment (borrowed from production vehicles) made it possible in 1943 to create a tank with performance characteristics at the level of the Panther. With a combat weight of 32.0 tons, the modernized T-28P would have equivalent protection identical to the Pz.VD tank, which had a combat weight of 43.0 tons. On the other hand, the armament of both tanks was not symmetrical. The German KwK-42 had greater armor penetration, the domestic ZiS-S53 had a greater high-explosive and fragmentation effect. Due to the high-explosive fragmentation advantage, the author gives preference to the Soviet gun. But his opinion does not (and would not) matter. There was no other tank gun (with acceptable muzzle energy) in the USSR.

The side projection area of ​​the T-28P (14.13 m²) was only slightly smaller than that of the Panther (14.33 m²). But in the frontal projection the advantage was very significant: T-28P - 5.24 m²; Pz.VD – 7.31 m². The early detection of the Panther on the battlefield was determined not only by the 40% excess of the frontal projection area, but also by the greater height of this tank: T-28P - 2.60 m; Pz.VD - 2.97 m.

For complete “transparency” of the situation with the T-28P (in the aspect “ modern approach» to the analysis of BTT), the author considers it necessary to clarify his position on some issues.

To one question, is the T-28P adequate to the Pz.VD tank in terms of performance characteristics, the answer is quite obvious - YES. Some differences in the power of weapons, chassis and dimensions are insignificant. But with equal characteristics, the utmost simplicity of the design of a domestic tank seems more important, i.e. high technology and low production costs.

To another question, is the T-28P adequate to the Panther in a “duel” confrontation, the answer is no less predictable - NO! The significant advantage in armor-piercing ability of the KwK-42 (especially with a sub-caliber projectile) and the notorious quality of the German fire control systems would not allow the T-28P to approach an enemy tank within striking distance with impunity. It should be recognized that the parity of protection between two tanks is violated by the higher fire efficiency of one of them. And the advantage in this aspect, alas, is not on the side of our T-28P.

To the third question, was there a need to create an “epic fighter” out of every domestic tank, the author unequivocally answers - NO! Whether “tank fights with tank” is a rhetorical question. The tank fights “everything that moves” and this is undeniable, but how often does it take on the role of a “breather”? In combined arms combat, different types of troops participate and interact. Therefore, for example, a Panther tank ambush with superior KwK-42s could cause significant damage to a tank unit armed with a T-28P in only one case. In case of poor intelligence and/or “inadequate” planning of the operation. By the way, even in this case, the life of the ambush is before its first shot... Inverting the situation, we can say with a fair degree of confidence that a T-28P ambush with “weak” ZiS-53S could, with no less probability, inflict a similar defeat on a tank column "Panther"...

A few words in defense of the anti-tank properties of the T-28P. Regardless of the “goal”, to modernize the “cardboard tram” to the level of “one of the best tanks of the Second World War”, a very remarkable conflict arose during the design. Allow me just a few phrases about the specifics of the T-28P reservation. The “concept” was based on the principle of simplifying the technology, which led to the choice of thin-sheet rolled products. In turn, this decision forced the main armor to be shielded and the shape of the hull and turret to be simplified. The straightness of the surfaces, as can be seen from the figures, significantly reduces labor costs in the production of the tank, but does not provide “optimization of armor differentiation.” As a result, it turned out that the VLD has an inclination of 18° to the horizon, and the equivalent of a 40 mm sheet is 132 mm, which is slightly greater than the armor penetration of the Pzgr 39/42 at a distance of 1.0 km. A similar situation occurs on the frontal cheekbones of the tower. In a frontal attack, the equivalent of the main armor and screen is 134 mm. This advantage is lost when the turret is rotated. Due to the rotation of the cheekbones relative to the longitudinal axis of the T-28P, at a heading angle of 30° the equivalent of 96 mm of armor. This is more than the thickness of the T-34/85 mantlet, but is completely insufficient to counter the KwK-42. However, in defense of the chosen turret geometry, it is said that at a heading angle of ±60° the equivalent of armor is more than 90 mm. Such security would allow the T-28P crew not to be afraid of Pz.IV tanks armed with KwK-40.

Theoretically, it is possible to create an “anti-tank” tank based on the T-28, capable of dealing with both Pz.VD/A/G and Pz.VIH/E without much damage. True, in this project little will remain from the original T-28. Firstly, to accommodate weapons (D-10T) a completely different turret structure (shoulder straps, in particular) will be required. Secondly, an increase in protection (equivalent to frontal armor and turret > 200 mm, sides ~ 100 mm) will lead to a significant increase in combat weight. Thirdly, improving tactical characteristics will inevitably require changes (at least strengthening) of the chassis and transmission.

According to preliminary estimates, the weight of this tank, let's call it T-28T, could be 37.0..38.0 tons, but the real T-54, having similar performance characteristics, weighed only 36.0! In other words, the “anti-tank star” T-28 could shine only until 1944.

...the traditional classical layout has exhausted itself...

3. CONCEPT OR PURPOSE

A concept, by definition, is a “set of views” of a subject. Moreover, it does not matter at all who represents this “subject” - an individual or a group. In both cases, being the bearer of a “concept,” the subject is unable to make a decision without obvious “subjectivism.” With this statement, the author in no way seeks to prove the ability of man (and humanity) to objectively assess the world. Any machine is created on the basis of technical specifications formulated by “subjects” operating it in real conditions. The developer, due to limited time, is only capable of mental modeling of these conditions. Which obviously excludes a lot of aspects from his presentation. Moreover, often not due to a natural desire to simplify the model, but due to banal ignorance of the realities of operation. From this point of view, the terms of reference, by definition (and not as is often the case...) are “more objective” than the model created “in the quiet of the office.”

Nothing different happens when developing BTT. Military “subjects”, based on the analysis of battles, formulate an “objective” technical specification (required performance characteristics), and “designer subjects” try to “trample” their existing components and mechanisms into the required combat vehicle (completely not intended for this). By the way, after the “subject-designer” wipes his brow, connecting the incompatible, he will have to put forward his “objective” task to the “subject-technologist”... Is it necessary to continue this chain of “subjective translation of an objective technical task”?

The three previous paragraphs, at first glance, have nothing to do with the “set star” T-28. This would be so if it did not reflect the author’s “concept” on design methods. Of course, this also applies to the T-28. The paradox of the situation is that the author, contrary to his own “concept,” himself recreates the events of the Second World War “in the quiet of his office.” Those. synthesizes an exclusively “subjective” and incomplete model. Alas, we can’t count on anything else. All modern historians are diametrically opposed in their assessment of that period of time (in classical geometry, only two points can be “diametrically opposed”, in “ historical science"Everything is not so simple).

The local problem is still much simpler. It is “only” necessary to synthesize a model of behavior of a relatively autonomous tank unit of the Red Army in the conditions of the Second World War in the Soviet theater of operations. And, on this basis, formulate technical specifications for the BTT that meets the assigned tasks. Well, then everything is simple - you need to design such an armored vehicle. The result of the “analysis” of the combat operations of the Second World War shows significant temporary changes in the requirements for armored vehicles. Without considering the exotic tanks (and tank countries) of that period, just look at the main aggressor. The most popular Blitzkrieg tank, the Pz.III, armed with a 37-mm puncher, became heavier by 20% by the end of its history (50% from the first series!) and was rearmed with a 50-mm puncher. However, in 1943, this tank irretrievably disappeared from the battlefield, having lived for only 8 years (5 of which were combat). But the German history of the “anti-tank” tank did not die there. The “Gloomy Genius” gave birth first to the simple “Panther”, and then to the “royal” one, called for some reason “Tiger B”. Despite the 2..3-fold weighting, in essence these tanks remained “duelists”. And it’s not even about their armor – it’s about their weapons. Both KwK-42 and KwK-43 ideally performed only one job - knocking out enemy tanks.

The fight against infantry, artillery and transportable anti-tank weapons became somewhat difficult for this tank. Without going into details of “patching Trish... assault caftan” with various self-propelled guns and assault guns (a very interesting topic), it’s worth taking a look at another Reich tank. On the "Tiger" Pz.VIH/E. The general layout and powerful all-round armor of this tank (note the modern domestic “Terminator”), combined with the 88-mm “aht-aht”, is a kind of cross between a “bulldog and a rhinoceros”. In essence, this tank was supposed to replace the Pz.IV in the role of a “breakthrough” defense. But... but military realities changed the “concept”! Instead of a 105-mm howitzer (of course, with 5..10 cumulative shells in the ammunition rack), the tank, perfectly protected from any enemy anti-tank weapons, was equipped with... an anti-aircraft gun. “Neither two, nor one and a half”... The Pz.VI became a “breakthrough anti-tank tank.” A completely meaningless combination.

The author did not consider it possible to discuss domestic technology. Too painful a topic. The author's opinion, let it remain so. It is a thankless task to evaluate the actions of ancestors. They did everything they could. Not true. They did more than they could! But forgetting history is even worse. In general, with such a preamble the author is trying to justify his clearly “far-fetched” (artificially synthesized) model of the development of Anglo-American (more precisely, on the contrary, American-English) tank building during the Second World War. One tank, the Sherman Firefly, and one armored personnel carrier, the Ram-Kangaroo, were selected from the English branch. In general, the development of American tank building before 1941 (or rather, its absence) was determined by the military budget, although some “wise men” argue that this is a sign of the idiocy of the American military and designers. The author remains with his “concept” - there were no tanks in the USA due to lack of need (i.e. there was no purpose for them there). But in 1941, “necessity” came to the “banks of the Potomac.” And “Uncle Sam” said his weighty word. First, “Grant/Lee” - “a mass grave for seven”, and a year later - “Sherman”, the basis of the tank forces of the USA. Not everyone supports the author's point of view, pointing to technical problems with this machine. Especially with the Multibank version (M4A4). Gentlemen, allow me! The author is talking only about the functional compliance of the tank with the intended purpose, and not about the technical quality of achieving the result. Otherwise, you will have to remember the KV with its transmission and the V-2k. It was also a wonderful idea... In general, in addition to the “multi-bank”, the Sherman family had other engines, including a diesel one! And the control of this tank was much more convenient than the T-34... But, perhaps, there are enough excuses, it’s time to move on to the essence of the main issue.

Without stopping at the Sherman chassis, it is worth paying more attention to design solutions designed to implement the technical specifications. And here the Sherman is all right. Moreover, the number of modifications and their specialization is simply amazing! The author does not know the “subject” who, in a distant office overseas, realized that “one tank in the field is not a warrior.” Or maybe it was an “objective” technical assignment from military “subjects”? In general, this doesn’t matter, because... as a result, the following appeared on the battlefield: M4, M4A1, M4A3, M4A4, M4A6. As eyewitnesses recall, all these types of Sherman were quite “average” medium tanks. But then... then suddenly (or not at all “suddenly”?) an M7 self-propelled gun (M3 base, “Grant”) appeared in the units, providing fire support with its 105-mm howitzer. But, alas, there was nothing for her to do in the attack, or rather, it was dangerous. And support was often needed immediately... M4(105) and M4A3(105) appeared. These vehicles could not only support their tanks with pood-sized “suitcases,” but also keep up with them when breaking through enemy defenses. The all-round armor and rotating turrets of these vehicles were no different from the base tanks.

Everything would be fine, but the Allies faced the Panthers and Tigers. From these meetings, the Yankees’ “breakthrough frenzy” quickly dried up. It was possible to get through the “cat” line of defense only after the B-29. And before the “carpet bombing,” the Wittmanns knocked out “Shermans” as if in a shooting gallery (the author is exaggerating, of course). This is where the English Firefly was needed to protect the “main tanks”. Not having powerful armor, but armed with a serious “hole punch” (17pdr.OQF), this tank had a real chance of defeating the German “heavy” tanks even before the arrival of the “flying fortresses”. By the way, for the same purpose, the Yankees installed a 90-mm anti-aircraft gun in the Slugger self-propelled anti-tank gun based on the same Sherman (even earlier, in 1942, the Wolverine appeared, but by 1944 its gun no longer corresponded to the German armor ).

The closer the Allies came to the Reich, the more stubborn the German defense became. True, the number of armored vehicles in the Wehrmacht was declining faster. The main opponents of the Allied tanks were German anti-tank guns and Hitler Youth students with Faustpatrons. The M4(105) successfully fought the anti-tank missiles, but their shooting at the grenade launchers only illustrated the phrase “from a cannon at sparrows.” The results were disappointing, i.e. the effect was negative. The fact is that the “sparrows” shot more often and faster. The Shermans caught fire again. The usual thickness of armor was no longer enough for them. But it was only at the beginning that the Americans lacked armor. And a little later it became quite enough. On the special “assault tank” M4A3E2 “Yumbo” the frontal armor was increased to 140 mm, the side armor to 76 mm, and the gun mantlet to 180 mm! This tank was not hit head-on by the Germans even at point-blank range! By the way, they kept the old 75 mm cannon so as not to waste a lot of gunpowder on a single target. The military-technical “subjects” did not forget about the infantry. True, not the Americans themselves, but their allies and neighbors. The Canadians, based on the damaged M7s, and later on the RAM tank, created the Kangaroo heavy armored personnel carrier. Of course, the “American military” did not miss the opportunity to use this allied development “for its own purposes.”

The author missed in his reasoning both the “Long Tom” with a 155 mm cannon and the M43 with a 203 mm howitzer. In general, everything is already quite obvious. The “American military” (and the designers, of course) tried to understand the situation of the Second World War and organize the armament of tank units with a “combat complex” on a single technical basis. What qualities this technical base had is another matter (a serious matter, by the way, related to the capabilities of the infrastructure of the warring state). More importantly, from the point of view of combat effectiveness, the interaction of “medium” and assault tanks, heavy (“medium”) armored personnel carriers, “fighter tanks” and fire support howitzers made it possible to react flexibly to almost any change in the combat situation. Of course, under the indispensable condition of precisely this configuration of tank units. Overseas “armchair strategists” demonstrated a good example of an adequate assessment of the real combat missions of armored vehicles during the Second World War. What to say? Well done... But is the priority of the American “combat complex” so obvious? Alas for the former allies in the anti-Hitler coalition, they were not the pioneers of the “unified technical base of the combat complex.”

4. COMBAT COMPLEX BK-28

Oddly enough, the pioneers of the “modern promising idea of ​​a single combat complex” were domestic military personnel and designers. By the way, our “subjects” not only “discovered”, but also embodied this idea in metal. Moreover, the very appearance of this “complex” took place back in 1935 (truly, “everything new is well forgotten old”).

Don’t be surprised, gentlemen, but everything was exactly like that - the base of the world’s first “combat complex” was indeed the domestic T-26 tank (adapted “Vickers 6t”) or, as it is now called, “a tin can with nuts.” However, it’s not worth repeating other people’s nonsense. It’s better to look at what our designers did in the distant 30s.

The combat “branch” of the BK-26 consisted of T-26 tanks, BMPT XT-130, AT-1 assault guns, TR-4 armored personnel carriers and SU-5-2 fire support self-propelled guns. The service units were equipped with T-26T tractors, TR-26 ammunition carriers, TR-26Ts tankers and ST-26 combat engineer tanks. The control subsystem included T-26R radio tanks, BSNP observation posts, and film and photo tanks. The obvious question of why the BK-26 did not appear in real battles remains open to this day. Of course, the technical aspect was not the reason for this. There was no task! Think for yourself, the most popular rear vehicle of the complex, the T-26T tractor, was produced in the amount of... 183 units, which amounted to less than 2% of the total production of the base T-26. True, the thickness of the BK-26 armor barely reached 20 mm...

As you know, “the generals are preparing for the last war,” but the Americans were able to quickly navigate the current one. The ideas of domestic specialists not only anticipated the Second World War, but they were also realized quite recently! Who knows what would have happened if the empire had treated its citizens even a little more humanely... By and large, the entire previous historical excursion was intended to confirm the fact that by the beginning of the Great Patriotic War there was nothing “supernova” in the creation of a “combat complex”. No brilliant “messenger from the future” was needed. The good will of a “successful government manager” was needed. And fewer execution sentences... And then, in 1940 or 1942, with inevitable inevitability, the tactics of the Second World War, the concept of the “combat complex” and the T-28 would have been combined into a single whole.

From 1933 to 1940, the T-28 tank went from a “long-range tank” to a “medium-range tank.” And he even fought successfully as a “reinforcement tank when breaking through heavily fortified defense lines.” By 1943, the T-28 could become “unified” and “main”. And in 1944 he was able to turn into an invulnerable “St. John’s wort”... And retire as a Victory tank! But the pinnacle of development of the T-28 was not a traditional “tank”, but a “combat complex”! As you know, the unshielded T-28 tank had a huge number of shortcomings. But “disadvantages are only a continuation of advantages.” True, not always literally and symmetrically.

1. Balanced suspension. Disadvantage: short stroke and low energy consumption. Advantage (not symmetrical): external installation.

2. Reserved space. Disadvantage: the largest volume of existing tanks (20 m³). Advantage: plenty of internal space for modernization.

3. Thin armor. Disadvantage: low level of security. Advantage (not symmetrical): high technology in manufacturing and cutting sheets, assembling hulls and turrets of combat vehicles.

4. The rectilinear shape of the armored boxes. Disadvantage: weakened protection. Advantage: ease of changing the BTT configuration.

5. Longitudinal arrangement of the power plant. Disadvantage: large volume of logistics. Advantage: Potential room for modernization.

Summing up the balance of “disadvantages/advantages” of the outdated T-28, it can be formulated as follows: “large unused volume, protected by thin armor.” The task before the designers would be: “how to use the T-28’s shortcomings on the battlefield with maximum efficiency?” In addition, the idea of ​​the BK-26 “combat complex” and the “Blitzkrieg” strategy (with its tactical breakthroughs and envelopments, separations and captures) were already known. Additionally, the disgusting army logistics “pressured” the designer. There were no four-wheel drive or half-track army vehicles in the country (or civilian ones either)! However, one might say that there were no roads either. As the author believes, with these initial data, the general designer of LKZ did not have to be a genius to propose to the Red Army to convert the “obsolete” T-28 into a tracked logistics transporter. Moreover, with minimal losses for the plant. Make yourself a platform on old slipways and even save on towers. The technology is already working well. And the head of the GABTU also did not need to have “seven spans in his forehead” to see the exorbitant cost of the “transport unit” created from a former tank. And the general of the Red Army could not shine with talents, so as not to be outraged by the transformation of, even an outdated tank, into a truck. And the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense for Armaments, even if he was “simple as a cucumber and unpretentious as a rake,” was able to discern a rational grain in these mutually exclusive proposals and objections - the tank had to turn into a universal platform. And the Deputy People's Commissar's assistant, an inquisitive young man “with a burning gaze,” could well remember archival material on the “BK-26 combat complex” and suggest this idea to the boss. And after the birth of the term “combat complex”, further discussion between the four main tank “generals” of the country could become quite constructive. If, of course, the interlocutors were enthusiasts and sought consensus for the benefit of the Motherland. Otherwise they are enemies of the people!

There are a majority of military personnel at such a meeting, so the first vehicle of the complex will be a tank... well, that is. not quite a tank... but a tank transporter... of personnel, i.e. infantry. But not an armored personnel carrier, but something like this, you know... a vehicle for infantry that can go on the attack without fear, i.e. it must be “combat”! ...So, it should be an “infantry fighting vehicle” BMP-28. But such an infantry fighting vehicle will weigh like a tank, and the suspension will quickly fail... then let it only be like a tank in battle, and lighter in the field... It doesn’t happen that way! Why not? And if you come up with removable screens for infantry fighting vehicles... Okay, screens are possible, but how will the infantry be parachuted? Under machine guns? No, you can't do that. And it won’t come out underneath. On the side, the suspension balancers are in the way. And behind the MTO...

Why is the MTO “at the back”? It’s so accepted... As it’s accepted, so it’s taken away! If you turn the tank over, you won’t have to seat the troops around the tower, like in a round dance... Who here is “not sure” that this is correct? What do you mean, “nobody did it”? And Taylor, who's a Whippet? What about the T-44 project? In short, we enter into the terms of reference: convert the “classic rear-engine” layout into an “advanced front-wheel drive”...

Such a meeting could have happened in 1940 or early 1942. Let there be a last date, yet until that time the T-28 tank (see Fig. 6: T28E, T-28N, T-28F) completely coped with its “dueling” » tasks. But at the end of 1942, with a high probability, a dilemma could arise - further modernization (to the T-28P) or decommissioning... The most complex design work for the “inversion” (or “conversion”?) of the T-28F is the organization of air flow of logistics and the development of a working driver's seat. In addition, it is necessary to rearrange the transverse shaft driven gear in the gearbox. All other aspects of the synthesis of the infantry fighting vehicle (BMP-28) do not go beyond the scope of conventional layout solutions without changing components and mechanisms. Sketches of intermediate operations are shown in Figure 15.

Particular attention was paid to changes to the hull and turret. The basis of the BMP body is pentagonal side sheets, cut along a single contour (right down to the suspension mounting holes). The remaining sheets are welded and/or attached to the sides (on the slipway) using fasteners (rivets or bolts with angles). The ideal connection is “tenon” or “rabbet”. However, in order to reduce labor costs, connection along orthogonal edges is possible. In this case, the cutting accuracy of armor plates (±5..10 mm) is not significant. The most important tactical and technical feature of the BK-28 combat system is the modular principle of its design. The completion (assembly) of each combat or transport vehicle on the “Basic Chassis-28” (BS-28) can be carried out by the unit’s repair services. The most complex process is the installation of the turret plate and turret with shoulder strap adjustment. All other work has no fundamental differences from ordinary field work. repair work for installation/dismantling of units and components of a “medium” (by weight) tank. Factory delivery must correspond to the organizational and staffing structure of the unit. During combat operations, standard repair and/or conversion (doubtfully) field kits (most likely, operable components of damaged vehicles) are the basis for promptly changing the configuration of a specific BK-28 component.

The modular principle is also used in the factory assembly of components (vehicles) of the combat complex (see Figure 16, top left). The production kit consists of power, transport and combat units, a turret, weapons and 4 suspension bogies. Before assembly, all these modules are completely independent and interchangeable. The main performance characteristics of the universal platform of the BK-28, BSh-28 combat complex: combat weight - 22.0 tons; crew – 2+(20) people. (evacuation capacity – 2+(40) people, “omnibus” type); load capacity – 10.0 t; dimensions – 7.80×3.00×1.80 m; size of the transport and combat compartment (“in the clear”) – 3.38 × 1.98 × 1.22 m; area – 6.7 m²; volume – 8.1 m³; loading height – 0.60 and 1.80 m; ramp – 1.05×0.95 m. As an additional kit, the Sh-28 can be equipped with a set of armored “kung” superstructure (side walls, roof, front sheet, folding tailgate): element thickness – 10 mm; weight – 1.2 t; The height in the body when installing the kit is 1970 mm.

The layout and placement of additional equipment of some combat and auxiliary vehicles (TRM-B - full plan, analogue of PM-5-6) are shown in Figure 17. In the same place, the company’s “hozo” vehicle. In the same place, long-distance communication center: RAF (US receiver) “car van radio station” SV/HF (845 units as of 06/22/1941): power - 600 watts; range – 250..750 kHz and 2.5..12.0 MHz; range – 300 km tlf / 500 km tlg; simplex-half duplex; DC generator – AL-6/2. Of course, the motorcycle is “parked” only in courier communication vehicles; in Figure 17 it is shown only for a comparative assessment of the size of the BK-28 transport and combat compartment.

The armor of all components of the BK-28 (see Figure 18) provides all-round protection against anti-tank weapons with a caliber of up to 20 mm (inclusive) at distances from 500 to 100 m depending on the heading angle). Vertical and inclined armor – 20 mm, lower frontal part – 30 mm. Roof and bottom – 15 mm. Suspension screens – 10 mm. The weight of the hull armor is 8.45 tons. The universal turret of all combat components of the BK-28 is based on the cylindrical part of the turret of the “old” T-28 tank with 20 mm armor. Roof – 15 mm. Strengthening the protection of the tower is ensured by installing a hexagonal casing made of armor plates 20 mm thick. Front frame – 2*30 mm. The bottom and roof of the casing are 10 mm. The weight of the turret armor is 2.80 tons. Reinforcement of the armor is carried out by hanging single screen modules (650x475x30 mm, weight 75 kg). Forehead – 12 pcs.; board – 28 pcs.; tower – 8 pcs.; feed – 4 pcs. Complete set – 52 pcs., weight – 3.9 tons.

The least protected combat component of the BK-28 is the BRDM (absent in the BK-26 and BK-M4). The reconnaissance and patrol vehicle is a BMP-28 without screens with a smaller crew (8 people). The BRDM is equipped with a “tank flotation device” – PST-28, consisting of two side pontoons. The unsealed outer frame of the pontoons is made of solid sheets of armor steel 2.5 mm thick. Folded in half and hung on side brackets, PST-28 pontoons provide an additional screen (~20 mm) in the upper half of the hull sides. The buoyancy of each pontoon is provided by 5 inflatable tanks made of impregnated oilcloth fabric. Displacement of two pontoons ~21.5 tons; weight - 2*0.75 tons. Total displacement of the BRDM ~38.0 tons. Combat weight - 30.0 tons. Buoyancy reserve ~8.0 tons (~20%). Movement on the water is carried out by rewinding tracks in tunnels between the sides and pontoons.

The “weighted average thickness of equivalent protection” of the BK-28 is presented in Figure 19. The equivalent armor of the frontal projection of the BMP-28 hull and turret (with shields) is ~105 mm. Side projection protection: turret ~70 mm, vehicle total ~50 mm. At a heading angle of ±30°, the equivalent of side armor reaches ~100 mm. In other words, for the period summer-autumn 1942, the BMP-28 was slightly inferior to the KV-1s in terms of protection.

To conclude the technical aspect of the “reconstruction”, it remains to illustrate the appearance and interior of the main combat component - the BMP-28.

As a matter of fact, the “rivet” side of the “consistent reconstruction” is completed. In principle, the author only proposed to swap the bow and stern of the basic T-28 (“turn over” the tank) and create a “combat complex” on this technical basis. All other technical solutions were implemented on this tank before 1940. And the “front-wheel drive layout with a front-mounted engine” was not too original. The only “contradiction” of the reconstruction is the discontinuation of the base tank in real history.